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THEIOTES :

OR,

AN ARGUMENT ON THE EXISTENCE,
PERFECTIONS, AND
PERSONAL DISTINCTIONS, OF THE DEITY;

INTENDED AS

AN ANTIDOTE TO ATHEISM, PANTHEISM,
UNITARIANISM, AND SABELLIANISM.

BY

WILLIAM COOKE.

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PREFACE.

WHEN the Author published his first volume of "Christian Theology," he intimated his intention of issuing a second volume on the same subject, expecting to comprise therein the several topics deemed necessary to complete his compendium of christian doctrine. In the character of the present volume, however, the Author has rather diverged from the course he had prescribed. This was as unexpected by himself as by his readers. While the second edition of the first volume was passing through the press, the Author entered upon the preparation of a Rational Argument for the Trinity, which he intended to incorporate in that volume, but, as the article expanded under his hand, he found its dimensions too large for insertion in a volume already extending to five hundred and fifty closely printed pages, and therefore determined to publish the article in a separate form.

The argument on the Trinity being based upon the necessary perfections of the Divine Being, it occurred to the writer that, to render it complete, and to impart to it the solidity and strength which the high importance of the subject required, it would be requisite to take in a wider area of argumentation, and lay his foundation in the first principles of Natural Theology.

This plan necessarily involved a demonstration of the existence and perfections of God, as the basis of an argument for the personal distinctions which subsist in the Divine nature.

In an age when the fundamental principles of religion are violently assailed, and the spirit of scepticism is extensively prevalent, it is a source of ineffable satisfaction to the christian philosopher to behold every new discovery in science augmenting and brightening the evidence of Divine truth—

archaiology, ethnology, geology, astronomy, chemistry, and general physics, contributing new facts in confirmation and illustration of revealed doctrines. Just in proportion as the archives of nature are explored and deciphered, they witness for God and his truth, and unequivocally declare that the volume of nature and of revelation have the same eternal, intelligent, benevolent, and holy Being for their Author. In establishing the first principles of christian Theism, the Author has availed himself of such scientific discoveries as the nature of the argument required, and the limited size of the work could admit ; and, should the process of argument he has been induced to pursue be found adapted to the existing state of society, and be productive of usefulness among the masses of our population, he will rejoice in the attainment of an object which has engaged his anxious solicitude.

While this volume was passing through the press, the Author met with the valuable work of Professor Anstead on Geology, which brings down the discoveries in this science to the verge of the present date. The most recent researches recorded by Anstead serve but to corroborate the facts of his predecessors, so far as they apply to our argument ; but some valuable investigations, in reference to fossils and remarkable foot prints on the new red stone, are given in a note at the end of this volume.

The present work is intended to be the Author's second volume on Theology, and he hopes to issue, should Providence permit, a third volume, which will comprehend his summary of christian doctrine.

As this work will fall into the hands of many not accustomed to scientific terms, a brief explanation is added for their use.

April, 1849.

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ERRATA.

PAGE.	LINE.	ERROR.	CORRECTION.
56	22	Catastrophies	Catastrophes
"	33	ibid.	ibid.
58	8	when their	where those
62	13	moluscas	mollusca
77	28	before	coeval with
160	39	desirable	durable
176	29	atheist	atheistic
276	23	curiously	cursorily

THEIOTES;

OR,

AN ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE, PERFECTIONS, AND PERSONAL DISTINCTIONS OF THE DEITY.

INTRODUCTION.

“The entrance of thy words giveth light.”—Psalm, cxix., 130.

WE propose to show that the great truths which revelation unfolds, respecting the existence, perfections, and personal distinctions of the Deity, are in harmony with right reason. Sense, reason, and revelation, are the *media* appointed by our Creator, to convey truth to the mind. While reason is an advance upon sense, revelation is an advance upon both. While sense makes us cognizant of objects in the external world, reason extends the sphere of our knowledge to abstract principles, and recondite truths of philosophy; but revelation vastly expands our mental horizon, by bringing into view the sublime doctrines of religion. What the telescope is to the eye, revelation is to the mind. It makes visible numerous objects which reason could not descry, and others but dimly seen before, are thereby rendered distinct and apparent.

But though revelation instructs reason, it does not contradict it; though unfolding many truths before unknown, it does not controvert those already known. Revelation must harmonize with our mental constitution, for God is the author of both, and has ordained both as vehicles of truth. The laws of light are not more in harmony with the organs of vision, than revelation is with our mental constitution. Whenever there appears opposition or discrepancy here, the collision is between revelation and ignorance, error, or

prejudice; not between revelation and right reason. Owen Feltham has justly observed: "I believe there is nothing in religion contrary to reason, if we knew it rightly;" and it may be yet further affirmed, that there is not a single proposition in religion, but to which, "*if we knew it rightly*," reason would utter an affirmative response. It was an axiom with Bossuet, that "every error is a truth abused;" but it is, we think, more correct to say, that every error in religion springs from an abuse of reason. There is certainly no discrepancy between the human judgement and the teachings of revelation, except when we draw conclusions without data, or from insufficient data; or substitute hypothesis for fact; or, in some way, allow our depraved nature to pervert the exercise of our reasoning faculties.

Yet, it is not the prerogative of reason to originate or discover the truths of religion, but to receive them—to assent and give her intelligent response to the instructions of divine revelation. Vast and magnificent is the region of revealed truth, but narrow is the domain which man can claim as his own discovery. When, however, the light of inspiration discloses a truth, the human mind can generally perceive its beauty, consistency, and harmony with other propositions, and the high probable evidence by which it is sustained. Bishop Warburton has observed: "Had not revelation discovered the true principles of religion, they had, without doubt, continued altogether unknown; yet, on their discovery, they appeared so consonant to human reason, that men were apt to mistake them for the production of it." This statement is verified by the conduct of many writers on what is called "the religion of nature." Already familiar with the great truths of revelation, they proceed to demonstrate their accordance with reason, and then, forgetting their divine origin, ascribe their discovery to rational induction. Yet, even this erroneous assumption yields homage to the general truths of religion; for it shows that they are in harmony with the decisions of the human mind, and that the intelligent christian can often give a reason for the faith, as well as the hope, that is in him.

Let it not, however, be understood that we claim for every revealed truth the same emphatic response and confirmation from reason. While the rational evidence of some, and indeed of most, religious truths, is so clear and strong, that those truths at once command our rational assent, there are others, respecting which, it must be admitted, our knowledge is so limited, and the data furnished by analogy are so remote, that reason is either altogether silent, or its testimony so faint, we are compelled to repose solely on divine authority. But silence is not opposition. If human reason cannot, in every case, furnish a demonstration, it never supplies a valid objection. Several doctrines are termed mysteries, but not one of these presents a collision with the dictates of sound reason, while some of them are susceptible of a rational confirmation.

For what is meant by the word mystery? and what is the kind of doctrines included under that designation? Does mystery mean that which contradicts our reason? certainly not. The word, as used in scripture, primarily means that which is hidden. Thus it is often applied to the introduction of the Gentiles to the privileges of the gospel, because this gracious dispensation was in a great degree veiled, or hidden, prior to the apostolic age. Ephesians, iii., 4-9. And although the word is also applied to the Godhead, the incarnation of our Lord, the resurrection of the dead, &c., it is not intended thereby to intimate that these sublime doctrines are repugnant to the dictates of right reason. Mysteries they are properly called, because they involve depths of wisdom, power, and love, which to men and angels must be for ever unfathomable. Yet as doctrines of divine revelation, they are explicitly asserted. As parts of the christian system, they furnish no discordant element in our theology. They are in perfect harmony with every other doctrine, and even necessary to the consistency and beauty of the whole; and as tested by the decisions of sound philosophy, they are not incompatible therewith.

The Godhead is our present theme; and though from its profundity and partial obscurity, it presents itself before us

as a sublime and awful mystery, we think it will be found no difficult task to show that the teachings of revelation on this subject, make no unreasonable demands upon our faith, and that even the doctrine of the Trinity itself is not as Dr. Channing has been pleased to insinuate, “an enormous tax upon human credulity;” but in perfect harmony with the principles of true philosophy and right reason.

Whether the proposition, *there is a God*, be or be not discoverable by reason, will hereafter be considered; but certainly when once propounded to the human mind, it is found so consonant to reason, that no truth is more readily admitted. The evidence sustaining it is so clear, bright, and convincing, that it cannot be resisted without doing violence to our faculties. This we hope fully to establish in the First Part of this work.

The declarations of scripture respecting the Divine nature and attributes, are sustained also by the voice of reason. Though the human mind, by the exercise of its powers, has never been able to ascertain the existence of any attribute or perfection in God, except such as are already asserted in the sacred scriptures; yet all those divine perfections which are set forth in the inspired records are so congruous to reason, that they command our assent. This truth we hope to establish in our Second Part.

But, as already intimated, we have a further task to perform: We believe that the great truth which revelation has disclosed, respecting *a plurality of persons in the Godhead*, is sustained by the testimony of reason. We are aware, indeed, that in this view we differ from the judgement of men whom we highly venerate for their erudition and piety. The general view of divines, in relation to this interesting doctrine, is, that it rests exclusively upon the divine testimony, and is incapable of receiving any evidence from reason—that there is, indeed, nothing within the range of human knowledge which can furnish any data on which to build a single argument apart from the direct and positive testimony of the scriptures. We are free to admit, there is no probability that the human mind, by the unaided

exercise of its powers, would have discovered this profound doctrine, at least in the present state of existence ; but that, when once revealed, it can receive no corroboration from the verdict of reason, is a point we cannot concede. We have the conviction, that reason furnishes a strong and decided testimony in favour of a plurality of persons in the Godhead—that in fact, the doctrine follows as a rational consequence from postulates and axioms admitted equally by the philosopher and the christian.

Let it not be supposed, however, that our attempt to sustain this doctrine by rational evidence, arises from any misgivings, as to the clearness and fulness of the scripture testimony. We believe the Trinity to be as clearly revealed as any doctrine peculiar to the christian system ; and we should hold ourselves under an indispensable obligation to receive it with full assurance of its truth, and gratitude for its discovery, even if the voice of reason were unable to utter a syllable of concurrent testimony in its favour. But there is surely no need to reject the service of reason in this sacred cause. Mr. Wesley says, “Let reason do all that reason can, employ it as far as it will go.”* It is not more religious to exercise *implicit* faith, than to seek for either rational demonstration, or rational probability, respecting any religious truth. It may safely be affirmed *à priori*, that there is *folly* in unbelief as well as sin—that if it is wicked to reject any revealed doctrine, it is irrational as well as wicked. If this irrationality can be shown, there is some service done to the cause of truth and religion. We hope to show that unitarianism and sabellianism are both absurd—that, if he who says there is no God, is a fool ; he that affirms there is no Trinity, is not wise—that both are sinning against the laws of mind, as well as against the laws of God. This task will occupy the Third Part of the work.

* Sermon, lxxv.

PART I.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

CHAPTER I.

GOD'S EXISTENCE NOT DISCOVERED BY MERE HUMAN REASON.

“The World by Wisdom knew not God.”—1 Cor., i., 21.

THE great and primary truth, that “*there is a God*,” has obtained among men almost universally, and in all ages; so that the Holy Scriptures which speak of God in every page, and which advert to the prevalent sentiments of mankind for the period of four thousand years, assume this truth as almost universally admitted. In the early ages of the world, indeed, there is no positive evidence that speculative atheism had any advocate; and if, at a subsequent period, ‘the fool said in his heart, there is no God,’ the sentiment appears more prominent in his affections than his judgement; and withal, had so feeble an influence over the minds of men, that the sacred writers never deemed it necessary to combat the error either by formal proofs of the existence of God, or by an appeal to miraculous operations. Polytheism, not atheism, was the prevailing sin; and therefore, the aim of inspired men was not so much to prove the existence of one God, as the non-existence of others—to maintain his authority, and enforce his laws, to the exclusion of all rival pretenders.

Yet, this general belief in the existence of a Supreme Being does not warrant the conclusion, that it resulted from rational investigation. There can be no doubt that the great truth was at first, divinely communicated. The earliest records of man, present him in a state of intercourse with his

Maker ; and the whole history of the bible, is a record of communications from God to man. Whether the human mind, if left to itself, is endued with native strength sufficient to originate the conception of a Deity, is another question ; and not so easy to determine, as at first sight would appear. Locke has said, that “ the visible marks of extraordinary wisdom and power, appear so plain in all the works of the creation, that a rational creature, who will but seriously reflect on them, cannot miss the discovery of a Deity.”* Such a discovery, however, is unsupported by fact, and the sentiment of this great man, may be disputed. Familiarized as we are, to the idea of a God, we are scarcely in a position to estimate the difficulties and hindrances, which lie between the human mind and the attainment of a conception so sublime. Philosophers, we know, even in heathen nations, have elaborated their professed demonstrations of its truth, but then, their original idea of a God had been previously derived from another source : and to demonstrate the truth of a proposition, when the terms and subject are already known, is a diminutive task, compared with that of originating the elementary conception. Some savage tribes are found entirely destitute of both the notion and the name of a Supreme Being;† so that the idea, though once possessed by their progenitors, has been lost in the process of mental deterioration. Nor is there a record of one instance, in which a nation having lost this great truth, has recovered it by rational inquiry. The doctrine when restored in such countries, has not been revived by the resuscitation of native intellect, but imported by missionary instruction, or by some other mode of contact with civilized man. If, then, the history of mankind reveals some melancholy instances, in which the human mind has entirely lost this truth, but furnishes no instance, in which it has regained it, the facts of the case are, presumptive evidence against the supposition that reason is adequate to the discovery of even this first principle in religion.

* Locke, c. iv., sec. 9.

† Robertson's *America*, Book iv. Moffatt, c. 17.

It is true the apostle Paul speaks of the ‘Creator’s eternal power and godhead, being evinced by the things that are made ;’ but it is quite clear from the context, he is not inveighing against atheists, nor against men who had no knowledge of God, but against idolaters—against men who did ‘not like to retain God in their knowledge,’ ‘who held the truth in unrighteousness,’—who had corrupted the truth originally imparted, and sunk into the degradation of worshipping the work of their own hands. Consequently his design was not to teach the competency of reason to elicit the discovery of God’s existence from the visible universe, but to show that this great truth, being previously communicated to man, was so abundantly attested and confirmed “by the things that are made,” and the divine character so fully illustrated by his works, that the drivelling sentiments and polluting rites of heathenism were left totally without excuse. Rom., i., 18-23.

God made himself known to man at first by direct communication, and nature mirrors the great truth which revelation has given ; and reason, rightly exercised, utters her emphatic response to the heavenly oracle ; but this response is, in our view, the limited prerogative of human reason on this subject. Instinctive as is the tendency of the human mind to refer every effect to a cause, and adequate as man is to urge a successful course along this line of inquiry up to a certain limit, yet the conception of one spiritual, unlimited, and all-perfect being, as the First Cause and Creator of all things, is an idea too refined and sublime for the discovery of man. Apart from revelation, indeed, we know not from what sources of human knowledge the idea of such a Being could be derived ; and, unless the notion of his existence were derived from some source, it could never be an object of thought and contemplation, and, consequently, neither be affirmed nor denied. This case is pertinently put in the judicious remarks of Hare : “Suppose a person whose powers of argument are improved to the utmost pitch of human capacity, but who has received no idea of God by any revelation, whether from tradition, scripture, or

inspiration; how is he to convince himself that God is, and from whence is he to learn what God is? That of which he, as yet, knows nothing, cannot be a subject of his thought, his reasonings, or his conversation. He can neither affirm nor deny, till he knows what is to be affirmed or denied. From whence, then, is our philosopher to divine, in the first instance, his idea of the infinite Being, concerning the reality of whose existence, he is, in the second place, to decide?"

If to a number of men totally destitute of the idea of a God, but intelligent in other respects, the existence and natural attributes of Deity were proclaimed, and an appeal made to the works of creation for proofs of the truth thus announced, we believe it impossible for them to exercise their reason rightly upon the subject, without arriving at a conviction in the affirmative. But without the suggestion of the subject from some quarter, it would be impossible for them to attain any idea of a First Cause at all worthy of God. For, supposing it possible that some philosopher, pursuing his inquiries into nature, guided by the principle that every effect must have a cause, should hit upon the sublime conjecture, that all nature was itself the effect of some great cause or causes, he is still at an immense distance from the conception of the Deity. The lofty idea, as yet, is only a conjecture; and where, it may be asked, shall he get the demonstration? Then comes the question, Does nature owe its origin to one or several causes? How is he to solve this inquiry? In the universe he sees physical evil as well as good, and he asks, Have these one and the same originator? In nature he recognizes a variety of causes in visible operation, and hence he asks, Is the invisible origin one, several, or many? What shall enable our philosopher to solve these inquiries? Again, suppose our philosopher to conceive the universe the work of one Being, he is further pressed by the inquiry, Is this originator of the visible universe himself unoriginated and uncaused, or is he originated by another, anterior to himself? Again, Does this being act necessarily, or freely and intelligently? Is he material or immaterial?—if, indeed, the idea of imma-

teriality could be conceived by a man in such circumstances. It is quite evident these are inquiries our philosopher is incompetent to answer ; and it is equally clear, that without an answer to these and a multitude of other inquiries, there would for ever remain an impassable gulf between the boundaries of philosophy and the first rudiments of religious truth—the existence and perfections of God. When the facts before us are duly considered, and when it is remembered that the most enlightened philosophers in the heathen world, though possessing from tradition the notion of a God, held the eternity of matter, and deemed its creation absolutely impossible ; and, that in the prevalent systems of Pagan theology, the mere construction of the universe out of pre-existent elements, was ascribed to inferior deities ; and when, moreover, it is remembered that even the wisest men in the christian world, with their conceptions refined, and their powers of thinking invigorated by the quickening beams of revelation, have never been able to prove the existence of a single attribute of the Divine Being, beyond what are plainly asserted in the bible ; (though probably there are many other attributes :)—I say, when we put these facts together, we are forced to the conclusion, that, as the world, by wisdom, never has discovered God, so it never would have discovered him—that the sublime conception of one God, an eternal, independent, all wise, all powerful, and absolutely perfect Being, the creator and governor of all things, could never have been realized by man without a revelation from heaven.

CHAPTER II.

MODE OF CONDUCTING THE ARGUMENT :—DR. S. CLARKE'S
REASONING EXAMINED :—FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES STATED.

“For every house is builded by some man, but he that built all things is God.”—Hebrews, iii., 4.

THE admission previously made as to the incompetency of reason to originate the conception of the Deity, does not detract from the clearness and force of the evidence which creation affords to the mind of this great truth, when once propounded by revelation. The Newtonian system of the universe was an unresolved, and apparently an unresolvable problem for near six thousand years. The loftiest minds had sought in vain for a solution of this profound problem, until Newton appeared; but now that system is unfolded, its facts are so obvious, its laws so simple, and its demonstration so complete, that the most ordinary minds may understand it, and the most incredulous are forced to admit its truth. Had the philosophy of the universe been *revealed from heaven*, thousands of years ago, it would at the same time have been susceptible of a mathematical demonstration. The existence of the Deity stands in a case similar to the one supposed. The great truth, though not discovered by man, has been revealed from heaven, and nature supplies her corroborative testimony—furnishes a demonstration so clear, decisive, and convincing, that no man can resist it without a direct and violent perversion of his own powers.

In proving the existence of God, two modes of argument have been employed: one, technically called the *à priori*; and the other, *à posteriori*. The *à priori* literally means an argument taken *from that which is before*, and designates those arguments which are constructed by reasoning from cause to effect, from an antecedent to a consequent, from a principle to a corollary. As, when astronomers, from the laws and motions of the solar system, determine the return

of a comet, or the exact time when there will be an eclipse ; or, when geologists determine by the principles of comparative anatomy, the form, size, proportions, and character, of the creature to which a fossil fragment belonged : in such cases, the reasoning is *à priori*. On the other hand, an argument *à posteriori*, is reasoning conducted from an effect to a cause, from a consequent to an antecedent. As, when, from the mechanism of a watch, or some exquisite work of art, we infer the skill and genius of its author. But no example more clearly and forcibly illustrates this latter kind of reasoning, than the compendious statement of Paul : “ Every house is builded by some man, but he that built all things is God.” As the house proves a builder, the universe proves a God.

It will at once be seen, that the latter kind of reasoning is conclusive and satisfactory ; but the former, as an argument for the existence of God, is totally inapplicable. However appropriate and useful in proving some of the *attributes* of Jehovah, it is altogether out of place when used to prove his *existence*. The reason of this is obvious : the argument *à priori*, necessarily requires an antecedent to prove a consequent ; but, as God is the First cause of all things, he can have no antecedent, and therefore his existence admits of no proof of this kind ; yet, as this mode of argument has been employed by men of acute and powerful minds, it may not be out of place to give it some consideration, ere we pass to that tangible and common sense line of argument, which, as it may be understood by all, is calculated to convince and satisfy all reasonable men. Dr. Samuel Clarke is admitted to be the most able advocate and expounder of the *à priori* argument, and, as his work on “ the being and attributes of God,” is the most generally known, we shall analyze his reasoning on this subject.

It is proper, however, to observe, that the appellation *à priori*, is by no means applicable to the *entire* argument even of Dr. Clarke. *Metaphysical* it may be called, for the most part, but the title of *à priori*, is unquestionably a misnomer as to the greater portion of his reasoning ; for it is mainly based

upon posterior facts, as we shall shortly show; and such indeed, must be the reasoning of all men, on this subject, whatever may be the title ascribed to it. The doctor's argument is grounded upon three general propositions.

The First proposition affirms, "*That it is absolutely and undeniably certain, that something has existed from eternity.*" Granted: but this proposition the Doctor proves by an *à posteriori* argument, founded upon the fact of our own actual existence, and that of the universe around us.

The Second proposition affirms, that "*this something which has existed from eternity, must be an unchangeable and independent Being;*" and, therefore, distinct from the universe itself, which, in all its parts, is changeable and dependant. This proposition, also, he establishes by an *à posteriori* argument.

In the Third proposition, our author affirms, that "*this unchangeable and independent Being, which has existed from eternity without any external cause of its existence, must be self-existing, that is, necessarily existing.*" In support of this proposition, he argues in the first instance:—"Whatever exists, must either have come into being out of nothing, absolutely without cause, or it must have been produced by some external cause, or it must be self-existent. Now, to arise out of nothing, absolutely without any cause, has been already shown to be a plain contradiction. To have been produced by some external cause, cannot possibly be true of everything; but something must have existed eternally and independently, as has been shown already. It remains, therefore, that that Being which has existed from eternity, must of necessity be self-existent." So far, conclusive and satisfactory, but still it will be seen that the reasoning rests upon an *à posteriori* foundation—it is still an argument from effect to cause.

From this point, however, the doctor diverges, and enters upon debatable ground: here he introduces his *à priori* argument, so called, and his reasoning becomes confused and unsatisfactory. An application is made of the term "*necessity*," as the ground of God's existence, which is inadmis-

sible, and an attempt is made to sustain it by an argument, based upon metaphysical subtleties respecting space and eternity, which we regard as untenable and unsound. But we give the doctor's own words. "Now, to be self-existent is not to be produced by itself, for that is an express contradiction." Very true. But he adds, "it is, (which is the only idea we can frame of self existence; and without which, the word seems to have no signification at all;) it is, I say, to exist by an absolute necessity, originally in the nature of the thing itself. And this necessity must be antecedent; not, indeed, in time, to the existence of the Being itself, because that is eternal; but it must be antecedent, in the natural order of our ideas, to our supposition of its Being; that is, this necessity must not barely be consequent upon our supposition of the existence of such a Being; (for, then it would not be a necessity, absolutely such in itself, nor be the ground or foundation of the existence of any thing, being on the contrary, only a consequent of it;) but, it must antecedently force itself upon us, whether we will or no, even when we are endeavouring to suppose that no such Being exists. For example: when we are endeavouring to suppose, that there is no Being in the universe that exists necessarily, we always find in our minds, (besides the foregoing demonstration of something being self-existent, from the impossibility of every thing's being dependant;) we always find in our minds, I say, some *ideas as of infinity and eternity*; which to remove, that is, to suppose that there is no being, no substance in the universe, to which these *attributes, or modes of existence, are necessarily inherent*, is a contradiction in the very terms. *For modes and attributes* exist only by the existence of the substance to which they belong. Now, he that can suppose eternity and immensity, (and, consequently, the substance by whose existence these modes or attributes exist,) removed out of the universe, may, if he please, as easily remove the relation of equality between twice two, and four."

Such is Doctor Clarke's general statement of the *à priori* argument, expanded and elaborated in the subsequent pages of his work. The high respect we cherish for his

talents, and the object for which they were employed, render it an irksome task to take exceptions to his arguments ; but the paramount claims of truth render it desirable that the fundamental doctrine of religion should be based only on sound principles of reasoning ; and, therefore, we deem it incumbent upon us to point out what we conceive to be untenable in the argument adduced.

In the paragraph we have quoted from Dr. Clarke, the term "*necessity*" is employed in a sense which we deem objectionable, and the general argument we consider fallacious. The grounds of our objection to both may be briefly stated. The Doctor speaks of an 'absolute necessity in the nature of God' as 'the ground or foundation of his existence.' To represent an "absolute necessity" as the "*ground or foundation*" of God's existence, is, in our view, to use words without meaning ; or if such words have any meaning, they are inapplicable and improper. We can form no conception either of a necessity, or anything else, as the *ground or foundation* of an existence that is underived, unoriginated, independent, and eternal. There can be no necessity—physical or absolute—which could operate upon God to modify his existence, much less be its foundation. In speaking of God as *self-existent*, we keep within the bounds of Scripture and reason, but when we seek for any physical or absolute necessity in the Divine nature, as the foundation of that existence, we involve ourselves in absurdity.

We admit, indeed, that the existence of God is necessary, in opposition to contingent existence, but this is widely different from supposing a necessity as the *foundation* of his existence. The self-existence and independence of God are the foundation or ground of that necessity, and not that necessity the ground or foundation of his existence. It is because we admit his unoriginated self-existence, that we admit his necessary existence. Existence is essential to God because he is self-existent ; self-existence and contingent existence are contradictory.

It is a further exception to the argument of our author,

that it is involved in obscurity by a strange confusion of ideas. Throughout the paragraph quoted, and in others on that argument, the reader will find that a *physical* is confounded with an *intellectual* or *logical* “necessity.” In the same sentence, a “necessity,” which is described as existing in the Divine nature, is spoken of as forcing itself upon our minds, and taking its place among our established truths, or self-evident propositions. It is granted the subject is abstruse, and a difficulty is often felt from the poverty and ambiguity of language, but the distinction between a physical and an intellectual necessity—between a principle in the Divine nature, and a mental perception—is so obvious and apparent, that it seems strange to confound them in laying down the basis of an argument; and, in this instance, the *lapsus animi* of our author has thrown not a little obscurity and confusion over his performance.

We have, however, graver objections than those stated. We regard the entire argument as illogical in construction, and fallacious in principle. In reviewing the paragraph quoted above, from our author, we would direct special attention to the words we have marked as emphatic. The necessary existence of Deity is argued from infinite space and duration.* “We find in our minds” says Dr. Clarke, “some ideas of infinity and eternity,” or of infinite space and infinite duration; and then, assuming that these are attributes, he argues, that these “attributes” necessarily involve the existence of a substance in which they inhere, or to which they belong; and from this proceeds to show, that, as we cannot dismiss from the mind an idea of these attributes (eternity and immensity), we cannot dismiss the idea of the substance itself to which they belong; and, therefore, the idea of God, or of an infinite and eternal Being, forces

* A similar view is expressed by Newton, of which the following is a translation:—“God is not eternity and infinity, but is eternal and infinite. He is not duration or space, but by existing through all duration and space, he constitutes eternity and infinity.” It was probably from this scholium that our author derived the principal elements of his *à priori* argument.

itself upon the mind as a necessary truth. This is the substance of the *à priori* argument; and were it as easily proved as stated, the controversy with atheists would be in a narrow compass indeed.

But the argument is both illogically constructed and fallacious in its foundation. It is built upon a mere assumption. The great principle on which all depends is taken for granted, instead of being proved; and, unfortunately, is very capable of being disproved. The Doctor first speaks of our having "*ideas of infinity and eternity*," and before the sentence is finished, these "*ideas*" are magnified into "*attributes!*" Who does not see that the argument is worthless, unless it were proved that our conceptions of eternity and immensity (or infinite space) do necessarily imply that these are attributes? Till that is done, the argument is without foundation. A careful examination of our ideas of eternity, and infinite space, will make it manifest, that, abstractedly considered, they are not the ideas of either attributes or modes, and do not necessarily imply the existence of either. For what is our idea of eternity but an idea of duration unlimited, or of time indefinitely extended—extended backward into the past, and forward into the future? It is an idea of duration without beginning and without end, and differs from the idea of a moment, or a year, only by indefinite enlargement; and a thing does not part with its essence by enlargement. We get the notion of time by observing the succession of ideas in our minds;* and we get the idea of *defined* and *measured* portions of time by the regular and stated motions of bodies; and having once got the idea of time, and of definite portions thereof, we can conceive of it either in short periods, or in long periods, or as being *unlimited*; and this last idea of time is our notion of eternity. Now it is evident we can

* We take the word, *idea*, in the large and general sense in which it is used by Locke. Reid and Brown refer our notion of duration to the faculty of memory. It is certainly by the power of memory that we have any conception of succession, and therefore there is no substantial difference between these authors in this respect.

conceive of different limited portions of time, from an hour to a thousand ages, without supposing those periods to be the measure of any object actually existing. We can arbitrarily conceive of them as pure mental abstractions, just as we can of arithmetical numbers, or mathematical problems ; and if we can thus conceive of *limited* portions of time as pure mental abstractions, so we can of unlimited duration. The conception of eternity, therefore, does *not* necessarily imply that eternity is an attribute of any substance whatever ; and if not, the Doctor's argument is fallacious.

The Doctor's assumption respecting "*immensity*," or unlimited space, is equally untenable. But what is space ? Some writers have contended that it is God himself, and Dr. Clarke contends that it is an attribute of God. Others have adopted the same theory. We contend, however, that it is neither a substance nor an attribute, but mere *nihil*ity, or, what is the same thing, mere capacity for being. How do we get the idea of space ? Is it not from sight and touch ? We observe, or feel, that bodies are apart from each other, and perceiving nothing between them, we call that nothing space. Thus, the idea we receive is that of simple negation. Whether or not there may be some invisible and intangible substance between the bodies is quite another consideration, and has no essential connection with our idea of space itself. Our idea of space being a mere negation, or absence of something, is not an idea of either substance or attribute ; and if such be our idea of space when we contemplate it in any defined or limited portions, it is essentially the same when considered as unlimited and boundless. Our idea of its nature is not altered by changing its dimensions. Whether we consider it finite or infinite, it is still a mere negation. It is no more an attribute of something really existing, than silence is an attribute of sound, or darkness an attribute of light, or absence an attribute of something present, or Aristotle's "privation" a principle of existence.*

* Nor can any exception be taken to our argument, on the ground that we do not distinguish between "space real," and "space ideal." For we know of no difference. We contend that our ideas are in strict

It is true, that as language was formed to speak of *something*, rather than of *nothing*, we are compelled, even when speaking of “nothing”—of that which has no being—to employ *positive* terms ; and thus a mere negation becomes nominally invested with attributes of a real existence. Hence, we speak of the *existence* of space, of space having various dimensions, as a foot, a yard, a mile, or the extent of the solar system, &c. ; but, herein, we mean merely just so much distance or emptiness as may correspond with those dimensions. We acknowledge an impropriety (philosophically considered) in this application of positive terms to a mere negation ; but the language is well understood by the common people, unsophisticated by metaphysical subtleties, though it has bewildered philosophers, and led to the adoption of such crude theories and speculations, as have caused metaphysics to be despised. Bacon has well observed respecting the use of words, that “ although we think we govern them, yet, certain it is, that, as a Tartar’s bow, they shoot back upon the understanding, and mightily pervert the judgement.” Thus, our ideas are often created, and oftener influenced, by the use of words.

Deluded by the misapplication of positive terms to a mere nihility, metaphysicians have at length reasoned as if those *terms* were the representatives of positive *ideas*, and finally have invested pure space, or mere nothing, with the Divine attributes of eternity, omnipresence, and necessary existence : indeed, by some it has been seriously argued, that space is no other than the Deity himself. One would think that such an extravagant perversion would have broken the reverie of philosophers, and brought them back to the regions of common sense. Yet, we may easily see how the equivocal and ambiguous meaning of terms may have originated even this erroneous conception ; it is only the common fallacy of mistaking words for things, and nominal resemblances for substantive realities. They argue that space

accordance with the reality in this case. Besides, as Dr. Clarke’s *a priori* argument is based on “ certain ideas in our minds,” so our objection is based upon the ideas we have of space, &c.

must be eternal, because we cannot conceive of its having either beginning or end ; but the same may, and with equal propriety, be predicated of *nihility*, for that which has no existence can have no beginning, and, therefore, can have no end. They argue that space must be infinite in extension, because we cannot conceive of its having bounds ; but the same may be affirmed of *nihility*, for that which has no existence cannot be bounded. They argue that the existence of space must be necessary, for we cannot even conceive of its destruction ; but, by the same licence, it may be affirmed that *nihility* has necessary existence, because it cannot be destroyed ; we cannot make mere nothing less than nothing ; that which is *nihil* already, cannot be *annihilated*.* It is evident that whatever may be predicated of space may, by the same licence of language, be predicated of mere nihility, and they are thus proved to be identical. The application of positive terms to space, or nihility, is a mere licence of language ; but all the positive terms which men can heap upon space cannot convert nothing into something ; and all the imaginary attributes with which they invest it melt away in the crucible of common sense, and leave it just what it is—mere nothing. Death is merely the absence or privation of life, yet the poets have personified Death, and called him the king of terrors ; and it would be just as philosophical to conceive of this poetic fiction as a real person, as it is to conceive of space as either substance, attribute, or mode. It is just nothing.

We see, then, how futile must be any argument, built upon such mental abstractions, to establish the great and fundamental truth of religion—the existence of God. We have shown, that neither the idea of eternity nor space necessarily implies the existence of an eternal and infinite subsistence, and, therefore, this argument of Dr. Clarke must be pronounced untenable. The same may be affirmed

* We are aware that it may be alleged that the existence of the material universe precludes the absolute infinity of space, but, however much this may militate against the notion of our opponents, it makes nothing against our view, as to space and mere nihility being identical.

respecting the abstract idea of an absolutely perfect being, adduced by Cartesius and other metaphysical writers, as a proof that such a Being *must* exist. Even the idea of such a Being must, we are satisfied, have been derived originally from revelation : but whether thus derived, or not, the bare fact that we have such a conception in our minds, is of itself no more a proof of the actual existence of such a Being, than that every abstract problem in Euclid is necessarily a representative or type of something actually existing in the material universe, or than the arbitrary creations of a poet's imagination are necessarily types of things actually existing. We grant that the conception of an absolutely perfect Being, as it involves in it no contradiction, implies the *possibility* of his existence, but affords not the shadow of a proof of his *actual* existence. Those who wish to pursue this subject further may consult Law's Enquiry ; Watt's Enquiry concerning Space ; Jackson, on Space, &c. ; Gretton's Review of the Argument *à priori* ; Dr. Chalmers on Natural Theology, Vol. I. ; and Watson's Institutes.

We now proceed to the argument *à posteriori*. Here we feel that we tread on solid ground, on a rock of adamant. Here we deal with facts which are obvious, and arguments which can be easily comprehended, and which must carry conviction to every mind where candour, integrity, and a love of truth, have their abode. The proposition to be established is, that—*there is a God*—a conscious intelligent Being, who is the creator and upholder of all things. To enable the reader more clearly to apprehend the general scope and tenor of the argument, it may be advisable to state the fundamental principles on which it will be sustained. Those principles are the following :—

- I.—Every effect must have a cause, and the cause must be adequate to the effect.
- II.—There must be something which is not an effect, but unoriginated and eternal.
- III.—The universe is an effect, and therefore is not the unoriginated and eternal Being in question.

IV.—The universe, as an effect, must have a cause, and the unoriginated Being must be its cause.

V.—This cause must be a conscious intelligent Being, because the effect is the product of intelligence and design.

The corollary of this argument is the proposition we have stated: There is a God—a conscious intelligent Being—the Creator and upholder of all things.

CHAPTER III.

FIRST PROPOSITION :—EVERY EFFECT MUST HAVE A CAUSE,
AND THE CAUSE MUST BE ADEQUATE TO THE EFFECT.

THIS fundamental truth is one of those self-evident axioms which no reasoning can make more obvious, and so firmly grounded in our nature, that no sophistry can subvert it. It is verified by consciousness and observation, and by every way in which truth can be recognized by the mind. We know, from consciousness, that we have power to produce numberless effects which could not take place without our agency; and the power which consciousness attests as existing in ourselves, our observation and experience witness as existing in others. In fact, the languages and the reasoning of all nations evince, that this consciousness of personal agency is natural to man, and is the foundation of morals and responsibility. The man who denies his own agency, denies the evidence of his own consciousness, and might as well deny his own existence; every action he performs convicts him of insanity or hypocrisy. We see other causes in operation around us in the material universe. It is true, the relation between cause and effect in the operations of inanimate nature, is different in its kind from that of human agency, but not in its uniformity and certainty. For the connection between the falling of a stone, as the effect of gravitation, is not less certain and real than the connection between a volition of the mind and a corresponding action of the body. All philosophy is built upon this certainty. What, indeed, is philosophy, but an inquiry into the laws of nature? and what are those laws, but rules or principles according to which the diversified phenomena, or effects, are produced by their respective causes? The dependance

of effects upon their cause, therefore, lies at the very foundation of all philosophy. Without this axiom there could be no inquiry prosecuted, no law demonstrated, no principle evolved. Nature would be contemplated as a chaos. The physical dependance of effects upon their causes, is admitted an axiomatic principle, which irresistibly forces itself upon every mind. It is an intellectual necessity, which is alike felt by the savage and the sage.

It may be further affirmed, that our confidence in the connection between cause and effect is an instinct of our nature. While we reject the doctrine of innate ideas, we admit the existence of innate tendencies and impressions, and our confidence in the constancy and uniformity of nature arises from an instinctive tendency or impression. It appears in the earliest developments of our mental constitution, before reasoning or experience has had time to originate the impression. Dr. Chalmers has well observed, "In a newly formed mind, there is no idea of nature, or of a single object in nature—yet, no sooner is an object presented, or is an event observed to happen, than there is elicited the tendency of the mind to presume on the constancy of nature. At least as far back as our observation extends, this law of the mind is in full operation. Let an infant, for the first time in his life, strike on the table with a spoon, and, pleased with the noise, it will repeat that stroke with every appearance of a confident anticipation that the noise will be repeated also." *Natural Theology, Vol. I.*

It is certain that, in the mind of the infant, the noise is connected with the stroke on the table, and the stroke with its own agency. There is here some undefinable recognition of the connection between the effect and the cause, obviously accompanied with an unhesitating confidence in the uniformity and constancy of nature; and as these impressions of the infant mind cannot be the result of reason or experience (for they are felt anterior to both), they must be referred to an instinct of our nature. This original impression continues with us through life. This recognition of the connection between cause and effect never leaves us.

It is as natural for us to believe that every effect must have a cause, as it is to confide in the certainty of our own existence ; and all the operations of nature are in harmony with this principle, and demonstrate that it has not been implanted in our nature in vain. This harmony between the instinct of our mental constitution, and the operations of nature, does of itself present a powerful argument for a designing and an intelligent Creator, but it would be out of place to pursue this argument at present. Our object, now, is merely to show that the connection between cause and effect, whether it be considered in relation to our own actions, or the operations of nature, is a principle so thoroughly grounded in our mental constitution that it cannot be resisted. It is not possible even to imagine an effect without a cause ; the mind instantly resists every attempt to entertain such a conception, because it is contradictory to an intuitive principle.

The sophism of David Hume, who endeavours to resolve the connection between cause and effect into the mere relation of succession, is a quibble, worthy only of himself and his abettors. For this succession is either founded in nature as a physical necessity, or it is not.* If it is, then the dependance of effects upon their causes is admitted. If it is not, then we demand, How is it that this succession is invariable and universal ? How is it, that what are called effects, do not take place without any causes ? If this succession were merely accidental, it would be just as proper to say that light is the cause of darkness, or darkness the cause of light ; for they succeed each other daily : it would be as proper to say that silence is the cause of sound, or sound the cause of silence, (for these succeed one another,) as it would be to say fire was the cause of heat ! Again, if this succession were accidental, the order of it might, and indeed

* When we speak of essential or necessary connection between cause and effect, we mean merely that connection which the Deity himself has established in the system of nature, and not as excluding from Him the power of establishing a different class of causes, had he thought proper.

would, be often interrupted, or inverted. We ask, then, How is it, that the events called effects, do not promiscuously change places with those agencies called causes? Why do not effects as often precede their causes as causes precede their effects? How is it that the succession universally flows one way—from cause to effect? I suppose when the infidel philosopher wrote his preposterous sentiments he used a pen; but if his theory be correct, why may we not as justly suppose, that the goose quill used the philosopher, as that the philosopher used the goose quill?

But we confront this philosopher with himself. We may silence and condemn him out of his own mouth. It is hard for those who contend against the truth to preserve their consistency, and of this our infidel philosopher is an example. When arguing against the being of God, he denies the necessary dependance of effects upon their causes; but, in another place, when arguing against christianity, he denies the credibility of miracles, because, as he alleges, they are contrary to our experience of “*the constancy of nature.*” But if there be no necessary dependance of effects upon their causes, there can be no necessary constancy in the operations of nature. If the succession of effects be purely accidental, it is quite in character for effects, such as miracles, to take place without physical causes. His arguments thus destroy each other, and his inconsistency utters no compliment upon his sincerity. His argument against miracles, however, has this value; it proves that he had no confidence in his argument against the Being of God; it proves that his argument was merely a subtle sophism, fabricated with a design to obscure and perplex a plain but unwelcome truth; and it proves that Hume, like all other men, believed in the necessary physical dependance of every effect upon its cause; or, in other words, that there can be no effect without a cause.

Every infidel, in objecting to the miracles of christianity, bases his objections upon a principle which necessarily admits the connection between cause and effect. For what is a miracle, but an effect apparently *without* an adequate cause?

And why does the infidel deny the truth of a miracle but because it is an event without an adequate cause? And why does he object on this ground, but because he confides in the constancy of nature? But what is the constancy of nature, except the essential relation between cause and effect? And why does he so tenaciously believe in that constancy, but because he believes that relation to be real and essential, not fortuitous and accidental; or, in other words, because he believes there can be no effect without a cause. Thus his infidelity presents its own antidote, and does homage to the common sense of mankind, and the fundamental truths of religion.

Since every effect must have a cause, it necessarily follows, that the cause must be *adequate* to the effect. The preceding postulate being admitted, this will not be disputed. While we are conscious ourselves of a power to produce many effects, we are conscious, also, of inability to produce many others. We feel that our powers are limited. We can modify and transform the rude materials of nature, made ready to our hand; we can change them into forms of elegance and usefulness; but we cannot *create* a single particle of dust. We can make a watch, a steam-engine, and other ingenious machines, but we cannot make life even in its lowest forms. With regard, also, to the agencies of inanimate nature, we see that their powers are limited. The laws of motion, gravitation, chemical affinity, attraction, repulsion, &c., produce many important effects in the economy of nature; but no possible operation of these laws can be conceived adequate to the production of a watch, a steam-engine, a house, or a ship. These effects, and all of a similar character, are beyond the powers of nature alone. These effects exhibit intelligence and design, to which inanimate nature is not adequate. Whether, or not, the operations of nature evince the existence of intelligence and design, corresponding to what are displayed in works of men—in the construction of a house, a ship, or a complicated machine—is a question which will engage our attention hereafter. If, however, such intelligence and design *are* manifested in the universe, it is clear the intelligence and design

do not reside in ourselves, or in nature, but in something above, and superior to, both. If there are effects which it is demonstrable cannot be produced either by man, or any species of animal existence, or by any natural causes, we shall be compelled to look for some other cause distinct from, and independent of, all. But, at present, we have merely to lay down the fundamental axiom, that as every effect must have a cause, and as each cause must be adequate to the effect it produces, so every effect indicative of intelligence and design, must have an intelligent author. The intelligence of the agent may be superior, but it cannot be inferior, to the effect it produces. The principle here laid down must be admitted by all reasonable minds; its use and application in our argument will appear hereafter. We proceed to consider the next proposition.

CHAPTER IV.

SECOND PROPOSITION :—THERE MUST BE SOMETHING WHICH IS
NOT AN EFFECT, BUT UNORIGINATED AND ETERNAL.

FROM the necessary connection between cause and effect, it follows that, in a chain or series of events, all proximate causes are themselves effects of remoter causes ; and these again are effects of other causes still more remote ; and so on throughout the whole series, until we come to a first cause which must be unoriginated and eternal. All causes, then, are in reality effects, until we reach an original or first cause, which, from its very nature, cannot be an effect. Hence, our second proposition—There must be something which is not an effect, but unoriginated and eternal. At present we stop not to inquire into the *nature* of this something ; whether it be material or immaterial ; whether it be nature itself, or something apart from nature, and independent of it. These inquiries, though highly important, are quite distinct, and must be reserved for subsequent and separate consideration. The proposition must not be encumbered with any extraneous ideas. We have merely to show that there must be something which is not an effect, but is unoriginated and eternal ; and this proposition may be established by a very simple process of reasoning. We know from consciousness that we exist, and, from the evidence of our senses, we know that others exist, and that the universe around us exists. We are certain, also, that no being can create itself, or be the cause of its own existence ; for this would imply that it acted before it existed, which is a contradiction. It is evident, therefore, if ever there had been a period when there was absolutely no being in existence, it would have been absolutely impossible that any being could have begun to exist. *Ex nihilo, nihil fit*—out of nothing, nothing can arise

—is an axiom universally admitted. We repeat, had there been a period in eternity when there was neither matter nor spirit; no being whatever, intelligent or unintelligent; not the bare existence of any thing, created or uncreated; but all infinite space, being, absolutely, an infinite void; there could not ever have arisen any existence at all—a boundless vacuity must have remained a boundless vacuity for ever. Seeing, therefore, it is certain that something does now exist, something must always have existed, and that which has always existed must itself be unoriginated and eternal. It is the fountain and source of all subsequent existence, and, therefore, it is no effect, it can have no cause, no origin, but is necessarily eternal. We pass on to our next proposition.

CHAPTER V.

THIRD PROPOSITION :—THE ETERNAL SOMETHING MUST BE
DISTINCT FROM THE UNIVERSE, BECAUSE THE UNIVERSE
IS AN EFFECT.

IN establishing this proposition, it devolves upon us to prove that the universe is an “*effect*.” By the universe, we mean nature as it exists, with its diversified laws, arrangements, and constitution. That the frame-work and organization of the universe are collectively an effect, produced by something, there is abundant evidence, and that even its constituent elements themselves are effects produced by something, will be shown hereafter. If, however, the former only were demonstrated, to be collectively, an effect, it would involve evidence that the latter is an effect also; for it is incompatible with the idea of an unoriginated Being to receive subsequent changes and modifications. Prove that nature, as now constituted, is an effect, and it follows undeniably, that matter is not the unoriginated and eternal Being whose existence we are seeking. But of this we shall speak hereafter.

Now, the proof that the universe is an effect, lies in the fact *that it has had a beginning*.

That ourselves, and the numerous individual beings comprehended in all present existent species of the vegetable and animal kingdoms, have had a beginning, is too plain for the atheist to deny; but that each *species* of beings, as well as each existing individual in the species, has also had a beginning, may be demonstrated.

The fiction, that things have existed in an eternal series, has long since been logically exploded. It has been shown, that the notion of an eternal series of dependant beings involves a contradiction and an impossibility; because each

individual in the series being derived from, and dependent upon, its predecessor, the properties of derivation and dependence must belong to the whole ; and derivation and dependence necessarily involve an origin, and that origin must be underived and independent, and therefore eternal.*

Conclusive and satisfactory as this argument may be deemed, we need not rest upon it. In fact, this argument has, we may say, become almost obsolete, by the more tangible and impressive evidence of facts.

The science of Geology furnishes a palpable demonstration that the notion of an eternal series of beings is a mere figment of the imagination ; for this science reveals successive periods, when not an individual of the present species of animal or vegetable had existence ; nay, more, when neither animal nor vegetable of any kind had existence.

It would lead us away into too extended a digression, compatibly with the unity of our argument, to introduce in this place the critical evidence which proves the consistency and harmony between Geological discovery and the teachings of Holy Scripture, in reference to the history of the creation. Suffice it for the present to observe, that we have the fullest conviction there is a perfect harmony, and that the harmony is founded on just and obvious principles of interpretation. The history of creation, furnished in the first

* This argument has been illustrated by Wollaston :—" Suppose a chain hung down out of the heavens from an unknown height, and though every link of it gravitated towards the earth, and what it hung upon was not visible, yet it did not descend, but kept its situation. And upon this a question should arise. What supported or kept up this chain ? Would it be a sufficient answer to say, that the first or lowest link hung upon the second, or that next above it ; the second, or rather the first and second together, upon the third ; and so on *in infinitum* ? For what holds up the whole ? A chain of ten links would fall down, unless something, able to bear it, hindered : one of twenty, if not stayed by something of yet greater strength, in proportion to the increase of weight. And thus it is, in a chain of causes and effects, tending or (as it were) gravitating, towards some end. The last, or lowest, depends, or (as one may say) is suspended, upon the cause above it. This, again, if it be not the first cause, is suspended, as an effect, upon something above it."—*Religion of Nature delineated*.

chapter of Genesis, does not confine the works of God to six days. It speaks of at least two distinct periods of divine operation. The one, when "God created the heavens and the earth;" and another, quite distinct from this, when, on six successive days, he wrought certain wonderful operations, among which man was created. The stupendous act of creation—of bringing into actual existence the constituent elements of nature, was the event set forth in the first period, for it was "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth." But that the six-days' operation was the next or *second* work of God, is neither stated nor implied in the sacred narrative. What period elapsed between the first act of creation, and the six-days' work, is not stated; and what wonderful operations were accomplished during that interval are not recorded. Respecting both the intervening period and the intervening works, the scriptures are silent, because such information was not necessary to our welfare; it being the object of revelation not to teach us the sciences, nor to set forth, specially, all the operations of the Almighty, but to teach us our relation to God, and our duty towards him. The distinct and independent form, therefore, in which the first verse stands, with respect to those which follow, and the entire silence of scripture as to both the period and the operations which might occur between the actual creation of the universe "in the beginning," and the more detailed operations during the six-days, give a latitude for the supposition of myriads of intervening ages, and myriads of intervening operations, and thus perfectly harmonize with the discoveries of Geology. The scriptures plainly declare that God is the author of all things; and they teach us also the very recent existence of man, and the present order of things: Geology confirms both these truths; and by unfolding to us successive revolutions which transpired between the first fiat of creation, and the more recent changes when man was brought into existence, abundantly refute the atheistic notion of an eternal succession, and add a mass of important evidence to the fundamental truths of theology.

It would be incompatible with our limits to enter minutely into the details of Geological science ; but it may be generally stated, that the numerous strata composing the crust of our globe, for about ten miles in thickness, have been classified, by Geologists, into four series. Each series embraces a variety of rocks, formed, successively and slowly, by sedimentary deposits, during such immense periods of time, that, compared with the aggregate of those periods, the entire epoch of human history is only as an hour compared with a thousand years. The most ancient strata, lying next to the granite, and consisting of gneiss, mica schist, hornblende, clay state, &c., are designated “The primary series.” The next in antiquity, comprising various formations, which commence with the Silurian rocks, and end with the great coal formation, are termed “The transition series.” The next strata in the ascending series, starting from the great coal formation, include numerous rocks of sandstone, limestone, &c., and, terminating with the chalk deposits, are named “The secondary series.” And the next strata, reaching from the chalk formation to the surface soil, are denominated “The tertiary series.” The crust of the earth, just described, has been so torn, fractured, and transposed, by successive convulsions and revolutions, that portions of the various strata are thrown up to the surface, and exposed to human observation. Internal agencies, of amazing power, have agitated the bowels of the earth at different periods, and forced through the superincumbent strata those vast masses of granite, which form the central columns and peaks of the towering Appenⁿine and Andes, &c. The very foundations of the earth are raised to its loftiest summits, and the fractured strata which repose on the mountain side, or build up the rugged walls of the frowning precipice and deep ravine, reveal to the geologist the successive formations which lie between the lowest unstratified rocks, and the soil on which our harvests wave. Examining these piled-up ruins of former ages, he can read the general history of our planet through those awful cycles of time which have elapsed, from the period when our world glowed as a

molten mass, up to the time when man trod the flowery walks of paradise. What, then, say these lithographic records? Do they teach that existing species are derived from an eternal succession of progenitors? They proclaim the reverse. They reveal a period when no *existing* species had a place in our world, and a period still more remote, when no anterior species of either animal or vegetable tribes had a being; and, indeed, when the conditions of the earth were such, that the existence of any organized being was physically impossible.

Now, as fossil remains attest the species of beings which in different ages have occupied either the surface of the earth, or the waters of the ocean, it follows that, if man had existed in an eternal succession, we should find remains of the human species, and of human arts, through all the series of rocks, from the most recent tertiary, down to the strata of the oldest transition, and even in the granite rocks themselves, as deep as human observation has reached; but the soil, which man ploughs for his subsistence, is the only deposit where his remains are to be found.* Dr. Buckland affirms, “no conclusion is more fully established, than the

* Human skeletons have been discovered, imbedded in solid limestone rock, on the shore of Guadaloupe; but, as Dr. Buckland observes, the rock in which they occur is of recent formation. Sometimes, too, human bones have been found in caves, inclosed in stalactite, or mingled with the fossils of extinct species of quadrupeds, but such cases may be accounted for in various ways;—“Many of these caverns have been inhabited by savage tribes, who, for the convenience of occupation, have repeatedly disturbed portions of the soil, in which their predecessors may have been buried. Such disturbances will explain the occasional admixture of fragments of human skeletons, and the bones of modern quadrupeds, with those of extinct species.” “In the case of caverns, which form the channels of subterranean rivers, or which are subject to occasional inundations, another cause of the admixture of human bones with the remains of animals of more ancient date, may be found in the movements occasioned by running water.” *Buckland's Bridge-water Treatise*, 105-6. All such cases furnish no evidence against the recent origin of the human species. In fact, if the skeletons in question were coeval with the rocks in which they are found, it would not militate against our argument, for we have only to descend to lower strata, and every vestige of man disappears.

important fact of the total absence of any vestiges of the human species, throughout the entire series of geological formations.”* Remains of other animals are numerous for thousands of fathoms deep in the strata of the earth; and some of those remains compose entire rocks, of prodigious thickness, which must have occupied myriads of ages in their formation; but the remains of man have no place except on the surface of the tertiary system. Not a human bone is found, not a monument of human art is found, in the immense piles of strata, which, for ten miles deep, form the crust of the earth. Nor can it be pretended that they once existed, but have been decomposed and obliterated; for the remains of animals and vegetables, whose texture was formed of the softest and most pulpy substance, have been preserved through millions of ages, but not a fragment of the human system, not a statue, or medal, or utensil, or intaglio, or inscription, or pillar, or building, or artificial work of any kind, to attest man’s existence in ages anterior to the few thousand years which the bible assigns to his history. As Dr. Harris has eloquently observed, “quitting the living surface of the green earth, and entering on our downward path, our first step may take us below the dust of Adam, and beyond the limits of recorded time. From the moment we leave the mere surface soil, and touch even the nearest of the *tertiary* beds, all traces of human remains disappear, so that let our grave be as shallow as it may, in even the least stratified bed, we have to make it in the dust of a departed world.”† Thus the existence of man is proved to be of recent origin. If natural generation carries us back to a single pair of human beings, as the first of our race, Geology soon carries us back to a period when even the first pair had not begun to exist; and thus the atheistic theory of an eternal succession of human beings is shown to be a figment of the imagination, both absurd and impossible.

While Geology thus sustains the testimony of scripture as to the recent origin of man, the same truth is confirmed

* Bridgewater Treatise, p. 103. † Pre-adamite Earth, p. 72.

by all authentic history, by the recent dates, in which the arts and sciences have advanced from primitive rudeness and imperfection to their present development. The art of printing, the mariner's compass, the true system of the universe, the science of chemistry and geology, the steam-engine, and a multitude of other discoveries, of the greatest importance to man's well-being, are of recent origin; a fact totally incompatible with the notion of man's having had a very protracted existence, much more with the notion of an eternal succession of the species. Even the ancient atheistic Epicureans were compelled to admit the recent origin of man.

While Geology demonstrates the recent origin of man, it proves, by the same evidence of facts, that *all* organic existence has had a beginning. More remote, indeed, was the origin of many inferior tribes than that of man, but there is the clearest proof that there were periods in the history of our planet, when neither any species now existing, nor others of anterior origin, inhabited the earth. In the tertiary series of rocks, there are, indeed, remains of shells belonging to existing species, and of fishes and land animals belonging to existing *genera*, but combined with many others, which have no living representatives. As we descend lower, this dissimilarity increases, until, entering the secondary series, we come to a period when, though fossil remains attest that the seas abounded with fishes, testacea, crustacea, and zoophytes, yet only one genus of the terrestrial mammalian class is found to have existed, and gigantic forms of reptiles, and flying lizards, were almost the only tenants of the earth. Leaving the secondary series, and descending to the transition rocks, we arrive at a period when not a solitary species of terrestrial animals is to be found. The petrified remains of this era furnish proof that the seas were inhabited by vertebrated fishes, molluscs, articulated and radiated animals, but no remains attest the existence of either bird or beast at this period. Descending still further, and reaching the primary series of rocks, we come to an era when not a relic of either animal or vegetable

existence is to be found. The strata, composing the series of primary stratified rocks, are of immense thickness, and must have required myriads of ages for their deposition ; but those enormous piles are “wholly destitute of organic remains.”* Descending lower than these primitive stratified rocks, we come to those immense beds of granite, the depth of which no man knoweth, in which not only are there no organic remains, but it is clear, from the state of the earth at this period, that no organized being, animal or vegetable, could have existed. The igneous origin of granite is too clear to be disputed. The vitrified and chrystal characteristics of the primitive foundations of our world, show, that they must have been, at one period, a molten mass of such intense heat, that even the waters of the ocean could have had no repose upon the earth’s surface, but must have been suspended in vapours, “floating in the atmosphere around the incandescent surface.” While such was the state of our planet, it would be just as possible for either animal or plant to live on the earth, as for them to live in streams of fiery lava, as they issue from the crater of a volcano.

We may conclude this branch of our argument in the language of one of the most eminent Geologists of the age. “From the *absence* of all organic remains in the primary strata, we may derive an important argument, showing that there was a point of time in the history of our planet, (which no other researches but those of Geology can possibly approach) antecedent to the beginning of either animal or vegetable life. This conclusion is the more important, because it has been the refuge of some speculative philosophers to refer the origin of existing organizations, either to an eternal succession of the same species, or to the formation of more recent from more ancient species, by successive developments, without the interposition of direct and repeated acts of creation ; and thus to deny the existence of any first term, in the infinite series of successions, which this hypothesis

* Buckland 55, *ibid* 58.

assumes. Against this theory, no decisive evidence has been accessible, until the modern discoveries of Geology had established two conclusions, of the highest value, in relation to this long disputed question: the first proving, that existing species have had a beginning, and this at a period comparatively recent in the physical history of our globe. The second showing that they were preceded by several other systems of animal and vegetable life, respecting each of which it may be no less proved, that there was a time when their existence had not commenced; and that to these more ancient systems also, the doctrine of eternal succession, both retrospective and prospective, is equally inapplicable." These remarks apply to the stratified rocks, the lowest series, lying next to the granite itself. Anticipating an objection, he further states:—"Those who contend that life may have existed during the formation of the primary strata, and the animal remains have been obliterated by the effects of heat on strata nearest to the granite, do but remove to one point further back the first term of the finite series of organic beings; and there still remains, beyond this point, an antecedent period, in which a state of total fusion pervaded the entire materials of the fundamental granite; and one universal mass of incandescent elements, wholly incompatible with any condition of life which can be shown to have ever existed, formed the entire substance of the globe." *

While Geology thus demonstrates that every species of animal and vegetable existence must have had a beginning, Astronomy conducts us to the fact, that the earth itself must have had a beginning also—affords evidence that there was a period when our world had no place in the solar system, or, rather, when the solar system itself had no existence.

Analogy, indeed, would afford a presumptive argument of this. For, if all organized substances on the earth have had a beginning, and if every stratified rock has been formed by depositions of the spoils of pre-existing formations, and if

* Buckland, vol. i. 53-55.

the consolidated and vitrified granite itself gives evidence of a previous state of fusion, what foundation is there for the supposition that even this igneous state was the primitive condition of our planet? If change can thus be traced through every period of its Geological history, the presumption is, that its anterior history was also one of change; and a period may rationally be contemplated when it had neither its present globular form, nor its present place in the solar system. Analogy leads us to the same results respecting every other planet; indeed, respecting the entire solar system, and, respecting every system and every globe in the universe; and these deductions derive confirmation from various Astronomical phenomena.

The general laws of Astronomy are now too well understood, even by the humblest classes, to require a formal statement of the evidence that the earth is one of several planets belonging to the solar system; that it derives its light and heat from the sun; that it turns upon its axis once in about twenty-four hours; and that it revolves in an orbit around the sun once in the year. Now the non-eter-nity of the earth may be satisfactorily evinced, we think, from the existence and effects of a resisting medium within the space through which it revolves.* That the space of the earth's orbit is a vacuum, is contradicted by the fact, that light is incessantly streaming forth from the sun through every part of the solar system, and to a distance inconceivably beyond the wanderings of the most distant comet. Whether light be regarded as a direct emanation of particles from the solar atmosphere, or the vibrations of an ethereal fluid, the existence of material particles, diffused through the entire expanse of the solar system, is established. The existence, too, of a gravitating force, whatever it be, if material, implies the presence of something pervading every part of our system. That there is one or more media,

* The perturbations and oscillations in the earth's orbicular motion, caused by the attraction of the other planets, are rectified by forces mathematically accounted for by Laplace and La Grange; but this does not affect the argument arising from a resisting medium.

through which the planets move, however etherial and attenuated, must therefore be admitted ; but the effects of this medium, as to planetary motion, could scarcely be conjectured, until recent observations upon Encke's comet showed a small retardation, affecting the periodical returns of that vaporous and attenuated body. Two hundred years ago, indeed, Dr. E. Halley stated, in his *Miscellanea Curiosa*, p. 59., he thought he could demonstrate that the opposition of the ether to planetary motion would, in time, become sensible ; but it remained for more modern astronomers to determine the fact by actual observation. The solid and compact bodies of the planets present, indeed, no *appreciable* difference in their periodical revolutions ; but Encke's comet, being a body of light and vaporous substance, and consequently the more easily affected by any resisting agency, has had the time of its revolution diminished by about two days since its discovery in 1786. This diminution, however, in the time of its revolution, is accompanied by the fact of its being ten days in advance of the place which it would have reached, had it not been influenced by some retarding force. This apparent paradox arises from a conjunction of the facts, that while the comet's motion is slower, its orbit is narrower, and it gains more by the shortening of its orbit, than it loses by the diminution of its velocity. These effects can be accounted for, only by the existence and influence of a resisting medium.

Professor Airy observes, "I cannot but express my belief, that the principal part of the theory, viz., an effect similar to that which a resisting medium would produce, is *perfectly* established by the reasoning in Encke's memoir." A similar conviction is expressed by Professor Nichol, and by many great authorities.

We adduce, at some length, the important statement of Dr. Whewell: "The same medium which is thus shown to produce an effect upon Encke's comet, must also act upon the planets which move through the same spaces. The effect upon the planets, however, must be very much smaller than the effect upon the comet, in con-

sequence of their greater quantity of matter." The same writer goes on to state the consequence of this resistance to a planet. "If a planet, revolving about the sun, were to lose any portion of its velocity by the effect of resistance, it would be drawn proportionably nearer the sun, the tendency towards the centre being no longer sufficiently counteracted by that centrifugal force which arises from the body's velocity. And if the resistance were to continue to act, the body would be drawn perpetually nearer and nearer to the centre, and would describe its revolutions quicker and quicker, till at last it would reach the central body, and the system would cease to be a system."

"This result is true, however small be the velocity lost by resistance; the only difference being, that when the resistance is small, the time requisite to extinguish the whole motion will be proportionably longer. In all cases, the times which come under our consideration in problems of this kind, are enormous to common apprehension. But," observes this writer, "the changes themselves must, sooner or later, take place, in consequence of the existence of the resisting medium. Since there is such a retarding force perpetually acting, however slight it be, it must in the end destroy all celestial motions. It may be millions of millions of years before the earth's retardation may perceptibly affect the apparent motion of the sun; but still the day will come (if the same Providence which formed the system should permit it to continue so long) when this cause will entirely change the length of our year, and the course of our seasons, and finally stop the earth's motion round the sun altogether. The smallness of the resistance, however small we may choose to suppose it, does not allow us to escape this certainty. There is a resisting medium; and, therefore, the movements of the solar system cannot go on for ever. The moment such a fluid is ascertained to exist, the eternity of the movements of the planets becomes as impossible as a perpetual motion on the earth."*

This argument derives confirmation from similar observations which astronomers have made on Biela's comet;

* Whewell's *Bridgewater Treatise*, 197, &c.

and, admitting it to be conclusive, as we conceive we must, it may be applied to the stellar universe, as well as to the solar system. The fixed stars are now admitted to be suns—independent sources of light and heat—like that which illumines and invigorates our world; and, like him, very probably attended by revolving planets, too remote for the human eye, or any optical instrument, to descry; and what happens to our system, as the effect of a resisting medium, may be predicated with respect to every solar system in the universe. In truth, the retardation of these comets has established this fact, that while there is no physical law discovered in nature, adequate to originate the celestial motions, or restore them when lost, there is that in existence which does retard motion, and this retardation proclaims the final cessation of all motion, as a physical and necessary result of the constitution of the universe.

There are many stars which revolve around one another, and astronomical observation demonstrates, that our entire solar system is shifting its place in the universe, and moving towards a point in the constellation Hercules, and probably revolving around some remote centre. Indeed, the sublime hypothesis is gaining ground, that the countless myriads of stars, with the crowds of *nebulæ*, too remote to be deciphered into stars, are all revolving around a common centre, “in an orbit so vast, that no measurable arc, in any calculable period of duration, would ever appear otherwise to us than a straight line.” This hypothesis is sustained by the analogy of nature, so far as the observations of man have extended. But apart from the hypothesis which connects and binds all the systems into one magnificent whole, subordinate to, and revolving around, one common centre, it may be confidently affirmed that—wherever there is a system, there is motion; and wherever there is the presence of light and gravitation, there is a resisting medium; and wherever there is such a medium, there is a physical cause for the final cessation of motion, and the ultimate destruction of the system itself. Thus, if the universe be a con-

gregation of such systems, as there is in each an element of final destruction, the ultimate dissolution of the whole must flow from the physical laws now in operation, unless prevented by the interposition of some agency, distinct from nature, and superior to it. Thus, from the ephemeral fly, to the whole frame-work of nature, there is nothing eternal ; though the one continues but a day, and the other for ages incalculable, yet both are finite, and as nothing compared to the cycles of eternity. The heavens, as well as the earth, shall perish, and wax old as a garment, and like a vesture be folded up and laid aside.

Every advance, which superior instruments or more accurate observation enable the Astronomer to make, in the starry regions, supplies new facts, accumulating the proofs, that gravitation and motion prevail, in the remotest regions which the telescope can reach ; and that their effect, like that upon our system, is, to narrow the orbicular sweep of the stars, to congregate them into more dense and compact clusterings—thus prognosticating their final approximation and consequent destruction, by the slow but certain operation of physical laws. Let any one examine the diagrams of nebulæ and starry clusters, as copied from the *spectrum* of Herschel's and Ross's telescopes, and he will find that the prevailing form of nebulous and starry clusters is, more or less, spherical, and the prevailing characteristic observable is, that of central condensation. When the telescope is turned to the Milky Way, it appears to be breaking up into separate clusters, as if the stars were being gradually drawn closer together, and forming distinct groups. “ Sir William Herschel counted no less than two hundred and twenty-five such groups, or subordinate clusters, within the extent of the Milky Way he examined ; and as all those were of a kind indicating the action of gravity, he concluded the existence of a clustering power, *drawing the stars into separate groups*—a power which had broken up the uniformity of the zone, and to whose irresistible influence it was still exposed. ‘ Hence,’ says he, ‘ we may be certain that the stars will there be gradually compressed, through

successive stages of accumulation, till they come up to what may be called the ripening period of the globular cluster, and total insulation; from which it is evident, that the Milky Way must forcibly be broken up, and cease to be a stratum of scattered stars. We may also draw an important additional conclusion from the gradual dissolution of the Milky Way, for the state into which the incessant action of the clustering power has brought it is a kind of chronometer that may be used to measure the time of its past and present existence; and, although we do not know the rate of the going of this mysterious chronometer, it is nevertheless certain, that since a breaking up of the parts of the Milky Way affords a proof that it cannot last for ever, it equally bears witness that its past duration cannot be admitted to be infinite." *

Add to these considerations the fact, that while some stars are augmenting in their brightness and apparent magnitude, others are diminishing in both, and others again are totally disappearing. "It is an extraordinary fact," observes Dr. Mason Good, "that, within the period of the last century, not less than thirteen stars, in different constellations, none of them below the sixth magnitude, seem totally to have perished; forty to have changed their magnitude, by becoming either much larger or much smaller; and ten to have supplied the place of those that are lost. Some of these changes may perhaps be accounted for, by supposing a proper motion in the solar and sidereal systems, by which the relative positions of several of the heavenly bodies have varied. But this explanation, though it may apply to several of the cases, will by no means apply to them all; in many instances, it is unquestionable that the stars themselves, the supposed habitations of other kinds or orders of intelligent beings, together with the different planets by which it is probable they were surrounded, and to which they may have given light and fructifying seasons, as the sun gives light and fruitfulness to the earth, have utterly vanished, and the spots which they occupied in the heavens have become blanks.

* Professor Nichol.

What has befallen other systems will assuredly befall our own. Of the time and manner* we know nothing, but the fact is scarcely controvertible; it is foretold by revelation, it is inscribed in the heavens, it is felt throughout the earth. Such is the awful and daily text:—What ought to be the comment?"†

The application of the argument from astronomy is this—that as the solar and stellar systems are perishable, they must have had a beginning. As they are physically incapable of continuing for ever—of enduring through an eternity to come—so it is physically and mathematically impossible they can have endured through an eternity past. Eternity swallows up all conceivable duration, and, as an element of certain destruction does exist in the mechanism of the universe, it would have worked that fatal result already, had its duration been long enough continued. The vast horologe would have run down, and nature been a chaos. The fact that it still exists as an orderly system, performing its mighty revolutions, proves that it has not yet had time to run down, and therefore, compared with eternity, its existence is but as yesterday.

Another argument, proving that the constitution of our globe (and, by parity of reasoning, the constitution of every other globe,) has had a beginning, is furnished by the law of equilibrium, which obtains among all chemical forces. As Dr. Prout observes, "Amidst all that endless diversity of property, and all the changes constantly going on in the world around us, we cannot avoid being struck with the general tendency of the whole to a *state of repose*, or *equilibrium*. Moreover, this tendency to equilibrium is not confined to the ponderable elements, but prevails also, in the same remarkable degree, among the imponderable agencies, heat and light; which, as we have seen, cannot be any where

* In the effects of a resisting medium, we undoubtedly see *one* manner in which the catastrophe may be produced by a physical agency.

† Dr. Mason Good, whose remarks are founded upon Herschel's Observations, compared with Flamsteed's.—Phil. Trans., vol. lxxiii., art. 17.

long retained in a state of excess, on account of their natural disposition to acquire a certain state of equilibrium."

Every one will see, that it is owing, in a subordinate sense, to the activity of chemical forces, that the earth is rendered a fit habitation for animal and vegetable existence. It is by the action of these antagonistic forces, that combustion, evaporation, refrigeration, and all the innumerable forms of analysis and combination, have been and are still effected. It is, indeed, by their agency, that the various strata of the globe have been built up, that atmospheric air and water have been constituted, and the world rendered fit to sustain animal and vegetable life.

It requires but slight attention to see, that, however fixed and uniform may be the *laws* of chemistry, the *intensity* of their operation has been greatly diversified during the several Geological epochs. The evidence, that the materials of our world were once in a state of fusion by heat, is, we think, too clear to be resisted; and such a state implies an amazing excess in the activity of some chemical forces, compared with what they are in the present day. At a subsequent period, when the exterior surface of the earth had so far cooled down as to admit the chrystalization of the primitive granite, the excess of those chemical agencies must have abated, while the action of others must have increased; but, still the state of the world, not admitting at that period of the existence of animal and vegetable life, renders it evident, that the temperature of the globe, and the action of chemical forces, must have been, even then, widely different from the comparative repose of the present day. Again, in that subsequent era, called the Carboniferous period, during which, dense forests of Fern Trees flourished for successive ages, and their deposition formed the massive beds from which we now extract our fuel; and, when successive generations of corals formed the prodigious piles of mountain limestone, the atmosphere must have been impregnated with carbonic acid to an excess incompatible with the existence of land animals—a probability, further sustained by the fact, that no remains of terrene animals are found

in the rocks belonging to that period. During such an era, the action of chemical forces must have been greatly modified—differing, perhaps, as much from the intensity of the former period, as from their tranquillity in the present day.

In the Geological epochs following the Carboniferous period, we witness further modifications, evidenced by the diversified Fauna and Flora of the earth—the diversified species exhibiting meteoric change, and meteoric change involving the subsidence of some chemical forces, and the ascendancy of others; and the combined action of all progressively advancing towards the present state of things. It is, indeed, by no means improbable, that a considerable change has taken place in the action of chemical forces even during the brief period of human history. The shortness of life in the human race, since the deluge, intimates a meteoric change as at least one of the causes; and it is certain that climate, in different localities of the world, has altered during a period still more recent. Ere we dismiss these evidences of a diversified intensity in the action of chemical forces, during the protracted periods of Geological history, we ought to mention another, namely—that furnished by those great catastrophes, in which the lowest strata have been forced, by violent internal agencies, to the highest summits of the earth. These are the effects of an intensity of action, such as is not known to exist in the present day.

Comparing, then, the known tendency of all the elements to produce an equilibrium—a state in which antagonist properties neutralize each other, and produce a state of rest, we ask, Does not the history of our planet plainly indicate the effects of the operation of this law? Has not the earth passed from a period of intense and violent action, in which the power of some elements preponderated in the production of violent catastrophes, to a period of comparative repose? Has not intense heat given place to a temperature compatible with life? Have not vast accumulations of carbonic acid in the atmosphere been absorbed and solidified in the Carboniferous strata, and the air rendered fit to sustain animal and vegetable existence of the highest order? Now,

What should prevent this tendency to equilibrium from proceeding to ulterior results? The tendency still exists in the elements—Why should not that tendency continue to operate until the last antagonism between the elements shall cease—until analysis and combination shall have completed their cycle, and perfect repose, quiescence, and death, shall succeed the activity and animation of the present order of things? We see nothing, but the interposition of a Divine agency, to prevent this result. Philosophy teaches it *à priori*, and the history of our planet confirms the decision. Let us listen to the judgement of one whose physiological research entitles him to the highest respect. Professor Whewell observes, “We can no longer maintain the infinite past duration of the earth; for chemical forces, as well as mechanical, tend to equilibrium: and that condition once attained, their efficacy ceases. Chemical affinities tend to form new compounds; and though, when many and various elements are mingled together, the play of synthesis and analysis may go on for a long time, it must at last end. If, for instance, a large portion of the earth’s mass were originally pure potassium, we can imagine violent igneous action to go on so long as any part remained unoxidized; but when the oxidation of the whole has once taken place, this action must be at an end; for there is no (physical) agency which can reproduce the deoxidized metal. Thus, a perpetual motion is incapable in chemistry, as it is in mechanics; and a theory of constant change, continued through infinite time, is untenable, when asserted upon chemical, no less than upon mechanical, principles.”

If, then, the laws of chemistry, and the history of their operation, infallibly lead to a cessation of action, they as certainly lead us back to an origin. A cycle which has an end must have had a beginning. The fact, that it has not yet completed its series, shows that it has not yet had time for that completion, and, therefore, cannot be eternal. This argument, pursued to its ultimatum, would prove, that the laws of chemistry, as well as their operation, have had a beginning, and, by rational consequence, that the particles

of matter itself are not eternal. At present, however, it would be out of place to pursue the argument further than is necessary to sustain our second proposition, which is—that the universe is an effect. While astronomy gives evidence of a beginning, with respect to mechanical motion, chemistry supplies evidence of a beginning, to the action of chemical elements; and both combine to prove that the formation of worlds—of all worlds when ²² ²³ their laws operate—have had a beginning, and are the effects of a cause on which we shall hereafter discourse at large.

Recapitulation. We have seen, then, that the human species, and all organized existence, have had a beginning. We have seen that, in ages past, numerous species and genera, had a being, in earth and sea, which are now extinct. We have seen, that in the lower stratified rocks, though hundreds of fathoms deep, there are no organic remains, not a vestige of animal or plant; and, therefore, during the inconceivable ages in which these rocks were being deposited, there was no form of life on our planet. We have seen, that during this era, and especially during the formation of the granite rocks, (the primitive foundations of the earth,) such was the incandescent condition of our planet, that the life of either plant or animal was physically impossible. We have further seen that the earth itself as a globe, as a planet in the solar system, and the solar system itself, must have had a beginning; and finally, we have seen that all the starry systems too, the whole fabric of nature, where motion, gravitation, and light, exist, must also have had a beginning—that there was a time when there was not a sun, or planet, or satellite, in existence, as parts of any orderly system. Thus, proving that all things have had a beginning, we prove that the universe collectively, is an effect. As an effect, therefore, we must look to something distinct from it, and superior to it, as its cause. This brings us to our fourth proposition.

CHAPTER VI.

FOURTH PROPOSITION :—THE UNIVERSE, AS AN “EFFECT,” MUST HAVE A CAUSE, AND THE UNORIGINATED BEING MUST BE ITS CAUSE.

THE establishment of our former proposition wrests an important argument from the power of infidelity, and, in effect, saps the foundations of every sophism which seeks to exclude a Creator. Still it may be necessary to pursue the argument to ulterior principles. It may be replied by the infidel sophist:—“Admitting that the entire system of nature, and all the forms of organized existence, have had a beginning, and are therefore effects of a pre-existent cause, yet, as the argument does not necessarily prove that the elementary particles or atoms of matter had a beginning, we are not necessitated to look for any cause beyond matter itself, for we contend that those elementary particles themselves, in the aggregate, are The eternal and unoriginated substance; and that matter, being eternal, is adequate to all the formations, which either have existed in former ages, or do exist at the present time.”

Now, this is narrowing the controversy, and it plainly shows, that the dispute is not as to whether there be an eternal something, but whether that something be matter or mind; whether it be a conscious, intelligent agent, or whether it be unconscious, dead matter, acting either according to fixed laws, or blind chance, or absolute necessity. Now, by exploding this sophism, we logically arrive at the great truth—that the formation of the universe was originated by a self-existent and independent Being, distinct from matter and infinitely superior to it. Let us, then, carefully probe this infidel sophism to its very core. We have not to proceed far before its hollowness will appear: for,

I. *It is grounded upon a mere assumption.* It assumes that matter is eternal, and thus takes for granted a funda-

mental principle, which, from its importance in the argument, should have been established with the greatest care, and with the clearest demonstration. As the infidel professes to be a man of reason—a philosopher—ever on his guard against imposition and error—at the greatest possible remove from all credulity—holding it to be even a virtue to doubt, until the clearest demonstration be afforded, have we not a right to demand from *him* a proof of the eternity of matter? Have we not a right to insist upon his furnishing a demonstration of this first principle, and of resolutely maintaining, that, unless he do this, his argument about the sufficiency of nature alone—about the prolific powers of nature being adequate to the production of all phenomena—is good for nothing, is utterly without foundation? Undoubtedly we have. But how will he attempt to prove the eternity of matter? He has no data on which to build a single argument in proof of this. Is the eternity of matter a necessary truth, which irresistibly forces itself upon the mind? Is it an axiom so clear and self-evident as to require no proof? Certainly not. The necessity for an eternal something is felt by every mind. We cannot but admit it; but that that something is *matter* requires proof. We can conceive it possible for matter not to have existed, and this possibility excludes the eternity of matter from the category of necessary truths. A writer, now before me, who was so far confirmed in infidelity, that he gloried in the name of *Antitheos*,* and wrote a work expressly to disprove the being of God, says, “*We can conceive matter not to exist.*” Important admission; for, if we can conceive matter not to exist, its non-existence is admitted to be possible, and therefore cannot be contended for as necessarily eternal. It follows, then, that matter is not necessarily the unoriginated and eternal Being. Besides, matter is constantly changing. We have already traced its varied forms, through immeasurable periods, in the earth’s strata, and, beyond that, have traced it back from its present orderly arrangement in planetary

* A denier of God’s existence. See Gillespie, on the Necessary Existence of the Deity, 253.

systems, to a state of chaos. We ask, Is this perpetual change the attribute of an eternal and unoriginated being; or, is it the property of a finite, passive substance, acted upon by a power superior to itself? Let reason judge.

II. If the eternity of matter were granted to the atheist, he could not proceed in the argument unless we grant him also the eternity of motion. But we have already proved that both mechanical and chemical motion must have had a beginning; and a mass of dull, inactive matter, incapable of originating a single motion, internally or externally, must remain the same inorganic mass for ever, unless some superior agency act upon it.

III. We may proceed even further, and affirm, that if matter, and motion, and all the varied laws of matter, were admitted to be eternal, even then, the spontaneous production of the universe, the orderly arrangement of the planetary system, and the organization of animal and vegetable life, would be for ever a physical impossibility. If the present order of things were destroyed, there is nothing in nature alone, adequate to reproduce it; or matter, in a state of chaos, but impressed with the same laws as at present, could never produce the universe, and the organized existence which inhabits it.

Here, then, we meet the theories which infidelity has fabricated to dispense with the idea of a Creator, and to resolve all the phenomena of the universe into the operation of what are called natural laws, &c.

The hypothesis of Gradual Developement, refuted. One infidel theory is, that of a spontaneous and gradual developement—a theory which propounds the doctrine, that all systems and all forms of organization and life, have been gradually developed by nature itself, beginning with the lowest, and thence proceeding to the highest classes of existence. It assumes that man was derived from a species of inferior animal, next in order to himself, and that species from another inferior to it, and so on, pursuing the gradation downward to the lowest animalculum, which, in its turn was derived, some say, from the action of electricity,

and some say, from a vegetable, and the vegetable, it is said, sprang spontaneously from matter in a peculiar state of fecundity; and, by a similar process of derivation, the earth, the solar and stellary systems, are said to have derived their modified existence, and orderly adjustment, from masses of diffused nebulæ, floating in immense fields, through boundless space.* In contemplating this theory, we are forcibly reminded of Paley's remark—that infidelity never did furnish a probable argument in its support, but only challenges us to prove the impossibility of its hypothesis. Indeed, when a man would rather have an ape for his grandfather, than acknowledge God for his Maker, and prefers to trace his remoter ancestry among the moluscas of the ocean, and the infusoria of a putrid stream, to ascribing his creation to an intelligent Mind, we ought not to feel surprised at any absurdity he may propose. The present hypothesis imposes a tax too enormous upon human credulity to gain many disciples; and, had not some features in it been sanctioned by several popular writers of the present day, it might have been passed by without any further notice. We shall briefly show that it is absurd and impossible—that it is contradicted by facts and common sense.

First Refutation. The transmutation theory is overthrown by the natural, essential, and impassable distinction of genera and species, in all organized existences. If the infidel theory were true, there would be no such thing as distinct species of animals—no essential difference betwixt one order and another. The higher would only be an advance upon the lower; possessing faculties more developed indeed, but such as each inherently possesses in an embryo state; and which its progeny may, in successive generations,

* This theory, variously modified, is advocated by Buffon, Lamarck, Monboddo, Mirabaud, and many modern authors, of loose principles, and infidel tendencies. The anonymous author of "The Vestiges of Creation," contends for the same theory, but professes to believe in a Creator. His theory, however, of transmutation of species, is in flat contradiction to the Holy Scriptures. It is but the ancient error of the Epicureans, revived and dressed up in modern costume.

enjoy in the same degree of development. But this is contradicted by all observation, by all history, and all experiment. In surveying the diversified tribes of animated beings, we do observe distinct species, marked by essential differences, and separated by impassable barriers. The same essential difference obtains in all countries, and history attests that it has obtained in all ages. "Egypt, which, as the learned commission of the French naturalists well observed, has preserved for us a museum of natural history, not only in its paintings, but in the mummies of its animals, presents us every species, after three thousand years, perfectly unchanged."*

This distinction of species and genera, is guarded by an instinctive aversion among animals, to propagate with any but their kind; and if, by any peculiar circumstance, or by artificial constraint from man, two animals of different, but proximate species, produce a hybrid, the race cannot be perpetuated. Nature rigidly protects the distinction she has formed of separate species, by rendering hybrids barren, and thus dooming the mongrel race to sudden oblivion.†

Besides, if the hybrid race could be established and made permanent by propagation, it would deteriorate, and not improve, the animal tribe. The mule is inferior to the horse, and exhibits a marked tendency to degenerate in organization. The procreation of a hybrid always involves, that either dam or sire are of a *higher* nature than itself; and the perpetuation of such races, if possible, would have the effect of collapsing, not developing, existing properties and faculties; of *deteriorating*, not *improving*, the species. The transmutation of species by generation, if possible, and continued for an indefinite period, would gradually run the species down to an inconceivable state of deterioration and degeneracy.‡ But we need not enlarge; such a deterioration

* Dr. Wiseman, on the connection between science and revealed religion. Lecture iii., page 121.

+ Lyell's Geology, vol. ii., 395.

‡ "I may also remark, that if it could have been shown, that a single permanent species had ever been produced by hybridity (of which there

is impossible, because the transmutation of the species is impossible. Nature invariably maintains that graceful and dignified distinction of species established in her own free domain, and omnipotently resists all the efforts of human contrivance to break through the invisible guards she has erected around her own works. Lyell, after the most elaborate examination of Lamarck's theory, by the test of nature, thus concludes: "From the above considerations it appears, that species have a real existence in nature, and each was endowed, at the time of its creation, with the attributes and organization by which it is now distinguished."* Varieties there are, in the same species, of both animal and vegetables, the effects of diversity of climate, nourishment, habits, treatment, &c.; but these varieties are prescribed within certain limits, and never break through the essential difference between one species and another. The fact, then,

is no satisfactory proof), it might certainly have lent some countenance to the notions of the ancients respecting the gradual deterioration of created things, but none whatever to Lamarck's theory of their progressive perfectibility, for observations have hitherto shown, that there is a tendency in mule animals, and plants to degenerate in organization.—*Lyell's Geology*, vol. ii., 396.

* Lyell, vol. ii., 403. The same author, speaking in reference to vegetable species, remarks: "It seems now admitted by horticulturalists, that none of our garden varieties of fruit are entitled to be considered strictly permanent, but that they wear out after a time; and we are thus compelled to resort again to seeds; in which case, there is so decided a tendency in the seedlings to revert to the original type, that our utmost skill is sometimes baffled in attempting to recover the desired variety." Again, after speaking of varieties in the same species of plants being effected by climate, and other external agencies, he remarks: "The nature of these results, however, depends upon the species, and they are of a specific character; they exhibit the same phenomena again and again, and indicate certain fixed and invariable relations between the physiological peculiarities of the plant, and the influence of certain external agents; they afford no ground for questioning the stability of the species, but rather the contrary; they present us with a class of phenomena, which, when they are more thoroughly understood, may afford some of the best tests for identifying species, and proving that the attributes, originally conferred, endure so long as any issue of the original stock remains upon earth."—*Ibid*, vol. ii., 363-365.

that each species is distinct, permanent, and impassable, proves that each must have had a distinct origin; and, if each had a distinct and separate origin, the development theory, by transmutation of species, is found to be false, and must be rejected.

Second Refutation. If the development theory were true, each generation ought to be more perfect than the preceding one, but all existing facts, and all history of the past, combine to prove that no such physical development either is taking place now, or has taken place in ages past. In stature, in constitutional vigour, in physical strength, in symmetrical proportion, in beauty of countenance and form, and in the term of his existence, man presents no superiority over his remotest ancestors. Whatever truth there may be in his supposed deterioration in some respects, and his certain deterioration in others (the term of life for example), there is clearly no physical advancement. The savage stands on a par with the sage in these properties, and nations of the remotest antiquity with the men of this generation.

Third Refutation. If the development theory were true, we should see, at least, some animals and plants in a transition state; and the natural history of past ages would furnish us with a narrative of others in the same transition state. The development of nature would operate uniformly, if at all, as well in the present era as in past times; and proofs of this development would undoubtedly present themselves to our view. We should somewhere see plants passing into animals, fishes into reptiles, reptiles into birds, birds into quadrupeds, and quadrupeds into nations of human beings, and human beings into something above human! We should now and then surely find some animals acquiring new organizations, new faculties, new organs of sense; now and then, the rudiments of an eye, or an ear, in an oyster—animals, with only one or two senses, acquiring a third, or fourth, or fifth sense. Sometimes a nascent wing should be found sprouting on the shoulders of a frog, or a newt, and,

in successive generations, these new powers and organs would be advancing towards perfection in these species.

Lamarck says that the structure and organs of animals have resulted from their propensities—that as any animal has been driven by its wants to new or peculiar habits, for which it was not originally adapted, it has thereby acquired the variation of organization necessary for its new state; although he admits that many generations must persevere in their exercise before the new powers are acquired. Thus, for instance, a bird is driven by its wants to take to the water, and either swim or wade; its successors do the same; in the course of many generations the outstretching of its claws produces a web between them, and it becomes a regular water-fowl; or it extends its limbs to walk in deeper places, and gradually its legs are prolonged to the length of the crane's or the flamingo's. If some birds which swim have long necks, as the swan and goose, it is from their custom of plunging their heads in the water to fish. These two agencies combined—new wants and the tendency of nature to meet them—conspired to make man out of the baboon. We will not humble ourselves, nor disgust the reader, by any further quotations from this writer on this subject. But we may ask, with Dr. Wiseman, “If the swan and the goose have long necks from plunging their necks under water for their food, how is it that the same habit has not produced a like effect in the duck or teal? The bee has been striving, without intermission, in the art of making its sweet confection since it sipped the flowers of paradise; the ant has been constructing its labyrinths, and the beaver its dwelling-place, from the morning of their creation until now, without acquiring a new perception, or a new organ for these purposes.”

If new organization and additional faculties proceed from an endeavour to meet fresh exigencies, how is it that man, with all his intense acquisitiveness, has never been able to elicit, from bounteous and prolific nature, a new organ, or an additional sense? As he stands at the head of animal

existence, how is it that the force of development has not elicited a sixth sense? As he is incessantly aiming at something beyond his physical ability, and puts all nature under contribution to aid him in his attempts, how is it that this intense and active appetency does not work out some new physical energy? He strains his sight to search through nature in quest of new wonders; he constructs optical instruments to aid him in examining the minute, and in exploring the vast and the distant; yet, though still dissatisfied, and longing for further powers of discovery, nature dilates not his pupil, enlarges not the sphere or the depth of his vision. He looks upon the eagle as he soars, and envies the velocity of his flight, but still remains himself fixed to the earth's surface. He desires to move across continents with speed, and invents engines of locomotive power to convey him, but this propensity elicits no new faculty of action. However bountiful *Art* may be in obeying his call, to aid his senses, and facilitate his action, parsimonious *Nature* never comes to his help. Prolific as she is to swans, and geese, and apes, in developing new powers for new wants, she is most niggardly to man. Though she has raised an oyster to a man, she sternly refuses to add one new faculty or power to the lord of the inferior tribes! A system involving such absurdities and contradictions is propounded to us as philosophy! And this we are to believe in order to rid ourselves of the idea of a Creator! If such be philosophy, where shall folly be found? True philosophy, however, irrespective of all religious considerations, teaches an opposite doctrine—teaches that the propensities of an animal are not the determining cause of its organization, but its organization is the cause—the proximate cause of its propensities. The propensity never anticipates the faculty, but the faculty anticipates the propensity, and is formed prospectively. The faculty is not the consequence of a new condition, but a preparation for it. “Thus, the larva of the winged insect can only walk, but, if we take it and dissect it, just before its metamorphosis is completed, we find an apparatus in progress for

flight through the air. The embryonic animal has a life adapted to its condition; but this life is subordinate to the formation of its organs for a life after birth; and for which, during the whole period of gestation, it is unconsciously preparing.”*

The theory of Lamarck is contradicted by the general organization of animal and vegetable existence. Look at the mechanical structure by which the joints are fitted for action. As Paley observes, “The ligaments, or strictures, by which the tendons are tied down at the angles of the joints, could, by no possibility, be formed by the motion or exercise of the tendons themselves, by any appetency exciting these parts into action, or by any tendency arising therefrom. The tendency is all the other way; the conatus in constant opposition to them. Length of time does not help the cause at all, but the reverse.” Look at the valves in the blood-vessels. “They could never be formed in the manner which our theorist supposes. The blood, in its right and natural course, has no tendency to form them; when obstructed or reflux, it has the contrary. These parts could not grow from their use, though they had eternity to grow in.”

Look at the senses of animals. “How will our author get at vision, or make an eye? How should the blind animal affect sight; of which, blind animals, we know, have neither conception nor desire?” How should an oyster form a conception of sight? and the conception would be equally remote from an animal of higher organization destitute of that faculty, and as remote from either as from a stone. And the same applies to any other sense. If Lamarck himself, to support his own theory, requires first, an appetency or desire for a faculty, as necessary to its organization, and if that desire requires an antecedent conception of the thing desired; then, if there be no conception to begin with, there can be organization as the result: for, as Paley observes, it

* Dr. Harris’s “Pre-Adamite Earth,” page 278—a work of profound interest.

is in vain to inquire how that might proceed which could never begin.

Look at the organization of plants, in which there is adaptation as complete and successful as in animals. How will the theory of organization as resulting from desire, apply to vegetation? As well might our author ascribe reason and immortality to mosses and lichens, as argue their organization from the fallacious principle assigned. But, finally, the foolish theory is contradicted as plainly by fact as by philosophy. If such an appetency or desire existed, it would show itself. It would operate uniformly in all ages, and with the greatest force in the highest orders of existence, and the effects of its energy would be seen in all ages. But where are those effects? The eye of the Trilobite—one of the earliest animals in existence, the species of which became extinct in the Carboniferous period—exhibits an optical apparatus as perfectly adapted to the laws of light, as any kindred crustacean of the present day. What creature has acquired a new member, a new faculty, or a new sense? What species has emerged into a higher one, nay, what single animal, from a mollusk to a man, has proceeded a single step in the ascending scale of existence, or, during the whole history of our world, exhibited the first germ of a capability thus to ascend. We have seen how single individuals of a species may *degenerate*, but, that they ever have *ascended*, or can *ascend*, one grade above their kind, is contradicted by all facts, and disproved by all philosophy. On this ground, therefore, the transmutation theory must be rejected.

Fourth Refutation.—If the development theory were true, then the perfection of figure, and the perfection of intellect, would be uniformly combined. Now, as man is admitted to be the type of perfection, both as to organization and intellect, it would follow, on Lamarck's theory, that the animals which have most intellect would conform the nearest to man in external symmetry. But this is contradicted by fact. An elephant, or a dog, has more sagacity than an ape, and yet how remote the figure of these quadrupeds from

the symmetry of man! Many species of birds, and some serpents, are remarkable for their sagacity, yet how far removed from the symmetry of the human species.* Thus, the development principle, if continually operating in the various orders of animals, would, in time, lead to the production of not merely *one* rational species, conforming to the type of human nature, but to the production of rational animals of *multifarious* species, having the most diversified forms, shapes, sizes, and modes of existence. If this be an absurdity, it necessarily springs from the development theory, and while it charges the scheme with absurdity on the one hand, it involves it in the most palpable inconsistencies and contradictions on the other; for, while assuming to lead the inferior animals up to man, it makes them to diverge from him into types of the greatest conceivable dissimilarity. Such contradictions prove the falsehood of the theory which involves them.

Fifth Refutation.—If the theory of a gradual development were true, it would follow, that the highest order of vegetables should produce the lowest forms of animal existence.† We know, indeed, that the author of the “Ves-

* The attempt to trace a graduated scale of intelligence, through the different species of animals, accompanying the modifications of the form of the skull, is a mere visionary speculation. It has been necessary to exaggerate the sagacity of the ape tribe at the expense of the dog, and strange contradictions have arisen in the conclusions deduced from the structure of the elephant: some anatomists being disposed to deny the quadruped the intelligence which he really possesses, because they found that the volume of his brain was small, in comparison to that of the other mammalia; while others were inclined to magnify extravagantly the superiority of his intellect, because the vertical height of his skull is so great, compared to its horizontal length.”—*Lyell, vol. ii., 398.*

† Mirabaud, and others, ascribe the origin of animal life to putrefaction; the author of “The Vestiges” thinks it may be generated by a chemical process; and another thinks that *entozoa* may spring from flakes of lymph. Any theory which imagination can devise seems preferable, with such reasoners, to a creating energy. Most advocates of spontaneous generation, however, seem to think the existence of vegetable life a necessary condition for the production of the lowest kind of animal existence.

tiges of Creation," and others, refer vegetable and animal life to a distinct and separate origin; but if the lowest form of sentient life is higher than the highest order of vegetable life, the scale of gradual development, to be consistent with itself, requires that the lowest animals should spring from vegetables, and as one being springs from another by generation, it follows, that the vegetable should *produce* the animal, or, in other words, that the latter should spring from the former, as its fruit—its natural spontaneous production. But an animal thus produced was never found, because none such ever existed. Nay, as Steffens has justly remarked, the links between the lowest orders of animal and vegetable life, as the polypus, the sponge, &c., possess the *lowest* qualities of each. If we regard the vegetable characteristics, they resemble the fungi, the lowest in the scale of vegetable organization, and if we look at their animal characteristics they conform to the mollusca, or soft bodied animals—the lowest species of the two kingdoms of nature. Thus, the links in the chain of the development theory have no adhesion, because no foundation in nature.

Sixth Refutation.—If the development theory were true, we should find its truth attested by geological discoveries, but those discoveries utterly disprove it. The almost fathomless strata which have been deposited during cycles of myriads of ages, and which reveal the first forms of organization, will certainly bear unequivocal testimony to the manner in which both animal and vegetable life have progressed. Now, on the supposition of the theory which derives a superior from an inferior being, we should find the first fossil deposits in the earth's strata to consist wholly of vegetables; first, those of the lowest class alone, and then, as we ascend to more recent formations, gradually changing into the higher, until we arrived at the climax of vegetable life. Above these strata, or in connection with them, should first appear the vestiges of incipient animal existence, and thence, as the strata advanced, the forms should gradually change, by the most easy and imperceptible transition, to higher orders of sentient being, from the zoophyte to the

mollusk, from the mollusk to the jointed animal, thence to the vertebrate, or back-boned animal; each of the series, commencing with the lowest species, of the lowest genus, of the lowest order, of the lowest class; and so proceeding until, by imperceptible gradations, and through cycles of myriads of ages, it had crept through all the inferior classes up to the quadruped race, and thence ascended to the human species. Such must inevitably be the uniformity and regularity of the development system, if it be true; admitting of no hiatus, no interruption, no sudden formations, and of no inconstancy, but what may be accounted for by the catastrophes which in different periods, have suddenly occurred. No catastrophe, however, can invert the order now stated, if the development theory be true. An earthquake, or volcanic eruption, may dislocate the strata, and such changes may convert the dry land into an ocean, and *vice versa*, but no such events could make the vestiges embedded and indurated in one strata, to amalgamate with those of another. However transposed the masses of strata may be, their embedded contents will always attest the age and order of their deposition. The theory in question, to be consistent with itself, implies, that vast periods must have elapsed between the formation of the lowest type of vegetable life, and the first appearance of animal existence; and, again, between the earliest formation of sentient life, and the animals exhibiting higher and more elaborate organization. Consequently, these diversified forms of being can never be found embedded together in the early series of fossiliferous strata, but separated, as they are assumed to be, by wide intervals in the date of their origin, their vestiges must be separated from each other by wide intervals in the series of geological strata.

Such is a correct representation of a graduated scale of existence, successively developed. Now what are the facts? Dr. Mantell, a geologist of no mean authority, and whose statement is based upon a wide and scrutinizing survey of the science, affirms that the facts of geology warrant no such inference as this theory adduces;* and Mr.

* Mantell's Wonders of Geology, vol. ii., 667.

Lyell, another geologist of the greatest eminence, asserts that geological researches afford no countenance whatever to the fancied evolution of one species out of another.* Agasséz, another eminent geologist of our own times, says, "I cannot admit the idea of the transformation of species from one formation to another. In advancing these general notions, I do not wish to offer them as inductions drawn from the study of one particular class of animals, (of fishes, for instance,) and applied to other classes, but as results of direct observation of very considerable collections of fossils of different formations, and belonging to different classes of animals, in the investigation of which I have been specially engaged for many years."

These authorities, and many others which might be adduced, are sustained by geological facts, which most unequivocally contradict and overturn the theory of transmutation: for,

1. Instead of vegetables being found *first*, "the earliest forms of life known to geology (at present) are not, as might have been expected, *plants*, but *animals*." The oldest monuments yet discovered of living things are shell-fish and coral-oids. Now this fact is fatal to the development theory, for, if animals existed before plants, how can the former be derived from the latter, or from decomposed vegetable matter. Indeed, if we admit that the existence of animals involves a physical necessity for the prior, or at least contemporaneous, existence of plants, yet, the fact of their remains having been obliterated, while animal vestiges of that period have survived, shows they were of a very inferior nature, and cannot be claimed by our theorists themselves as the progenitors of the animal species, on the principle of a *gradual* transmutation.

2. Again: instead of a gradual and uniform transition from the lowest appearance of animal life, passing onwards by imperceptible degrees, we have beings of distinct orders and advanced organization suddenly introduced. The fossil animals, which appear in the oldest strata, are not *radiata* alone, but these, with other classes, which have a highly

* Lyell's Principles, vol. ii., 396-7.

developed organization. The second and third division of the animal kingdom are mingled with the first:—Families of Radiata, Mollusks, and Articulata, embedded in the same strata. Predaceous cephalopods,* mollusks of the highest organic structure, and trilobites, with reticular eyes,† lived together in the same seas, and at the same times, with the lowest zoophytes. Thus, the first facts in geology contradict the theory of one species being evolved from another. Ascending higher in the strata, we come to the upper silurian rocks. Here, instead of an imperceptible transition, we meet with fishes. Some of the preceding species are continued, but exhibit no signs of a process of transformation to a higher class of animals; and the fishes accompanying them do not come into view half formed or imperfectly organized; nor are they of the lowest class in the family of fishes, but of the highest: one represents a genus of the shark family; and Dr. Buckland remarks, “there is no period in geological history in which many of its forms did not prevail.” Now the shark is a fish belonging to the highest class; and, indeed, all the fishes, found in the silurian system, are of a high organic structure. Thus, we have the

* The cephalopods are the most highly organized of all mollusks. In some families they have an internal skeleton, together with a heart, and a head, having some resemblance in form, and armature, to that of the parrot tribes. They were carnivorous and predatory.

† The eye of the Trilobite, at this early period, exhibits the same elaborate and complicated structure as the eyes of the crustacea and insects of the present day. Dr. Buckland remarks, “We find in the trilobites, of these early rocks, the same modifications of the organ of sight, as in the living crustacea. The same kind of instrument was also employed in the intermediate periods of our geological history, when the secondary strata were deposited at the bottom of a sea, inhabited by limuli, in the regions of Europe, which now form the elevated plains of central Germany.” And Dr. Mantell observes, “The eye” [of the trilobite] “is made up of a vast number of elongated cones, each having a chrysaline lens, pupil, and cornea, and terminating on the extremity of the optic nerve. Each organ of sight is, therefore, a compound instrument, made up of a series of optical tubes, or telescopes, the number of which, in some insects, is marvellous.”—*Dr. Mantell's Wonders of Geology*, vol. ii., p. 591.

highest class of fishes appearing in the early formations. The shark immediately succeeding the earliest forms of life—the mollusk, the trilobite, and the zoophyte. Will the atheist affirm that the former derived his being from the latter? If he does, he contradicts his theory of gradual development; and if he does not, he must admit them to have been produced by creation.

3. Our limits will not permit us to examine the contents of every strata in the ascending series, but we may affirm, that similar contradictions to the fanciful theory of Lamarck and his disciples occur in every series. Ascending from the transition series to the secondary series of rocks, we find, in the *earlier* formations of the new red sandstone, numerous impressions of the claws of various species of birds, with similar impressions of the tortoise, of various small animals, and of a larger creature of singular proportions, called the *Chirotherium*. These foot-prints are distinct and well defined, as if made at the present hour, indicating the distance of the footsteps from each other, and the size of the animals which made them. The existence of birds, at this early period, is very remarkable. Yet, those birds must have had a perfect organization; and though some of them were small, others were of a size far exceeding the largest feathered tribes of the present day. Both the existence and organization of birds, at this early period, contemporaneous with the existence of amphibious reptiles, are contradictory to the theory of a gradual development. Ascending to the masses of magnesian limestone rocks, we find the remains of reptiles, but, here again, those in the lowest strata (or the first in the order of time) are completely formed. Nor are these reptiles of the lowest order, but approaching the highest, and have their several organs of sense as perfectly formed as any of the present day. Some of them are of gigantic stature, and predatory habits, as saurian monsters, iguanadons, pterodactyles, &c. Ascending higher, we come to the oolitic system, where we have not only fossils of birds, reptiles, &c., but the first representative of the mammalian tribes—that

of an opossum animal. Though this animal appears at a period so much earlier than other mammalia, it is of higher organic structure than some of a far subsequent period, and, indeed, than some mammals of the present day. On entering the tertiary system of rocks, millions of organic remains appear, including representatives of every order, from corals up to quadrupeds, numerous species of which are now extinct. But here, again, we perceive nothing like a gradual and insensible transmutation of one species into another. Indeed, the theory which insults our nature, by deriving the human species from the monkey tribe, is here most flatly contradicted by geological facts. For that theory supposes the monkey tribe to be the most perfect development of the brute species, and consequently of the *latest* formation next to man. But geological discovery proves, that the monkey race existed in the earliest period of the tertiary series. The remains of monkeys, of three and four feet high, are found in the eocene period; not only myriads of ages before man, but myriads of ages before the appearance of other tribes, of an inferior type to the monkey race itself. Another fact, contradictory to the *gradual* transmutation theory, is witnessed in the contemporaneous existence of carnivorous and graminivorous animals. In this era, as in others, no imperfect animal, or half-formed senses, are found. Numerous species had died out, and numerous others were introduced, yet, so distinct in their nature, attributes, habits, and modes of existence; so different in anatomical structure; and presenting so many exceptions, interruptions, and inversions, of any graduated scale of succession, as to preclude the possibility of one species being derived from the other. In the tertiary series, multitudes of fishes, reptiles, birds, and quadrupeds, lived in the same eras, and each appears complete in all its organs, perfect in its senses, fixed in its habits, and impassable in its class, order, genera, and species.*

* There is, apparently, a want of candour and ingenuousness in the anonymous Author of "The Vestiges of Creation," as to the manner in which he disposes of geological facts, when they contradict his theory

Summary. Such, then, are the facts presented in the immense chronology of our globe, from the first dawn of organized existence, up to the period which immediately preceded that new order of things described by the sacred historian. From which facts it is manifest, that, while, on the whole, a *general* progress is evident in the several periods, that progress is interrupted by many exceptions and inversions. We have seen, that, in the earliest vestiges of life, beings of high order, of elaborate organization, and fully developed as to their size, were contemporaneous with the lowest order, and the simplest forms; and, that geology alone does not even determine whether plants or animals existed first. We have seen, that genera, of the highest class of the four great divisions of the animal kingdom, not only existed among the early formations, but appeared *suddenly*, without the existence of any intermediate or connecting links of genera, leaving wide and impassable gaps between their nature and anatomical structure, and that of their contemporaries. We have seen, that the most perfect of the senses, the eye for example, and the most complicated organs, always appear complete, even in the deposits of the earliest strata.

of a gradual transmutation of species. In pretending to describe the series of geological remains, as they occur in the several strata of the different periods, we have observed that he omits from their proper place, important facts, when they militate against his reasoning. For example, in pages 95, 96, when giving an account of the new red sandstone, he omits the fact, that the foot-prints of various species of birds, are visible in this strata. That fact proves the existence of birds *before* ~~terrene~~ reptiles, and is fatal to his theory. True, he subsequently refers to these footprints, but it is to insinuate a doubt respecting the evidence afforded. Again, in pages 128-9, when describing the Eocene period, he omits the monkey tribes from the list of organic remains, because their early appearance is fatal to his theory. These he mentions afterwards. But the exclusion of these remains, as well as the foot-prints of birds, from their proper place, seems artfully done, as if to elude the force of the evidence which the facts present against his theory of a gradual transmutation. The introduction of these remains, *after* the mentioning of others of more recent date, is calculated to confuse and mislead a common reader, especially as his subsequent reasoning in page 149, entirely evades and keeps out of sight the facts in question. This is disingenuous.

The derivation of one species from another was, therefore, physically impossible. While, then, a former argument from geology showed that all species of animal and vegetable existence had a beginning; and while the law of generation carries us down to the first individuals, as the primogenitors of each species, the present argument from geology shows, that those primogenitors must have been brought into existence at once, complete and entire in their nature and attributes—perfect in their symmetry, members, and organization—fitted for their appropriate element, and distinctive habits—and endowed with power to propagate their kind.

Thus, the records of geology, during those vast epochs which preceded the six days creation, unite with all the facts furnished by natural history, during “the period of recorded time,” in utterly disproving the theory which derives one species from another. All the facts which have been examined irresistibly lead to the conclusion, that each species had its original progenitors brought into being immediately and perfectly. Now, this immediate origin of the species can be ascribed to only one of two causes:—either to matter itself, spontaneously and *suddenly* forming perfect beings of the highest as well as the lowest class—as an oak, a cedar, a whale, an eagle, an elephant, a lion, a man; or else we must ascribe their origin to a Divine Creator. The incapacity of mere matter to do this is sufficiently manifest. No history furnishes any record of such a spontaneous production. If such ever had taken place, it would take place now. But it would be *absurd* to dwell upon this absurdity. Its impossibility is admitted even by our opponents; hence their forced resort to the theory of *a slow and gradual* transmutation. That slow and gradual transmutation, however, being disproved, we are irresistibly driven to the only alternative, namely: that the immediate origin of the first beings of each species was produced by the creating energy of a Being distinct from nature and superior to it.

Evidence, refuting the transmutation theory, might be vastly extended from other sources, opened to us by anatomy

and physiology. It might be shown, that the differences in anatomical structure and organization of the species are differences in *kind*, as well as degree, and exclude the possibility of spontaneous transmutation. Cuvier, that great and practical genius in comparative anatomy, maintains, that the universal application of the graduating principle, is philosophically untenable; and he disclaims its rigorous application to the objects even of one and the same kingdom of nature. The *general* progression of vegetable and animal existence, which is witnessed in the earth's strata, might be shown to accord well with the physiological condition of our planet during the several geological epochs, but the essential differences in the organization of the species forbid their evolution of one from another. The diversity of organization, exhibited in the animal tribes, might be shown to be essentially connected with an equal diversity in economy, in instincts, dispositions, propensities, and habits,—a diversity which indeed amounts to direct contrariety and opposition of nature, which it would be just as absurd to suppose, sprung from an evolution of species, as it would be to contend that the tortoise was formed for aerial flights, and the eagle to lead the life of a lobster. Indeed, anatomy and physiology open out innumerable sources of evidence, contradictory to the theory under consideration, and multiply its absurdities *ad infinitum*. Our limits forbid us to enlarge.* The arguments already adduced

* The transmutation theory seeks to support itself by the fanciful analogy of foetal development, alleging "that each animal of a higher kind, in its embryo state, passes through the successive stages of the lower kinds; the character of these stages being taken from the brain and the heart, and man being the highest point of the series. To which we furnish a reply from Dr. Whewell, based upon the authority of a distinguished physiologist, who maintains, that "the brain of the human embryo does *not* resemble at any period, however early, the brain of any mollusk, or of any articulate, which are two of the lower stages. It never passes through a stage, comparable or analogous to a permanent condition of the same organ in an Invertebrate Animal. And, in like manner, the spinal chord in the human vertebræ at no period agrees with the corresponding part of the lower kinds of animals. The moment it becomes visible in the human embryo, it is entirely

present irresistible evidence, that the transmutation system is not merely unsupported by fact, but contradicted by countless myriads of facts, which present themselves in every department of nature and philosophy.

THE ORIGIN OF ANIMALCULA CONSIDERED.

As the spontaneous generation of *superior* orders of existence is proved to be impossible, it will not be out of place to notice the doctrine in reference to the *lowest* animalcula and plants. At the same time, it must be observed, that this subject is quite distinct from the preceding argument: so distinct, indeed, that, even if it could be proved that certain species of animalcula and plants were produced spontaneously, yet, unless it could be shown, that the higher species were derived from the lower species by gradual evolution—unless it could be shown, that these spontaneous animalcula and flora were the progenitors of all the rest, there would remain the *same necessity* for a creating energy, distinct from, and superior to, nature. That derivation has already been shown to be impossible, by a series of palpable facts, and therefore the argument stands complete of itself, and is totally unaffected by the question now under consideration. But, Is there such a thing as the spontaneous production of the most minute and simple forms of animal and vegetable life? Facts, as far as our imperfect organs, aided by the most powerful instruments, can trace them into the secret operations of nature, reply, *There is not*; and, when those operations become too subtil for our senses to pursue them further, analogy comes in to confirm that decision. Cicero says, “*Opinionum commenta delet dies, naturæ judicia confirmat*”—*Time obliterates human opinions,*

dorsal in position; while in mollusks and articulates, a great part, or nearly the whole, is ventral. The same is true of the heart, or centre of the vascular system, which has always a different relative position to the great nervous centre in the Human Embryo, from what it has in any Articulate Animal, and in most Mollusks.”* Thus, the theory falls, because contradicted by the irresistible evidence of facts.

* Indications of a Creator, p. 38-9.

but brings to light the true principles of nature. This seems verified with respect to the present question. Aristotle, and speculators of more modern date, held the doctrine of spontaneous production, but, as true philosophy has advanced—as nature has become subject to the test of experiment, and her operations scrutinized by the use of optical instruments—that opinion has been gradually given up, and may now be said to be abandoned as untenable.

Lyell justly remarks, “We must be on our guard, not to tread in the footsteps of the naturalists of the middle ages, who believed the doctrine of spontaneous generation to be applicable to all those parts of the animal and vegetable kingdoms which they least understood, in direct contradiction to the analogy of all the parts best known to them; and who, when at length they found that insects and cryptogamous plants were also propagated from eggs or seeds, still persisted in retaining their old prejudices respecting the infusory animalcula, and other minute beings, the generation of which had not then been demonstrated by the microscope, to be governed by the same laws.”*

By the advocates of spontaneous production it has been urged, that, from flour and water, from decayed animal and vegetable matter, from stagnant water, &c., numerous animalcula might be produced, where no pre-existing germs could be traced; and, that even in the interior parts and fluids of animals, species of animalcula were formed where it could not be supposed possible, as they alleged, for *ova* to be introduced; and, therefore, such animalcula must be spontaneously produced by a prolific energy inherent in nature. To this specious theory we reply:—

First.—Life is not essential to matter, for there is no life in the unorganized particles of matter, as our senses themselves declare; and it might, therefore, be argued, *à priori*, that matter cannot give that which it does not possess. Nor is life essentially connected with *organized* matter, as our senses also declare; for we often see an animal perfect in its organization when the vital principle is absent. It

* Lyell's Principles, ii., 348.

is, therefore, to say the least, unphilosophical to speak of matter having an inherent power to produce life, for it cannot have a power to produce properties which it does not essentially possess.

Secondly.—The phenomena adduced in opposition to this principle are only *apparent*, and are to be accounted for, by the inadequacy of our senses to follow the operations of nature into all her minute and secret laboratories. As far as our senses are capable of tracing the economy and habits of animals, from the largest to the smallest, all are produced by procreation from the living predecessors of the same species; and recent discoveries by Ehrenberg have proved that the very simplest forms of microscopic animalcula are propagated in the same way. Let us take a few examples: We select the *Infusoria*—animalcula, called by that name from the circumstance of their swarming in all infusions of vegetable or animal substances which have been kept for a sufficient time. They are, in general, far too small to be seen by the naked eye. We select these because they present animal existence in its minutest forms, and, at one time, the mystery of their existence was the stronghold of the theorists of spontaneous production. But, as Roget observes, their fanciful dreams have been dispelled by the important discoveries of Ehrenberg, who, by introducing colouring matter into the liquids where the animalcula reside, and by his unwearied application of the best microscopes, has been able both to detect their organization, and explore the secrets of their physical economy. He has ascertained that the Rotifera (wheel animalcula) have a structure and functions indicative of elaborate organization. He has observed these diminutive beings discharge their *ova* (eggs) in the form of extremely minute globules, and watched these ova expand into animalcula corresponding with the parent, and, having grown to seven times their original diameter, they were distinctly seen to excite currents, and to swallow food. The same diligent observer detected the young of the *Rotifer Vulgaris* perfectly formed, moving in the interior of the parent animalculum, and

brought forth in a living state; thus constituting these viviparous animals, as the former were oviparous. Other species again imitate the hydra, in being what is called *gemma*parous, that is, producing gemmules (like the budding of a plant) which shoot forth from the side of the parent, and are soon provided with cilia (small projecting filaments which they put in motion,) enabling them, when separated, to provide for their own subsistence; although they are of a very diminutive size when thus cast off.* The *Volvox* (a spherical animalculum,) propagates its kind in a singular way. "The germs of this animal are developed in great numbers in its interior, having a globular shape, and visible by the aid of the microscope through the transparent covering; and, while yet retained within the body of the parent, other still minuter globules are developed within these, constituting a third generation of these animals. After a certain period, the young, which have been thus formed, escape by the bursting of the parent *Volvox*, which, in consequence, perishes. Similar phenomena are presented by many of the Infusoria."† The *Monad* is the smallest animalculum which the microscope, of the highest magnifying power, has rendered visible. It was formerly thought to be nothing more than a homogeneous globule of living matter, without organization, but endowed with the single attribute of voluntary motion: and even this property was denied to it by some authors. It was described as "the ultimatum of animality," spontaneously produced by the prolific energy of nature. And Buffon and Lamarck conjectured, that here they saw "an illustration of the natural development of a particle to a mammal, at that point of the process when the organism stands between the vegetable and animal worlds." But Ehrenberg has demonstrated, that this species, the smallest in size, and the simplest in form, of all the Infusoria, has a mouth, a digestive and a reproductive system.‡ Thus, recent discovery puts to flight the reveries of our *Theorists*, and places the microscopic tribes of animalcula under the

* Roget on animal and vegetable physiology, vol. ii., p. 592.

† Ibid, vol. ii., p. 591. ‡ Ibid, vol. ii., p. 584.

same general law of procreation as animals of the greatest magnitude and the most elaborate structure. The Infusoria, to whom a drop of water is an ocean, are derived by propagation as well as the elephant, and the leviathan of the mighty deep.

As to the difficulty arising from the places in, and the circumstances under which, these animalcula are found, it is to be explained by the extreme minuteness of their germs or ova, the tenacity with which they retain the principle of vitality, and their facility of entering into, and combining with, all animal and vegetable substances, where they are held, until circumstances favour their development.

“As to the tenacity of life, it is known of some vegetable seeds, that they will germinate after they have been kept for many centuries, and that such minute organisms as flour-ells, and wheel-animalcula, may not only be reduced to perfect dryness, so that all the functions of life may be suspended for years, yet, without the destruction of the vital principle, but that, in despite of drying *in vacuo*, along with chloride of calcium and sulphuric acid, for twenty eight days, subjected to a heat of 240° F., some of them have been observed to recover. And as to the subtle manner in which germs, thus tenacious of life, obtain access to the interior of living bodies, the probability is, that they can enter wherever air can penetrate. The fact, that minute infusory animalcula can be raised with the watery vapour, and floated for a season in the atmosphere, deserves, as Humboldt remarks in his *Cosmos*, to be well considered in connection with this subject; especially since Ehrenberg has discovered, in the kind of dust-rain, frequently encountered in the neighbourhood of the Cape de Verd Islands, at a distance of 380 miles from the coast, Africa, the remains of eighteen species of siliceous-shelled polygastric animalcula. And if Entozoa—creatures living in the interior parts of other animals—have been found in embryos and in the eggs of birds, so, also, says Tiedemann, have pins and small pieces of flint.”*

* Dr. Harris's *Pre-Adamite Earth*, p. 284.

That bodies so inconceivably numerous, and so extremely minute, as the ova of infusoria, and of other microscopic animalcula, should enter into, and combine with, all other animal and vegetable substances, is what might be expected ; indeed, such a result is unavoidable : and, that animal and vegetable matter, fraught as it is with these *ova*, should, in certain conditions, favour the development of these ova, is only in accordance with the well-known laws of generation in the highest orders of animals. If the warmth of the fowl's body, or heat artificially obtained, developes the principle of life in the eggs of a bird, Why should not a chemical change in animal or vegetable substances develope the principle of life in microscopic *ova*, deposited therein ? and, Why should not many, such as the entozoa species, be developed by other means within the animal system ? These results are in harmony with the known laws and operations of nature, and, from known facts in the history and economy of microscopic animals, might be predicated *à priori*, were there no demonstration of the phenomena.

That experiments should sometimes elicit the appearance of animal or vegetable life, might be expected. It is a result in conformity with known laws. But the experiment does not create the life ; it merely developes the life which lay hidden in the dormant *ova*, until circumstances called it forth. The experiment is equivalent to incubation, which quickens and evolves the seed into animal or vegetable existence. This is further confirmed by the fact, that experiment never results in bringing into view the simple seed or egg, but the perfectly developed animal or plant—a fact which implies the prior existence of the germs or ova from which they have been derived ; and this derivation is further confirmed by another fact—that the animalcula, which are evolved by the experiment, are found to have their body full of eggs or young—thus propagating their species like larger animals, and, like them, being propagated by others of the same race. We need not pursue this subject further. As the eloquent writer before quoted observes, “ The revelations of the microscope were hardly more fatal to the

Brahminical doctrine, that animal life should never be destroyed for food, than they have been to the hypothesis of spontaneous generation." So far, then, as the existence and habits of the smallest animalcula, can be traced by the microscope, they are like those which can be traced by the unaided eye—produced by natural generation.

Now, had our inquiries on the production of animalcula led to a different result—had facts even favoured their spontaneous generation, that result would not have sustained the development theory. It would have left *intact* every preceding argument by which that theory is overthrown. It would still have been demonstrated, that an impassable barrier was placed between one species and another—the hypothesis of transmutation would still have been contradicted by myriads of the plainest facts, in every department of the economy of nature, and the necessity for some originating and creating power, superior to nature, would have been established by irresistible evidence. But when we have evidence which is flatly against the spontaneous theory, when facts and analogy lead to the conclusion, that a creating power is as essential to the production of a *monad*, as to the production of an animal of the most elaborate and complicated structure, we have an additional fact to place on the roll of evidence for a creating power. We are thus enabled to comprehend in our category all animated existence, the least as well as the greatest, the simplest as well as the most complex of all organized beings, and say they all attest their origin to be Divine.

In the last chapter it was proved that all things had a beginning ; it has now been proved that neither animal nor vegetable life began of itself, nor has been produced by any inherent energy in nature. Thus, we have here, again, an effect which nature is not adequate to produce, and, as every effect must have a cause, the corollary necessarily follows, that all *organic* existence has been produced by something distinct from nature, and superior to it.

THE NEBULAR HYPOTHESIS EXAMINED AND REFUTED.

We now proceed another step in the enquiry, in which we propose to show, that the *inanimate* and unorganized masses, composing the vast universe, could not receive their present arrangement and disposition from the operation of any natural law. But here let it be observed, this argument is not essential to the force and conclusiveness of the preceding one. The former proofs of a Creator, are each independent of one another, and equally independent of this; and are equally conclusive and satisfactory, though we should not be able to carry our evidence a step higher. The creation of a man, a quadruped, a reptile, a mollusk, an animalculum, or a plant, each proves a creator beyond dispute, even if we could not demonstrate the creation of the inanimate globular masses, which compose the solar and the stellary systems. But this too can be demonstrated.

It has already been proved, under our first fundamental propositions, that the solar system, and, indeed, the entire universe must have had a *beginning* (see pages 39-58); it has now to be shown that that origin could not spring from matter and its known properties, but must, like all organized existence, be derived from something distant from nature and superior to it. Now, had we no *direct* proof that the universe was created, or brought into its present conformation and revolutions by a Divine hand, *analogy* would present a strong presumptive argument of this fact. Since the existence of all organized forms of animal and vegetable life naturally and necessarily leads to a Creator, it becomes highly probable that the arrangement and disposition of the material universe have had the same origin. If it be impossible for matter spontaneously to originate organized existence, it is exceedingly improbable that it can originate its own modifications, and dispositions, and motions, so as to produce the most perfect mechanism, the most consummate order and harmony, in the arrangement of its several parts. The former being irresistibly proved, there is not one mind among ten thousand who could resist this conclu-

sion to which analogy so clearly conducts us. But, here we are met by the Nebular hypothesis, which proposes to account for the origin of our planet, and, indeed, of the solar system, and all the other systems, by supposing that the atoms, of which the whole material universe is composed, existed primarily in an extremely diffused and attenuated state through immensity.

There are numerous patches of apparently dull cloudy matter, irregularly interspersed through the vault of the heavens. A few of these are faintly visible to the naked eye, but by far the greater portion are revealed only by the telescope. Some of these were always resolvable into clusters of stars, while the others long resisted all attempts, even with telescopes of the highest magnifying power, to reduce them into determinate bodies. Even when Herschel's great reflector was turned to the heavens, many of these nebulae still remained unresolvable; changed indeed in figure, but still presenting the aspect of masses of cloudy vapour. It was, indeed, thought that some of these unresolvable masses were nearer to the earth than others which had yielded to telescopic power; and hence arose, during the close of the last century, various conjectures respecting their nature, and the purposes they served in the universe. Some thought they served to supply the systems of stars in their vicinity, with materials to replenish the waste brought on by the emission of light; but the most magnificent theory, and one which ultimately absorbed other conjectures, was the hypothesis, that these nebulous masses consisted of luminous matter in its primitive condition, ere it had condensed itself into a compact body of spherical form. Assuming this as the first principle in the hypothesis, and assuming, as the second, that the law of gravitation was inherent and constantly operating, the different degrees of luminosity, presented by the various nebulae, were supposed to be characteristic of the different degrees of condensation to which the respective masses had advanced, in their progress from a state of primitive diffusion to solid globes. Hence system-makers arose in *quantum sufficit*. Mechanical laws were conjectured, diagrams were

drawn, and books were written, to show us how our planet had arisen, how systems grew, how constellations of burning suns, attended by revolving worlds and humble satellites, were formed, and how other young systems were growing. At this period, worlds were made, and hurled into immensity, with as much facility as the school-boy casts his tennis-ball. Infidels expounded the theory to show us what Nature could do without a God, and good men took it up to show us how it harmonized with the nature of God and his word. These systems are still fresh, and their drawings and diagrams look beautiful on paper ; but they have no other foundation than the paper on which they are displayed.

This specious generalization is the ultimatum of the development theory. It may be viewed in a two-fold aspect, according to the mode in which it is advocated by its admirers. By some, as we have intimated, it is advocated simply as the mode in which the Creator has produced the universe ; and by others, as the mode in which the universe has been spontaneously produced by the operation of natural law, without the agency of a Creator. Viewed simply as an hypothesis, it is unsupported by the phenomena on which it was founded ; but viewed as an atheistic scheme, it is fraught with palpable contradictions and absurdities.

I. *The Nebular hypothesis is proved, by Astronomical discovery, to be without foundation.*—It stands precisely in the same position with respect to the telescope, as the spontaneous production of animalcula once did to the microscope. Both systems could boast a species of plausibility, while the unassisted eye, or limited and imperfect instruments, were the only means of investigation ; but both alike vanish, as idle dreams before the light of day, when science employs more perfect instruments, and more patient attention. As a conjecture, it rested mainly on the supposition, that vast masses, composing nebular phenomena, were unresolvable from their *nature*, and not from their distance. This was the foundation on which its plausible pretensions were supported, and which gained for it a temporary credit among men. It availed not, how much augmented was the power

which the great Herschel applied. When he turned to the heavens his telescope of forty feet, with its four feet mirror, penetrating into space near 200 times beyond the distance of unaided vision, still these nebular masses were unresolvable. Every other celestial object seemed to yield to its power. Stars which had appeared single, and scarcely visible from their minuteness, were found to be double, triple, quadruple, &c. Myriads, which the human eye had never seen to twinkle from the creation, were beheld powdering the blue canopy of the sky. The faint light of the Milky Way was found to proceed, as Democritus anciently suggested, from millions of brilliant orbs, congregating in the form of an immense belt, suspended in space. Cloudy appearances, whose grey and dusky aspect was invisible, except in the clearest atmosphere, were ascertained to be clusters of stars of diversified forms and splendour. Multitudes of other nebulous masses were brought into view, some light and well defined, but many diffused, sparse, and dull of aspect. These latter, and some faintly visible to the naked eye, would yield to no power which the great astronomer could bring to bear upon them. They sternly resisted all his attempts to resolve them into starry clusters; under the amazing power of his four feet reflector, they still appeared cloudy, vaporous substances; and hence they were supposed to be masses of matter, diverse from other celestial objects, and from their *nature*, not their *distance*, incapable of being resolved by telescopic power. They were supposed, in fact, to be the crude materials, the primordial elements, of nascent worlds. Furnished with these materials, imagination supplied gravitation and mechanical laws, and, by their aid, attempted to account for the origin of the universe.

Thus, the nebular theory was based upon a conjecture, and subsequent discoveries have proved the conjecture was founded in error. Time, the great revealer of events, and expounder of physical law, has demonstrated that the cause, why Nebulæ were unresolvable, was not their *nature*, but their *distance*. Lord Rosse's magnificent telescope has left its noble predecessors far in the rear. With its polished

and perfect disc of six feet, it penetrates into space more than twice the distance of that constructed by Herschel. It carries our observation into the fields of immensity, at least five hundred times farther than the unassisted vision could reach; or, in the other words, it “will descry a single star six thousand times more remote than an average orb of the first magnitude.” The instrument of these tremendous powers, when turned to the heavens, at once revealed the fallacy on which the nebular hypothesis had reposed. Numbers of the masses of nebulous vapour, supposed to be crude materials in their primordial state, were immediately resolved into splendid constellations,—brilliant clusters of stars. The diffused and irregular forms which bid defiance to Herschel’s telescope, have yielded to the more powerful instrument of Lord Rosse, and placed themselves among the other immense systems of stars, too aggregated and numerous to be calculated. The *nebulæ* of Andromeda, and Orion, are among the most celebrated of these modern discoveries—objects so distant that their light reaches not our sphere “until sixty thousand years after it has left the regions where they lie.” The nebula in Orion, which once seemed a shapeless mass of unresolvable matter, is found to be a glorious object—a celestial continent, “dotted all over with wisps, not unlike the flakes of a mackerel sky—each of which must, in itself, be almost a universe—even a SANDHEAP of stars.”*

It is admitted, there are still numbers of *Nebulæ* which refuse to yield to the resolving power of even Lord Rosse’s telescope, but this does not build again the fallen hypothesis. It is a fact which we should rationally expect; a fact, indeed, which must necessarily be successively repeated, after still more wonderful optical achievements, unless man could invent an instrument, which could pierce beyond the utmost verge of creation. Not till then, will it be possible to resolve all the *nebulæ* which would successively appear as the penetrating power of the telescope might augment. No such period, however, can be looked for on our planet, with our limited powers. But the fact which we have to

* Professor Nichol, L.L.D.

regard in our argument, is this:—The nebular hypothesis rested on the supposition, that the cause why nebulous material was not resolvable by the telescope, existed in the *nature* of that material, not in its *distance*; but telescopic observation has now demonstrated that the cause lay, *not* in the nature of the material, but in its *distance*, and that its nature is totally different from that which our system-makers had reckoned upon as the foundation of their hypothesis. The foundation of the theory being thus destroyed, the hypothesis built upon it, falls to the ground.

II. But although scientific discovery dissipates all evidence of the existence of such nebulous matter as was supposed by our theorists, yet, if we admit that such was the primordial state of matter, it can be demonstrated, that there was still an absolute necessity for a Divine Being as its originator and disposer. Matter, when brought into existence, (or if it had eternally existed) must have been in *some* state prior to its present orderly arrangement; and the diffused nebulous state may be admitted, without conceding a particle of evidence for a Creating and Disposing energy. It can be shown, that to consider matter to have been originally in a nebulous state, furnishes as palpable contradictions to atheism, and as conclusive evidence of God's existence, as any other view of the subject.

1. Let us, then, suppose all the matter of which the universe is composed to have been originally in a diffused nebulous state; we shall soon see that this state cannot be defended on atheistic principles, but, that it necessarily involves a Creator; for, either the matter of the universe was eternal, or it was not. If not eternal, it must have been created; and if created, its creation involves the existence of a Creator. But, if it *was* eternal, either the property of gravitation was eternal and co-existent with it, or it was not. If *not*, then gravitation was superadded; and its superaddition involves the existence of a Creator. If gravitation *was* eternal as well as matter, then, as Newton observes, matter could not exist in a gaseous or vapourous state, such as our theorists suppose, but in a compact and solid mass or masses by the

eternal action of the gravitating force.* If it be said the action of the gravitating force was suspended or counteracted; we demand, by what agency? There are but two agencies which can be supposed—either a voluntary or a physical agency. If a voluntary force suspended it, then have we the existence of a voluntary agent or mind, which is the truth contended for. If that agency was physical, we ask, what was it? Is intense heat alleged as the physical agent to counteract the force of gravitation, and keep the primordial particles of matter in a diffused and dissipated state? We reply, we know not how such intense heat could exist among particles, so widely separated and diffused. But, further, this supposed heat was either eternal or it was not. If not, then it was superadded, and its superaddition involves a Creator. Indeed, a state of intense heat is not a permanent state, and could not be eternal. The property of radiation is the constant associate of heat, and the effect of radiation is refrigeration—a reduction of the intensity of heat—and whatever might be the intensity of heat at any given period, radiation would, in time, reduce it to an equilibrium. Thus the supposed state of intense heat, if it ever existed, must have both a beginning and an end, and cannot be eternal. This destroys the atheistic hypothesis. For, in the absence of this heat, gravitation would have condensed the vapourous fluid into solid bodies; and, on the other hand, the presence of this heat, at any time, implies a change, superinduced by an extraneous power, distinct from nature and superior to it. Let the atheist, then, adopt which side of the dilemma he chooses. On either side he is involved in inextricable contradictions. If he hold to the nebular hypothesis, he contradicts his atheism; and if he retain his

* “For if there be innate gravity, it is impossible now for the matter of the earth, and all the planets, and stars, to fly up from them, and become evenly spread throughout all the heavens, without a supernatural power; and certainly that which never can be hereafter without a supernatural power, could never be heretofore without the same power.”—Sir Isaac Newton’s letters to Dr. Bentley; see his life by *Dr. Brewster*.

atheism, he contradicts his nebular hypothesis. He cannot maintain his theory without admitting a Creator.

2. If *any* Nebulous matter exist at the present day, its existence involves the necessity of a Creator. In considering the matter of the universe to be originally nebulous, the supposition of any portion of it being found in a nebulous state at the present day, gives another phase to the argument, and presents an additional evidence of a creating power. For if all the matter of the universe had existed from eternity, it must all have had the *same* condition. The laws of nature acting eternally must have acted *uniformly*, and produced uniform results. Consequently, all the matter subject to the operation of these laws, must be in the same state—either all being in the state of diffused nebulae, or all condensed into solid and compact bodies. The fact that many solid and compact bodies do exist, is a proof of the action of gravitation and cohesion. Now if all the matter of the universe had been *eternally* subject to these laws, *all* would have been compacted and solid, like our own globe, and not any have remained at this day in a diffused nebulous state. If, then, we suppose any matter at this day floating in a nebulous state, diffused and uncondensed, that portion must either have been without the property of gravitation, or it must have been created, and that within a comparatively recent date.* To suppose the former, is to admit that gravitation is not essential to matter, but superadded, and its superaddition involves the necessity of a Creator. To suppose the latter, namely, that nebula *has* been created, is to admit a Creator; and if he created that portion which the hypothesis supposes still to exist in a diffused state, he must have created all the matter of the universe. Thus, to contend for the existence of nebulous matter, is to deny its eternity, to contradict the atheistic theory, and furnish proof of a Creator.

3. The Nebular hypothesis cannot account for the produc-

* The nebulosity of comets is no exception to the argument, for their location, their motions, and their constitution, combine to disprove their eternity.

tion and cosmical arrangements of the planets, as parts of a regular system, without admitting a Creator. There is no natural agency adequate to the spontaneous production of the planets. Supposing the primordial matter of the universe had been *evenly* diffused through space, and the law of gravitation in action, the particles would have moved towards the centre, and congregated into one spherical mass. If the scattered elements had been *unevenly* diffused, they would have formed several, or, perhaps, an immense number of such masses. But how were these to form subordinate bodies, such as planets and moons revolving around their primaries? Our theorists tell us, by the larger masses throwing off portions from their surface, by the action of a centrifugal force. But we reply, there could be no centrifugal force without a rotatory motion, and whence this rotatory motion? The effect of gravity upon the elementary particles of matter, is to draw them in straight lines towards a given centre, and we cannot conceive that such an action could originate a rotatory motion. Its tendency would be, by equal pressure on all sides, to produce perfect rest to the aggregated mass. The Author of the “Vestiges,” and others, in defending their theory, refer us to eddies and whirlpools, formed by the action of running water, as an example of the manner in which a rotatory action might be produced in a nebulous mass of matter; but we can see no analogy between the two cases. In a stream of water, the particles are moving in one direction, and would never produce an eddy, but from some interruption or irregularity produced by various causes—such as a curve in the channel, or the uneven depth of the stream, or some other impediment, which, giving a turn to some particles of water, and these again meeting with resistance from other particles, their yielding nature occasions a circular action, and an eddy is produced. Widely different, however, is the supposed state of nebulous matter, which is assumed to have been “formed of one mass;” “the constitution of the whole uniform, consisting of similar elements,” and “the same physical laws presiding over the whole.”* Now

* Vestiges of Creation, 27.

the particles of matter, under these conditions, evenly diffused through space, and acted upon by gravitation, would gradually and slowly move in straight lines towards the centre of the mass, with the most perfect order and regularity, no impediment arresting their course, or disturbing their action, no opposing currents would be formed, but an equal pressure would be exerted on every radius from circumference to centre.* Under such conditions, we cannot see how any rotatory action could be generated without the interference of another power, independent of matter. But without dogmatically asserting the impossibility of such a result, there are other facts connected with the solar system, which cannot be accounted for by a rotatory motion, supposing it to have been thus generated. For instance, the axes of the planetary bodies and their satellites, are not uniform, but are variously inclined from the plane of the ecliptic. What rotatory motion in the central mass can account for this? The satellites also have their axes inclined from the equator of their primaries. What rotatory action can account for this? It is vain and fanciful to ascribe these phenomena to "undulations in the nebular mass." Where does the theorist derive his undulations, but from his own imagination? Again: the satellites of Uranus, instead of moving from west to east, as the theory would require, have their orbits nearly at right angles to the ecliptic, and move in a direction from east to west. This is not merely an exception to the mechanical result of the theory, it is a *contradiction* to that result. But the author of the "Vestiges," is fertile in invention, and can easily find a cause in his own imagination, even where there is none in nature. In fact, his theory consists of a bundle of hypotheses. It is one hypothesis built upon many. To account

* We need not here suppose the regularity and uniformity of the motion of the atoms to have been disturbed by chemical affinities; for if the law of chemical affinity operated then, it would operate uniformly through the entire mass of nebulous matter, and we cannot see how this law, any more than that of gravitation, nor both combined, could produce a rotation of the entire mass. But both the law of gravitation, and chemical affinity, will hereafter be specially considered.

for the opposite motions of the satellites of Uranus, he has recourse to the supposition of "a curve in the uttermost portion of the nebular mass;" but this is a mere supposition, contrary to all probability, and, unfortunately for the hypothesis, the discovery of Neptune proves that Uranus is not at the uttermost portion, but very far in the interior of the system. It is in vain to fabricate an hypothesis, to account for the fact in question; it is a contradiction to the mechanical result of the centrifugal force to which the theory ascribes it. The production, therefore, of the planets, and their orderly arrangements and motions, must be ascribed to a Power distinct from nature, and mere physical or mechanical law, and infinitely superior to both.

4. The Nebular hypothesis cannot account for one body in the system, being luminous, and all the rest opaque. Here, is another ultimate fact which no philosophy can account for by natural law. The nebular theory contemplates the primitive elements as a mass without any such separation or partial distribution of light and opaque matter. The appropriating, then, of light to one body, and the withholding of it from others, is an effect, but for which, there is no cause to be assigned in natural laws.* Here, then, is another ultimate fact which requires the agency of a Power distinct from nature, and superior to it.

5. The Nebular hypothesis cannot show why the luminous

* We are aware it is conjecture by some, that the planet Neptune is self-luminous. This, however, is at present only a conjecture, but should subsequent discovery prove it to be correct, it will rather strengthen our argument for an arbitrary and not a mechanical power, determining the location of light. For what natural law could cause light to be located only in the centre, and the extreme limits of the solar system, omitting all the bodies which lie between the centre and the circumference. We see the utility of its location in the centre, as the source of light and heat to the nearer planets; and we may see its utility too, in an orb situated at the extreme boundary of the system, on account of its remoteness from the central orb, but no physical law can account for an arrangement so admirable. Therefore, if this conjecture prove correct, it supplies another ultimate fact, which refers us to a Creator.

body should be in the centre of the system. That this is a most advantageous arrangement all admit, but, what natural law can account for it? We have admitted the existence of gravitation, but gravitation cannot account for the central collocation of light; for, of all bodies, light seems to be the least affected by gravitation; and if it be affected by it as much as other matter, opaque bodies have the property of attraction, in proportion to their bulk, equally with the luminous ones. Gravitation belongs, indeed, to all matter, and if light were collocated by its influence, all bodies would be luminous without exception. Motion cannot account for it; for, if the rotation of a globe have any effect upon particles of light, it must be to throw them off from its surface. The action of light itself cannot account for the phenomenon, for, whether light be by emission or undulation, its action is always in straight lines; and, in passing from a spherical surface, it diverges mathematically into a wider area, and, without a directing agency, could never converge to a centre. So far as we can observe the action of light, whether emitted or reflected from a sphere, it is constantly passing *from*, not approaching to, a centre—being constantly diffused, not concentrated. The collocation of light, therefore, in the centre of our system, is contrary to the known laws of light, and, consequently, the placing of the luminous body in the centre, is another ultimate fact which no law of nature can account for, and necessarily requires an Agency distinct from nature, and superior to it.

6. The nebular hypothesis cannot account for the distances, bulk, and density of the planets. The theory assumes, that the more remote from the central orb, the larger the planet in dimensions, and the less in density. The author of the “Vestiges” says, there is a “progressive bulk and diminution in density, from the nearest to the sun to the most distant,” and that “the distances are curiously relative.” Such, we admit, should be the result of the theory, were it correct, but the actual state of the solar system is widely different from our author’s representation. Thus Venus and

the earth are nearly of equal dimensions and density, though greatly different in distance; while Mars, though more remote from the sun, is only about half the size of the earth or Venus, and of about the same density. These facts flatly contradict our author's theory of "progression in bulk, and diminution in density." The same contradiction is seen in the remoter planets. Jupiter is by far the largest planet, though situated in the *middle* of the system. He is several times the size of Uranus, though four times nearer to the sun. Again, the newly discovered planet, Neptune, is said to be 2,900,000,000 miles distant from the sun, or, in round numbers, six times more distant than Jupiter, and yet not more than half the size.* There is, indeed, a most perfect adjustment between the centrifugal and contripetal forces, clearly proving regularity and design, but, there is such a departure from the pretended relation between distance, bulk, and density, as mocks the generalizations of our theorists, and defies every attempt to resolve the collocation of the planets, and the arrangement of the system, into the operation of mere natural law, and compels us to refer the whole to the presiding intelligence and agency of One, distinct from nature, and infinitely superior to it. As Sir Isaac Newton has well observed, "To make such a system, with all its motions, required a cause which understood and compared together the quantities of matter in the several bodies of the sun and planets, and the gravitating powers resulting from thence; the several distances of the primary planets from the sun, and of the secondary ones from Saturn, Jupiter, and the Earth, and the velocities with which those planets could revolve about those quantities of matter in the central bodies; and to compare and adjust all these things together, in so great a variety of bodies, argues the cause

* The existence of this planet was inferred by Adams, of Cambridge, from the perturbations of Uranus, and subsequently discovered by Leverrier. Supposing the dimensions &c., of Neptune to be as yet not accurately and nicely ascertained, yet any allowance for error which can be reasonably made, will still leave results which show a wide departure from the uniformity required by the operation of mere natural law.

to be not blind and fortuitous, but very well skilled in mechanics and geometry ”*

7. To the reasons already adduced many others might be added ; but we shall content ourselves with one, which applies to *every* view which can possibly be taken respecting the origin of the universe. It is this important truth:—There is no hypothesis can be conceived of the origin of the universe, independent of a Creator, if it does not provide for the perpetuity and everlasting continuance of the universe. For, if it be incapable of continuing for ever, it was equally incapable of originating itself. We have before proved that both mechanical and chemical motions must necessarily come to an end, however remote from the present period that end may be. Therefore, the spontaneous origin of the universe was *impossible*; and, by an intellectual necessity, we arrive at the conclusion, that all the worlds, and all the forms of organized existence inhabiting them, must have proceeded from a Divine Creator—a Being essentially distinct from nature, and infinitely superior to it.

We have thus traced the development hypothesis, through all its parts and pretensions, and proved that it is unsupported by facts, and repugnant to philosophy. The evolution of one species from another, is contradicted by the entire length of natural history, though the scroll be unfolded through the dateless eras of geological formations, up to the first period of organic existence. The doctrine of spontaneous generation, is disproved by facts, so far as the eye or the microscope are capable of extending their observations. The nebular hypothesis—the ultimatum of the theory, we have seen, has no foundation in fact; but if true, affords equal refutation of the atheistic theory, as it clearly demonstrates the agency of an intelligent Creator.

The development hypothesis is by far the most specious generalization, which has been conceived in order to dispense with the agency of a Creator, and that being disposed of, we have no other system of absolute atheism, which can claim any lengthened consideration. The hypotheses of

* Sir Isaac Newton's Letter to Dr. Bentley, in 1692.

Chance and Necessity, however have their advocates, and must be briefly noticed.

THE THEORY OF CHANCE REFUTED.

We are told that all the phenomena of Nature are productions resulting from Chance. But we reply, in the first instance, by demanding, What is Chance? It is not a substance, it is not an attribute; and if neither, it cannot be the origin of nature, for it has no substantive existence. If it be replied, Chance is the mode of Nature's operating—that nature is ever active and prolific, and must ever be producing something; but that her operations are such as we see them to be is merely fortuitous. Now, of the truth of this hypothesis we demand a proof. If Chance mean anything, it means the absence of design; and the absence of design can only be proved by the prevalence of universal disorder and confusion; and by the absence of adaptation of means to ends, nay, by the *total* absence of all existence of either means or ends. Will the atheist undertake to show, that there is nothing in nature but a chaos of disorder, confusion, anomalies, and contradictions? Will he, in seriousness, be responsible to show to his disciples, that in all nature there is no such adaptation of means to ends, or, rather, that there are neither means nor ends—that all nature's operations are random, isolated, and unconnected efforts? He is bound to do this, or give up his theory as untenable. He will never undertake this formidable task. Let us, then, look into nature for ourselves, and see if there be no proof of order, harmony, constancy, law, adaptation, and consequent design; and if either our senses, or our reason, can be relied on, we shall find demonstrations of these at every step in our inquiry. When the simple Arab was interrogated, "How do you know there is a God?" He replied, "In the same way that I know that the camel has been in the desert, when I see his footsteps." The rude impressions of a camel's foot he could not ascribe to Chance. We shall soon find traces of the Divine presence and agency

impressed upon every object in the universe, from a world to an atom.

1. *Proofs of order.* Natural history is the history of the nature and economy of animals. Does the philosopher find nothing but disorder and confusion here? On the contrary, Is not the science based upon the regularity, the uniformity, the harmony, and constancy, of nature? The philosopher divides the animal kingdom into classes, orders, genera, species. Is there nothing but disorder here? He observes that each species, from time immemorial, propagates its own kind, and that the individuals in the species are distinguished into sexes, male and female, and that this distinction, in proportionate numbers, is continued from age to age. Is there no regularity or harmony here? He sees each individual of the same species possessing the same organs and members, the same number of eyes, ears, feet, &c., and these situated in the same parts of the body, and performing the same functions respectively. Is there no order or arrangement here? He sees each individual of the same species living in the same element, actuated by the same instincts, and pursuing the same habits. Is there no order or system here? and if order and system be the distinction between Chance and design, What does the universal prevalence of order demonstrate, but the absolute falsehood and folly of the atheistic hypothesis.

2. *Constancy.—Fixed Laws.* There are numerous fixed laws in the universe, and every such law affords proof of order and constancy. For, What is a natural law, but a mode or rule, according to which Nature operates with uniformity and constancy? Thus gravitation pervades all matter, all individual atoms, and all worlds, and operates according to a fixed principle—its force being invariably determined by the quantity of matter a body contains, and the square of its distance from another body. Does this fact reveal nothing but disorder? Could Newton have successfully applied this principle in resolving the great problem of the mechanism of the universe, if nature's operations had been random and fortuitous? Light moves with a determined amount of

velocity, and always in straight lines, whether emitted or reflected—whether it diverge or converge; and when reflected it always rebounds, according to a definite angle of incidence. Does this fact exhibit nothing but confusion? The laws of motion are constant and invariable, and hence the regularity of planetary revolutions; so regular, indeed, are these motions, that they conform to the most rigid principles of mathematics. Their regularity furnishes *data* from which the mathematician can ascertain the relative position of the planets for ages back, and predict with absolute certainty, the moment of an eclipse for ages to come. Indeed, it was by this mathematical regularity that the celebrated Adams and Leverrier inferred, that the perturbations of Uranus indicated the existence of another planet beyond that orb; and, shortly after, the vigils of astronomers found the stranger in that vicinity, where mathematics had determined his location. Thus, Neptune was added to the spheres of the solar system. Could the discovery have been made if nature had operated by chance?

It has been said, God works by geometry, and it is certain the motions of the heavenly bodies are our standard of perfect order, perfect time, perfect regularity. The most perfect chronometer, constructed by man, is a specimen of disorder, compared with the precision, the perfect exactness, of the grand horologe of nature. We ask, Is this regularity an evidence of Chance? The laws of chemical affinity, attraction, repulsion, and combination, are definite, fixed, and uniform. The materials of nature can be resolved into about fifty-five constituent elements; and these, in forming compound substances, enter into combination with each other, not at random, or indifferently, but on the mysterious principle of elective affinity, and in fixed and definite proportions. This rule is invariable, and all the ingenuity or power of man can neither alter the rule, nor force a departure from it. There is the same constancy and uniformity in the laws of sound, atmospheric pressure and elasticity, in heat, combustion, refrigeration, evaporation, rarefaction, solution, and decomposition. Indeed, all the sciences are based on this

undeviating regularity in the laws and operations of nature. Optics, on the constancy of the nature and the laws of light ; astronomy, on the constancy of the laws of gravitation and mechanical forces ; chemistry, on the constancy of the nature and properties of matter ; anatomy, on the constancy of organic structure in the species respectively ; so uniform, indeed, that the celebrated Cuvier, from a fossil fragment could accurately determine the entire form, size, proportions, and habits of the animal to which it once belonged. He could thus build up the structure of species which had been extinct for myriads of ages, and determine their habits, whether graminivorous or carnivorous, whether aquatic or land animals. And this he could do because of the order, uniformity, and constancy of Nature's laws and operations, in all ages past as well as at present.*

It is a proof of the same order and constancy, that the same physical causes uniformly produce the same effects, and that not only within the period of human history, but through all those remote cycles of past duration, which reach down to the dateless period when the ancient granite rocks were formed, constituting the primitive foundations of the earth. Even the most sudden and violent changes which, at times, appear to invade and break in upon the quiet and uniform operations of nature, and convulse the globe, are subject to the same laws of order, regularity, and system. The eruption of a volcano is as much the effect of natural law as the budding of a primrose ; the heaving and rending of an earthquake, as the rising of the morning star ; the fierce and destructive hurricane, as the gentle zephyr of a summer's eve. Indeed, all those apparently fickle and fitful meteoric changes, which consist of varieties in atmospheric temperature, in the humidity and dryness of the weather, in the ascent of vapour, the descent of mists and showers, hail and snow, in the dulness and brightness of the sky, and even in the fantastic drapery of the clouds, are regulated by fixed and unalterable laws. There is not a particle of dust that floats at random ; there is not a change

* See Cuvier's "Theory of the Earth," pp. 83, 93.

but it is an effect; there is not an effect but it has a definite cause; and there is not a cause but which operates according to fixed laws. Atoms and worlds, the events of a moment, and the stupendous results of ages; the minutest details of Nature's facts, as well as the most magnificent systems of congregated worlds, are all under laws which operate uniformly, constantly, and universally. Two thousand four hundred years ago, the celebrated Pythagoras applied the science of numbers and of music to general physics. He considered the order of the universe so complete, that it exemplified the most perfect regularity of numbers, and the most perfect harmony of sounds. Modern science has demonstrated, that, if "the music of the spheres" is to be ascribed to the poetry of the Sage's imagination, the harmony of numbers—of adjustment by weight, measure, and quantity, in every part of the universe, is a doctrine of sound philosophy. Order and harmony pervade all nature; and if these are opposed to confusion, and confusion be the offspring of Chance, there is no such thing as Chance in the universe.

3. *Evidences of Design.* Equally conclusive is the evidence of design arising from *adaptation*. Chance has no end to accomplish, no purpose, either immediate or final, to obtain, and therefore employs no means. The atheist, in speaking of nature, can never use the word *adaptation*. If he does, he involves himself in contradiction; and if he does not, nature herself contradicts him by myriads of facts. Nature tells him his feet were made to walk, and he uses them for that purpose; yet he denies their adaptation! Nature tells him that his teeth were made to masticate food, and he uses them for that purpose; yet he denies their adaptation! Nature informs him that his eyes were formed for sight, and he uses them for that purpose; yet denies their adaptation! The science of optics tells him that if either the laws of light, or the structure of the eye, had been different from what they are, he would have been blind; and yet he denies the adaptation of one to the other! Astronomy tells him that if the centripetal and centrifugal forces had not been balanced with mathematical exactness, the

earth could not have been an inhabited world ; and yet he denies the adaptation of the one to the other ! Further proofs of adaptation will be given hereafter. Let these suffice for the present argument. Only remarking, just now, that so prevalent is the manifestation of design in the economy of nature, that scientific men, in pursuing their investigations, have found the postulate—"Everything has a purpose to accomplish,"—is an important guide to the discovery of truth—a principle which every new discovery honours, in its turn, by an additional verification. Nature is one great system of means and ends. She never works but for a definite result ; she produces no result but by means ; she never employs her means without success ; and this unvarying success flows from the perfect adaptation of those means. In the face of all this, the atheist may still deny the existence of *adaptation* ; but let him not pretend to be governed by reason ; never more let him speak of the Christian's credulity ; never more let him demand evidence of the truth of religion ; and never more let him speak of the parts of a watch as being adapted to indicate time, nor the construction of a telescope as adapted to the eye, nor the locomotive engine as adapted to facilitate human intercourse. As his mode of thinking is contradictory to nature, and axiomatic truth, let his vocabulary exhibit the same perversion of language as his mind does of reason, and then, however unfit for the society of rational men, he will be understood by those of his own class.

4. *Order, law, and adaptation, are not to be resolved into the possibilities of Chance.* There is but another aspect that we know of in which Chance has been presented. It is this :—that order itself is one of the possibilities of Chance ; and, as there is a boundless range of possibilities in which nature may happen to operate, the present constitution of things may be one result of those blind, but multifarious operations ; and, that as nature has had eternity in which to ply the energies of her vast laboratory, the present state of the universe has been produced as one out of an infinite number of preceding states. This final subterfuge of the

patrons of Chance is soon exploded. We have only to apply the principles and facts already before us. If nature operates fortuitously, without design, without ends or means, though her operations may produce the appearance of order in a few isolated cases, she can never produce a *system of universal order*, much less can she perpetuate that order with undeviating and mathematical certainty through the whole history of her operations. As the result of the fortuitous operations of antagonist forces, chaotic disorder and confusion must always be predominant, if not universal; and the *appearance* of any orderly construction, or any regular sequence of events and facts, for even a limited portion of time or space, would not bear the proportion of one to a million. Accordingly, if nature had operated by Chance, the universe must always have abounded with an immense preponderance of malformations, misshapen prodigies; and geology, which records her past deeds, must exhibit, at every step, the absence of law and order—the thick strata must indeed be built up with monumental proofs that adaptation and design never ruled. But, while the prevalence of order in the present state of the universe overturns this notion with overwhelming force, so the strata of former geological periods carry the contradiction down through all past ages.

Geology has unrolled to us the volume of nature, and we can read the history of her operations, from the most complicated mixtures and combinations, down to the simplest element, and from the present date, down to the period when the earliest formations were produced; and both past and present events unite in showing that Chance has no place except in the brain of the atheist, whom both nature and reason disown. If the complicated structure of the human body gives evidence of order and adaptation now, so does the structure of animals and plants in all ages past: and if we descend to the period when neither animals nor plants existed—ere organization had been commenced—we find, even in the constitution of the granitic rock, the operation of law and order, of chemical affinities and combinations,

carried on in definite proportions. Dr. Buckland remarks : “The mineralogist has ascertained that granite is a compound substance, made up of three distinct and dissimilar mineral bodies, quartz, felspar, and mica, each presenting certain regular combinations, of external form and internal structure, with physical properties peculiar to itself. And chemical analysis has shown, that all these several bodies had a prior existence, in some more simple state, before they entered on their present union in the mineral constituents of what are supposed to be the most ancient rocks accessible to human observation. The chrystallographer has also further shown, that the several ingredients of granite, and of all other kinds of chrySTALLINE rocks, are composed of molecules, which are invisibly minute, and that each of these molecules is made up of still smaller and more simple molecules, every one of them combined in fixed and definite proportions, and affording, at all the successive stages of their analysis, presumptive proof that they possess geometrical figures. These combinations and figures are so far from indicating the fortuitous result of accident, that they are disposed according to laws the most severely rigid, and in proportions mathematically exact.

“The atheistic theory, assuming the gratuitous postulate of the eternity of matter and motion, would represent the question thus: All matter, it would contend, must, of necessity, have assumed some form or other; and, therefore, may *fortuitously* have settled into any of those under which it now actually appears. Now, on this hypothesis, we ought to find all kinds of substances presented, occasionally, under an infinite number of external forms, and combined in endless varieties of indefinite proportions; but observation has shown, that chrySTALLINE mineral bodies occur under a fixed and limited number of external forms, called *secondary*; and that these are constructed on a series of more simple *primary* forms, which are demonstrable by cleavage and mechanical division, without chemical analysis.”*

When the chrystallographer can proceed no further in

* Dr. Buckland's Bridgewater Treatise, vol. i., chap. 23.

the division of these minute atoms by mechanical cleavage or separation, the chemist takes them up, and subjects them to chemical analysis. Here, still, he finds the prevalence of law, order, constancy, and design. When his laboratory has reduced the particles of matter to their ultimate elements, and analysis can proceed no further, he finds new evidences of system and law. For, in the elementary atoms, there is no fortuitous or promiscuous combination; but the particles, being endued with elective affinities, enter into union with each other only in fixed and definite proportions.* Dr. Prout, after elaborately proving and illustrating this fact, now so well known and so generally admitted, remarks, "We assert, without fear of contradiction, that the molecular constitution of matter is decidedly artificial; or, to use the words of a celebrated writer, 'that the molecules of matter have all the characteristics of a manufactured article.' Chance, therefore, has no more place in the elementary particles of matter, than it has in the construction of the most elaborate and complicated organization.

"When we have in this manner traced back all kinds of mineral bodies to the first and most simple condition of their compound elements," says Dr. Buckland, "we find these elements to have been at all times regulated by fixed and universal laws, which still maintain the mechanism of the material world. In the operation of these laws, we recognize such direct and constant subserviency of means to ends, so much harmony, and order, and methodical arrangement, in the physical qualities, and proportional quantities, and chemical functions, of the inorganic elements, and we further see such evidence of intelligence and foresight, in the adaptation of these primordial elements, to an infinity of complex uses, under many future systems of animal and vegetable organizations, that we can find no reasonable account of the existence of all this beautiful and exact machinery, if we accept not that which refers to the antecedent Will and Power of a Supreme Creator."

* The merit of this important discovery is ascribed to Dr. Dalton, one of the most distinguished chemists of modern times.

5. Before we dismiss the absurdity involved in the hypothesis, that things have been produced by Chance, it is proper to remark, that this absurdity is rendered the more strikingly apparent by another fact, which geology and natural history attest, in respect to organized existence—namely, that the original primogenitors of each species of animals were produced *immediately* and *suddenly*. That, as no species has been evolved from another, the originals, from which the whole progeny have descended, must have been brought into being at *once*, by a distinct act of creation. Thus, if Chance be the author of nature, it at once produced an eagle, a lion, a man, &c. The absurdity of which is too gross, and the impossibility too obvious, to require further animadversion.

The sum of our evidence in refutation of the sophism of chance, then, is this: Chance is another name for confusion and disorder; but the universe is full of order and harmony. Chance is expressive only of fitfulness and inconstancy; but the universe exhibits every where fixed laws, producing the most perfect regularity and uniformity. Chance has no purpose, no end to accomplish, and employs no means—every thing is isolated and operates at random; but the universe is replete with design and adaptation—nothing is isolated, every thing, great and small, every thing in the infinite multitude of objects which exist, is a part of one great system of means and ends. This order, system, law, constancy, and universal adaptation, pervade not only the present and past history, which chronicles the period of Mosaic times, but equally so those vast geological cycles which belong to the remotest ages of our planet; and this harmony, system, and rule, apply not only to those masses called worlds, but to all beings therein, and to all atoms composing them, and to all those ethereal elements which escape both the eye and the microscope, and can be examined only by chemical analysis. Thus, Chance has no place in creation, no existence in time.

Cicero, appealing to the common sense of mankind, asks, “Can any thing done by chance have all the marks of

design? Four dice may, by chance, turn up their aces; but do you think that four hundred dice, thrown by chance, will turn up four hundred aces? Colours thrown upon canvas, without design, may have some similitude to a human face; but do you think they might make as beautiful a picture as of the Coan Venus? A hog, turning up the ground with his nose, may make something of the form of the letter A; but do you think that a hog might describe, on the ground, the Andromēcha of Ennius? Carneades imagined that, in the stone quarries at Chios, he found, in a stone that was split, a representation of the head of a little Pan or sylvan deity. I believe he might find a figure not unlike; but surely not such a one as you would say had been formed by an excellent sculptor, like Scopas. For so, verily, the case is, that chance never perfectly imitates design.* Thus, of old, a heathen could show the absurdity of supposing chance to be capable of producing a single object indicative of design, but modern discoveries in science have demonstrated the idea of chance, as the cause of the universe, to be a conception not only of an absurdity, but of an absolute impossibility.

If a man should say, that all the theorems of Euclid had been constructed by accident, and not by a man; or that all the letters, composing the volumes of poetry, history, science, and literature, in the Alexandrian library, or in all the libraries in the world, might have fallen into their orderly location by accident, he would not conceive an impossibility more gross and palpable, than the man who proposes chance as

* Quidquam potest casu esse factum, quod omnes habet in se numeros veritatis? Quattuor tali jacti, casu Venereum efficiunt. Num etiam centum Venereos, si ecce talos jeceris, casu futuros putas? Adpersa temere pigmenta in tabula, oris lineamenta effingere possunt; num etiam Veneris Coae pulchritudinem effingi posse adpersione fortuita putas? Sus rostro si humi A litteram impresserit, num propterea suspicari poteris, Andromacham Ennii ab ea posse describi? Fingebat Carneades, in Chiorum lapicidinis saxo diffisso caput exstitisse Panisci. Credo, aliquam non dissimilem figuram, sed certe non talem, ut eam factam a Scopa diceres. Sic enim profecto se res habet, ut nunquam perfecte veritatem casus imitetur.—Cicero "*De Divinatione*," lib. i., cap. 13.

the author of universal order and harmony through all ages. The planetary motions, themselves, are so clearly indicative of a Creator, that La Place said respecting them, "It is infinity to unity, that this is not the effect of chance." And if the phenomena of the solar system alone, viewed astronomically, justified such an assertion from the great philosopher, the "infinity" becomes, in a manner, multiplied by endless infinities, when extended through all organized existence down to the molecular constitution of matter.

When Aristippus was shipwrecked on the island of Rhodes, seeing, accidentally, a geometrical diagram drawn upon the sand, "Courage, my friends," said he; "here are the traces of men." The sight of one geometrical diagram was enough to evince the existence of an intelligent being as its author. "God geometrizes," says Plato; yet, that philosopher saw but a page of the divine problems, compared with the number which modern science has laid before us, in the volume of the Creator's operations—a number which cannot be numbered. From the petal of a flower, to congregated worlds; and from congregated worlds, down to the minutest atom of ancient granite, which the chrystallographer and chemist have examined, geometrical figures and mathematical proportions obtain, indicating the mind and the hand of infinite intelligence. No mind, capable of appreciating an argument, can resist the clearness and the force of evidence which nature every where furnishes against the possibility of chance. An interesting illustration of the effects of this evidence upon the mind of a Sceptic, is graphically related by himself:—

"Some years ago, I had the misfortune to meet with the fallacies of Hume, on the subject of causation. His specious sophistries shook the faith of my reason, as to the being of a God, but could not overcome the repugnance of my heart to a negation so monstrous; and, consequently, left that infinite restless craving for some point of fixed repose, which atheism not only cannot give, but absolutely and madly disaffirms.

"One beautiful evening in May, I was reading by the light of a setting sun in my favourite Plato. I was seated

on the grass, interwoven with golden blooms, immediately on the chrystal Colorado of Texas. Dim, in the distant west, arose, with smoky outlines, massy and irregular, the blue cones of an off-shoot of the Rocky Mountains.

“I was perusing one of the Academician’s most starry dreams. It laid fast hold of my fancy without exciting my faith. I wept to think it could not be true. At length I came to that startling sentence : ‘God geometrizes.’ ‘Vain reverie!’ I exclaimed, as I cast the volume at my feet. It fell close by a beautiful little flower, that looked fresh and bright, as if it had just fallen from the bosom of a rainbow. I broke it from its silvery stem, and began to examine its structure. Its stamens were five in number; its great calyx had five parts; its delicate coral base five, parting with rays, expanding like the rays of the Texas star. This combination of five in the same blossom appeared to me very singular. I had never thought on such a subject before. The last sentence I had just read in the page of the pupil of Socrates was ringing in my ears—“God geometrizes.” There was the text, written long centuries ago; and here this little flower, in the remote wilderness of the west, furnished the commentary. There suddenly passed, as it were, before my eyes a faint flash of light—I felt my heart leap in my bosom. The enigma of the universe was open. Swift as thought I calculated the chances against the production of those three equations of five in only one flower, by any principle devoid of reason to perceive number. I found that there was one hundred and twenty-five chances against such a supposition. I extended the calculation to two flowers by squaring the sum last mentioned. The chances amounted to the large sum of fifteen thousand six hundred and twenty five. I cast my eyes around the forest: the old woods were literally alive with those golden blooms, where countless bees were humming, and butterflies sipping honey-dews.

“I will not attempt to describe my feelings. My soul became a tumult of radiant thoughts. I took up my beloved Plato from the grass, where I had tossed him in a fit of

despair. Again and again I pressed him to my bosom, with a clasp tender as a mother's around the neck of her sleeping child. I kissed alternately the book and the blossom, bedewing them both with tears of joy. In my wild enthusiasm I called to the little birds on the green boughs, thrilling their cheery farewells to departing day—'Sing on, sunny birds; sing on sweet minstrels! Lo! ye and I have a God.'"

The individual, who thus describes the process of his conviction of the great truth in question, was not an ignorant or credulous person. It is evident he was a man of education—a scholar, a mathematician, a skilful reasoner; one who could detect a sophism, and carefully weigh an argument. But the geometrical argument presented by the petals of a flower is one which runs through the universe, multiplied by every organized substance, and even the atomic particles which constitute the chrystalline rocks, and all chemical combinations, until the numbers run into infinities. Every animal and vegetable—every star in the firmament, and daisy in the wilderness—every constellation above, and every particle of sand below, and every floating atom in the universe, declares chance an impossibility as well as an absurdity, and proclaims a creating and presiding Power.

THE HYPOTHESIS OF NECESSITY REFUTED.

The theory of necessity is not, indeed, worthy of serious refutation, except to expose the flimsy pretexts and shallow sophisms which infidelity employs, to uphold its baseless fabric, and to present another example of the manner in which those enlightened sons of reason and philosophy can dispense with demonstration when arguing against religion, and be content with the most extravagant hypothesis. It is no small evidence of the folly of Atheism, that its arguments are suicidal: it seeks to reach the same conclusion by opposite arguments—arguments which mutually destroy each other. Thus, while, at one time, it ascribes the phenomena of the universe

to Chance, at another time, it ascribes the same results to Necessity. No two arguments can be more antagonistic to each other than Chance and Necessity: for, while chance assumes a state of chaotic disorder, the pretext of necessity is assumed on the universal prevalence of order, constancy, and uniformity. This subterfuge may, however, be disposed of in various ways.

1. If this necessity exist, it must be in the original particles of matter, but the existence of matter itself was not absolutely necessary. The Atheist himself admits that it is possible to conceive matter not to have existed at all; and what may thus be conceived of, is a *contingency*, not a necessity; and what is itself, in its very nature, a contingency, can never be made the foundation of an argument for necessity. The argument, therefore, is unsound from its foundation. But, if matter were admitted to be of necessary existence, still the argument for Necessity, as the cause of the orderly arrangement and constitution of the universe, is false: for,

2. If the present state of the universe be by an absolute necessity, then must this state have been eternal. But we have before demonstrated that it had a beginning, and, on this ground, both necessity of existence, and necessity of operation, fall to the ground.

3. If the existence of the universe, as it is, be by an absolute necessity, then must it be *unchangeable*. But facts already adduced, abundantly show that it *has* changed, that it is *now* changing every moment, and that it will continue to change hereafter, and ultimately be destroyed. If it be said, that the changes of the universe are themselves necessary from the *laws* which are in operation, and which laws are equally necessary, We reply, this is a plain contradiction; for, if the laws themselves are necessary, and therefore eternal, they must eternally have produced the *same* effects they do now, and must continue to produce the *same* effects through all eternity to come. Necessity and change are incompatible. Uniformity and immutability are essentially included in the idea of an eternal, physical necessity. The

existence, therefore, of change in every part of nature, and in all ages of its history, contradicts the notion of immutability, and thus overturns the notion of necessity.

4. *Finally*, the notion of necessity is refuted by the fact previously established in the argument from Geology—namely, that the original progenitors of each species were brought into existence *suddenly*, at *once*. Not, as Lucretius and others describe, from bulbs, generated slowly by the prolific earth, but, as before proved, by an agency, which at once gave to each species existence, symmetry, and organization, as perfect as that which they have at this hour. A fact as fatal to necessity as it is to chance. He who can conceive of either Necessity or Chance, producing instantaneously a perfect oak, a perfect eagle, a perfect lion, or a perfect man, has mental properties which disqualify him for rational society.

Look at these diverse theories in whatever aspect we may, the absurdities, contradictions, and impossibilities they involve, meet us at every step. In our argument, we have given them the advantage of every possible supposition, and yet, we find, they cannot be sustained. As Dr. Bentley observes—"Though universal matter should have endured from everlasting, divided into infinite particles, in the Epicurean way, and though motion should have been coeval and co-eternal with it; yet, those particles or atoms, could never of themselves, by omnifarious kinds of motion, whether fortuitous or mechanical, have fallen or have been disposed into this or a like visible system;" but this has been established by facts and evidence, which the eye or mind of Bentley never knew. We are thus irresistibly conducted to the conclusion embodied in the proposition which stands at the head of this chapter—namely, That the universe, as an effect, must have a cause, and the unoriginated Being must be its cause. In our First proposition it was proved That every effect must have a cause, and the cause must be adequate to the effect. In our Second proposition it was proved, That there must be something which is not an effect, but unoriginated and eternal. In our Third proposition it was proved,

That the universe is an effect, and cannot be the unoriginated Being in question. And now, in our Fourth proposition, we have proved, That the universe could not originate itself from any elementary particles of matter, supposing them and their existing laws to have been eternal; nor from Chance; nor from Necessity: and hence we are carried to the conclusion, that it was created by a Being distinct from nature, and infinitely superior to it, and this Being, as the cause of all things, must himself be uncaused and eternal.

CHAPTER VII.

FIFTH PROPOSITION :—THE ORIGINATOR OF THE UNIVERSE MUST BE A CONSCIOUS, INTELLIGENT BEING, BECAUSE THE EFFECT IS THE PRODUCT OF INTELLIGENCE AND DESIGN.

“ Shall the work say of him that made it, He made me not? or, shall the thing framed say of him that framed it, He had no understanding? ”
—Isaiah, xxix., 16.

OUR preceding arguments have carried us to the logical necessity of admitting the existence of *some* Being, distinct from matter, as the author of the universe. Our present proposition is, that this Author is a conscious and intelligent Being. This postulate rationally springs from the application of our first proposition—namely, That while every effect must have a cause, that cause must be adequate to the effect. An effect may be inferior to the cause—it may be infinitely inferior in its properties—but a cause can never be inferior to the effect. Hence, it follows, that the existence of *life* in the creature, demonstrates the existence of Life in the Creator; the existence of *consciousness* in the creature, demonstrates the existence of consciousness in the Creator; the existence of intelligence in the creature, and the various manifestations of design in the works of creation, demonstrate the existence of intelligence in the Creator; and life, consciousness, and intelligence, are the attributes of a real personal existence. Thus, evidences of the Creator’s personal existence multiply with every view we take of his works, for there is no perfection in the creature, but what is derived from the Creator; and whatever perfection he may impart to others, he possesses himself. The evidence of personal existence from the manifestations of an intelligent and designing mind are too numerous and interesting to be cursorily passed by.

In reference to the evidences of design, Paley, with his usual clearness and judgement, observes, “contrivance, if established, appears to me to prove everything we wish to prove. Amongst other things, it proves the personality of the Deity, as distinguished from what is sometimes called ‘nature,’ sometimes called a ‘principle;’ which terms, in the mouths of those who use them philosophically, seem to be intended to admit and express an efficacy, but to exclude and to deny a personal agent. Now, that which can contrive, which can design, must be a person. These capacities constitute personality, for they imply consciousness and thought. They require that which can perceive an end or purpose, as well as the power of providing means and directing them to their end. They require a centre in which perceptions unite, and from which volitions flow; which is mind. The acts of a mind prove the existence of a mind; and in whatever a mind resides, is a person.”

PROOFS OF INTELLIGENCE. In this argument, we regard nature as we regard any work of art. Both are effects, and both are effects produced by a designing, intelligent mind. “Every house is builded by some man, but he that built all things is God.” In the present advanced state of science, the latter proposition has the clearness and the force of an axiomatic truth, as well as the former. In the construction of a house there is evidence of the existence of an intelligent architect, and in the construction of the universe there is evidence, too, of the existence of an intelligent mind;* the difference being only in this, that the evidence in the latter case is indefinitely multiplied, and the character of the mind is infinitely superior.

It is felt to be as much an intellectual necessity to ascribe the manifestations of design to a *designing mind*, as it is to ascribe any effect to some cause. Even the atheist uniformly does this when speaking of the works of art; and if he refuse to refer the works of nature to a designing mind, he contradicts himself, and involves himself in the most palpable inconsistencies. Yet, this inconsistency is defended

* Cicero De Divinatione, lib. ii., 15—19.

by the subtle and sophistical David Hume. This apostle of infidelity argues, that our mental habit of referring any work of art to an artist, is the result of observation and experience, but the same cannot be pleaded respecting the works of nature—that we have *seen* a man in the act of constructing a house, but we have never *seen* a Deity engaged in the construction of a world, and, therefore, though it be logical to ascribe a building to a man, we have no right to ascribe the universe to a God. We give his own words: “If we see a house, we conclude, with the greatest certainty, that it had an architect or builder, because this is precisely that species of effect which we have experienced to proceed from that species of cause. But, surely you will not affirm that the universe bears such a resemblance to a house, that we can, with the same certainty, infer a similar cause, or that the analogy is here entire and perfect. The dissimilitude is so striking, that the utmost you can here pretend to is a guess, a conjecture, a presumption, concerning a similar cause; and how that pretension will be received in the world, I leave you to consider.” Again he asks, “Can you pretend to show any such similarity between the fabric of a house and the generation of a universe? Have you ever seen nature in any such situation as resembles the first arrangement of the elements? Have worlds ever been formed under your own eye? And have you had leisure to observe the whole progress of the phenomena, from the first appearance of order to its final consummation? If you have, then cite your experience, and deliver your theory?”*

This sophism is very transparent, and susceptible of a two-fold refutation.

1. It has already been demonstrated that the universe cannot spring from matter and its laws, but must have an author—a Creator. This question is settled, and, therefore, Hume’s objection is obsolete. We refer to the marks of intelligence, not to prove the *existence* of a Creator—that has been already effected by another process of argument; but we refer to the marks of intelligence to prove the *character*

* Hume’s Dialogues concerning Natural Religion.

of the Creator. It being established that the works of nature have an Author, so far as those works exhibit intelligence, they exhibit the intelligence of their Author, just as the works of an architect, an engineer, a mathematician, or a writer, exhibit the intelligence of their respective authors. Creation is God's work, and exhibits his mental properties.

2. The sophism of Hume may be refuted, also, from its own absurdity. The sum of his objection has been already stated ; it is this :—that we cannot reasonably conclude the universe to have an intelligent author, because we did not see him in the act of creating it ! To sustain this, he assumes, that we are not to refer any work of art to man, unless either we have seen it produced by man, or else the work has a most *intimate resemblance* to such as we have seen produced by man. Now, our experience contradicts this absurdity every day. In the vast variety of objects of art and manufacture, which are presented to our notice, there is as great a disparity in shape, character, kind, material, and use, as can well be conceived ; and of these how few people have *seen* all such fabricated by man ? And yet, who, among all the millions of our race, would hesitate to pronounce them all the work of man ? A modern volume printed in English characters, and a vellum scroll written in Hebrew, are very dissimilar ; yet, who, that understands them, would deny that each was the work of man. Surely, no one except Mr. Hume and his disciples, who, it seems, would rather practise this absurdity, than allow nature to have a Divine author. In the construction of a ship and a chronometer, of a steam-engine and a theodolite, there is a sufficient disparity, and, though comparatively few persons have *seen* any of them constructed, there is not a sensible man, (indeed, there is not an atheist) on the surface of the earth, who could be found to maintain that either one or the other was not the work of man. There must be a reason for this fact. If every work of art is thus ascribed to man, there must be some common ground or reason for it. The reason is simply the one which is embodied in our first proposition, “ That every effect must have a cause, and every cause must be adequate to the effect.” So, then,

if the effect exhibit contrivance, it must have a contriver; and if it exhibit design, it must have a designing mind for its author.

3. The mental habit, nay, the intellectual necessity, of inferring an intelligent author from the manifestation of design in any work of art or manufacture, is so uniform in its operation, that the *measure or degree* of a man's intelligence is estimated by his productions. It is thus we judge of the degree of the genius and mental cultivation of an individual or a nation. Thus, if a traveller find the ruins of an African kraal, consisting of rude and comfortless huts, he determines that its inhabitants were in a low state of civilization; but if he discover the ruins of an ancient city, as Pompeii, or Herculaneum, with numerous fragments of beautiful pillars, temples, palaces, and monuments of elaborate sculpture and architecture, he infers that its inhabitants were a polished and highly cultivated people. On the same principle, we assign a higher order of intelligence to the original inventor of a science, than to him who merely comprehends it when explained to him. There is intelligence necessary to understand the various parts, relations, and uses of a complicated machine, but there was more intelligence required for its origination. There is no ordinary intelligence required thoroughly to understand all the problems of Euclid, but a far higher faculty is displayed in originating those problems, and the theorems by which they are demonstrated. There is intelligence, and, indeed, a high order of intelligence, requisite to understand the discoveries which some men have made in astronomy; but a still higher order is conceded to those gifted minds whose sagacity has pierced into the hidden principles and truths, and led their contemporaries and successors into untrodden paths of scientific discovery. Yet, there is no truth in philosophy discovered by man but what previously existed in nature. All man's knowledge is borrowed; there is no originality here. The first discoverer of any truth gets it but second-hand. If he is sagacious, and makes some magnificent discoveries, the fact implies that there is another mind vastly wiser than his own, whose skill

had previously originated the truths he has discovered, and which has been employing those truths for ages, and working out great practical results from their application. Nature is always man's instructor, and, however far his mind may proceed in receiving her lessons, ultimate facts are constantly reminding him that he is only on the margin of the vast ocean of truth, which lies still unexplored before him, and all that truth implies the existence of a mind in which the whole was originally preconceived.

4. All the sciences are only so many collections of great truths existing in nature, and existing there because previously conceived in the mind of the great Author of nature. All human arts are only imperfect imitations of nature's operations, and those operations are all the skilful workings of a Divine mind. When an inquisitive savage comes to see and inquire into some complicated work of art, he is like a philosopher who comes to inquire into the laws and mechanism of the universe. Both may perceive many contrivances, adaptations, relations, dependencies, connections, uses, &c., and be enchanted with their discoveries; but, neither the one nor the other can claim the character of inventor; both are studying the plans and ideas which originated in a mind, distinct from, and superior to, their own.

5. Astronomy is the science which unfolds the laws and revolutions of the heavenly bodies, so far as they are known to man. We speak of Isaac Newton as a man possessing prodigious intellect, because of the profound discoveries recorded in his *Principia*; but, if all the elaborate calculations, and all the discoveries which astronomy involves in its present advanced state, had been made by Newton alone, how much more exalted the view we should have entertained respecting his intelligence! yet, in all this, he would have only touched the surface of the subject, and every truth he *had* discovered belonged to an immense system of truths, which had been conceived and perfected myriads of ages before the astronomer was born; and not only conceived, but in practical and harmonious operation. Can we then attribute intelligence to the scientific discoverer

of the solar system, and deny it to the sole Inventor and Fabricator of the wondrous universe ?

6. The science of chemistry reveals to us some of the laws and properties of matter, with the principles of its affinities, attractions repulsions, combinations, &c. ; and every fresh discovery therein entitles its author to our admiration, and often to our gratitude. Now, if all the discoveries which have been made in chemistry had been the result of one man's investigations, how should we have stood amazed at his skill and penetration ! yet, he would have discovered only a few principles out of an almost infinite number, which had previously existed in the mind of the great Author of nature, and principles which, ages ago, he had brought into practical operation in the vast and ever-active laboratory of nature.

7. The science of anatomy unfolds the structure and organization of animal bodies, exhibiting the multifarious functions and adaptations of the animal system. Here, and especially in the human frame, is a most elaborate and complicated piece of mechanism, presenting an economy of means, adaptations, and uses, so curiously and yet so perfectly developed, that volumes would not exhaust the manifestations of contrivance and design. The admirable structure of the person, the symmetry and utility of its members, the gracefulness and dignity of its motions, the elastic and transparent cuticle which covers the whole, the beauty of the complexion, and the minute adaptation of all our vessels and organs to the various purposes of life, health, and activity, present a wonderful display of intelligence in the mind of the Creator. If, as the celebrated Howe supposes,* for the sake of illustration, the external covering and muscular fibre of the human body were made of some very transparent substance, flexible, but clear as crystal, rendering visible all the internal mechanism of the system, so that we could clearly perceive the situation, order, offices, and operations, of all the vessels and organs :—if we could see the circulation of the blood flowing from the heart as

* Vide Howe's Living Temple.

from a fountain, through the arteries and veins, spreading themselves like net work over every part of the body :—if we could see each little valve open and shut, to let in and out the purple stream, as it flows from one vessel to another, and the apparatus for converting the food into chyme, and the chyme into blood, and the blood itself to be replenished with oxygen to renew its vital power, and administer nourishment to the whole system :—if we could discern the curious artifice of the brain, its elaborate organic structure, its mysterious connection with the organs of sensation, its modes of generating, filtering, and refining, those spirituous fluids which are diffused through the nervous system ;—could we behold the complicated ramifications of the nerves, starting in pairs from the spinal marrow, and extending their delicate texture over the whole frame :—could we, through the same transparent medium, perceive the admirable adjustment of the bony structure, with its four or five hundred parts, based on fulera, and so nicely articulating by joints and hinges, that flexibility and strength, ease and variety of motion are combined ; and see the whole in action ;—could we thus have a clear and perfect view of the entire organism of the human frame, with all its diversified parts in operation, we should be filled with amazement, and each exclaim, how fearfully and wonderfully am I made !

It was the study of the human system which converted the famous Galen from the Epicurean system, in which he had been educated, and which induced him to write a book on this subject, with a view to convince others that man must be the work of an intelligent Author. Geological discovery shows the recent origin of man, and natural history proves that his existence was derived from no inferior species, but immediately created. Anatomy as clearly proves that his Creator was an intelligent Being. If contrivance and design are evidences of a contriving and designing mind, we have it here in the utmost perfection ; and the conclusion, that man is the work of an intelligent Being, becomes irresistible, when the mind is not totally besotted by ignorance, or corrupted by an inveterate hatred to the truth. To the sculptor

who chisels the rough block of marble into the human shape, we award talent and skill, though the most finished marble of Phidias is only a cold and an external resemblance to man, and without either motion, mechanism, or life. To the painter who makes the canvas blush with the human form divine, we award talent and skill, though his work is but the shadow of man's skin. On what principle, then, can we deny intelligence to that Being who has built up the human fabric, with all its internal mechanism, as well as its external beauty; and to these admirable contrivances, added the mysterious attributes of life, sensation, thought, and voluntary action? If a man but imitate a work of art, we call him ingenious; if he imitate a work of nature, we call him more ingenious; but as the works of nature exhibit marks of contrivance and skill, indefinitely surpassing the most wonderful productions of art, so the skill of their Author must be incomparably greater. When some laborious student of nature makes a fresh discovery in the use or adaptation of any vessel or organ in the human frame, we invariably regard it as an evidence of his sagacity. When Harvey discovered the circulation of the blood, mankind did homage to his intellect, and his fame is handed down to posterity. But, if it required superior intellect to *discover* the existing phenomenon, what intellect was required to originate it? To accede intelligence to the discoverer, and not to the originator, is to belie our own judgement. It is a piece of folly and perversion, not equalled by the man who should extol the sagacity of a savage for finding out the main-spring of a chronometer, but denies the intelligence of the man who first invented that time-telling machine.

8. The science of optics reveals the laws and properties of light, and the adaptation of the eye to this element. At every step we take in this science, proofs of design crowd upon us. In this, we have to consider the properties of light—the inconceivable minuteness of its particles—that while its impulses do not injure the delicate mechanism of the organ of sight, they may make every part of the surface of an object visible through so small an instrument—the action

of light in straight lines, and its power of reflection, refraction, divergence, and convergence, all of which are determined strictly on mathematical principles. Then there is the wonderful structure of the little organ, made to be the instrument of vision. Perception arises from the image of an object being painted on the retina, or expanded nerve, at the back part of the eye; and the organization is formed to produce this effect by pencils of light. The humours of the eye, therefore, are a combination of lenses, of different refracting powers, and the focal distance is mathematically adjusted to the convergency of the rays, on the spot where the image is to be formed. Is there not intelligence in the means and adaptations here employed? Is there not an object contemplated, a set of means adjusted to that object, and the object accomplished? Is there any thing of human contrivance more artificial? The laws of mechanics and mathematics are made to operate conjointly in the organization of the eye, so that we have the most exquisite adaptation of the instrument to the element of vision; and had either the properties of light, or the structure of the eye, been different, the sense of vision could not have been enjoyed: even a slight depression or convexity of the cornea of the eye, beyond what the focal distance of the retina requires, results in imperfect vision. The telescope is formed on the same principles as the human eye: as Paley observes “The end is the same, and the means are the same; the purpose in both is alike; the contrivance for accomplishing that purpose is in both alike. The lenses of the telescope, and the humours of the eye, bear a complete resemblance to one another, in their figure, their position, and in their power over the rays of light, namely, in bringing each pencil to a point at the right distance from the lens, that is, at the exact place where the membrane is spread out to receive it.” If the construction of the telescope evince contrivance and design—the evidences of intelligence—we cannot withhold that attribute from the Author of light, and the Maker of the eye.

Nor should it be forgotten that the perfection of the telescope was accomplished by copying the art displayed in

the mechanism of the eye. This is a fact of modern history. The refracting telescope, in the days of Newton, had the imperfection of presenting objects tinged with different colours, as if viewed through a prism—an effect arising from a diversity in the refractive properties of different coloured rays—and Newton despaired of the possibility of this imperfection being corrected in the refracting telescope. This exigency had been met from the beginning, in the construction of the eye, by the use of different humours of diversified refracting properties; and, in about two years after Newton's death, an individual of the name of Hall, while studying the mechanism of the human eye, was led to suppose that telescopes might be improved by a combination of lenses of different refractive powers, corresponding to the different humours composing the lenses of the eye. This he actually accomplished; and, subsequently, the discovery was brought to perfection by Dolland, and other ingenious artizans. Every one will admit the intelligence which elicited the discovery that perfected the telescope, but it was borrowed from an original, which a prior intelligence had conceived and constructed.

If any one wish for a more familiar illustration, let him take that of a glass window. He will not dispute that it was made to see through, how then can he deny that the eye was made to see with? If he allow design and intelligence to the maker of the window, how can he deny them to the Maker of the eye?

Proofs of contrivance, and of the consequent intelligence, displayed in the diminutive organ of vision, are almost numberless. The exquisite mechanism for the dilatation and contraction of the pupil; the socket, embedded in fat, and lubricated with moisture, to give ease to the globe which is placed therein; the muscles, so admirably adapted for adjusting the position of the eye towards its object, and securing ease and rapidity of motion; the eye-lid, furnished with its lash to protect the delicate organ; the position of the eyes in an elevated part of the body, most convenient for sight, and giving beauty, vivacity, and expression to the

countenance ; the symmetry, which renders both eyes alike in the length of their foci, and the angle of vision, and gives simultaneous action to both, so that objects are not seen double, or in different situations, at the same moment ; all these, and a multitude of other arrangements, contrivances, and adaptations, combine to excite our wonder. In the eyes of fishes, there is an adjustment to correspond with the denser medium, through which the light passes ; and in the eyes of birds there are arrangements adapted to their mode of life.

When, for a moment, we reflect upon the fact, that without that bright little organ called the eye, man, and all other animals, would have lived in absolute pitchy darkness, can we doubt that the eye was formed with a purpose to secure the object of vision ? When we reflect, too, that without a strictly mathematical adaptation of the eye, in all its parts, to the properties of light, vision could not have been realized, Can we doubt that an adaptation, so perfectly realizing that purpose, is the result of contrivance ? and when we thus see a complicated contrivance realizing a purpose, Can we doubt the contriver to be an *intelligent* Being ?

9. The same argument applies to all the other senses. Without the organism of the ear, every animal must have been deaf. No sound of harmony, no dulcet tones of nature or friendship, could have been heard. Without the organs of hearing and seeing, universal silence would have been the associate of universal darkness. When we find an organ formed to convey sound, Can we doubt that it was formed for a purpose ? and when we see an elaborate organization accomplishing that purpose, Can we doubt a contriving mind ? When we remember, that without any of the senses, man could have had no communication with the external world, and see a system of diversified apparatus, formed to give him that communication—enabling him to see, hear, taste, smell, and feel, and thus become conversant with the existence and properties of the universe—we cannot doubt that this admirable adaptation sprang from a purpose, and that the

contrivance, which so perfectly adapted the organization to the purpose, was, emphatically, an intelligent mind !

10. All the sciences are only so many systems or classifications of knowledge, which propose to expound the principles and laws of nature ; and all arts are so many imitations of the operations of nature. It has taken the human family near six thousand years to bring science and art to its present state of perfection. We have here the collective result of the human intellect. We have here the aggregate development of mind, after operating in millions of individuals, and through so many generations. If all this had been the result of one mind, how we should have revered his intellectual powers ! His penetration—his sagacity—his powers of analysis, of combination, of abstraction, and of invention—his profound knowledge of mathematics, and mechanics, and all the sciences—would have commanded universal applause and wonder. If any one said he had no intellect at all, it would be a certain proof that the calumniator was mad. Everywhere, his word would be an oracle, his name be mentioned with adoration, and statues be erected to his genius in every part of the world. Yet, this prodigious mind, after all, would have been merely studying the designs and operations of another mind, infinitely surpassing his own. He is not an original, but a copyist. His knowledge is merely the knowledge of what another has done ; his arts and inventions are merely imperfect imitations of the operations of another. If he hit upon an invention, which is not entirely copied from nature, by a little further inquiry he will find that, however complicated his machine, it is vastly surpassed by contrivances around him in nature. Skilful as he may be in chemistry, he is not able either to make one particle of matter, or to add one new property to matter already made. Practised as he may be in mechanics, there are myriads of operations which he vainly tries to imitate. He sees the theory of perpetual motion exemplified in the solar system, and in a thousand organized structures, but he cannot produce it. If he understands many things in the universe, there are countless

numbers he cannot understand. In every branch of science he is perpetually coming to ultimate facts, which bound his knowledge, and mock his inquiries. If he ask what is life, he cannot tell; what is matter, he cannot answer; or what is spirit, he is perplexed. A blade of grass has mysteries he cannot explore, and an atom of dust is too profound a subject for him fully to explain. But why? Because the intellect which formed these objects, and gave them laws, so far surpasses his own. To deny intelligence, therefore, to the Creator, is to surpass the madness of one who should affirm that there is no intellect in all the sciences man ever knew, or the arts he ever practised.

INSTINCT, A PROOF OF DIVINE INTELLIGENCE.

There are three classes of actions essentially distinct from each other, and referable to separate causes—Mechanical, Rational, and Instinctive. Mechanical actions are those of the automaton, the clock, or the steam engine—arising not from any spontaneous or self-determining impulse, but from mere mechanism. Rational actions are those proceeding from the combined exercise of the understanding, judgement, and will, in which the mind employs definite means to obtain a given result. Instinctive actions are distinguished from the former, by their proceeding from a propensity, which prompts to a course of action, “prior to experience, and independent of instruction.” Such, in the new born infant, and indeed in the young of all mammalian animals, is the act of hunting out for the mother’s milky food, and of sucking with a perfection which can never be acquired in subsequent life; such is the whole process of nestling, or nidification among birds; the periodical change of salt for fresh water among the sturgeon, salmon, and other fishes. Such, among insects, is the formation of the exquisite decoy-lines of the spider, and the nice masonry of the bee, and of the white ant; and such is the remarkable construction of habitations by the beavers.

Now, in the results of instinct, we have a multitude of

effects, exhibiting a presiding intelligence as resident somewhere—either in the animals themselves, or in some other being distinct from the animals. Some of the evidences of intelligence may be specified.

1. All the operations of instinct, are directed to specific results. We never witness these instinctive operations for any continued period, but we observe them tending towards an end, and we never persevere in our observations to the consummation of the animal's work, but we see the end successfully accomplished. No architect proceeds more systematically, and none ever succeeds more completely in his work, than the bee in the construction of its cell, the bird in the building of its nest, and the beaver its habitation. Thus there is somewhere, a mind contemplating a given result—an intelligence which understands the relation between cause and effect.

2. In the operations of instinct, we have the manifestation of an intelligence comprehending a complete and perfect knowledge of all things requisite to produce the effects contemplated, and combined with this intelligence, we have skill for the execution of the object intended.

(a) There is clearly a knowledge of the physical properties of bodies. In the spider's web, we see proof of a knowledge of the properties of that net-work, to entangle prey. In the selection of strong materials for the outside of a bird's nest, and of wool, feathers, and moss for lining the inside, there is evinced a knowledge of the properties of the one to strengthen, and of the other to give warmth. In the process of incubation, there is a knowledge of the chemical properties of heat to evolve the principle of life in the egg. One insect deposits its eggs in the cabbage, and another in the willow, and these never change places. The willow-caterpillar is never found in the cabbage, nor the cabbage-caterpillar in the willow; as the food for the one is not adapted to the other. The parent insect always selects the appropriate vegetable, and this selection involves a knowledge of the distinction between the properties of each, and of its adaptation for food to her progeny. The young of all mammalia hunt for their mother's

teat as soon as they are born, which implies a knowledge, somewhere, of the properties of milk, and its adaptation to nourish the infant constitution. In the laying up of stores of food by the bee, and the ant, in summer, there is a knowledge of approaching winter; and, in making provision against its barrenness and cold, there is an anticipation of meteorological changes, and a knowledge of their effects upon nature. Examples of this kind might be indefinitely multiplied, affording proofs of an unerring knowledge of the laws and properties of matter.

(*b*) There is evidently a knowledge of the dispositions and habits of other animals of a different nature and species. Thus the net of the spider implies a knowledge of the volatile and careless habits of the fly; and the location of the bird's nest in the most secret place, and its suspension on the most distant and inaccessible branches of a tree, are provisions against the predacious habits of other animals.

(*c*) In the economy of some animals, if not in all, there is involved a knowledge not only of natural laws, and their operation, but of mechanics and the higher branches of mathematics. For the sake of illustration, we select the industrious bee. "Bees it is well known construct their combs with small cells on both sides, fit both for holding their store of honey, and for rearing their young. There are only three possible figures of the cells, which can make them all equal and similar, without any useless interstices. These are the equilateral triangle, the square, and the regular hexagon.

"It is well known to mathematicians that there is not a fourth way possible, in which a plane may be cut into little spaces that shall be equal, similar and regular, without leaving any interstices. Of the three, the hexagon is the most proper, both for convenience and strength. Bees, as if they knew this, make their cells regular hexagons.

"As the combs have cells on both sides, the cells may either be exactly opposite, having partition against partition, or the bottom of the cell may rest upon the partition between the cells on the other side, which will serve as a buttress to

strengthen it. The last way is the best for strength ; accordingly, the bottom of each cell rests against the point, where three partitions meet on the other side, which gives it all the strength possible.

“ The bottom of the cell may either be one plane perpendicular to the side partitions, or it may be composed of several planes, meeting in a solid angle in the middle point. It is only in one of these two ways that all the cells can be similar, without losing room. And, for the same intention, the planes of which the bottom is composed, if there be more than one, must be three in number, and neither more nor fewer.

“ It has been demonstrated, that by making the bottoms of the cells to consist of three planes meeting in a point, there is a saving of material and labour, not very inconsiderable. The bees as if acquainted with these principles of solid geometry, follow them most accurately : the bottom of each cell being composed of three planes, which make obtuse angles with the side partitions, and with one another, and meet in a point in the middle of the bottom ; the three angles of this bottom being supported by three partitions on the other side of the comb, and the point of it by the common intersection of these three partitions.

“ One instance more, of the mathematical skill displayed in the structure of the honey comb, deserves to be mentioned. It is a curious mathematical problem, at what precise angle the three planes which compose the bottom of a cell ought to meet, in order to make the greatest possible saving of material and labour. This is one of those problems belonging to the higher parts of mathematics, which are called problems of *maxima* and *minima*. The celebrated Maclaurin resolved it by a fluxionary calculation, which is to be found in the Transactions of the Royal Society of London, and determined precisely the angle required. Upon the most exact mensuration which the subject could admit, he afterwards found, *that it is the very angle in which the three planes in the bottom of the cell of the honey-comb do actually meet.*”*

* Reid, on the Mind, vol. iii., chap. 2.

3. Conjoined with this intelligence of the materials of nature, of its laws, and of abstruse mathematical principles, we have the most consummate skill. Could any artizan construct a bird's nest with more neatness and perfection than the linnet? or build up a honey-comb with more order and regularity than the bee? or spin with more dexterity than the spider does his thread, or the silk-worm its shining cocoon? Whatever advantages man may have from the variety and perfection of his tools,—from the line, the rule, the square, the plummet, and the wheel,—he cannot excel the simple artificers of nature in their mechanical operations.

The effects of intelligence are before us, and we require the cause; or, in other words, we ask for the source of this intelligence and skill. By the establishment of our first proposition, we have proved, that “every effect must have a cause, and that the cause must be *adequate* to the effect;” and, from the application of this principle, we must now find a cause *adequate* to the effects produced before us. There are but two sources which can enter into our considerations, and these are to be found either in the animals themselves, or in their Creator. To suppose that this intelligence is possessed by the animals is absurd, for this is to ascribe to them an intelligent nature far superior to man. It is to make birds, spiders, bees, and other insects, into profound philosophers, into mathematicians and mechanics of the highest and most perfect order—a notion which refutes itself by its superlative absurdity, and which is contradicted by the most obvious proofs.

If the mathematics of the Bee were understood by that diminutive creature, they must have been acquired; but this is contradicted by the fact, that they are practised as perfectly by the young as by the old, and are practised without learning, without imitation, and without experience, and are permanent in the species. If the intelligence displayed in instinctive operations resided in the animals themselves, the species would be able to give and receive instruction one from another; but this never takes place, even where their habits are similar in some respects. The bee borrows

nothing from the ant, nor the ant from the bee. Their whole economy is fixed and stereotyped in each species, from the first generation to the last. The bees of our day gather honey, and fabricate their cells, precisely in the same way as they did when Virgil celebrated their economy in his flowing numbers. If the required intelligence resided in the animals themselves, it would extend to a vast variety of other objects in nature ; for, as the sciences run one into another, it is impossible for any creature to be perfect in one, without having some considerable acquaintance with others. But the inferior animals, however they excel in such things as are instinctive, have not even that superficial knowledge of many other things with which children and savages are familiar, nor have they any capacity for acquiring it.

“ Sir Joseph Banks had a tame beaver, which was allowed to range at liberty in a ditch about his grounds, and was at all seasons liberally supplied with food. One day, about the end of autumn, it was discovered in the ditch very busily engaged in attempting to construct a dam after the manner of its companions in a state of nature. This was evidently the blind impulse of its instinctive feelings ; for, a moment’s exercise of the lowest degree of reflection must have shown it that such labour, under the circumstances in which it was placed, was altogether superfluous. A common quail was kept in a cage, and became quite tame and reconciled to its food. At the period of its natural migration it became exceedingly restless and sleepless ; it beat its head against the cage in many vain efforts to escape, and, on examination, its skin was found several degrees above its usual temperature. A bee, which can fly homewards, one or two miles, in a straight line to its hive, with extreme accuracy, if it happen to enter an open window in a room, will exhaust all its efforts in attempting to get out at the opposite window which is closed down, but never pauses to think of retracing its flight a little way backwards, so as to fly out at the opening at which it had entered. We often observe a dog, when going to sleep on the floor, turn himself several times round before he lies down, and this is just one of the lingering

instincts which he has retained; while in his wild state he is accustomed thus to prepare his bed amid the tall grass or rushes. An acute observer of animal habits has remarked that a jackdaw, which, for want of its usual place of abode, had, for its nest, made a choice of a rabbit hole, was often sorely perplexed in what way to get the long sticks, of which its nest was to be formed, drawn within the narrow entrance. Again and again did it attempt to pull in the piece of stick, while it held it in the middle in its bill, and it was only after a series of vain efforts, that, by mere chance, it at last accomplished its object by happening to seize it near one end instead of the centre. In this case it appeared to the observer that the building instincts of this bird were complete and perfect within a certain range, but without the limits of this circle, it had no deliberate foresight to guide its actions."*

It is evident, therefore, that the intelligence exhibited in instinct, is the intelligence of another, and not of the animals themselves. This conclusion is the more obvious from the economy of plants, in which there is a similar display of a presiding intelligence. As examples—A strawberry offset, planted in a patch of sand, will send forth its runners in the direction in which the soil lies nearest. A tree, which requires much moisture when planted in a dry soil, has been observed to send forth much the larger portion of its roots towards the nearest water. When a tree happens to grow from a seed on a wall, it has been noticed on arriving at a certain size, to stop in its growth for a while, and send down a root to the ground, and this being fixed in the soil, the tree resumed its growth in an upward direction. The grass called *phleum pratense*, or common catstail, when growing in pastures that are uniformly moist, has a *fibrous* root, for it is locally supplied with a sufficiency of water, but in dry situations its root acquires a bulbous form, and thus instinctively accommodates the plant with a natural reservoir.† It will not be pretended that these

* British Quarterly.

† Vide Mason Good's Book of Nature, Vol. ii., p. 124-5.

habits of accommodation in the plant, result from intelligence or reasoning in the plant, neither can the instinctive economy of animals be referred to any reasoning process in them. There is, in the economy of both, a demonstration of intelligence, but it exists in another Being, distinct from, and infinitely superior to both.

A wide disparity there is, indeed, between the nature of animals and plants. The latter have life, but so far as we can judge, are devoid of sensation, as well as reason; while the former have an inferior description of mind, superadded to life. They have sensation, perception, volition, and memory, as well as muscular contraction; and these qualities are the evidences of mind. It is owing to these qualities, that they have the power of imitation to a limited extent, and of performing some feats which have been ascribed to them. It is, however, to be remembered, that while feats are awkwardly and imperfectly performed, instinct is perfect and infallible; and, that while the former are learned by imitation, the latter are neither learned nor acquired, but are performed in the first stages of life, just as well as in the last; in the first generations of the race, as well as in those of the present day. These facts denote an essential distinction between what is instinctive, and what is not.

Summary.—From the whole train of the foregoing reasoning it is obvious, that all instinctive habits involve the existence somewhere, of a most accurate knowledge of the laws and properties of matter; in some cases a knowledge of the dispositions and habits of other animals of a different species; a knowledge, too, anticipative of future events; a knowledge of mathematics in some of its highest branches; a knowledge, too, which is infallible, and never miscalculates or mistakes; and as it is evident, this knowledge cannot dwell in the minds of reptiles and insects, or plants, we have no alternative, but to ascribe it to the Creator of all things. As Dr. Reid elegantly and forcibly observes, “If a honey comb were a work of art, every man of common sense would conclude, without hesitation, that he who invented the construction, must have understood the principles on

which it was constructed. We need not say the bee knows none of these things. They work most geometrically, without any knowledge of geometry; something like a child, who, by turning the handle of an organ, makes good music. The art is not in the child, but in him who made the organ. In like manner when a bee makes its comb so geometrically, the geometry is not in the bee, but in that Great Geometrician who made the bee, and made all things in number, weight, and measure."

There is no more certain nor satisfactory evidence of a truth, than when we reach the same conclusion, by taking either side of an alternative; just as when a certain mathematical result is arrived at by different theorems. Thus it happens to the truth under consideration. For should any one be so foolish as to take the contrary side of the argument, and contend as Darwin, Smellie, and others have done, that the instinctive operations of animals result from intelligence and reason in the mind of the animals themselves, he is inevitably carried the same conclusion—namely, that the Creator of these animals must be an intelligent Being. For, if as we contend, the intelligence which guides animal instinct, does *not* dwell in the animal itself, it must dwell in the mind of the Creator; and, if as the objector contends, it *does* dwell in the mind of the animal, it must have dwelt first in the Creator, for he planted it there, and he could not give to another that which he did not himself possess. The cause may be superior to the effect, but it cannot be inferior. Whatever intelligence, therefore, is exhibited by the creature, whether by instinct or reason, must previously have existed in the Creator.

The same conclusion flows from the consideration of human intelligence and reason. Those who are so bountiful to reptiles and insects, as to contend for their intelligence, will perhaps not deny the same powers to man: We are, therefore saved from the process of proof in this instance. But if man have intelligence, the Being who gave man his existence, must be admitted to have intelligence also. "Shall the work say of him that made it, He made me not? Or

shall the thing framed, say of him that framed it, He had no understanding?" The answer is anticipated by the inquiry. The Maker of an intelligent being, must himself be an intelligent Being.

Intelligence implies consciousness, perception, thought; and the exercise of that intelligence for an object, implies will, purpose, and the choice of means; and these are the attributes and acts of mind. They can no more exist without a subject, than the essential properties of matter can exist apart from matter. We cannot conceive them apart from a subject in which they inhere. Thus, every proof we have furnished of intelligence and purpose, is a proof of the existence of mind. The existence of mind being established, the proper personal existence of the Creator is established, for a mind is a personal existence. Man is a conscious personal being, and so is that Great Being who gave him existence.

The personal existence of the Creator is a truth which accumulates evidence, not only from the Creator's works, but also from every view we take of his character and attributes. Thus, as we proceed to discourse upon his benevolence, his justice, his holiness, and his other perfections, we speak of attributes which can belong only to a person, and every evidence of the existence of these attributes augments the proofs of his proper personal existence. We have thus arrived, step by step, to the corollary of our five fundamental propositions:—THERE IS A GOD—A CONSCIOUS INTELLIGENT BEING—WHO IS THE CREATOR AND UPHOLDER OF ALL THINGS.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE SPIRITUALITY OF THE DIVINE NATURE

“*God is a Spirit.*”—John iv., 24.

THE process of argumentation pursued in proving the existence of God, affords evidence as conclusive respecting the spirituality of his nature, as it does of the certainty of his existence. Indeed, in proving the truth of this proposition, we have little more to do than to apply the principles and facts previously laid down and established.

I. Thus, from the application of our first proposition, That “every effect must have a cause,” combined with our second proposition, That “there must be some Being who is not an effect, but unoriginated and eternal,” we arrive at the truth that God is not an effect, because he is the originator of all things.

II. By the application of our third proposition, namely, That “the universe is an effect,” we have the certainty that God and the universe are not identical, because, while the universe is an effect, the Creator is unoriginated. God and the universe, therefore, are as distinct from each other, as it is possible for any cause and effect to be distinct from one another. Nature is not God, for it is an *effect*; God is not nature, for he is its Cause. Distinguished from Nature as to his identity, he is equally distinguished by his Nature. The universe is material; God is not material, for the same reason that he is not Nature. He is not identical with matter, because he is not identical with Nature or the universe. Therefore, as it is not pretended that there are more than two substances in existence—matter and spirit, it necessarily follows, that God is a Spirit. Now, had we no other proofs, these are abundantly sufficient to prove the immateriality of the Divine Nature. But proofs multiply

with every aspect in which the subject is contemplated, and though they need not be pursued at length, they may be noticed in order to show the extreme weakness and folly of the contrary hypothesis. Hence :—

III. God is not material, because he is infinite, while matter is limited, and their co-existence is a physical impossibility. That matter is finite, is evident from the fact, that it exists in various degrees of density and solidity, from the compact diamond to the most diffused gases ; and that God is infinite, is a truth, necessarily resulting from his eternity, and absolute perfection, which will be proved at large hereafter. Now, if God were material, there would then be materiality existing to an infinite extent ; and as it is an axiomatic truth that two material substances cannot both occupy the same place at the same moment of time, it would follow, that the existence of an *infinite* material substance would exclude and prevent the existence of any *finite* material substance, and thus have prevented the existence of the material universe. If God were an infinite material substance, he would fill immensity with his own substance ; and, therefore, not a world, nor an atom of any other material substance, would have space for existence. The actual existence, therefore, of the material world, presents a double proof of the spirituality of the Divine Nature. First, in that it was created by an intelligent Being totally distinct from it, and who existed eternally prior to its existence ; and, secondly, in that its existence as a finite and limited creature, involves the certainty that no infinite Being of the same nature can co-exist with it. The existence, therefore, of God, is that of an immaterial or spiritual substance.

IV. God is not material, because the properties of his nature are essentially diverse from the properties of matter.

1. God is a conscious and intelligent Being. This was established under our fifth proposition, but matter is destitute of these properties. If we consider it in its diffused elementary state, it is unorganized and chaotic, and destitute, not only of consciousness and intelligence, but also of life. But, whether we consider matter in atoms or in aggre-

gate masses, united by chemical attraction and affinity, it is equally destitute of consciousness, of intelligence, and even of life; and, if destitute of life, it must be devoid of all the attributes of life. In such unorganized masses as are cognizable by our senses, it is inert, passive, and without life or sensation; and, when analyzed by a chemical process, and separated into ultimate and invisible particles, it must be the same. Neither combination nor analysis can produce the least change in this respect. A diamond is as devoid of life, sensation, and thought, as a piece of charcoal, and both are as devoid of these properties as carbon in its gaseous form.*

2. The absurdity of investing matter with the properties of consciousness, intelligence, and volition, will further appear from the fact that matter is not one thing but many. As it presents itself to the senses, it consists of an indefinite number of particles, and when subject to chemical analysis, these particles are further reduced to atoms, inconceivably small, and are multiplied to an extent so as to elude the power of numbers to express, as they do of sight to recognize. Yet, every atom, however small, has a separate individual existence, and if the properties of mind belong to matter, they must belong to each atom. Each atom in this case, must have distinct consciousness, intelligence, volition,

“Divide matter into as minute parts as you will (which we are apt to imagine a sort of spiritualizing or making a thinking thing of it,) vary the figure and motion of it as much as you please; a globe, cube, cone, prism, cylinder, &c., whose diameters are but 100,000th part of a gry, will operate no other wise upon other bodies of proportionable bulk than those of an inch or foot in diameter; and you may as rationally expect to produce sense, thought, and knowledge, by putting together, in a certain figure and motion, gross particles of matter, as by those that are the very minutest, that do any where exist. They knock, impel, and resist one another just as the greater do, and that is all they can do. So, that, if we will suppose nothing first or eternal, matter can never begin to be; if we suppose bare matter without motion eternal, motion can never begin to be; if we suppose only matter and motion first or eternal, thought can never begin to be. For, it is impossible to conceive that matter, either with or without motion, could have, originally, in and from itself, sense, perception, and knowledge; as is evident, from hence,

and every other attribute of mind, as certainly as it has a separate individual existence. Thus the materialist to evade the truth of *one* Creative, Spiritual Intelligence, plunges into the extreme absurdity of supposing an infinite number of intelligent atoms. To escape this absurdity, we have no alternative, but to admit that intelligence is not a property of matter, and, therefore, the intelligent Creator is not a material, but a spiritual existence.

3 If the materialist, pressed by the facts and arguments adduced, should admit that consciousness and intelligence, do not reside in either atoms or unorganised masses, but as a *dernier* resort contend, that these are properties of organized matter associated with life, we reply, "This objection is irrelevant, if urged against the spirituality of the Divine nature; for how can any material organization be associated with the nature of Deity, seeing he existed prior to all organization, and prior to all life, but his own? If consciousness and intelligence, do not reside in each of the particles of matter in its original state, then it is impossible to contend for the materiality of God. Again: the objection is *absurd*, as well as irrelevant, for it supposes an effect to exist before its cause. The primordial state of matter, was that of elementary particles as destitute of organization, as of vitality and consciousness. This was proved under our

that sense, perception, and knowledge, must be a property eternally separable from matter and every particle of it."—*Locke, on the Understanding*, book iv, chap. 10, sec. 10.

Saurin justly asks, "What relation can ye find between wisdom, power, mercy, and all other attributes which enter into your notion of Divinity and the nature of bodies? Pulverize matter, give it all the different forms of which it is susceptible, elevate it to its highest degree of attainment—make it vast and immense, moderate or small; luminous or obscure, opaque or transparent; there will never result any thing but figures (*different forms and combinations*); and never will ye be able by all these combinations, or divisions, to produce one single sentiment, one single thought, like that of the meanest, and most contracted of all mankind. If matter, then, cannot be the subject of one single operation of the soul of a mechanic, how should it be the subject of these attributes, which make the essence of God himself?"—*Saurin's Sermons*, vol. I., 55.

fourth proposition. The subsequent organization of matter was an effect produced, not by any inherent power in matter itself, but by the operation of a Being, distinct from, and infinitely superior to it. This has been established by an appeal to a multitude of the most obvious facts in philosophy. Thus we have positive proof of the operations of an intelligent Being, prior to the organization of a single thing. Moreover, the Being who exercised this intelligence, has been proved to be unoriginated and self-existent; and, therefore, we have proof of the existence of an intelligent Being for an *eternity* of duration, prior to the existence of either animal, plant, or world. Thus, it is evident, that intelligence existed for infinite ages, prior to, and independent of any material organization, and, therefore, instead of intelligence resulting from organization, organization resulted from intelligence. It is an effect of which a distinct, an eternal, and independent intelligence is the cause. If, then, the intelligence of God is neither a property of matter in its primordial state, nor the effect of any organization, it follows, that it is totally distinct from matter, and, therefore, the Creator of the universe cannot be a material, but a spiritual existence.

4 The naturalist may allege, that the intelligence of man, and of the inferior tribes, springs from their organization. If the allegation were true, it would be of no service against the argument for the spirituality of the Divine nature, for the reasons already stated. But we deny the assertion, and in vain do we ask for proof. Certainly, in man we see a material organization connected with mental attributes; and in lower animals, too, we see some of the inferior attributes of mind: but these mental properties are not the results or products of mere organization. The facts before us neither identify mind with matter as essentially one and the same substance, nor prove that mental attributes spring from material organization. In the Deity, we see life and intelligence, *unconnected* with organization; and in plants, we see life and organization, *unconnected* with intelligence, or any mental attribute. These facts prove that there is

no *necessary* connection between intelligence and organization ; and, consequently, the intelligence of man is not to be resolved into a mere product of organization, but to the existence of a distinct and immaterial principle, which, at present, acts through the medium of a material organization.

If it be said that this doctrine invests the inferior animals with a similar principle, We reply, that we shrink not from the logical results of our argument. It is true, the most sagacious of the brute creation exhibit no faculty for combining and analyzing their ideas, of forming abstract and general conceptions ; they have no conscience, or moral faculties ; and instinct, as we have seen, is essentially different from reason ; still, we are far from considering the inferior tribes of creation to be mere machines. We do see some manifestation of the *inferior* attributes of mind, and wherever there are the attributes of mind, there *is* mind of some sort ; and wherever there is mind, there is a principle distinct from matter. In this admission, we see nothing repugnant to either philosophy or religion. As Watson observes, “ It strengthens, and does not weaken, the argument ; and it is perfectly in accordance with scripture, which speaks of ‘ the soul of a beast,’ as well as ‘ the soul of a man.’ ”* We never suppose that man has the highest order of mind : Why should we suppose he has the lowest ? Why not allow gradation *below* as well as *above* the human species ? It does not, however, follow, that the souls of inferior animals are immortal. The truth is, that God alone hath independent immortality, because he alone is self-existent ; and neither human nor brute souls are, of necessity, immortal. The immortality of the human soul is a gift from God, which he has withheld from brutes, as he has withheld, also, moral consciousness, and the higher faculties of reason and speech. “ The spirit of man goeth upward, but the spirit of a beast goeth downward to the earth.” As Matthew Henry observes, “ The soul of a beast is, at death, like a candle blown out—there is an end of it ; whereas, the soul of a man is like a candle taken out of a dark lantern, which leaves the lantern

* Institutes, vol. i. Vide Watt's Works, vol. viii., 446—9.

useless indeed, but does itself shine brighter." Though the certainty of our soul's immortality lies not in its *immateriality*, it is abundantly sustained by irrefragable evidence of another kind; but as this enters not into our present argument, we must postpone its consideration.

From the preceding observations, it will be seen that any objection taken from the connection of mind with a material organization among created beings, has no force, either against the philosophy of our argument, or against the spirituality of the Eternal and Uncreated Mind. Indeed, no metaphysical question can invalidate the great fact previously demonstrated, that the Infinite, Intelligent, and Almighty Being, existed and acted prior to all organization, and prior to all life but his own, and therefore. cannot be material.

V. *The Non-eternity of Matter*.—Another distinct and independent proof of the spirituality of God, arises from the non-eternity of matter. All our previous argumentation has been based on facts and principles, irrespective of the non-eternity of matter. The establishment, therefore, of the present proposition must irresistibly establish the evidence of the spirituality of the Divine nature.

1. The eternity of matter is a gratuitous assumption, unsupported by the slightest evidence. It is not a self-evident proposition; nor is it sustained by a single fact, nor indeed by any argument that will bear a moment's examination. It is admitted by Antitheos, a modern materialist before referred to, that we can conceive matter not to have existed; therefore its non-existence is admitted to have been possible—and though the admission of so self-evident a proposition does not involve much condescension, it certainly excludes the eternity of matter from the category of necessary truths, even on the testimony of infidelity itself. Indeed, as the *actual* existence of matter is certain, and its non-existence is admitted to have been *possible*, What ground has matter for its existence at all but the creating energy of another?

The ground on which the ~~non~~-eternity of matter was argued by Epicurus, and echoed from one heathen philosopher

to another, was the alleged impossibility of something arising from nothing,* an argument (as we have previously demonstrated), irresistibly conclusive for the eternal existence of *something*, but certainly not for the eternal existence of *matter*. That eternal *something* we have proved to be a Being distinct from matter, and possessing properties and attributes essentially different from matter. Thus the eternal existence of one Being having been established, and that Being having been proved to be the Author of all organized existence, and all systems of being, the *eternal* existence of another being is not required, either by logic or philosophy.

When the eternal existence of one Being is thus established—that axiom, “*Ex nihilo, nihil fit*,”—(From nothing, nothing can arise)—has no relevance in a question respecting the eternity of matter. Nor is the creation of matter properly or justly stated by describing it as “*bringing something out of nothing*,” but rather by describing it as *causing that to exist which did not exist before*; recognizing both a positive agent, and a positive act. What then, we demand, is there impossible in a self-existent, eternal, independent, and Almighty Being causing a thing to exist? Limited as are the capabilities of a human being, we can originate *events*. By a mere exercise of volition, we can cause a variety of events to be which at present have no existence. Why then cannot a self-existent Being cause the existence of another being? Why cannot an Almighty Being do any thing which does not in itself involve an absolute contradiction? In causing a substance to exist, which did not exist before, there is no more contradiction involved than in causing an event to exist which did not exist before! It is evident, then, that the doctrine of the eternity of matter is without foundation. It is a mere figment of the imagination.

2. The eternity of matter is not only unsupported by reason, but it is contradicted by reason. This will appear from the following considerations:—

(a) It has already been demonstrated that sound philosophy requires but one unoriginated, eternal, and self-existent

* Laertius, i. c. Lucretius De Rer Nat i. 157. Persius Sat. iii, 83, &c.

Being to account for the origin of the universe. It has been shown that that Being is not matter, but One totally distinct from matter, and infinitely superior to it. It being thus manifest, that matter is not The Unoriginated Being, whose existence is necessary, to contend for its eternity, is to contend without reason and against reason. It is to contend for a notion which can serve no purpose even for atheism itself; for, if matter were eternal, it would require another eternal being, infinitely superior to it, to give it form, adaptation, system, and such orderly arrangement as it now possesses. This was proved under our fourth proposition. The notion, therefore, of the eternity of matter is incompatible with philosophy and sound reason.

(*b*) The notion, that matter is eternal, involves the further absurdity of limiting the power and perfections of the Creator. God's existence being established, it follows, that he is an independant and all-powerful Being—a Being of infinite perfections; but, to maintain the eternity of matter, is virtually to deny him the attribute of omnipotence. It is to limit the *infinite*, and to invest the *finite* with at least one attribute of infinity, which is absurd.

(*c*) It involves the absurdity of supposing *two* eternal and independant beings of *opposite* nature and attributes. No two natures can be more different than these two. The one spiritual, the other material; the one conscious, the other absolutely unconscious; the one intelligent, the other devoid of all intelligence; the one essentially living, the other destitute of life; the one essentially active, the other entirely passive; the one omnipotent in energy, [the other absolutely helpless; the one immutable, the other perpetually changing; the one doing all things freely, and by his own volition, the other doing nothing of itself, nor capable of doing anything; the one infinite in all his attributes, the other limited and confined. We cannot conceive of properties more dissimilar and contrary. Yet, all the properties ascribed to God are in harmony with himself, because they are in harmony with his eternity. They perfectly accord with his unoriginated and independent existence. But, all the properties of

matter are repugnant to Deity because they are inconsistent with independance and eternity. Passibility, change, inactivity, unconsciousness, and the total absence of vitality, are qualities as incompatible with self-existence, independence, and eternity, as they are with the nature of Deity. It is irrational to conceive, that a Being, so dissimilar to Deity in every other respect, should be identical with him in self-existence and eternity. In fact, limitation in every other attribute is incompatible with infinity in one. For these reasons, we must reject the notion as an absurdity.

(d) The absurdity of the eternity of matter further appears from the fact, that both the laws and operations of matter had a beginning. By a preceding argument in the fourth proposition, it has been proved, that the *mechanical* motions of the earth, planets, and sidereal systems, are destined to terminate. However vast, and overwhelming to contemplate, the periods through which those spheres may continue to revolve in their respective orbs, they are certain to come to an end. In a continuation of the same general argument, it was proved that the motion arising from *chemical* forces, was also destined to arrive at a termination. However long the several elements may continue their play of synthesis and analysis, the period must come when the tendency to equilibrium will bring about an ultimate cessation of all chemical action. These arguments having been stated at some length, it would be superfluous to repeat them, but, to refresh the memory of the reader, we refer him to pages 48-58.

A termination to any cycle of causes and effects, necessarily involves a commencement of their operations; for the fact that the cycle is still running on, implies that it has not yet had time to complete its course, which it must have accomplished infinite ages ago, had it been eternal.

A beginning to any object, excludes from that object the property of self-existence. It necessarily implies the interposition of a Superior Power of antecedent existence. Thus, the motions of matter, whether mechanical or chemical, having had a beginning, must have had a Beginner. As they have no power to continue their activity beyond a

limited period, they have no power to resume it when it ceases, and, certainly, had no power to commence it, for that would imply that they acted before they existed, which is an absurdity and a contradiction in the very terms.

It avails not to affirm that the present cycle of operations in the material universe, may be only one of a series, which have antecedently run their course. This but places the beginning, both of events and of the Divine agency, at an earlier period. It neither obviates the necessity of a beginning, nor supersedes the necessity of the Divine agency to effect that beginning. It only multiplies the operations of the Divine agency, the necessity of that agency being precisely the same in each instance; for, while the tendency to equilibrium infallibly determines an end to motion, there is no resuscitating self-acting energy in nature, to secure a resumption thereof. No multitude of cycles, however protracted, can make up eternity. They are but as a moment, contrasted with infinity. Where there is an end to either a series, or successive cycles of series, there must have been a beginning; and if the interposition of a Divine agency was required for the last, it was for the first. That it *was* absolutely required for the last has been shown, and that it was equally required for the first has been demonstrated. To refresh the reader's memory, We refer to our arguments, at length, on this subject. See chapter the fourth.

An important consequence flows from the facts before us; for, if all mechanical and chemical motion had a beginning, it follows, that the *laws* and *properties* of matter, producing those motions, had a beginning also. Thus the properties of elective affinity, attraction, combustion, &c., must have had a commencement. They could not have existed eternally without acting, unless a Divine power had restrained them, which the atheist will not assume, for that is to admit the existence of Deity. The beginning of mechanical and chemical motion, necessarily implies a beginning of those *properties* of matter, which determine and regulate the motions.

Thus, we are necessitated to contemplate a period when there was no such thing as chemical affinity, attraction, repul-

sion, combustion, &c., and we may add gravitation, for what is gravitation but a more general characteristic of attraction—the outer circle, so to speak of, chemical affinity? These properties having had a beginning, must have derived their existence from the first cause—the Creator of all things. They could not originate themselves—the idea is an absurd contradiction, for then they must have acted before they existed. Matter could not originate them spontaneously, for how could it give what it did not possess. In whatever aspect we contemplate the subject, we are compelled to have recourse to a Creator.

We ask, then, What is the rational conclusion respecting the *primary* and essential qualities of matter? and respecting the substratum of matter itself, if there be any distinct from the qualities themselves? If we can thus trace not only motion, but the origin of the chemical properties of matter, to a Divine hand, to what source shall we ascribe the creation of the other qualities, extension, solidity, &c., but to the same Divine hand. If matter could not give to itself the chemical and mechanical properties it now possesses, by what principle of reasoning can it be thought capable of giving the other? In fact, it must first be shown, that it could exist without either one or the other. With regard to the primary and essential properties of matter, it is agreed, on all hands, that matter could not exist without them, and it is impossible to prove that it could exist without its chemical properties. If it be allowed, that it is impossible for matter to exist without its chemical properties, then the question is decided: its non-eternity necessarily follows; for we have seen that these qualities were created; if this be not allowed, we have still a moral certainty—we have as high a proof as the nature of the subject will admit—that matter is not eternal, but brought into existence by a Divine hand; for He who gave its properties must also have given its existence.

Summary of the argument.—In taking a review of the argument, we find the following points established: 1.—That the actual creation of matter involves no contradiction.

2.—That the eternity of matter is a mere gratuitous assumption, unsupported by any evidence whatever. 3.—That this assumption does not aid the atheistic hypothesis, as the existence of an eternal and unoriginated Being is demonstrated. 4.—That the eternity of matter involves the absurdity of supposing two eternal Beings, of opposite properties. 5.—That as all the known properties of matter are those of a finite and dependent being, they are incompatible with the supposition of its eternity. 6.—That the chemical properties of matter are proved to have been created, and, by a parity of reasoning, all the other properties of matter, and its substratum too (if it have any), must also have been created. In fact, while it has no characteristic indicative of eternity, it has all the evidence it can have of being a creature of God.

Having adduced the testimony of reason on this subject, we may briefly remark (what is interesting to the believer in revelation), that this is the doctrine emphatically asserted in the sacred records. It is declared, “In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.” That the word *ברא* in this passage, signifies to *create*, or to cause that to exist which before had no existence, there can be no doubt to any candid mind; and the necessity of elaborate criticism to establish this meaning is superseded by the explicit statement of Paul, who affirms, “That the worlds were framed by the word of God;” and framed in such a sense, that the things which are seen were not made of things which do appear.” “The things which do appear” are those material objects which are cognizable by our senses. Thus the testimony of the apostle determines the sense of *ברא* in Gen. i., 1, and shows that the creation of the universe is to be understood in an *absolute* sense. It is not a mere modification of matter from pre-existent elements, but a bringing into actual existence the elements themselves, of which the great fabric of the universe is composed. Thus the teachings of holy scripture, and the testimony of reason and fact, are in perfect harmony on this most interesting and important subject.

The argument which proves the non-eternity of matter furnishes another proof of the existence of God, and places the spirituality of his nature beyond dispute. Even the atheist will hardly surpass all his other absurdities by contending that God created himself, and, unless he can do this, or overturn the arguments adduced, he must admit God to be an Immaterial Spirit. This and every other argument by which we have proved that God and matter are not identical, proves him to be an Eternal and Infinite Spirit.

Conclusion.—We have now completed our argument on the existence of God, and the spirituality of his nature ; not, indeed, that the subject is exhausted, for many volumes might be written replete with evidence. We conceive that any one of the arguments adduced, is, of itself, sufficient to satisfy any candid inquirer after truth. Thus the facts of natural history and geology, excluding, as they do, the possibility of either an eternal series, or the transmutation of species, necessitate a creating agency ; and, if we could proceed with no further evidence, the proofs thus adduced are complete in themselves. Astronomy and chemistry—proving that motion and the orderly arrangement of matter into its present forms, are physically impossible to have resulted from any spontaneous energy in nature—present another proof of a Creator ; and this evidence, irrespective of all other, is sufficient to carry the conviction of God's existence to any mind accessible to the power of truth. Again, the manifestations of intelligence and design in all the operations of nature, involve a demonstration both of the existence and personality of the Deity. This was, indeed, the only evidence furnished in by-gone days ; and yet it was deemed abundantly sufficient to satisfy the mind of any candid lover of truth. To these may be added the proof, that matter is not eternal but a created substance. The whole combining to furnish, in our estimation, an impregnable demonstration both of God's existence and spirituality. Modern science has revealed facts which set infidel sophistry at defiance. To deny God, men must now not only resist their reason, but refuse to behold the most obvious facts.

If Atheism was folly in the days of David, it is madness now. The torch which science holds to religious truth, is so brilliant and powerful, that the monstrosity of atheism *must* seek an escape from the universe of mind. Men may hate and resist the truth, but they must believe, or refuse assent to a palpable demonstration. They must believe it, or wilfully, wickedly, and deliberately close their eyes against the clearest and the brightest light, with a perversity and obstinacy only equalled by the man who should bandage his eyes at noon-day and protest that the sun does not shine. The existence of the Deity is the grand central truth around which all others revolve, so resplendent with light, that its beams are diffused through the universe, and, from whatever part the open eye of candour turns, the divine rays fall upon it and depict the image of the Creator.

CHAPTER IX.

PANTHEISM.

“Great men are not always wise.”—Job xxxii., 9. “For the heart of this people is waxed gross, and their ears are dull of hearing, and their eyes have they closed; lest they should see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their hearts, and I should heal them.”—Acts xxviii., 27.

IN close alliance with Atheism stand the variable systems (if systems they may be called) of Pantheism, which, in all ages, have existed in some regions, and, strange to say, find abettors in countries where it might have been supposed the light of science and revelation had for ever excluded them. The general features and history of this protean monster, as it existed in former ages, are succinctly described by Dr. Good, in the First of his admirable Lectures, at the Surrey Institution. “According to this absurd hypothesis, the universe is an emanation or extension of the essence of the Creator. Now, under this belief, however modified, the Creator himself is rendered material; or, in other words, matter itself, or the visible substance of the world, is rendered the Creator. There can be no difficulty in tracing this doctrine to its source. It runs through the whole texture of that species of materialism which constitutes the two grand religions of the East—Brahmism and Budhism; and was undoubtedly conveyed by Pythagoras, and, perhaps, antecedently, by Orpheus, (if such an individual ever existed,) into different parts of Greece, in consequence of their communications with the gymnosophists. From Pythagoras it descended to Plato and Xenophanes, and, under different modifications, became a tenet of the Academic and Eleatic schools.

A few examples may be given of this doctrine from the writings of the ancients, both in the eastern and western worlds. A passage, in M. Anquetil du Perron's translation, from the Abridgement of the Veids, develops the entire doctrine as well as the principle. "The whole universe is the Creator, proceeds from the Creator, exists in him, and returns to him. The ignorant assert, that the universe, in the beginning, did not exist in its author, and, that it was created out of nothing. O ye, whose hearts are pure! how could something arise out of nothing? The first Being alone, and without likeness, was the All in the beginning; he could multiply himself into different forms; he created fire from his essence, which is light, &c." So, in another passage of the Yagar Veid, "Thou art Brahma! thou art Vishnu! thou art Kodra! &c.! thou art Air! thou art Andri! thou art the Moon! thou art Substance! thou art Djam! thou art the Earth! thou art the World! O Lord of the world! to thee humble adoration! O Soul of the world! thou who superintendest the actions of the world! who destroyest the world! who createst the pleasures of the world! O Life of the world! the visible and invisible worlds are the sport of thy power! thou art the Sovereign, O universal soul! to thee humble adoration!"

Plutarch, in his "Defect of Oracles," says, that the ancient philosophers resolved all things into God, and pronounced this of them universally,

Ζεύς ἀρχη, Ζεύς μεσσα, Διος δ' ἐκ πάντα τελονται.

That is, God is both the beginning and the middle, and that all things are out of God. Dr. Good observes, to the following effect, "As this doctrine became embraced by many of the Greek and Roman philosophers, it is not to be wondered at, that it captivated still more of their poets; and, hence we find it, with perhaps the exception of Empedocles and Lucretius, more or less pervading all of them, from Orpheus to Virgil. It is in reference to this, that Aratus opens his Phænomena with the passage (perhaps referred to by St. Paul

in the course of his address to the Athenians on Mars' Hill), of which I will beg your acceptance of the following version :—

From God we spring, whom man can never trace,
Though seen, heard, tasted, felt, in every place ;
The loneliest path, by mortal seldom trod,
The crowded city, all is full of God ;
Oceans and lakes, for God is all in all,
And we are all his offspring.*

“ So Æschylus in a passage still stronger in point, and imbued with the full spirit of Brahmsism :—

Jupiter is the air,
Jupiter is the earth,
Jupiter is the heaven ;
All is Jupiter.†

“ But, perhaps, the passage most express, is one contained in a very ancient Greek poem, entitled *De Mundo*, and ascribed to Orpheus, in the original, highly beautiful, and of which, for want of a better, I present you with the following translation :—

Jove first exists, whose thunders roll above ;
Jove last, Jove midmost, all proceeds from Jove.
Female is Jove, immortal Jove is male ;
Jove the broad earth—the heaven's irradiate pale.
Jove is the boundless spirit, Jove the fire
That warms the world with feeling and desire.
The sea is Jove, the sun, the lunar ball ;
Jove king supreme, the sovereign source of all.

* *Ἐκ Διὸς ἀρχώμεσθα, τὸν οὐδέποτε ἄνδρες ἑῶμεν*
Ἀρρήτον· μεστὰ δὲ Διὸς πᾶσαι μὲν ἄγναι,
Πᾶσαι δ' ἀνθρώπων ἀγοραὶ· μεστὴ δὲ θάλασσα,
Καὶ λιμένες· πάντα δὲ Διὸς κεκρήμεθα πάντες·
Τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν. —Lib. i., 1.

† *Ζεὺς ἐστὶν αἰθήρ,*
Ζεὺς τε γῆ·
Ζεὺς δὲ οὐρανός,
Ζεὺς τὰ πάντα.

All power is his; to him all glory give,
For his vast form embraces all that live.*

From the Greeks this doctrine was adopted by the Latins. Thus Lucan says, "Whatsoever thou seest is Jupiter."† Seneca asks, "What is God?" and answers, "He is all that you see, and all that you do not see." "And he alone is all things, containing his own work, not only without, but also within." In another passage he has the following pantheistic sentiments:—"We are all members of one great body. The whole world is God, and we are not only his members, but also his fellows or companions."‡

From ancient times this doctrine has descended to our own age. It was elaborately set forth and advocated in the seventeenth century by Spinoza, and runs through the writings of the English sophists of the last century. It appears prominent in Pope's Essay on Man, though, probably, as Dr. Johnson intimates, its writer spoke more rhetorically than philosophically. The following lines, if understood literally, express the very quintessence of Pantheism.

"All are but parts of one stupendous whole,
Whose body nature is, and God the soul."

The writings of Neckar are full of this doctrine: and Isnard, on the Immortality of the Soul, labours to give it support and plausibility. Some of the sayings of Malebranche appear to favour this theory, for he says, that "We see all things in God," and that he is our "intelligible world."

* Ζεὺς πρῶτος γένητο, Ζεὺς ὕστατος ἀρχίκεραυνὸς
Ζεὺς κεφαλὴ, Ζεὺς μέσσα· Διὸς δ' ἐκ παντα τέτυκται·
Ζεὺς ἄρσιν γένητο, Ζεὺς ἄμβροτος ἔπλετο νύμφη·
Ζεὺς πυθμὴν γαῖης τὰ καὶ οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος· &c., &c.

—Ex. Apul.

† Jupiter est quodcunque vides.—Lib. ix., v. 580.

‡ Quid est Deus? Quod vides totum, et non vides, totum.

—Nat. Quaest, Lib. i.

Sec̃ solus est omnia; opus suum et extra et intra tenet.

—De Benefic, Lib. iv., c. viii.

Membra sumus corporis magni.—Epist. xcv.

Totum hoc Deus est, socii ejus et membra sumus.—Epist. xcii.

In Germany, a variable pantheism prevails to a considerable extent, which, though greatly differing in some of its elements from the materialism of its heathen predecessors, yet presents characteristics equally absurd, and equally repugnant, to all just conceptions of the Deity. Professor Kant* has the reputation, if not of originating, yet of elaborating and diffusing principles, under the designation of “*Transcendental philosophy*,” which his successors have ripened into various mystic theories, the most repellant to reason, and the most inimical to religion. Schelling regards ‘the objects of sense as the phenomena of the ideal world, and the ideal world as nothing more than the mode of the existence of the Deity.’ With him, ‘the infinite eternal mind is the absolute element from which all is evolved, while thought is essentially identified with being.’ Fichte ‘identifies object and subject, or being and thought are one—the finite and infinite are one. Ego (I) is an absolute principle, and the whole universe but as its dream; there is no reality beyond consciousness.’ According to Hegel, ‘creation is an eternal momentum: it is the Deity, by a negation of himself passing into a world, and becoming a second self: the creation is a world which is never made, but always being created.’

Such is a cursory view of the varied systems of Pantheism which, in different ages and climes, have held ascendancy

* More remotely, however, the principles which originated the German development of Scepticism may be ascribed to Des Cartes. Affecting to establish all things, even intuitive principles, by logical deduction, he placed his own existence among the things to be proved before it should be admitted in the category of established truths. Ego cogito,—*I think*, was his first proposition; and ergo sum—*I exist*, was his first conclusion. A dangerous concession to scepticism, and as foolish as dangerous; for, the evidence of his existence lay in his consciousness, as well as the evidence of his thinking. Scepticism respecting first principles, thus receiving a philosophic dress, and the sanction of a great metaphysician, soon obtained disciples, who carried the vicious principle to an extent never anticipated by their master. Locke, on the contrary, took for granted his own existence, and that of the material world, and here was a solid foundation on which to erect a rational and desirable system of mental philosophy.

over vast multitudes of minds—systems so heterogeneous, that it is difficult to give them a general classification, and so contradictory, that they are equally opposed to each other as they are to truth and common sense. If such views had been originated and put forth by men of ordinary minds and status, they would have been deemed by the literati as scarcely worth denouncing—as too preposterous to merit a passing observation. The ravings of Johanna Southcott, and of the prophet of the Mormonites, do not furnish a greater outrage upon the first principles of reason than these philosophic reveries. Yet, they are earnestly and elaborately defended and propagated by men of strong intellect and great acquirements, whose potent influence in moulding public opinion can scarcely be estimated. Trifling, therefore, and absurd as the sentiments are, their extensive prevalence, and their elaborate defence by learned men, are to be treated as great and serious facts, and their fallacies and wickedness to be gravely set forth. This is our duty arising out of the argument which has engaged our attention, and we proceed to show that the Pantheistic theory, under every modification, is fraught with absurdity, infidelity, idolatry, and licentiousness.

I. PANTHEISM IS FRAUGHT WITH ABSURDITY.

1. It contradicts one of the most obvious principles on which all reasoning proceeds, and on which all knowledge is built—namely, the principle, that essential difference constitutes individuality, or distinct identical existence. In all classes, orders, genera, species, and individuals, there is an essential difference, by which one thing or person is distinguished from another, and has its individual identity. It matters not whether the beings be organized or unorganized, animate or inanimate, material or immaterial, atoms or worlds, persons or things; there is in each a distinct individuality. As a tree is not a man, and a man is not an ox, and an ocean is not a continent, so an idea is not the object it represents. Now, the theory that identifies the creature

with the Creator, the finite with the Infinite, the Deity with the universe, contradicts this obvious principle. It has the absurdity of making the workman and his work, the potter and his clay, the same identical being. It matters not how the theory be disguised, nor how metaphysically, learnedly, and elaborately, it may be presented—whatever be its costume, this is the theory itself, apart from all disguise.

2. While this theory is contradicted by the common sense of mankind, and the first principles of knowledge, it is equally contradicted by its authors themselves: they are every moment contradicting their own theory, both in their speculations and their practices. Are they mathematicians, they distinguish a square from a triangle, and they distinguish both from a circle; they cannot state a single theorem, nor even commence the process, without contradicting their own theory. Are they logicians, they distinguish one proposition from another, and the premises from the conclusion. If they made these identical, they could never construct a single syllogism, if they should live to the end of time. In fact, every effort they make to build up their own theory assumes the very principle which destroys it; in the very act to support it, they undermine its foundation. In every sentence they pen, they assume an essential difference in their own ideas, one from another; in every word, every syllable, and every letter, by which they seek to express their ideas, they assume this essential difference; and, in their controversies amongst themselves, or against their common opponents, they assume an essential difference in their systems, one from another; and this difference constitutes an individuality for each; and this individuality destroys the identity which lies at the foundation of their theory. There may be a *resemblance* between two beings of the same species, but there is still an essential difference which gives to each a distinct individuality. Two atoms of matter may be so near alike, that we can see no difference in shape, size, colour, or weight, but still they are not identical—there is such an essential difference between them, that each has its own identity and individuality.

If, then, there be distinct individuality in objects thus intimately resembling each other, how palpably absurd to contend against this distinction, with respect to objects between which there is the greatest disparity and contrariety ! The universe is finite, God is infinite ; the creature is of yesterday, God is eternal ; the creature is helpless and dependent, God is independent and almighty ; the creature is changeable, God is unchangeable ; the creature dies, the Creator is essentially and eternally living ; and yet these sage philosophers are writing books to persuade mankind that they are one and the same Being !

3. While this theory is contradicted by the first principles of reason, it is equally contradicted by our consciousness and our senses. We have a consciousness of personal identity, by which we know that *Ego* is not *Tu*, nor *Ille*—that *I* can neither be *Thou*, nor *He*—a consciousness, by which each feels that he is not another person, or another thing ; by which the existence of each person is distinct from nature and from all other persons and things ; and by which I know that my thoughts, affections, and actions, are my own, and not those of another person. All human laws recognize this distinct personal existence, and consequent individual responsibility ; and all human relations and habits exemplify its truth. Our speculators, themselves, feel this consciousness of distinct personal identity, and recognize it in others. They cannot theorize themselves out of this consciousness. Their own feelings witness to their own minds the falsehood and absurdity of their theory, and their actions exhibit the same testimony to the observation of others. They cannot escape from themselves wherever they may flee, and they cannot confound their identity with that of another creature, much less with the Creator. We never heard of any one *acting* on such an absurd hypothesis, except the hypochondriac or the maniac, and for the amusement of such alone is the philosophical reverie adapted.

4. It is not difficult to trace the origin of this delusion. It springs from a partial discarding of the faculties which God has given to man for ascertaining truth. The faculties

God has given to man for this noble purpose are, consciousness, sense, and reason. Not any one of these is sufficient of itself. Consciousness, without sense and reason, would barely distinguish man from a vegetable. Consciousness and sense, without reason, would, at most, only place us on a level with the brute creation. It is the combination of the three faculties, or the three classes of faculties, which constitutes us men—rational as well as sentient beings—qualified for ascertaining truth. Each of these faculties, being given for this exalted purpose, is adequate within its own sphere to fulfil its purpose—is a faithful witness of what comes within its cognizance, and ought, therefore, to receive proportionate confidence from its possessor.

Now, the two great divisions of the Pantheistic error—the material, and the ideal—have sprung from a discarding or disparaging of some of these faculties. Whether it is that truth is too obvious, when its evidence is poured upon the mind through the ordinary media, and is therefore despised, because it is popular; or, whether it is that some men, from an overweening opinion of their superior powers, imagine they can dispense with one half of their faculties, and demonstrate truth by the other, we need not determine; but certain it is, that the doctrines of these sceptical speculatists, both in ancient and modern times, involve a discarding, or at least, a disparaging of the evidence furnished by one class of their faculties.* The materialist, or the Pantheist who

* Paley's observation on the causes of scepticism well accord with our views. He says, "Were it necessary to inquire into the motives of men's opinions—I mean their motives, separate from their arguments—I should almost suspect, that because the proof of a Deity, drawn from the constitution of nature, is not only popular but vulgar, (which may arise from the cogency of the proof, and be, indeed, its highest recommendation) and because it is a species almost of *puerility* to take up with it; for these reasons, minds, which are habitually in search of invention and originality, feel a restless inclination to strike off into other solutions, and other expositions. The truth is, that many minds are not so indisposed to anything which can be offered to them, as they are to the flatness of being content with common reasons; and what is most to be lamented, minds, conscious of superiority, are the most liable to this repugnancy." Hence, those who follow the beaten track of

denies all spiritual existence, and resolves Deity and nature into one identical material substance, pretends to rely on the evidence of sense, which assures him of the reality of the material world, but rejects the evidence which consciousness and his mental faculties give of the reality of a spiritual existence. On the other hand, the Idealist or transcendental Pantheist, who denies the existence of the material world, and contends that there is no real being but mind, denies, in fact, the evidence of his senses. He can see the evidence of spirit in the exercise of consciousness and reason, but the testimony of his senses, which proclaims the reality of an external world, he rejects as delusive.

Nothing is more obvious than that men, in attempting to reason under the government of such principles, must greatly err. Error may be incidental to other minds, but is essential to theirs; and we need not wonder at any absurdity, however monstrous, which they may advocate. If a man deny the evidence of consciousness, he cannot believe in his own existence. If he confide in consciousness, but deny the evidences of his senses, he may believe in his own existence, but he cannot believe in the existence of the material world. Nor can he reason, for reason derives her materials from consciousness and sense; and, apart from revelation or inspiration, he can have them from no other source. "Sense is God's organ, his means of manifestation; and God cannot lie." "When reason degrades sense—charges her with deception—discards her informations—reason becomes transformed from truth into *nonsense*." When, therefore, these men deride those who enquire for truth by using *all* their faculties—consciousness, sense, and reason—and charge them with being "*empirical*"—when they scornfully describe them as "timidly lingering on the threshold of science," it may be justly replied, that *we* seek for truth in the only way in which it can be found, and that

nature, in believing the testimony of their senses and consciousness, are disdainfully spoken of as empirics in science—as those who timidly linger on the threshold of truth, instead of fathoming its depths, and soaring to its heights.

the renunciation of any one faculty is voluntarily to impose deception on all the rest. When men disbelieve their senses, they may dream and rave, but cannot reason; and their very dreams are composed of images drawn from the sources they discard. They may flatter themselves with the idea of soaring to the heights, and penetrating into the deep abysses, of truth, but their career is that of floundering from absurdity to absurdity at every step; and having abandoned the sources and first principles of truth, their denial of God's personal existence, or their confounding of his identity with the universe, is only one out of a multitude of errors, which necessarily spring from their folly. Though the truth of God's personal existence lies at their right hand, they cannot find it; though it shine with effulgent splendour, they cannot see it. The anatomist might as well attempt to find a spirit by dissection, and a limner might as well attempt to sketch a beautiful landscape from nature, in the dark recesses of a coal mine, as for either the materialist, or the transcendental pantheist, attempt to find the truth, while discarding the faculties which God has given for its perception and discovery.

It is worthy of observation, that a similar scepticism with regard to first principles has its advocates in India, in a modern sect of sophists, of which Dr. Judson records in his journal the following notable example:—"May 20th, 1821. Encountered another new character, one Moung Long, from the neighbourhood of Shway-doung, a disciple of the great Tong-dwan teacher, the acknowledged head of all the semi-atheists in the country. Like the rest of the sect, he is, in reality, a complete sceptic, scarcely believing his own existence. They say he is always quarrelling with his wife on some metaphysical point. For instance, if she says, 'The rice is ready,' he will reply, 'Rice! what is rice? Is it matter or spirit? Is it an idea, or is it a non-entity?' Perhaps she will say, 'It is matter!' and he will reply, 'Well, wife, and what is matter? are you sure there is any such thing in existence, or are you merely subject to a delusion of the senses?'" Bishop Berkley was a firm believer

in the existence of Deity, but it was the same mental disease which led him to doubt the existence of the material universe, and which disease, in a more developed state, induced Hume to reason against his own existence, and resolve all things into mere ideas and impressions. Thus, men of the most opposite theological sentiments find themselves carried to similar absurdities, when they proceed to reason by denying the evidence of their faculties.

It is remarkable how error furnishes its own antidote. Notwithstanding the obvious absurdity involved in the opposite speculations of the material and the spiritual Pantheist, there is just so much truth in each that they separately serve to confute each other, and combine to establish both the validity of our faculties, as the media of our knowledge, and the great doctrine of Jehovah's existence. Though the materialist disbelieves in all spiritual existence, he confides implicitly in his senses ; and his confidence in them does homage to the truth, that their testimony is faithful, and not deceptive, and that the existence of the material world is real, not ideal. The Idealist, though denying the evidence of his senses, confides in the testimony which consciousness and reason bear to the existence of the spiritual world ; and his confidence does homage to the verdict of reason. The affirmative side of one theory confutes the negative side of the other. One maintains the existence of Body, and the other the existence of Spirit, and thus they correct each other's errors, and supply a testimony that the existence of both body and spirit is sustained by the clearest evidence ; for it is certain that men of such sceptical sentiments would believe in nothing except the evidence extorted conviction. It thus appears too obvious to be denied, that each class of speculators missed the truth they were respectively seeking, by disparaging the faculties which were adapted to receive it—the one by denying his senses, lost the material world ; the other, by denying the evidence of his rational nature, lost the spiritual world. Thus, each maintained the opposite pole of the same truth. Each was right just so far as he used his faculties aright, and error began just where the

testimony of either sense or reason was discarded. Now, had both honoured the faculties God had given them, by an appropriate confidence and a due exercise of them, it is quite clear that both would have maintained the truths they now separately deny. Men might as well try to explore metaphysics with a lantern, as attempt to find the whole truth by their senses alone; and they might as well attempt to build a temple with oxygen gas, as to find the whole truth by reason, to the exclusion of their senses. Employ both, and, while they obtain a cure for their insanity, they will find that the material and spiritual world have each a real existence, and that God is the author of both.

There is another remarkable effect arising from the contemplation of these opposite theories—namely, the testimony they conjointly bear to the fundamental truth of religion—the *existence of God*. Contradictory as the systems are to each other, they each proclaim a Deity. Though each theorist starts from an opposite point, and pursues an opposite track, both reach the same conclusion—*There is a God*. Though the materialist believe in nothing but matter, he believes that matter to be God; though the transcendentalist believes in nothing but spirit, he believes that spirit to be God. Though each believes in but one Being, that Being is God. Though sceptical on all other points, on this they profess no doubt; with them, the evidence of his existence is so clear and decisive, that it extorts their unequivocal assent. It is thus that error itself yields homage to the truth. The existence of the Deity is legible throughout the universe, and the truth, though obscured and distorted, is too brilliant to be wholly lost, even amid the dark and eccentric wanderings and the most extravagant speculations which have marked the history of the human mind.

II. PANTHEISM IS FRAUGHT WITH IDOLATRY.

The systems of Pantheism are not only fraught with absurdity and contradiction, they are *idolatrous*. By lowering the Deity to the creature, they rob him of his distinguishing

glories ; and, by exalting the creature to the Creator, they transfer his glory to another. Is adoration offered to matter ? it is offered not to God, for he is not material. Is adoration offered to a created spirit ? it is offered not to God, for he is not created. Nor will Jehovah allow himself to be associated in worship with the creature under any pretence. Personal in his existence, independent in his attributes, infinite in all his perfections, and conscious of his prerogatives, he will not give his glory to another. There is an infinite disparity between him and his creatures ; and whether homage be offered to a molten statue, or to the universe ; whether to Nature, as an abstract impersonality, or to Nature, as a supposed conscious existence, it is idolatry ; and its votaries, however refined and intellectual, are as much idolaters as the Indian, who prostrates himself before the hideous Juggernaut, or the degraded South Sea Islander, who bows before the shapeless forms of his Maræ. More repugnant, indeed, in some respects, than the simple superstition of the savage, for the refined Pantheist may worship *himself*, under ~~under~~ the sanction of a theory which regards his nature as an emanation from the essence of God, or identical with his Being.

III. THE PANTHEISTIC THEORY IS FRAUGHT WITH INFIDELITY.

We are aware that this is a charge which some would indignantly repel, but no respect for talents, or deference to professions of candour, are to deter us from uttering the unvarnished truth. If to deny the teachings of the inspired volume be infidelity, we have it here in its most unequivocal manifestation. The scriptures teach that God is a Spirit ; this system, in one of its forms, maintains that he is material. The sacred volume affirms that all creatures are distinct from their Creator, as separate as individual existence can render them ; this system proclaims that God is all things, and all things are God, as parts of one great whole. This is resistance to inspired teaching ; it is infidelity. It is, in many cases, the ultimatum of that down-

ward course of error which began in the rejection of spiritual religion, proceeded in resolving miracles into natural events, and the history of Christ into a mythos, and which has descended, through various forms of Neology, to its present dark abyss of error, folly, and infidelity. The successors of the Reformers—ministers of religion—those who occupy the professor's chair, have turned their backs upon the pure and salubrious sun-light which shone upon them; and God is judicially permitting them to wander in darkness that may be felt, and presenting to the gaze of surrounding nations, a people the most eminent for learning, and the most consummate in folly—once foremost in emancipating the minds of men from papal bondage, but now the most elaborate in forging chains of mental slavery—in the sixteenth century exhuming the scriptures from masses of papal superstition, and in the nineteenth century burying them beneath the errors of atheism and pagan philosophy. They have repudiated *divine* truth, and God, in judgement, has permitted them to lose *natural* truth. They have repudiated revelation, and have forfeited their reason. They have become wise above what is written in the sacred word, and are incapable of reading the volume of nature. They have pronounced the Bible a fable, and their writings are a compound of fable. As it hath happened to the Jews who rejected Christ, so hath it happened to these rejectors of the doctrines of the reformation. With both, philosophy shares the same disgrace and outrage as religion,—with the absence of faith, we see in both the absence of common sense; and in both we behold these qualities succeeded by the most ignoble trifling, the wildest mysticism, and the most absurd and contradictory speculations; and, finally, as if to complete the burlesque upon sober sense, by a specimen of the superlatively ridiculous, these preposterous speculations are dignified with the title of “*Rationalism*” and “*Transcendental philosophy*.” Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools; and, like their heathen predecessors, have changed the image of the incorruptible God, into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds,

and four-footed beasts, and creeping things ; and, in this Pantheistic transformation, they have changed the truth into a lie, and God has given them over to a reprobate mind. Perhaps there never was an instance in which the prophetic judgement was more literally verified, “Hearing, ye shall hear, and shall not understand ; and seeing, ye shall see, and shall not perceive. For the heart of this people is waxed gross, and their ears are dull of hearing, and their eyes have they closed ; (literally closed their senses against the appeals of nature) lest they should see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their heart, and I should heal them.”

IV. PANTHEISM IS LICENTIOUS.

We mean not to charge its literary advocates with practical licentiousness, but we contend that such is the natural tendency of the system. It strikes at the foundation of morals, and moral responsibility. Thus, in Pope's Pantheistic Essay on Man, we find the doctrine associated with this licentious principle :

“In spite of pride, in erring reason's spite,
One truth is clear, Whatever is, is right.”*

Revolted as is the principle expressed in this distich, it is the genuine morality of Pantheistic philosophy ; for, if all nature be God, then human actions, are as much the actions of God, as the operations of gravitation, chemical forces, or any other natural law. On such a principle, there can be nothing wrong. As there is only one being in existence, there can be no standard of right but what exists in his mind, and, therefore, all actions must be equally good, when they are the products of that mind. Injustice, lying, treachery, oppression, intemperance, lust, and murder, are only names which conventional usage has given to certain actions ; but the actions themselves are as good as probity, chastity,

* There is reason to believe that Lord Bolingbroke supplied the *principles*, and Pope the *poetry*, of the “Essay on Man,” and that thus, Pope unwittingly gave currency to sentiments he did not hold.

benevolence, and any of those designated virtues. Some of the literati, who advocate the pantheistic theories, may live virtuously, but they live above their own principles; they may indignantly repudiate the doctrine, but it logically results from their speculations. Although the cloistered professor may indulge in his reveries for the sake of mere intellectual gratification, and subject his conduct to the government of an opposite class of principles, the masses will act otherwise. They will reduce the licentious theory to practice, so far as it may comport with self interest and depraved appetite. They will give it exemplification in their character and habits. They *are* doing so at the present day; and hence the disregard for all authority, human and divine—the open contempt of sacred things—the rude and unblushing blasphemy—the licentious indulgence of the passions—the perverse and extravagant notions of human rights—the concentration of all concern upon things present and momentary—the light estimate of human life—the suicide of individuals and nations—and the horrid murders which characterize the history of continental nations, where pantheistic and atheistic principles almost equally obtain at the present day!

By vast numbers throughout Germany and various parts of the continent, these principles are not only avowed with unblushing hardihood, but propagated with the most indefatigable diligence and perseverance. M. Wichern, a man of unblemished integrity and unwearied benevolence, at a public meeting in Wittenberg, on the 23rd of September, 1848, held for the purpose of forming an evangelical confederation, gave a lengthened statement of the most appalling facts. Speaking of the general prevalence and effects of atheism and pantheism among the artizans, he observes—“What scenes are enacted within the Herberge (the trades’ hall,) may not be rehearsed before so large an assembly as this: suffice it to say, that the most fearful orgies of the ancient heathens have been surpassed in them. Yet Hamburg is, in this respect, not worse than her neighbours. Her example may, therefore, be taken as a fair specimen of

all. How, then, does it stand with her? One single fact speaks louder than a thousand arguments, and I will, therefore, tell you that, recently, in Hamburg, one of the songs which resounded with applause in the convivial meeting of a certain trade, ran thus:—

“Curse on the Godhead, the blind and the deaf,
To which heretofore we have pledged our faith;
On whom we have hoped, and have waited in vain,
He hath tricked us, and mocked us, and laughed at our pain.”

“But neither to Hamburg, nor to all the large cities of the German fatherland, is the danger arising from its infidel travelling journeymen limited. Look at the shoals which overspread Europe! See Paris, Switzerland, Lyons, Marseilles, and London, teeming with them. When, some ten years ago, the danger of communism, as possibly threatening us from that quarter, was suggested, it was laughed at as a chimaera. Now, the thunderbolt has fallen, and no one can shut his eyes to the magazine in which it has been forged.

“It would be difficult for those who are unacquainted with this class of the population of Germany to form a conception of the sophistic attainments of our travelling artizans! The dogmas of the most radical philosophy, and the synthetics of Hegel’s theology, are familiar in their mouths as household words. Neither does practice lag behind theory; and they are fully prepared to bide the brunt of what may come upon them. As “they fear not God, neither do they regard man.”

“Switzerland has been the German journeyman’s preparatory school. There the most unblushing and ultra-atheism was preached as the surest and readiest road to communism.

“I am sorry to be obliged to name as the most prominent of these atheistic labourers, my own countrymen, William Marr, a native of Hamburg, and who has recently received the largest number of votes, as the future representative of her population. He makes no secret of his sentiments, and, after having served his apprenticeship to atheism in Switzerland, in which, by his own account, he was instrumental in leading hundreds of his own countrymen to apostatize

from God, he was, in 1845, in common with other members of her communistic clubs, forced to leave that country, where, as he says in his book, entitled *Das junge Deutschland*, ‘Many hundred Germans, avowed enemies to God, returned to their native land.’

“Druey got Marr to leave Switzerland (for he was too daring even for Druey), by urging on him that the leadership of a German propaganda was his natural sphere. In prosecution of this suggestion, Marr betook himself successively to Hystein, Hecker, and Robert Blum, and, at length, in pursuance of his mission, arrived in Hamburg (which is still his headquarters), everywhere introducing, with fiendish diligence, atheistic and communistic ideas into the artizan clubs and associations, and thereby inducing the dissolution of every earlier and holier tie.

“The aim and undeviating object of these men’s lives, is the promotion and spread of infidelity; and rank republicanism, with all its senseless tirade of perfect equality, fraternity, and community of goods.

“But William Marr does not confine his efforts to Hamburg, or its vicinity, but, with a zeal worthy a better cause, travels through the north of Germany, as an avowed missionary of atheism! In this capacity he was lately in Lübeck (after having perambulated Holstein), and is believed to be at this momemt going from village to village, in Lauenburg, with the demoniac purpose of recruiting the rank of God’s avowed opposers.

“I maintain,” says this shameless demagogue, “THAT THE BELIEF IN A PERSONAL LIVING GOD IS THE CHIEF FOUNDATION AND ORIGIN OF OUR PRESENT WORM-EATEN SOCIAL STATE; and further, that so long as mankind shall hang, by a single hair, to the idea of HEAVEN, there is no happiness to be looked for on earth.” “Christianity, and the existing order of things which is built upon it, are the true fretting cancers of human society.” “Man himself is the religion of futurity. GOD STANDS IN NEED OF MAN, BUT MAN HAS NO NEED OF GOD.” Such are the senseless blasphemies *published* by the man who has been chosen, by a large majority, as a member of

Hamburg's future legislative assembly ! Similar to these are the sentiments of Itzstuin, Hecker, Simon of Treves, Voght, and the larger portion of the Frankfort *extreme left*. Such are the sentiments entertained by the bulk of the Voigtland parishioners (in Berlin), of whom their pastor, the Rev. M. Kunze, sorrowfully testified at the Wittenberg meeting, that ninety-nine out of every hundred had not merely fallen off from Christ, but gone over to the enemy ! Such characters formed the aggregate of the celebrators of Robert Blum's* requiem in the Church of St. Thomas, in Leipsic, when such desecrations were ventured on, that the pious superintendent, Dr. Grossman, has laid down his pastoral office, in sorrow and disgust, feeling it impossible ever again to lead Divine service in the so grossly polluted building. The pulpit was, it seems, used as a tribune ; from which resounded, not the praise of Jesus Christ, but of his avowed contemner Blum, whose bust was placed on the altar, and many of *his* worshippers sat smoking cigars while the dirge was being played !”†

These revolting sentiments, alike destructive of social order, and personal virtue, are not confined to Germany, France, Switzerland, and other parts of the continent, but, as might be expected, have become widely diffused in our own country. Itinerating lecturers are propagating them in our public institutions. Sometimes a discourse on science is made the occasion of insinuating doubts, and administering scepticism in homœopathic doses to our youthful population, and sometimes the poison is offered in large and intoxicating draughts. Not long since, a popular lecturer, in Manchester, openly advocated scepticism as a mental excellency, and, in discoursing on human destiny, is reported to have averred, that wherever “We see man, whether on the ale bench, in the brothel, on the treadmill, or the gallows, we see him on the high road to dignity, to excellence, and happiness !”

* A foreign conspirator, who lately was tried by court martial, and shot, in Vienna.

† Abridged from the “Christian Times” for December 8th, 1848.

Whether we contemplate the system theoretically, or practically, it is the most outrageous monstrosity which the human mind has ever yet fabricated, or can fabricate. It is the ultimatum of absurdity and immorality. It was generated by conceit, fostered by pride, and matured by the most consummate depravity. Viewed by the eye of philosophy it is arrant nonsense, by the eye of morality it is disgustingly obscene, and by the eye of religion it is horrid blasphemy. It is repugnant to our reason, and revolting to our moral sense. It is a foul disgrace to the intellect and character of man, which it is both humiliating and loathsome to contemplate; and the disgrace is deepened when we think of the men, the country, and the age, with which the system has sprung. A maniac could not equal its folly, nor a demon exceed its wickedness. The prince of darkness himself, delighting in devastation and misery as he may, could not desire a more complete abasement of human intellect, a more entire wreck of the human character and happiness, a more perfect subversion of the authority and designs of Almighty God. Its universal prevalence would consummate the wishes of that apostate and malignant spirit, in dissolving all the bonds of society, uprooting the foundations of social order and happiness, and filling the earth with lust, violence, and blood. We wonder not at the spread of socialism, communism, libertinism, anarchy, and hatred to religion; we wonder not that vices are open, crimes unblushing, and the vilest of men are held in reputation. There is a cause! learning and talent have prostituted their powers in advocating an atheist^{ic} lie, and have sent it abroad through society; and the lie, thus sanctioned, and ministering to the vilest passions of human nature, has produced the effects we deplore.

It is time, therefore, to sound an alarm—to exhibit the character and tendency of this great leading error of the age; and it is our duty to call upon ministers of religion, sabbath school teachers, and christian philanthropists of every name, to employ all lawful means to destroy the baneful system, and purge society from its malignant influence. To do this,

we must widely circulate the truth—we must bring the truth into more frequent contact with the multitude of men around us, and sedulously work its great principles into the minds of our youthful population. To zealous labour, we must unite earnest and believing prayer. We must cry aloud to Him whose being is denied, whose majesty is insulted, and whose prerogatives are trampled in the dust, by impious and presumptuous men. We must not trust in learning or talent, however splendid, but in the living God. We have seen enough to make us refrain from deifying the intellect of man. We must cease from man, whose breath is in his nostrils ; that breath often becomes pestiferous and blasphemous. We must lift up our importunate and restless cry to God against the common foe to himself and human happiness. We must beseech him to arise and plead his own cause. While strenuous exertions engage our right arm, our united cry must daily ascend to heaven, “ Help us, O Lord our God ; for we rest on thee, and in thy name we go against this multitude. O Lord, thou art our God ; let not man prevail against thee.”

PART II.

THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

CHAPTER I.

HAVING shown that the testimony of scripture, as to the existence of God, is abundantly sustained by the conclusions of reason, we proceed to descant upon the attributes of this glorious Being. By “attributes,” we mean the properties or qualities which God attributes to himself. The same volume which declares the existence of God, unfolds the attributes of his nature and character. It would be gratuitous to suppose, that revelation itself has made known to man all the perfections of Deity; sufficient, however, for all practical purposes, is the knowledge which is unfolded respecting the perfections of our Creator.

God is declared *eternal*. “Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting, thou art God.” “Thus saith the high and lofty One that inhabiteth eternity, whose name is Holy.”—Psalm xc., 2. Isaiah, lvii., 15.

God is *absolutely perfect, all-sufficient, and independent*—attributes clearly indicated by the sacred name, “*Jehovah*,” and the expressive title, by which he revealed himself to Moses, “I am that I am.” I am self-existent and independent, deriving nothing from another, but communicating all things. “I am Alpha and Omega! I am the first and I am the last! and, beside me, there is no God.” He is the “blessed God;” “God over all, blessed for evermore.”—Rev. i., 8. Isaiah, xliv., 6. Romans, ix., 5.

God is *immutable*. “For I am the Lord, I change not.” He is “the Father of Lights, with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning.”—Malachi iii., 6. James i., 17.

God is *omnipresent*. “Whither shall I go from thy spirit, or, whither shall I flee from thy presence? If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there: if I make my bed in hell, behold, thou art there. If I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea; even there shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me.” “But will God indeed dwell on the earth? Behold! the heaven, and the heavens of heavens, cannot contain thee!” He “filleteth all in all.”—Psalm cxxxix., 7—10. 1 Kings, viii., 39. Eph., i., 23.

God is *omniscient*. “He that planteth the ear, Shall he not hear? He that formed the eye, Shall he not see?” “I, the Lord, search the heart.” “There is no darkness, nor shadow of death, where the workers of iniquity may hide themselves.” “For, he looketh to the ends of the earth, and seeth under the whole heaven.” “If I say, Surely the darkness shall cover me, even the night shall be a light about me. Yea, the darkness hideth not from thee; but the light shineth as the day: the darkness and the light are both alike to thee.” “O, the depth of the riches, both of the wisdom and knowledge of God.” “His understanding is infinite.”—Psalm xciv., 9. Jer., xvii., 10. Job, xxxiv., 22.; xxviii., 24. Psalm, cxxxix., 11, 12: cxlvii., 5. Romans, xi., 33.

God is *omnipotent*. “I am the Almighty God: walk before me and be thou perfect.” “I know that thou canst do every thing, and that no thought can be withholden from thee.” “And Jesus looking upon them, saith, With men it is impossible, but not with God: for with God all things are possible.” “Alleluia: For the Lord God omnipotent reigneth.” Gen., xvii., 1. Mark, x., 27. Rev., xix., 6.

God is *benevolent*. “And the Lord passed by before him, and proclaimed, The Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, long suffering, and abundant in goodness and truth.” “O give thanks unto the Lord for he is good, for his mercy endureth for ever.” “The Lord is good to all, and his tender mercies are over all his works.” “God is love.” Exodus, xxxiv., 6. 1 Chron., xvi., 34. Psalm, cxlv., 8. 1 John, iv., 16.

God is *holy, just, and true*. “Be ye holy, for I the Lord your God am holy.” And the seraphim “cried one to another, saying, holy, holy, holy is Jehovah of hosts: the whole earth is full of his glory.” “Great and marvellous are thy works, Lord, God, Almighty; just and true are thy ways, thou king of saints. Who would not fear thee O Lord, and glorify thy name? for thou only art holy.” Lev. xix., 2. Isa. vi., 3. Rev. xv., 3, 4.

Such is the scriptural representation of the Divine attributes in which we have the most purifying and enobling views of our glorious Creator. These discoveries of his natural and moral perfections are frequently combined with the most eloquent and lofty exhibitions of his majesty and glory. He clothes himself with light as with a garment. He stretcheth out the heavens like a curtain. He layeth the beams of his chamber in the waters. He maketh the clouds his chariot; and he walketh upon the wings of the wind. He maketh the heavens his throne, and the earth his footstool, and the inhabitants thereof are as grasshoppers before him. He measureth the oceans in the hollow of his hand, and meteth out heaven with the span, and comprehendeth the dust of the earth in a measure. He weigheth the mountains in scales, and the hills in a balance. Behold! all nations are as a drop of a bucket, and are counted as the small dust of the balance, and he taketh up the isles as a very little thing. He bringeth the universe into being with a word. He said, let there be light, and there was light. He telleth the number of the stars, and calleth them all by their names. He looketh on the earth, and it trembleth; He toucheth the hills and they smoke. The thunders are his voice, the lightnings his arrows. At his rebuke, the sea retires as affrighted, the sun standeth still, the heavens gather blackness, and finally he will roll them together as a parchment scroll, and cause the stars to fall from their orbs, as a fig-tree casteth forth her untimely fruit, when shaken by a mighty wind. His throne is unapproachable for its brightness; a rainbow spans the terrible chrystal firmament: and round about the throne are living ones, cherubim,

seraphim, human spirits, angels, thrones, dominions, principalities, and powers, who, countless in their number, refulgent with brightness, and blissful in their estate, pour forth before him their ceaseless anthems of joy, and eternal hallelujahs of praise.

The richest imagination of uninspired man—the sublimest creations of the poet's fancy, could never equal this description of the Divine majesty. Nothing but the Spirit of God could furnish to the human mind such an exhibition of the majesty and glory of the blessed God. The most admired odes of heathen antiquity, or of modern genius, are not to be compared with these inspired representations of the Almighty Jehovah; and yet it must be confessed, that inspiration itself, conveyed through the imperfect medium of earthly symbols, and apprehended by the narrow and feeble grasp of human intellect, falls short, yea, infinitely short, of fully setting forth the Godhead to our view.

But, though our conceptions of the Deity are so vastly inadequate in measure, yet, they may, in some respects, be correct and true, if we allow them to be formed by a sober regard to the representations furnished in Holy Scripture. Though much of the language of inspiration is figurative, yet, it must be remembered that we are not at liberty to resolve all the scriptural exhibitions of God into mere figures of speech. It has, indeed, been maintained, that the attributes of Deity are of a nature altogether different from the mental and moral faculties of the human mind, and, that the analogy between the powers of the human mind, and the perfections of God, is very remote, and has in it no more of real resemblance “than a map of China has to China itself.” Archbishop King remarks, “We ought to remember that the descriptions which we frame to ourselves of God, or of the Divine attributes, are not taken from any direct or immediate perceptions that we have of him or them; but from some observations we have made of his works, and from the consideration of those qualifications, that we conceive would enable us to perform the like. It doth not truly follow from hence, that God must have either

these or other faculties equivalent to them, and adequate to these mighty effects which proceed from them. And, because we do not know what his faculties are in themselves, we give them the names of those powers that we find would be necessary to us in order to produce such effects, and call them wisdom, understanding, and foreknowledge; yet, at the same time, we cannot but be sensible that they are of a nature altogether different from ours, and that we have no direct and proper notion or conception of them."

We demur to this representation as being inaccurate, and calculated both to obscure our conceptions of the Divine Being, and almost obliterate the impressions of scriptural truth. We grant, indeed, that the language of scripture is often figuratively employed in setting forth the Divine Being, and is to be interpreted soberly. We grant, that when the Divine Majesty is represented by the pomp and gorgeous costume of eastern royalty, when the members of the human body and some inferior passions of the human soul are ascribed to Deity, the language is anthropomorphic and highly figurative; but we cannot, on this account, allow all the exhibitions of the Divine character and attributes to be resolved into such distant analogies as exist between a map and the country depicted. We cannot admit the notion that the attributes of Deity "are of a nature *altogether* different from those of the human mind, and that we have no proper conception of them." Dark and enigmatical, indeed, must be the scriptures, and *erroneous*, as well as inadequate, must be the views we gather from them, if such were the case. We feel compelled to reject the representation of Dr. King as being unphilosophical as well as unscriptural. We contend, that, with regard to faculties and properties, there is a true and real resemblance. That, in reference to both mental and moral attributes, there is an actual representation as to their nature, however vast the disparity in measure and degree.

What, in fact, is the difference in *duration*, as it applies to God and man, but that in man it is finite, while in God it is infinite? The *nature* of duration in both is the same.

What is the difference in knowledge or wisdom, as it applies to Deity and to man? We conceive it is the same in both as to its *nature*, though infinitely different as to its perfection and degree. What is volition but the self-determining act of a free mind whether in the creature or the Creator? What is the difference in love, in truth, in faithfulness, in justice, in holiness, as they exist in the mind of God and man? Is not love an affection of complacency and delight in an object? Is not truth the conformity of our perceptions to things? Is not faithfulness the conformity of our purposes, dispositions, and actions, to truth? Is not justice the regulation of all our dispositions and conduct by the principles of truth and faithfulness towards others? Is not holiness freedom from and aversion to moral evil, and love to all that is good? Are not these principles essentially the same in all ages, in all minds, and in all worlds? Do they part with their essence or become changed in their nature by existing in minds of different order and capacity? We conceive they do not. Whether they exist in the mind of man, angel, or God, they are essentially and eternally the same in their nature. Here is the only difference: in the creature they are limited, in the Creator infinite; in man they are mixed with infirmity and often with qualities of an opposite kind, but in Jehovah their lustre is untarnished by any alloy—they exist in absolute perfection, in unchanging harmony and beauty—they are united to a mind of infinite capacity and unchanging rectitude. Gold is gold whether in the rude heterogeneous mass of ore, or in the pure and refined ingot; whether in the diminutive quantity of a grain, or a ponderous massive globe. So with regard to those faculties and properties of mind, indicative of excellence, there is a real resemblance between the creature and the Creator.

Similar views are expressed by the most eminent Theologians. Watson observes, “When it is said ‘God is a Spirit,’ we have no reason to conclude, that a distant analogy, such a one as springs out of mere relation, which, in a poetic imagination, might be sufficient to support a figure of speech,

is alone intended. The very argument connected with these words in the discourse of our Lord with the woman of Samaria forbids this. It is a declaration of the nature of God, and of the worship suited to his nature; and the word employed is that by which both Jews and Samaritans had been taught by the sacred inspired records, which they each possessed, to designate and conceive of the intellectual nature of man. The nature of God and the nature of man are not the same, but they are similar, because they bear many attributes in common, though, on the part of the Divine nature, in a degree of perfection infinitely exceeding.”*

Howe says, “The Godhead is of a nature nearly resembling our own souls, and the higher excellencies of the best of his creatures, although eminently containing in himself also all the real perfections, virtues, and powers of all the rest.”† Robert Hall remarks, “The body has a tendency to separate us from God by the dissimilarity of its nature; the soul, on the contrary, unites us again to him by means of those principles and faculties which, though infinitely inferior, are of a character congenial with his own. The body is the production of God, the soul is his image.”‡

We have, however, higher authority than that of human reason; for, not only does revelation represent the Deity under the designation of *Spirit*—the same word as that applied to the human soul—but, in setting forth the creation of man, it expressly declares him to have been created in the *image* and *likeness* of God. “And God said, let us make man in our image, after our likeness.” “So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him.” In this repetition of the affirmation, expressed in the same terms, there is an emphasis intended—calling our attention to the meaning of the phraseology and the importance of the fact set forth. Here, then, we have a resemblance definitely affirmed, and that resemblance expressed by the terms “likeness” and “image.” We know not what words the Holy

* Institutes, chap. iv. + Howe’s Living Temple, part ii., chap. 3.

† Sermon on the Spirituality of the Divine Nature.

Spirit could have employed more definitely expressive of a real and proper resemblance. It will not be pretended that the resemblance applies to man's corporeal nature, for, God is a Spirit, and there must be a total dissimilarity in his essence and properties. In the human spirit, then, and the Divine Spirit, the Creator, we are authorized to look for the resemblance intended. The soul of man in its spiritual essence, in its natural attributes, and in its moral qualities too, prior to its depravity by sin, and after its renovation by grace, has a real resemblance to God. Originally it was created in his image and likeness, and, when purified and sanctified by the Holy Spirit, it is said to be renewed "after the image of him who created it." On this passage Matthew Henry observes, "that the two words, image and likeness, express the same thing, and make each other the more expressive. Image and likeness denote the likeliest image, the nearest resemblance of any of the visible creatures. Man was not made in the likeness of any creature that went before him, but in the likeness of his Creator." Then this sensible Divine goes on to state the particular points of resemblance between the soul of man and God, which were—1. Its nature and constitution. 2. Its authority and dominion. 3. Its purity and rectitude. Dr Adam Clarke also remarks on the same important passage. "The image and likeness must, necessarily, be intellectual; his mind, his soul, must have been formed after the nature and perfections of God." As Theodorus Mopsuestenus quaintly saith, "When God created man, his last and best work, This was as if a certain king, having built a great city, and adorned it with many and various works, after he had perfected all, should command a very great and beauteous image of himself to be set up in the midst of the city, to show who was the builder of it."*

We grant there are qualities and properties in man, indicative of the weakness and dependence of its nature; these cannot be ascribed to God. Again, there are some attributes in the Deity which cannot be ascribed to man.

* Ap. Petav. T. iii., Lib. 2.

But, all the mental and moral properties of a human soul, expressive of the excellence and perfection of its nature, are characteristic of similar attributes in the Deity, in whom, from the self-existence and infinitude of his nature, they reside in boundless plentitude and unchanging glory. The consideration of this important truth will aid us as we proceed further in our contemplations of the Divine character. Having so far adduced the instructions of the sacred records with regard to the Divine attributes, we shall in the subsequent chapters, show that the conclusions of sound reason accord with the declarations of inspired truth, on these most interesting subjects.

CHAPTER II.

THE ETERNITY OF GOD.

“ *From everlasting to everlasting, thou art God.*”—Psalm xc., 2.

THE existence of an Eternal something was proved under the first and second propositions, and is admitted by all men. That this eternal something is not nature itself, but a conscious and intelligent Being, was demonstrated in the third, fourth, and fifth propositions. The eternity of God, therefore, follows as a necessary truth. The process of reasoning which proves that he *now* exists, proves that he has *always* existed, and, being self-existent, he must *continue* to exist for ever. He lives, but has had no commencement, and will have no end. There was nothing to originate him, there can be nothing to destroy him. He is before, above, and independent, of all that he has made. Possessing essential life in himself, he has given life to innumerable beings of various natures, some of whom quickly perish, and others by his appointment, will continue in life for ever; and their immortal nature is the most impressive image we have of Jehovah's eternity. Though our origin is of yesterday, it will be perpetuated long as that of our infinite Creator. This speaks the transcendant dignity of our nature, and closely allies the finite with the infinite mind; yet, though our *nature* resembles his, in our powers and faculties, there is an infinite disparity. A moment's thought reveals our feebleness. We cannot grasp even in conception, that duration he possesses and enjoys. We cannot comprehend eternity; we have no definite or adequate idea of it. All our positive ideas fall infinitely short thereof. After wearying ourselves with numbers, multiplying millions by millions, and bringing all the aid which imagination can supply, to swell the

aggregate, we feel compelled, at length, to fall back upon a mere negation, as the best conception we can form of this sublime and overwhelming subject, and can only say, His existence is without beginning, and without end. Mysterious and incomprehensible as eternity is, it is not the less so when contemplated purely, as a mental abstraction, than when applied to the existence of Deity ; and however mysterious to contemplate something as really eternal, it is an impossibility to avoid admitting it as a truth. To deny it, is to escape from a mystery by plunging into an absurdity. The difficulty and mysteriousness in relation to eternity is not theological, but metaphysical, and a similar difficulty is felt in relation to all mathematical infinities. While the great truth of God's eternal existence, defies our comprehension, it equally defies our contradiction, and irresistibly commands our assent.

The first attribute, then, which the mind ascribes to Jehovah, fills it with humility and awe. While it settles our convictions, because its bright evidence induces our assent as an intellectual necessity, it transcends our powers as infinity surpasses unity ; and its overpowering grandeur lays us prostrate before the Most High. We feel, indeed, the ground beneath us is a rock of adamant, which nothing can remove, but the awful and interminable line of duration, stretching into the past and the future, bewilders our imagination, and makes us shrink into insignificance. Through all the ages past, Jehovah lived ; through those vast periods of time, during the slow formation of the prodigious strata which build up the earth's foundations, he lived : ere the primitive atoms of matter had coalesced into globular masses, he lived : all the cycles through which they have run are as nothing compared with his eternal duration. Nay, if we recede still farther into the awful abyss of his duration, until we pass beyond the first moment of creation, when the universe was unborn—when there was neither a revolving world, nor a solitary atom—when the sacred throne was not surrounded by cherub, seraph, or the first-born of spirits—when universal nature was a universal blank—when

the holy place itself was occupied only by the radiant *schechinah*, and Jehovah dwelt in loneliness, without a purpose unfolded by any objective manifestation;—even then, we are only on the frontiers of his eternity, and the ages through which imagination has pierced, or may yet pierce, compared with his existence, are only as a unit to the infinite.

During those infinite ages, Jehovah was what he is now—his perfections, like his essence, are all eternal; and, during those infinite ages yet to come, he will remain the same, without addition or diminution, in the essential attributes of his nature.

The schoolmen, and after them many modern writers, have greatly mystified and perplexed this sublime doctrine, by a conceit which, to us, seems equally unsupported by scripture and reason. The eternity of God is described as *duratio tota simul*—duration without succession, or one eternal now. We are told that “the infinite perfection excludeth from God successive thoughts, as well as successive duration, which seem inconsistent both with eternity, and with infinite perfection.” Charnock says, “There is no succession in God;” “God hath his whole being in one and the same point, or moment of eternity.” “As nothing is past or future with him in regard of knowledge, but all things are present, so nothing is past or future of his essence.” “Of a creature it may be said, he was, or he is, or he shall be; of God, it cannot be said, but only he is.”* Dwight says, “His duration is a mere and Eternal now. In our own existence, the clearest resemblance to the duration of God, is found in the contemplation of a single present moment of our being, without taking at all into our view the succession even of that which immediately follows.” “He fills eternity at once, and does not come from the past, go by the present, and enter the future.”†

However great the names by which such a notion is maintained, we can no more assent to it than we can to two contradictory propositions. To us, it appears a jargon of

* Charnock on the Eternity of God.

† Dwight's Sermons, v.

unintelligible words, darkening the understanding, and mystifying one of the simplest yet most important truths of the christian religion.

1. It is certainly repugnant to the representation which the sacred scriptures give of God's eternity. The inspired writers freely speak of Jehovah's existence in ages *past*, at the *present* moment, and in ages to *come*, without any intimation that their language is not to be understood in its customary sense. Jehovah, speaking of himself, says, "I am the First and I am the Last; and beside me there is no God." "I am Alpha and Omega, saith the Lord God, who is, who was, and who is to come."—Isaiah 44, 6.—Revelation, 1, 8. In accordance with this representation, they speak of some of his purposes which *have been* fulfilled, of others *now* fulfilling, and of others to be fulfilled in ages *to come*; and the existence of *purposes* which are not yet accomplished refers to the Divine contemplation a succession both of time and events, like that which engages our own minds. In opposition, however, to this view, we are referred to a few passages which are supposed to favour the scholastic representation of the *Nunc semper stans*—the *Eternal now*. It is alleged, that God is said to "inhabit eternity." But this passage is conformable to the popular view of the subject, and says nothing which confounds past with present and future duration. Indeed, if his existence be absolutely without beginning or end, he must inhabit eternity. Again: we are referred to the declaration of Peter, "That one day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day." But this passage merely asserts the obvious truth, that as all finite duration bears no proportion to the infinite, so apparent length of time, indicates neither forgetfulness nor indifference with God, as to the ultimate fulfilment of his purposes, nor the want of means to accomplish his will. Moreover, the mentioning of "years" and "days" in this passage, confirms the popular view of this subject—it admits their reality even in reference to the Divine existence, though it asserts their insignificance contrasted with his eternity. This is more expressly obvious in

the corresponding passage in the Old Testament :—"For a thousand years in thy sight are but as yesterday when it is passed, and as a watch in the night." The declaration that he is "the same yesterday, and to-day, and for ever," is an affirmation of the unchangeable nature of Christ and his office ; and if applied to his eternity, the terms employed, clearly admit, because they express, the past, the present, and the future. If it be alleged, that the representation of this subject in the sacred volume is given in popular phraseology, in condescension to our capacities, we reply :—

2. The scholastic representation is as repugnant to philosophy as it is to the phraseology of the sacred records. It contradicts our consciousness, and our experience. We have before noticed that we get the idea of time from the succession of our ideas and the motions of bodies. If time be contemplated apart from the actual existence of any being, it is merely a mental abstraction, and if applied to the existence of any being, it denotes its actual duration or continuance in being. This continuance certainly consists of such a flow or succession, that the past is distinct from the present, and both are distinct from the future ; and this distinction is as real and essential as that between any two things, however diverse in their properties. Therefore, to demand from us to conceive of past and future ages as co-existent with the present moment, is to require an impossibility. Those who require it from us cannot do it themselves, and if this cannot be done with regard either to time in the abstract, or the duration of any created object, neither can it be done in reference to God. We may as well try to conceive every particle of matter to occupy the same point, as attempt to conceive the past, present, and future being of Deity, to be co-existent with the present instant. In fact, this notion is as repugnant to God's eternity, as it is contradictory to our consciousness and experience.

3. The advocates of the scholastic notion were indeed influenced by motives the very opposite to the logical result of their argument—they having conceived and defended the dogma, as necessary to the absolute perfection of the Creator.

Thus, Cudworth and others contend, that an existence through successive duration is the characteristic of an *imperfect* nature—a nature “expecting something of itself, which is not yet in being, but to come;” whereas, the infinitely perfect Creator, “hath a permanent duration, never losing anything of itself once present, as sliding away from it, nor yet running forwards to meet something of itself before, which is not yet in being.”* This succession is also declared to be incompatible with God’s perfection in knowledge; and, therefore, it is contended, “that infinite perfection excludeth from the idea of God successive thoughts as well as successive duration;”—successive thoughts, it is contended, “are plainly an imperfection, and argue a progress in knowledge.”†

The fallacy of the objection, here stated, lies in the erroneous supposition, that successive duration necessarily implies a change in nature, which it certainly does not. Whether a being change or not, depends not upon his duration, but upon the *nature* of the being, whether perfect and independent, or dependent and imperfect. Duration is simply continuance of being, and, though this duration implies succession or flow of time, it takes nothing from the nature of the being. What diminution of the glorious attributes of the Deity can we suppose to be effected by the mere continuance of his existence? What had he a year since, or a thousand years, which he has not at this moment? Does continuance in being deprive him of happiness? Does it detract from his knowledge, or power, or self-sufficiency? Impossible: for the source of these perfections is in himself, and mere time can no more diminish these than it can diminish his essence. Nor does the flow of time, or continuance in Being, involve, as the schoolmen suppose, an expectation of receiving something, or adding to the amount of his knowledge and happiness. As an absolutely perfect Being, his knowledge and enjoyment are infinite, not progressive. From eternity he knew all things,

* Cudworth’s *Intellectual System*, 645.

† Vide Brocklesby’s *Theism*, 365.

whether actual or possible, and his enjoyment flowed from his own exalted and absolutely perfect nature ; consequently he has nothing to expect to constitute the fulness of his felicity. If it be said that a succession of time or duration implies a portion of duration lost, and an expectation of future existence, We reply, there can be nothing lost to a Being whose existence is eternal. His existence and perfections are unimpaired, and the consciousness of present existence, conjoined with the knowledge that his existence can never terminate, is no imperfection, but an infinite excellency, and, indeed, the foundation of every other excellency.

The consciousness which human beings have of successive duration, does not detract from *their* nature or happiness, nor can we conceive they would have realized a more exalted state, or a greater degree of enjoyment, if their mental constitution had been so formed as to render them unconscious of this succession. On the contrary, our knowledge and expectation of immortality contribute greatly to our happiness, and evince our superiority of nature ; and what thus marks the excellence of our nature cannot be an imperfection in the Deity. We do, indeed, change : we lose both knowledge and happiness, and again we receive accessions to both ; but all our changes arise not from a consciousness of succession in our duration, but from the imperfection of our nature. We lose what we have because of our feebleness, and we receive accessions because we have not sufficiency in ourselves. Defect, limitation, and dependence, characterize our nature, and, hence we change : fulness, infinitude, and all-sufficiency, characterize the Deity, and hence, during the flow of ages, he remains the same.

4. The scholastic notion which denies to the Deity any consciousness of the succession of thoughts and events, so far from being necessary to a correct view of the Divine perfections, is positively derogatory to them ; for it involves ignorance and delusion ; it makes God conceive of things contrary to what they actually are. There is, in reality, a succession of events and of duration ; this cannot be denied. Therefore, to deny that God's thoughts coincide with facts,

is to suppose him ignorant, and to deny that they coincide with truth, is to suppose him deceived. We must, therefore, reject this notion, as unworthy of God, and unworthy of the great names by which it has been put forth. It removes not the absurdity, to maintain that, to the mind of a Being of infinite knowledge, all things must be present at one and the same instant. We grant, that “known unto God are all his works from the beginning,” but he knows them as they actually are, and not as they really are not. He does not know that to exist now which does not yet exist, nor that which is past or future to be present. His knowledge is according to truth. Things may be contemplated as actual or possible; as intended or accomplished. Prior to creation, the ideas or archetypes of the universe were in the Creator’s mind, and then creation must have been contemplated by him as a *future* event; but when the things were created, his mind beheld the various objects in *actual* existence, and was conscious of the difference between the *ideal* and the *actual*—the *purpose* and the *accomplishment*; and here we have a succession of thought. So with regard to each generation of human beings, the rise and fall of empires, the fulfilment of his own predictions, the accomplishment of his purposes, and all other events, there must be a distinction between the ideal and the actual, and, consequently, between the present, the past, and the future. This distinction involves such a succession of thought, as excludes all ignorance and deception, and corresponds with truth and reality. We, therefore, dismiss the scholastic figment, and wonder that a notion so contradictory and absurd should have found so many abettors among the wise and the good. We adhere to the scriptural representation of God’s existence as being strictly conformable to common sense, and sound philosophy. “Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting, thou art God.”

CHAPTER III.

ABSOLUTE PERFECTION.

“Who is over all, God, blessed for ever.”—Romans ix. 5.

A CONSCIOUS intelligent Being, whose existence is eternal, must possess absolute perfection. “To such a Being infinity may be justly ascribed; and infinity, not extrinsically considered, with respect to time and place, but intrinsically, as importing bottomless profundity of essence, and the full confluence of all kinds and degrees of perfection.” Limitation implies defect, and when the attributes of any being are limited, there is a cause for the limitation. Thus, every creature is limited, because the Creator has given to each a finite capacity, and a finite measure of any good which it may possess. The capacity may be filled, but it is limited. No such cause of limitation, however, is applicable to the Divine nature, for he is uncaused. He receives neither his existence nor his capacity from another, but, as already proved, is self-existent and eternal. It is, therefore, irrational to ascribe limitation to him, for it is to suppose an effect without a cause—an effect where it is impossible there could be any effect. Existing from all eternity, there was no extraneous cause to limit or fix bounds to any of his glorious perfections; nor could there be any intrinsic cause to produce that result, for every nature delights in its own perfection. Eternity of existence is itself an infinite perfection, and implies, in an intelligent nature, the actual and eternal possession of every other perfection. In such a Being, it is impossible to conceive the existence of defect, and this impossibility involves an intellectual necessity of supposing, on the contrary, the actual existence of every element of perfection, and that in boundless measure and degree.

INDEPENDENCE.

Absolute perfection involves Independence. All God's attributes and perfections being eternal, as well as his essence, they depend on nothing exterior to himself. There never was a period when they were not in him in the same infinite measure and degree as they are at this moment; and there never will be a period when they will be either augmented or diminished. Had no creature as yet existed, he would possess the same glorious perfections; and if no creature ever were to exist throughout eternity, he would be the same. Creation adds nothing to him; it can only present objective manifestations of what is in him, and always was in him from eternity; and if there had been no objective manifestation at all, God would still have been essentially and absolutely perfect. The great truth, thus established, is calculated to inspire intelligent beings with admiration of the Divine character, and excite unceasing thirst to know more of God. Infinity and perfection being impressed upon every attribute, they invest him with unfading and eternal glory, and establish, in sanctified minds, an assurance that there are in God, treasures of knowledge and enjoyment never to be exhausted, and beauties in the Divine character, to be unfolded to their astonishment and delight, world without end.

ALL-SUFFICIENCY.

Absolute perfection involves All-Sufficiency. A created mind has capacities without intrinsic and independent resources to replenish and satisfy them. The knowledge and enjoyment of all creatures are *derived*, and derived from sources extrinsic to themselves. "Whoever retires into his own mind for happiness, will soon find himself miserable; he will feel imprisoned until he is permitted to go forth and unite himself in affection and confidence to something out of himself. Hence, those who are most insulated and cut off from all contact with others, are styled, by way of distinction, *misers*, and are truly the most miserable of men. There cannot be a greater picture of abject wretchedness, than a

man, entirely confined to himself, possessing none of those sensibilities which attach mind to mind, and heart to heart,—a stranger to that reciprocation of feeling and affection between kindred minds, which is the very balm of life.”* This is a necessary result of our imperfect and dependent nature, and it characterizes the highest created intelligence in the universe, as well as ourselves; all finite natures are dependent upon sources extrinsic to themselves, for the knowledge and enjoyment requisite to fill their capacities. On the contrary, God is All-sufficient, in and of himself. Both his capacities and resources are infinite, and his resources are all in himself. The boundless ocean of his own nature affords scope for all his infinite faculties, and replenishes his mind with infinite enjoyment. Thus it was before the fiat of creation went forth; thus it was from all eternity; and thus it would have been if the stupendous operations of creative energy had been postponed myriads of ages; and, indeed, thus it would have been, had he continued to exist in absolute solitude for all eternity to come. But though he is dependent upon no creature, all creatures are necessarily dependent upon him, and all intellectual and moral natures must derive their supreme happiness from him. Whatever rivulets of enjoyment may flow from the creature, our capacities can never be filled, except from the ocean of bliss, which essentially dwells in the Creator. Such being the law under which all finite natures are placed, how exhilarating the assurance, that God is All-sufficient,—that the fountain is perennial and inexhaustible. That which has filled the capacities of the Deity through all eternity past, can never be expended by the claims and desires of the creature through all eternity to come. The capacities and wants of the finite, are as nothing to the treasures of the infinite—“The fulness of him that filleth all in all.”

IMMUTABILITY.

I. An absolutely perfect being, must be Immutable. Change is the law of all created existence. Nothing is

* Robert Hall on the Spirituality of the Divine Nature.

absolutely stable and unvarying but the Deity. The material universe is running through a course of gradual but certain change. One generation cometh and another goeth. The ocean shifts its place, the mountains are crumbling into ruin, chemical activities are seeking repose, the earth is narrowing her orb, and is destined to destruction. Similar changes are transpiring in other orbs, and analogy points to universal dissolution, as the destiny of the countless myriads of systems, which faintly shed their light upon our planet. The universe of mind, too, is changing, and destined to change. Some intelligent beings, once holy and happy, have fallen and lost their blest estate. Others are in a process of merciful recovery; and others passing from a life transient and trying, to one of immortality and glory. The most blessed in heaven are changing by accessions of knowledge and enjoyment, and a greater exaltation awaits them at the resurrection, to be succeeded by growing honours and accumulating blessedness for ever. The law of progression seems to belong to all minds, and all the various orders of angelic beings seem destined to advance with us, both in their faculties and attainments throughout eternity. The scale of being on our planet, too, has advanced through successive ages, and after another catastrophe, may be the abode of beings of a higher nature than any which have yet trod its surface.

II. But amid all this change and progression in the universe of matter and of mind, there is One who remains unchangeable—the everlasting God. Eternity, self-existence, independence, and all-sufficiency, involve an unchangeable nature. He cannot change by augmentation or improvement, for infinite and absolute perfection, admits not of increase or progression. He cannot change by diminution or decay, for his whole nature and attributes being self-existent, are not contingent, but necessary. He cannot change by deterioration, for on the one hand, as a perfect being he cannot but delight in the continuance of his own perfection; and on the other hand, being independent, he is superior to all incidents, and to the operation of all second

causes. All change implies limitation and imperfection, both of which we have seen are excluded from the nature of God. All his attributes being equally eternal and necessary with his essence, they can no more change than his essence. He is, therefore, immutable. Reason accords with his own divine declaration, "I am Jehovah, I change not."

III. Yet the immutability of God, does not exclude the exercise of dispositions and affections, nor involve a stoical indifference to the welfare of his creatures generally, or the character which may be assumed by intelligent and moral agents. Such an apathetic Deity, however conformable to the notions of heathen philosophers, is totally repugnant to the dictates of sound reason and the teachings of inspiration. All intelligent beings have dispositions and affections, and though some of these, such as fear, sorrow, sadness, and the like, are evidences of an inferior and dependent nature, and cannot exist in God, yet others, such as love, complacency, delight &c., are evidences of a superior nature, and do dwell in the mind of Deity. It is quite evident that to abstract these latter qualities from mankind, would be to deteriorate human nature. It is, indeed, within the scope of these affections, that all the moral excellencies of our nature are evolved, and without them, however intellectual a man might be, he could exhibit no moral excellencies; in fact, in a state of total apathy, we cannot see how he could be a moral agent. It is, therefore, irrational to suppose the Deity destitute of affections. The qualities which constitute either intellectual or moral excellencies in man, must exist in the Creator, and exist too, in infinite plenitude and perfection. Possessing these affections, Jehovah does not look with indifference upon the conduct of men; for apathetic indifference as to moral actions, would argue an imperfection in his *rectoral* character as the governor of the universe, just as the absence of all affections, would involve a defect in his *nature*. From his exalted throne he beholds the conduct of all men, and while he approves the righteous, and regards them with affection, he condemns the conduct of the wicked, and regards it with abhorrence.

IV.—Neither does immutability involve absolute uniformity of action or relation. God creates and he destroys ; he kills and he makes alive ; he raises up and he casts down ; he exalts to glory and he consigns to endless ruin ; yet, in all this, there is no change in God. He foresaw the end from the beginning, so that he is never disappointed or taken by surprise by any result—has never to alter his plan to meet any unexpected contingency or emergency. All that the creature does, he foreknew ; and all that he does himself, he had pre-determined. His purposes are stable, for they were laid by unerring wisdom, and his nature and character are unchangeable, though his operations are diversified. A righteous man may fall from the Divine favour, but it is because the man himself has changed in his character by sin ; and a wicked man may rise into the Divine love, but it is because he becomes changed by repentance. God may deal with nations as he does with individuals. The Jews may be cut off from the olive, and the Gentiles be grafted in ; the light of truth may expire in eastern churches ; and western nations, which sat in darkness, may emerge into the day-spring of gospel privilege ; but, in all these events, the change is in man, not in God. The one has rejected privileges, and they are withdrawn ; the other has improved them, and they are increased. The fact, that when men change in their character, they change also in their relation to God, is a further proof of God's immutability. It is because his law, his love of holiness, and the principles of his moral government, are unchangeable, that the repentant are accepted, and the impenitent rejected—that the righteous are approved, and the wicked are cast out. As the sun shines at midnight with equal brightness, though we are involved in darkness, and as his beams are diffused with the same genial and vivifying power in winter, though we shiver with cold, and our hemisphere is covered with barrenness and desolation, so God is the same in his nature, perfections, and laws, though our conduct may change our condition from happiness to misery, from favour to condemnation. “ With him is no variableness, neither the sha-

dow of a turning.” The only uniformity necessary in the operations of God, is this—that the works of his hand should always accord with the perfections of his nature—that the principles of his government should harmonize with the attributes of his character—and that his relation to his creatures should be in accordance with those principles. “Were it at all possible, that the product of any act of his power should be out of harmony with any attribute of his character, it would cease to be possible for his creatures, to read nature’s lesson with any clearness, or to arrive at truth with any certainty. The fault, in that case, would not be in the reader, but in the book. The oracle being ambiguous, no blame could be attached to those who understood it in different ways. These things are sufficiently plain.....In all his procedure, we must, without doubt, conceive of him as acting in the strictest agreement with the immutable principles of his character. By these principles, therefore, essentially and eternally inherent in his nature, he was guided in the formation of the universe—in fixing the constitutions, allotting the circumstances, and adjusting the mutual relations, of all his creatures;”* and by these principles he is guided still. The sum of this is, that as God cannot contradict himself, his works must agree with his nature. This agreement flows from his absolute perfection, and is everywhere seen in His works. His wisdom, power, goodness, truth, justice, and holiness, harmoniously beam forth in creation, in providence, and in his moral administration, especially as contemplated in the light of revelation, and with due reference to the future state of moral agents. Thus, his works are a running comment upon his unchanging character from age to age. The acts of power are directed by wisdom, and both wisdom and power accomplish the purposes of goodness; and the purposes of goodness harmonize with the dictates of truth and justice. However multiplied and diversified the operations of Deity, no attribute of his nature is ever infringed upon by his works; they are subject to no col-

* Wardlaw’s Christian Ethics, p. 216.

lision, no compromise, no change, and, however varying the character and condition of the creature, God is eternally the same.

V. Again, the immutability of God does not involve fatalism, or imply the existence and control of any absolute necessity in his operations. The scriptures everywhere describe the Deity as acting with perfect freedom of choice and will—a voluntary, self-determining power, directed by intelligence and goodness. He doeth all things “according to the good pleasure of his will.” This doctrine is abundantly sustained by reason. The notion of necessity, or fatalism, is contradicted both by the Nature and the Works of God.

1. His nature contradicts the doctrine of necessity.

(a) He is eternal and self-existent, and cannot be under any physical necessity, because, as he existed *before* all things, there could be nothing, originally, to induce that necessity; and *since* creation, there could be no such physical necessity, because, nothing exists but what he himself has freely brought into being; and every creature is subject to him while he is subordinate to nothing, but superior to all.

(b) His intelligence refutes the notion of necessity. Absolute necessity is blind, and acts without knowledge or choice, but we have before proved that his intelligence contemplated a purpose in multitudes of instances, and elected means for their accomplishment. Every proof of such intelligence and choice, expresses the freedom of the Deity, and totally disproves the notion of necessity.

(c) His absolute perfection refutes this doctrine. A being which acts from necessity, acts subordinately to a superior power, but Deity is absolutely perfect, and can have neither superior nor equal; on the contrary, all things are infinitely inferior to him, and absolutely dependent upon him. A being acting from necessity is of the lowest species of existence, for all things rise in dignity in proportion to their freedom. Thus, inanimate matter has no choice, but is necessarily and absolutely subject to the government or control of the laws

impressed upon it. The lowest animal which has voluntary motion, is higher than the most elaborate modification of matter, and than the highest form of vegetable existence ; but man, whose actions are voluntary and free, who is conscious of an elective and self-determining principle, is the highest creature upon earth. If, then, the Creator be of a higher nature than the creature, he must be perfectly free. Indeed, he could not have given freedom to man, had he not been absolutely free himself—he could not have made man a moral agent had he not himself been an intelligent and a voluntary Being.

2. All the works of God evince his freedom, and contradict the notion of necessity.

(a) An absolute Necessity must have acted eternally, but we have proved that there was a time when the universe had no existence.

(b) Necessity must act with absolute uniformity, but in the works of God there is a boundless variety, and a succession of changes therein from age to age.

(c) Necessity must act up to the utmost limit of the powers which it constrains and employs ; and as the attributes of God are infinite, they must, if thus influenced and determined by necessity, produce infinite results, whereas nothing is more evident, than that every creature is finite itself, and that all creation put together is finite and limited.

(d) Necessity must not only have acted uniformly from all eternity past, but continue to act through all eternity to come, producing nothing but the same results for ever ; but we have proved both that creation has had a beginning, and that it must have an end. The idea, therefore, of God being influenced by necessity, is a mere figment of the imagination, alike contradicted by his word, his nature, and his works.

The only necessity conceivable is that of fitness :—that, as a God of truth, he cannot lie ; as a God of benevolence, he cannot be unkind ; as a God of absolute rectitude, he cannot be unjust ; and, as a Being, wise, holy, and good, he cannot but do what is best. This, however, is not a physical, but a moral, necessity—a necessity of fitness, and is

as agreeable with his perfect freedom as it is with his unchangeable nature.

Summary.—We have thus shown that the immutability of God is perfectly consistent with the exercise of dispositions and affections, with a boundless variety of operations in the works of creation and providence, and with absolute freedom of choice and self-determination. From which it follows, that a correct view of Jehovah's immutability is this:—There is no change in his essence by decay; no change in his attributes by augmentation or diminution; no change in his views or purposes by ignorance, inadvertence, or mistake; no change in his dispositions and affections by fickleness or caprice; no change in his character by deterioration or improvement. What he is, he always was, and always will be—a Being, infinitely and absolutely perfect. Not an attribute, disposition, or affection, but what he ever had; and throughout eternity no new property or affection can arise. He is “the same yesterday, and to-day, and for ever.”

With what glory does immutability invest the Creator, and in what sublime and awe-inspiring contrast does he stand, with respect to the most durable existence, and the most exalted nature among his creatures! Compared with his eternity, the universe is young, and, compared with his immutability, it is unstable and evanescent. From his exalted throne, he beholds the longest series of events which the heavens have chronicled, come on and depart, and their duration is “but as a watch in the night.” The most protracted dynasties rise and fall, and their existence is but as an hour. Suns are lighted up, systems are formed, and he sees them wane and expire—he beholds their vast cycles run out, as we see the changing phases of the moon. He has seen the ethereal spirits, nearest his eternal throne—pure and refulgent with the reflection of his own image—rise from the dawn of infantine intelligence and excellence, and, through countless myriads of ages, advance in intellectual vigour and moral elevation to their present dignified estate. He envies not, but rejoices in their attainments, satisfied and pleased that they answer the end of their being. Yet,

he changes not. He shifts not his throne higher because of their exaltation. He expands not his powers because of their progression. He brightens not his perfections because of their augmenting glory. The excellencies of his intellectual and moral nature will for ever leave the most exalted seraph at an infinite distance from himself.

Such being the nature of Jehovah, his immutability can have no proper emblem or representation in nature; for, how can that which is essentially and eternally unchangeable, be fitly represented by that which is in a state of constant flux and mutation. It is only because rocks and hills seem not to change during the brief moment of our mortal history, that such are employed as faint images and shadows of God's unchanging nature. Strictly speaking, they are no more fit to represent the immutability of Jehovah, than the transient meteor, or the ignis fatuus is fit to represent the stability of the solar system. To whom, then, will ye liken God? or what likeness will ye compare unto him? Have ye not known? have ye not heard? hath it not been told you from the beginning? have ye not understood from the foundations of the earth? It is he that sitteth upon the circle of the earth—and the inhabitants thereof are grasshoppers—that stretcheth out the heavens as a curtain, and spreadeth them out as a tent to dwell in; that bringeth the princes to nothing; he maketh the judges of the earth as vanity. Yea, they shall not be planted; yea, they shall not be sown; yea their stock shall not take root in the earth: and he shall also blow upon them, and they shall wither, and the whirlwind shall take them away as stubble. To whom, then, will ye liken me, or shall I be equal? saith the Holy One. Blessed God, thou art beyond all compare! “Of old hast thou laid the foundation of the earth; and the heavens are the work of thy hands. They shall perish, but thou shalt endure: yea, all of them shall wax old like a garment: as a vesture shalt thou change them, and they shall be changed: but thou art the same, and thy years shall have no end.”

The immutability of Jehovah gives stability to his purposes, and certainty to his promises. His word cannot fail,

because his nature cannot change. His covenant rests on this sure foundation. Therefore, "The counsel of the Lord shall stand, and he will do all his pleasure." He is not man, that he should lie; nor the son of man, that he should repent. Though all flesh is grass, and the goodliness thereof as the flower of the field, the work of the Lord endureth for ever. Those who rest on him shall never be moved. Those who trust in him shall never be disappointed. Those who confide in his protection shall never be endangered. Those who seek their consolation and happiness in his favour shall never be repulsed. They tread upon a rock of adamant—they drink from an exhaustless fountain—and they are secure, though nature sink in ruin. Though living in a world of vicissitude and change—inhabiting a body of clay, destined soon to perish—surrounded by friends who fluctuate and die—and subject to events which oscillate and toss mankind, like a frail bark on a troubled ocean—they shall find strength and security in God. Our frail and changing nature, when united to him, inherits a lot which partakes of his changeless character; and not only amid the mutations of this life, but amid the awful scenes of the last day, "when the heavens shall pass away with a great noise, the elements melt with fervent heat, the earth also, and the works therein, shall be burned up," we shall rejoice in his changeless name.

To the wicked, this attribute presents another aspect. Like the cloudy pillar it sheds effulgence on the path of the just, but darkness and dismay upon the wicked. Because God is unchangeable, iniquity shall not go unpunished; the impenitent rejecter of offered mercy shall not, cannot, escape the threatened vengeance. The stability of the Divine will secures the fulfilment of every threatening, as it secures the accomplishment of every gracious promise. "If we believe not, yet he abideth faithful; he cannot deny himself:" and, therefore, the despiser of his authority, and the transgressor of his law, must finally perish. To such, "there remaineth nothing but a fearful looking for of judgment, and fiery indignation, which shall devour the adversaries."

CHAPTER IV.

THE IMMENSITY OR OMNIPRESENCE OF GOD.

“ Behold! the heaven, and the heaven of heavens, cannot contain thee.”

I Kings, viii., 27.

THE omnipresence of Deity, so emphatically asserted in the scriptures, is supported by the verdict of reason; but, ere we proceed to the evidence, it will be proper to fix the sense which we attach to this doctrine. The sentiments of men are as diversified on this point as on others which have come under our notice; and that diversity appears, in some cases, to have arisen from abstruse and unprofitable inquiries as to the mode of the Divine presence, and a vain attempt to bring it under the domain of metaphysical science. The schoolmen, who reduced his eternity to a moment, confined his essence to a point. “ One maintains, that God is a point, indivisible indeed, but a point, however, that has the peculiar property of occupying every part of the universe. Another, that God was the place of all beings, the immense extent in which his power had placed them. Another, that his essence was *really* in heaven, but yet, *repletively*, as they express it, in every part of the universe.” Even the sensible and eloquent Saurin, while censuring these conceits, so far allowed himself to be influenced by abstruse and metaphysical subtleties, as to devote a paragraph to prove that God is in no place. He candidly acknowledges that he finds it difficult to make this intelligible and clear, not only to the ‘ unthinking multitude, but to those who cultivate the sciences, and are most intent upon refining their ideas.’ There is no wonder at the difficulty felt, for the attempt to prove it is an attempt to prove what is contradictory both to reason and scripture. So far from God being in no place, the bible represents him as being in every place, and filling all things with his presence.

Sir Isaac Newton, in a passage previously quoted, appears to have considered space itself as a mode of the Divine existence. He says, "God is not eternity nor infinity, but he is eternal and infinite. He is not duration nor space, but he endures and is present. He endures always, and is present everywhere; and, by existing at all times, and in all places, he constitutes duration and space, eternity and infinity." The same sentiment lies at the foundation of Dr. Clarke's *à priori* argument, and is advocated by a modern writer of no mean ability.* This sentiment we have already examined, and stated our objections against it at length in pages 21-9. We hold that space, absolutely considered, is mere nihility or nothing, and cannot, therefore, be either an attribute of Deity, or a mode of the Divine existence.

Some writers contend that God is *virtually* present everywhere, and others say the essence of the Deity is expanded, or diffused, throughout immensity. Robert Hall says, "His essence is diffused over all space," and such is the view of Howe, Charnock, and other divines. Charnock thus argues: "If his perfections be infinite, his essence must be so. How God can have infinite perfections, and a finite essence, is inconceivable by a human or angelic understanding; an infinite power, an infinite wisdom, an infinite duration must needs speak an infinite essence; to own infinite perfections in a finite subject is contradictory. The manner of acting by his power, and knowing by his wisdom, cannot exceed the manner of being by his essence..... If, then, his essence be not infinite, his power and wisdom cannot be infinite, which is against both scripture and reason..... If, therefore, God have an infinite essence, he hath an infinite presence. An infinite essence cannot be contained in a finite place; as those things which are finite have a bounded space, wherein they are, so that which is infinite hath an unbounded space; for as finiteness speaks limitedness, so infiniteness speaks unboundedness; and, if we grant to God an infinite duration, there is no difficulty in acknowledging an infinite presence. Indeed, the infiniteness of God is

* Gillespie, author of "The Necessary Existence of Deity."

a property belonging to him in regard of both time and place ; he is bounded by no place, and limited by no time.”*

Our own views agree substantially with the representation of the subject by Charnock and Hall ; yet, we feel some hesitation in speaking of the essence of God as being “ *diffused* ” or expanded, lest we should associate with the subject ideas which are inappropriate to a purely spiritual existence. We know so little of the nature of spirit, or of its mode of existence, or of its being present in any locality, that we prefer being content with a belief of the doctrine, without being too curious in explaining and defining a subject, respecting which our views must be inadequate, and our language still more imperfect. Respecting the *mode* of the Divine presence, we feel, with David, that such knowledge is too wonderful for us ; it is high, we cannot attain unto it.

The scriptures emphatically declare that God is everywhere present, that he “ filleth all in all,” and that “ the heaven, and the heaven of heavens, cannot contain him.” We believe this doctrine in the popular form in which it is presented in the sacred records. We hold that the Divine ubiquity is such, that his personal consciousness, intelligence, power, and every other perfection, is everywhere ; that within and beyond the bounds of the universe, there is not a point or space, respecting which it may be said, God is not there. The notion that God is the soul of the world, though false and detestable in the Pantheistic sense, which makes the universe one being, and admits no distinction between the Creator and the creature, is true, so far as it expresses the pervading presence, and presiding and directing agency, of the Deity through the entire universe. “ The infinite Spirit is present with every part of his creation, as intimately as the soul of man is present throughout all the parts of that corporeal substance which it animates and sustains.” He fills all space, penetrates all substances, and pervades all minds. He is as intimately present with his creatures as they are to themselves, and unites himself with the very constitution of their nature. They exist within the bound-

* Charnock on the Divine Attributes.

less ocean of his presence, the grasp of his omnipotence, the sphere of his energy, and the light of his countenance. In him they live, and move, and have their being. Robert Hall observes, "We frequently speak of God dwelling in the world by the manifestations of his power and providence; but it may with equal truth be said, that the world dwells in God; all creatures being surrounded by his presence, and enclosed in his essence. We cannot for a moment conceive of such a Being, as separate from any part of the universe, or point of space; all creatures, spiritual and material, subsist in Him, who, maintaining his own separate existence distinct from the external world, exercises absolute universal dominion over all the beings he has formed. This particular property of his nature, this peculiar mode of his existence, renders him capable of being the all-comprehending God, of holding in his own hand all the innumerable creatures he has formed."

Respecting the glorious attribute of omnipresence, the testimony of reason is in harmony with the teachings of inspiration.

1. The evidence, that God is everywhere present through the universe, lies in the fact, that the universe is his work. The vastness of creation will hereafter be considered; we have now only to observe, that whatever may be the extent of the universe, he must be everywhere present therein. The workman must be present with his work—at least during the time of his actual operation. On the same principle, wherever the creature exists, there must the Creator be; wherever his agency and operations can be traced, there are traced indubitable evidences of his presence. It will not be conceived by any sensible mind—by any mind admitting the existence of a Creator—that as this Glorious Being formed new systems in different regions of space, he was under the necessity of withdrawing his presence from others where he had previously operated, and had to change his locality on each occasion of putting forth his creating energy? Yet, if such an absurdity were entertained, it would be refuted by the fact, that God is continually working in every part of

the universe. Active and powerful agencies are everywhere in unceasing operation. Light is every moment passing from orb to orb, emitted from some, and reflected from others. Every planet, and every sun, is moving with prodigious velocity through space ; and, if the projectile motion shows a forming God, does not the centripetal force, acting incessantly, prove a preserving God ? and does not his preserving agency evince his perpetual presence where that agency is displayed ? Gravitation pervades all bodies, the most minute atoms, as well as the largest globes that roll through immensity. Electricity, magnetism, and chemical affinity, are acting every moment upon all material substances. There is no space between the largest globes, and no interstices between the smallest atoms, in reference to which we can say, these various agencies are not continually acting. Can we exclude the presence of the Deity from the universe he has formed ? Where then shall we suppose him to be ? If we suppose him to be present with one part of his operations, on what principle can we exclude him from the other ? Seeing the operations of his agency are apparent everywhere, how can we suppose him to be absent from any place ; and seeing they prevail incessantly, how can we conceive it possible that his presence can be dispensed with for a single moment of time.

The atheistic advocate of the development hypothesis may, if he pleases, endeavour to generalize these agencies into the laws of nature. On the same principle that he labours to exclude the Divine hand from their origin, so he may labour to exclude the Divine presence from their continued activity. But we have exploded his hypothesis ; and, having proved the Divine hand in the origin of nature, we contend for the Divine presence and agency in its preservation and continuance. It is vague and unsatisfactory to ascribe the effects around us to the laws of nature. "A law cannot execute itself ;" it always refers us to an agency ; it is, in fact, only the rule according to which an agency acts ; and that agency we have shown to be God himself. It was his Almighty agency which created, and it is his Almighty agency which still

operates through all creation, and wherever we see traces of that agency, we see the tokens of his presence. Those tokens are universal, and, therefore, God is everywhere present.

2. This argument is as applicable to the world of mind as it is to the world of matter. The human soul, though immaterial, is not capable of self-subsistence. It is, indeed, a question with us whether matter itself could subsist without the perpetual agency of God. As it required the omnipotent fiat to bring both into existence, so both are dependent upon the sustaining word or energy of God for their continued existence. To us, it appears quite evident that the continuance of a spirit's existence (assuming its immortality) is not the necessary result of any inherent and essentially vital energy in the spirit itself. The souls of brutes expire with the body, and Why not the souls of men? Not because they are immaterial, for the souls of brutes are immaterial. The question, Whether a thing be material or immaterial, does not necessarily determine its immortality. The body of Adam was material, yet was destined to immortality, if he had retained his original state; and the souls of brutes perish though they are immaterial. It is evident, therefore, the certainty of the soul's immortality is not to be determined by any psychological reasons, but by the will of God; and that will, having determined it, supplies the agency which preserves it in being. The prevalence, then, of this agency, through the whole spiritual world, vast as it may be, declares the presence of Him who exerts it.

It would be beyond the province of our argument to adduce the operations of God upon the soul of the christian—enlightening, comforting, and sanctifying his nature—in evidence of the omnipresence of Jehovah; but the direct agency of the Creator, in the operations of instinct, belongs to the class of facts which are legitimately at our disposal. The phenomena of instinct evince a high degree of intelligence somewhere; and that intelligence, we have proved, does not reside in the animals themselves, but in God their Creator. In the operations of instinct, therefore, we see innumerable animals acting out the thoughts and purposes of God

—acting under the suggestions and influences of an infinite mind, ever present and ever operating. It is not for us to explain the mysterious connection between the mind of Deity and the various forms of animal existence, but we are certain there is a connection of some sort ; it is not for us to dogmatize on the mode by which the Deity imparts the influence which suggests and directs the operations of animal instinct, but we are certain that there is such an influence. The facts prove the agency of God, and the agency proves his presence.

The preceding argument carries our conclusion, as to the Divine presence, as far as the utmost verge of creation, but other considerations extend this conclusion to infinity.

3. The ubiquity of Jehovah may be argued from his nature. He is self-existent, and absolutely perfect, therefore infinite in all his perfections. But limitation and infinity are contradictory ideas. If, therefore, we admit him to be infinite in *all* his perfections, we cannot rationally suppose him to be limited in his presence. Besides, to suppose limitation, is to suppose an effect without a cause. The limitation cannot be essential, for he is absolutely infinite in all his attributes, and to contemplate it as an effect is absurd ; for, seeing he is self-existent and eternal, he is before, and above, all second causes, and there could be nothing to cause any limitation. Besides, he is immutable as well as infinite, and, therefore, it is impossible to conceive of any limitation or restraint being superinduced upon any of his perfections. As he was eternally infinite, so must he be still, and so must he remain for ever.

From this it follows, that there is no point, either within or *beyond* the bounds of the universe, where he is not. Wherever there is created being, whether matter or mind, there he is ; and in those vast regions of solitude and silence, where no creature exists—so immeasurably distant that no stray star-beam has ever reached—even there is God. His being can have no limits.

4. It is impossible, even in thought, to limit the presence of the Deity. We can conceive the universe to be limited ;

indeed, as a creature, it must be finite ; this truth we feel to be an intellectual necessity ; and as the universe is made up of materials of diverse degrees of density, we have ocular and tangible demonstration, that matter is not infinite in *quantum*, but we cannot conceive the presence of God as bounded. Locke observes, “ It is true, we can easily, in our thoughts, come to an end of solid extension ; the extremity and bounds of all body, we have no difficulty to arrive at ; but when the mind is there, it finds nothing to hinder its progress into endless expansion ; of that it can neither find nor conceive any end. Nor let any one say, that beyond the bounds of body there is nothing at all, unless he will confine God within the limits of matter. Solomon, whose understanding was filled and enlarged with wisdom, seems to have other thoughts, when he says, ‘ Heaven, and the heaven of heavens, cannot contain thee ; ’ and he, I think, very much magnifies to himself the capacity of his own understanding, who persuades himself that he can extend his thoughts farther than God exists, or imagine any expansion where he is not.” The universe, however vast, is a creature limited in time and extent, but God, who is self-existent and independent, has no beginning of his existence, and can have no bounds to his presence.

5. To suppose a limitation of Jehovah’s presence is to suppose a limitation to his power. The universe, we have seen, is finite ; there is, consequently, an immeasurable amplitude beyond the utmost bounds of creation. Now, let us suppose, that the Deity contemplated the progressive extension of creation, by adding thereto worlds upon worlds, and systems upon systems, beyond the confines of the present universe, and to continue this progressive extension of his empire for ever. The supposition is rational ; it comports with the power, wisdom, and all-sufficiency of Jehovah ; but such an enlargement of creation could not be effected, if the presence of Jehovah were limited, because, in the lapse of ages, that extension would reach the limits of his presence. A Being cannot exert his agency where he is not ; so, to limit his presence is to limit his power : to deny his ubiquity

is to deny his omnipotence, and limit the Holy one of Israel. It is, in fact, to deny that "all things are possible with God." Such a contradiction cannot be admitted, and, therefore, we must conclude, on this ground, that his presence is unbounded.

THE VASTNESS OF THE UNIVERSE.

The omnipresence of Jehovah is thus established by the clearest evidence, but, while it commands our assent, it overpowers our imagination. In contemplating the immensity as well as the eternity of God, we feel we have a truth which irresistibly forces itself upon the mind, but yet surpasses all its powers of comprehension. Whatever numbers and symbols we call to our aid, they fall infinitely short of the reality. Science has, indeed, greatly enlarged our conceptions of the vastness of the universe, and yet the whole dwindles into a point, contrasted with the ubiquity of the Divine Being. To gauge the extent of the universe, miles and leagues are too short, and even the velocity of light estimated by time, and that time, stretched to millions of years, affords but a faint idea of its magnitude. Light, the swiftest body in existence, travels at the rate of nearly 200,000 miles in a second. Compared with other bodies, the Sun is near to us, yet it takes eight minutes for a beam of light to pass from that orb to our world—a distance of ninety-five millions of miles. The planet Neptune, though belonging to our system, is said to be distant 2,900,000,000 of miles, and it takes a journey of four hours for a ray of light to pass from the sun to that planet. The great comet of 1680, at its aphelion, wanders to a distance about twenty-five times more remote than the planet Neptune, and it would take light above four days to travel from that distance to our world. Yet, that comet belongs to our system—it is one of the group belonging to the solar family. But vast as must be the circumference of a sphere, whose radius stretches so far into the fields of space, it is only a diminutive point compared with the distance of the nearest body unconnected with this family group. The time required for light to travel from the centre to the cir-

cumference of our system, we reckon by the narrow measures of minutes, hours, and days ; but the moment we emerge from hence to the nearest star, the journey of light, rapid as it is, has to be computed by years.

The star α Centauri is computed to be two hundred thousand times farther from us than we are from the sun ; the star 61 Cygni is three times the distance of α Centauri ; and the star α Lyrae is nearly three times more remote than 61 Cygni. Thus, the remotest of these three stars is so distant that a ray of light would be thirty years in passing from it to our world. We cannot realize these enormous distances, and yet they are “but our first milestones among the trackless space.” For, if we extend our observations to those stars whose distance renders them only just visible to the naked eye, we behold objects so remote that their light does not reach us until one hundred and twenty years after it has left the twinkling orbs. It is in vain to give this distance in miles ; we have to heap billions upon millions, until the imagination becomes confused by their enormous multitude. Yet, here, in these remote regions, we are only on the frontiers of creation. Beyond the visible stars, we come to that faint light called the Milky Way, whose belt infolds a space far beyond the smallest stars visible to the naked eye. This luminous zone consists of myriads of stars, which from their distance are invisible to the eye, but they are resolved by Herschel’s telescope, and, in one quarter of an hour, 116,000 of these stars were observed to pass through the field of vision of that powerful instrument. These stars are estimated, on satisfactory data, to be four hundred and ninety-seven times more remote from us than some of the fixed stars ; and it would require one thousand six hundred and forty years, for a ray of light to pass from thence to our world—or a cannon-ball, flying at the rate of 500 miles an hour, would occupy more than two thousand, two hundred, and sixty-seven millions, eight hundred thousand years in passing through the same space ! How prodigious the distance, then, of those orbs, whose light constitutes the Milky Way ; and yet we have made but little progress through the

vast systems of created being; for, the Milky Way is, with good reason, supposed to be the outer bounds of that great stellar congregation, to which our sun, and his planets, and all visible stars, belong. In depths of space, immeasurably beyond the Milky Way, there lie other congregated systems, and groups of congregated systems as large, or perhaps larger, than the entire field of creation we have hitherto explored. Our own galaxy, sufficient itself for a universe, and made up of millions upon millions of suns, so remote that light itself cannot pass from one star to another, under hundreds and thousands of years, is yet but a unit amongst myriads. Beyond it are other galaxies, appearing, from their distance, only as a faint and dubious light; and beyond these, again, are others; and again beyond these are others; the succession appearing in every part of the heavens, so long as instruments can be found capable of extending the view deeper into space. The Nebula of Orion, though visible to the naked eye, lies-a-deep so far away, that its light cannot reach us in less than sixty-thousand years after its departure; yet even this is near compared with others, for Herschel states, that “the rays of light, from some remoter nebulae, must have been two millions of years on their way;”^{*} and since the power of Lord Rosse’s six feet mirror has pierced yet deeper and deeper into space, it has brought some nebulae into view, which may be so distant that their light does not reach us in less than thirty millions of years.[†]

Let us only reflect for a moment upon the fact, that light travels at the rate of near twelve millions of miles in a minute, and yet objects are so distant that light itself cannot pass from them to our eye, in less than a period of thirty millions of years. It must be remembered, too, that as these nebulae are seen in all parts of the heavens, this amazing distance is only the radius of the known universe. We must double it to find the diameter, and we must six times double it to find the circumference: yet, even this is only the sphere of the known congregated systems. But who can tell

^{*} Sir W. Herschel, in the transactions for 1802, p. 408.

[†] Professor Nichol.

how far the beams of light, issuing from them on every side, pierce into the depths of space? How many times shall we have to double the circumference of the whole, to reach the utmost limit to which the flooding star-beams dart? What aids shall imagination call up to stretch its view to the most distant rays, shot forth with the velocity of twelve millions of miles each minute of time since the first moment of creation? But hitherto, lost as we are in immensity, we have been contemplating merely those objects which are *visible* through the telescope; yet, shall we suppose that our little tubes and mirrors, in this corner of the universe, are capable of sounding the depths of God's creation? Rather let us suppose, as reason and analogy require, that all we have explored, and all we can explore, compared with what remains unexplored, are but as the sands in an hour-glass compared with the stupendous Andes, or the still more stupendous globe itself. This vast universe Jehovah fills with his presence. He resides in every part. His being and consciousness pervade the whole, his intelligence guides, his power preserves, and his presence fills and replenishes, the whole. But, beyond creation, magnify it as we may—let imagination roam till it is weary with squaring and multiplying all we have yet contemplated—beyond all this, there is an infinite amplitude where no planet rolls, no nebula looms, no stray star-beam has pierced, no seraph's wing has swept, and no creative fiat has yet reached—an infinite amplitude, to which all imaginable creation bears no proportion; yet, Jehovah fills the whole—his presence and attributes absolutely fill immensity. “The heaven, and the heaven of heavens, cannot contain Him.”

Reflections.—In the contemplation of such overpowering majesty, what wonderful condescension does the Deity exhibit, in making man an object of his tender regard! Well might the Psalmist, when casting his eye on the vast and glittering expanse, above and around him, exclaim, “When I consider thy heavens, the work of thy fingers, the moon and the stars which thou hast ordained; what is man that thou art mindful of him, or the Son of man that thou

visitest him." Yet, he is mindful of him, and numbers the very hairs of his head.

How consoling to the believer to remember, that, wherever he is, and however diversified his condition, God is with him! How awful to the sinner to reflect, that all his crimes and offences are committed in the immediate presence of the Eternal Jehovah—his maker, and his judge! Men may shun the presence of their fellows, but they cannot escape from the presence of him "who filleth all in all."

While the presence of God is everywhere, it is not manifested everywhere alike. In those boundless regions of immensity, where no created being is, there can be as yet no objective manifestation; but, in every part of creation, there is a display of the Divine presence and perfections; and wherever intelligent beings reside, this display is recognized. Yet, this recognition is diversified according to the capacities and condition of the various orders of intelligent beings. Some mentally behold the traces of his presence by the objective display of his attributes, but have no sense of his favour; while others have both a mental perception of his presence, and a consciousness of his favour; for, he manifests himself to his people as he does not to the world. As there is thus a diversity as to the manifestation of the Deity's presence in different regions of the universe, and as perceived by intelligent beings of different states and capacities, it is only reasonable to suppose, that there is a distinct region where God, in a manner far more gloriously, unfolds his natural and moral attributes, and reveals the tokens of his favour to upright and holy intelligences. This rational supposition is conformable to the revealed doctrine of the spiritual world, where angels, and glorified human spirits, are congregated to enjoy the beatific vision of God. As in the Jewish temple, there was the outer court, the holy place, and the most holy; so, in the created universe, there are inner and outer circles, if we may so speak, where the presence of Deity is realized with various degrees of intimacy. The mere philosopher sees him with his mental eye, but the view, however imposing and grand, is cold and speculative—

the believer feels him by consciousness, as well as sees him by reason, and he rejoices in his relation to him as his father and friend; but the glorified in heaven, freed from those earthly impediments which both obscure the vision and blunt the moral sense, have a far clearer perception of his glorious perfections, and a far more intense and blissful consciousness of his presence and favour. Here we see God, but it is through a glass, darkly; but there, face to face. In his presence is fulness of joy. At his right hand are pleasures for evermore.

CHAPTER V.

THE OMNISCIENCE OF GOD.

“His understanding is infinite.”—Psalm cxlvii., 5.

I. THE intelligence of God has been previously demonstrated from his works. The universe of matter, and of mind, is the product of his wisdom as well as his power. Matter, its laws and diversified operations—the protracted concatenation of subordinate causes and effects—of means, adaptations, and uses, of connections, dependencies, and relations, pervading the entire fabric of nature—were conceived and devised by his mind before his power brought them into actual being. The phenomena of vegetable and animal life and instinct; and the still greater phenomenon of an immortal mind, with its faculties of consciousness, perception, memory, volition, and reason—its affections of love, fear, hope, joy, aversion—and its intense susceptibilities of happiness and misery—are the products of Divine intelligence. The mind which originated these wonders must possess a degree of knowledge to which no limits can be assigned.

If it be said that, as nature is finite, all the manifestations of intelligence, furnished by nature, cannot yield a positive proof that the knowledge of the Deity is absolutely infinite, we reply, First—the exhibition of intelligence, thus afforded, though finite, is so vast and diversified, that it defies us either to fix any limitation to his knowledge, or rationally to suppose any such limitation possible. And, Secondly—it must be remembered, that the powers of endless expansion, given to the creature, involve inexhaustible or infinite resources in the Creator. God could never give to the creature capacities which could surpass his own fulness. The illimitable growth and development of an immortal creature

necessarily imply resources absolutely bottomless and infinite in the Creator.

II. The infinity of Jehovah's intelligence may be argued also, from his absolute perfection, which has been previously established. Limitation in knowledge involves ignorance, and ignorance is incompatible with absolute perfection. From ignorance, may possibly result deception, and erroneous judgment, and, indeed, such results appear to us inevitable; but to attribute such qualities to the mind of Deity, is as repellant to reason as opposed to revelation. His absolute freedom from the possibility of error involves the possession of infinite intelligence.

III. The same attribute may be argued from the infinitude of the Divine nature. It will be admitted that the Deity knows himself, and, if he comprehend himself, he comprehends infinity, and must possess infinite intelligence. His understanding fathoms the depths of his own essence, and all the resources of his power and boundless perfections. Self-existent and independent, he must know all things actually existing in himself; and, as the Source of all being, as the author of all life, he must know all things, both actual and possible in the creature. As the finite cannot comprehend the infinite, it follows, that the mind which comprehends the Deity, and all other things, must possess infinite intelligence.

IV. The intelligence of the Deity is *immediate*. All things within himself he knows by consciousness, and all things adextra, or in the creature, he knows immediately by intuition, and by contact. There is here an infinite disparity between him and the most exalted work of his hand. Some few things we know by consciousness, and some by intuition, but far the greater portion of our scanty store of knowledge is acquired through the medium of our senses, and by the exercise of our reason. By consciousness, we know our own existence, and the sensations and operations of our own minds. By the organs of sense, we hold communication with the external world; and by reason, we deduce certain truths and principles from the facts which consciousness

and sense furnish to the mind. It is evident, from the limited faculties of our nature, that our stock of knowledge must be comparatively contracted and confined. Our consciousness extends only to a few particular truths within the narrow bounds of our own nature, and the organs of sense are chiefly confined to the limits prescribed by our personal presence. We can taste and feel only those objects with which we are in contact; we can smell and hear only those which are near; and, though vision can descry objects that are distant, it can do little more than ascertain their existence. Thus, our presence and personal contact being confined to a limited locality, our communication with the surrounding universe must necessarily be very circumscribed. Now, as reason can only deduce truths and abstract principles from the materials thus furnished, it follows that our range of knowledge must be very limited and confined. No such limits, however, can exist in the Deity, because there is no limitation to his presence and attributes. By consciousness he knows, at one view, all that there is in the depths of his own nature, and, thus knowing the infinite resources of his own nature, he must know intuitively all the *possibilities* of being in the creature; and from his omnipresence he must recognize by contact, all the *actual* being there is in the creature. Thus, all that is present, past, and future, must be seen by the comprehensive glance of Jehovah.

THE PRESENT. God is every where present, and wherever he exists, there all his attributes and perfections exist. It is impossible to conceive the absence of any attribute where his presence pervades. We cannot, even in thought, abstract or detach his power, his knowledge, and his other perfections from himself, or suppose them to be absent where he is present. Consequently, wherever God is, he perceives, he sees, he knows; and, as he pervades all substances, and fills all space, there can be nothing hidden from his view. Thus, the whole universe lies open before him with greater clearness than this page lies open before the eye of the reader. All worlds revolving, and all creatures moving, under the broad and open eye of the Creator, not a leaf falls,

not an atom floats, but is beheld and perceived by him who is everywhere present. Man can only perceive such qualities as his senses are adapted to observe; and it can never be supposed that our five senses are competent to recognize all the qualities of bodies: but the perception of Jehovah penetrates every occult property of matter, sees the very essence of every substance, and observes every secret phenomenon in nature. To him, nothing can be mysterious in its nature, properties, operations, or results, for he made every thing in the physical universe as it is; it operates according to his design, and nothing can escape his notice.

In the same complete and perfect manner, he observes every being in the *spiritual* world, and every action and thought of moral and accountable agents. The bright spirits in heaven, radiant with the beams of his glory—human minds, incarnate in earthly tabernacles—apostate demons, and the souls of the lost in the invisible regions of woe—are all beheld with the same minute and watchful observation. Penetrating spirit as well as matter, all the operations of mind lie equally under his eye, even as the most open and conspicuous actions of the life. Every principle we cherish, every emotion that stirs in our bosom, every desire and imagination we indulge, every thought we conceive, and the very motives which give a good or evil complexion to our thoughts and deeds, are all known as fully as we know them ourselves by consciousness. Nay, more so, for they are penetrated by an eye that not only sees their actual existence, but appreciates their moral quality and tendency with unerring exactness. To such a conclusion we are irresistibly carried by reason, and it is in perfect accordance with the teachings of inspiration—“Neither is there any creature that is not manifest in his sight: but all things are naked and opened unto the eyes of him with whom we have to do.”

THE PAST. In the same perfect manner does the knowledge of Jehovah comprehend all that is past. As there is no period in eternity in which he did not exist, there is no period in the history of creation when he was not present

with every part in the same intimate and all-pervading manner as he is this moment; and, therefore, every part has always been under his observation. As nothing in the world of matter and of mind can elude his notice at this moment, neither could any thing elude his notice in any past instant, nor can it in any future period. We must suppose the very nature of Deity to change, before we can suppose it possible for anything past, present, or to come, to escape his knowledge. Nor can we rationally suppose it possible for him to forget anything which he has observed. The faculty of memory in the creature is an excellence, and every excellence which the creature has in a limited degree, the Creator possesses in an unlimited extent. It may be that even *our* forgetfulness of events may arise from the connection of mind with a mutable and perishable organization.* But however this may be, we can no more suppose the Deity subject to forget any fact or event in the natural or moral history of the universe, than we can suppose it possible for any such event to escape his observation at the present moment. He is independent, absolutely perfect, and immutable, and, therefore, the knowledge of all that is past is as present to him as if it were occurring at this instant of time.

THE DIVINE PRESCIENCE. God foreknew all things. It has, indeed, been maintained, that there is neither foreknowledge nor after-knowledge with God. Thus the venerable Mr Wesley states, "If we speak properly, there is no such thing as either foreknowledge or after-knowledge in God. All time, or rather all eternity, being present to him at once, he does not know one thing before another, or one thing after another; but sees all things in one point of view, from everlasting to everlasting." This is the notion of the schoolmen, adopted by many divines, who, denying the succession of time, denied also the succession of events—making the past, present, and future, both of time and events, one eternal now, in the

* It is the opinion of the celebrated Isaac Taylor, that in eternity the human soul will have the faculty of recalling the whole of its past history. See his "*Physical Theory of Another Life*."

mind of Deity. The scholastic notion which confounds the present duration with the past, and reduces all to one instant, has been refuted before, and we need not dwell upon it again. Dr. Reid has well observed, "the schoolmen made eternity to be a *nunc stans*, that is, a moment of time that stands still. This was to put a spoke into the wheel of time, and might give satisfaction to those who are to be satisfied by words without meaning. But I can as easily believe a circle to be a square, as time to stand still." It is equally trifling to intimate that the scriptures are not to be understood literally, when they speak of God's "foreknowledge." Either God knows events before they transpire, or he does not. If we affirm that he does not, we charge him with ignorance, and deny the express statement of the scriptures. If he does know events before they transpire, then he must have "foreknowledge," and the scholastic figment must be rejected. That the Creator of the universe did foreknow all that has transpired, and that he does now foreknow all that ever will transpire, is a truth which is plainly taught in the scriptures, and which is corroborated by the testimony of reason. This foreknowledge we believe to be equally applicable to the universe of matter and of mind.

Respecting the material universe there will be no controversy between those who admit the existence of an intelligent Creator. The archetypes, or ideas of the universe, existed from all eternity in the mind of Deity, and his power formed it after the pattern in which his wisdom had conceived it. From hence, indeed, arise its order and system, its exquisite arrangement of connections and harmonies, of means and ends, its uniformity and stability. It is the execution of a plan originated and devised by the mind of God. He knew it, therefore, before the fiat of creation was issued by his almighty word. As matter was made and endowed with all its properties by God himself; as he determined also the laws which guide its multiplied operations, he must have known all the effects of those operations from the beginning and onward through all future ages. Respecting the Divine prescience, in respect

to the material universe, Saurin remarks, " God knows all the effects of matter. An expert workman takes a parcel of matter proportioned to a work which he meditates ; he makes divers wheels, disposes them properly, and sees, by the rules of his art, what must result from their assemblage. Suppose a sublime, exact genius, knowing how to go from principle to principle, and from consequence to consequence, after foreseeing what must result from two wheels, joined together, should imagine a third ; he will as certainly know what must result from a third, as from a first and second ; after imagining a third, he may imagine a fourth, and properly arrange it with the rest in his imagination ; after a fourth, a fifth, and so on to an endless number. Such a man could mathematically demonstrate, in an exact and infallible manner, what must result from a work composed of all these different wheels. Suppose, further, that this workman should accurately consider the effects which would be produced on these wheels, by that subtil matter, which in their whirlings continually surrounds them, and which, by its perpetual action and motion, chafes, wears, and dissolves all bodies, he would be able to tell you, with the same exactness, how long each of these wheels would wear, and when the whole work would be consumed. Give this workman life and industry proportional to his imagination, furnish him with materials proportional to his ideas, and he will produce a vast immense work, all the different motions of which he can exactly combine ; all the different effects of which he can evidently foresee. He will see in what time motion will be communicated from the first of these wheels to the second, at what time the second will move the third, and so of the rest : he will foretell all their different motions, and all the effects that must result from their different combinations.

" Hitherto, this is only supposition, my brethren, but it is a supposition that conducts us to the most certain of all facts. This workman is God. God is the sublime, exact, infinite genius. He calls into being matter without motion, and, in some sense, without form. He gives this matter

form and motion. He makes a certain number of wheels, or rather, he makes them without number. He disposes them as he thinks proper. He communicates a certain degree of motion agreeably to the laws of his wisdom. Thence arises the world which strikes our eyes. By the forementioned example, I conceive, that God, by his own intelligence, saw what must result from the arrangement of all the wheels that compose this world, and knew, with the utmost exactness, all their combinations * * * He foresaw all the vicissitudes of time, he foresaw those which must put a period to time, when the heavens shall pass away with a great noise, when the elements shall melt with fervent heat, when the earth, with all the works that are in it, shall be burnt up." A similar view of an all-comprehending and foreseeing intelligence is expressed by Leibnitz, Laplace, and other writers. It cannot, indeed, be disputed, that Jehovah knows every minute result that will flow from the mechanism of nature, as exactly and certainly as the operator at an electric telegraph knows the result which must follow from the touches he gives to his mysterious machine.

But while nothing is more certain than that the Deity does thus foresee all the effects which transpire from the combined and multifarious operations of matter, with the most perfect exactness, all such mechanical representations of the universe are calculated to mislead the mind, by suggesting an independent action to nature, and, therefore, require to be qualified by the recollection of two important truths, namely—that God himself is the ever-present and all-pervading Agent, guiding and directing the whole; and that the general laws he has prescribed for the operations of nature are not so absolute as to exclude special interpositions, and interruptions by his own almighty hand. Such interpositions, indeed, are repeatedly attested by geological phenomena, as having occurred in different epochs of our planet's history, and such will doubtless occur in its future history. The believer in the christian revelation beholds many such special interpositions in the miracles recorded in the sacred scriptures, and, in these facts, the records of

nature and of revelation unite in their testimony to the same principle. These special interpositions, however, present no exception to the exactness of the Divine prescience; for, they are a part of the Divine economy, foreseen and designed from the beginning, equally with the physical and mathematical results of mechanical laws.

With the same absolute certainty does God foreknow the actions and destinies of voluntary agents. But, here we come to a subject on which the most opposite sentiments have been maintained. The Divine prescience has been pronounced incompatible with the free agency of man, and divines, of opposite sentiments, to cut the knot they could not untie, have each adopted one side of the truth, and denied the other. Some, to maintain man's freedom, have denied God's foreknowledge; and others, to maintain God's prescience, have denied man's freedom. It will be evident to every individual, at first sight, that one class of these divines must be in error, because each maintains an opposite proposition; and we think it not impossible to show that both are in error. Let us, then, test these opinions, First, by the teachings of revelation; and, Secondly, by the dictates of reason.

1. The testimony of holy scripture is neither obscure nor ambiguous on these subjects. As to Jehovah's knowledge, it is declared to be infinite. "His understanding is infinite;" and, if infinite, it must include a prescience of all voluntary actions, as well as of all physical operations. To deny this is to limit the Divine understanding—it is to deny the infinity so plainly asserted in the scriptures. David, associating God's omniscience with his omnipresence, directly ascribes to him a prescience of the very thoughts of his heart. "Thou knowest my downsitting and mine uprising; thou understandest my thoughts afar off." The same doctrine is implied in every prediction which has reference to human actions. Such predictions abound in every part of the sacred volume, and whether they refer to the destiny of nations or individuals, they involve an exact foreknowledge of the thoughts, affections, desires, passions, principles, and

conduct, of individuals. It would be trifling to intimate that these predictions are based upon merely a general knowledge of man's moral history, for his general history is made up of individual actions and occurrences, and in many cases the predictions expressly refer to the history of isolated individuals, as Jeroboam, Cyrus, Judas, and a catalogue of other persons. It would also be profane, as well as trifling, for, unless Jehovah foreknew the character and history of individuals, his predictions would be no more than lucky guesses and sagacious conjectures. The multifarious prophecies, recorded in scripture, as clearly involve a prescience of the thoughts and actions of voluntary agents, as they do of the revolutions of the planets, or the operations of any physical law. If God thus foreknew the thoughts and affections of some men and of some nations, he must have foreknown the moral history and destiny of *all* men. To deny the Divine prescience, therefore, is to deny the plain teachings of the sacred records; it is to erect our own speculations in opposition to the express declarations of God himself.

Yet, in the same emphatic manner, do the scriptures assert the freedom and voluntary agency of man. They always recognize him as a creature possessing and exercising a self-determining faculty, capable of choosing the good and refusing the evil. They appeal not only to his reason, but to his will; they ply him with motives to obedience, and solemnly place life and death, blessing and cursing, before him. They severely censure his evil actions, and not only his evil actions but his evil thoughts and affections—clearly indicating his power to resist and control both the one and the other. They command him to exercise obedience, holy affections, and purposes—implying that with the offered aids of grace, he is competent to give a holy direction to his character, and a heavenly bias to the principles of the inner man—the hidden principles of action. They make him responsible for every action and thought, and suspend the issues of an eternal destiny upon his conduct in this life; and, if he perish, they emphatically declare that his doom is

attributable to no one but himself. “Ye will not come unto me that ye might have life.” “I called, but ye refused; I stretched out my hands, but ye regarded not.” “O that thou hadst known, at least in this thy day, the things that make for thy peace.” If, then, the scriptures speak the truth, and communicate that truth in language capable of being understood; if man be a moral agent and an accountable being, and if the principles of unchanging rectitude direct the government of God, man must be a free agent—he must possess and exercise a self-determining power. From which it follows, that to deny either the prescience of the Creator, or the liberty of the creature, is to deny the authority of Divine revelation.

2. The notions thus opposed to scripture are equally repugnant to reason. Indeed, to deny the voluntary agency of man is to oppose our consciousness; for there is no fact to which our experience more clearly and emphatically bears testimony, than to our moral liberty. We know we have power to commit or avoid a certain course of conduct, because our consciousness attests it; and while our consciousness attests this truth, our judgment perceives its conformity with our accountability to law, whether human or divine, and the absolute injustice of any accountability in the absence of this self-determining power. Hence, where reason and freedom end, accountability terminates. Human consciousness attests our freedom, and human reason acquiesces in the accountability of our actions, because we are conscious of our liberty and not otherwise. Here are principles which no arts of sophistry can evade. They are co-existent with mind; they are immutable and eternal. We can no more eradicate them than we can annihilate the mind itself.

Nor can the denial of God's foreknowledge be sustained by reason, any more than by the scriptures. The specious theory has been advocated by great names, but is, in our view, indefensible. Dr. Adam Clarke maintains, that “God has ordained some things as absolutely certain. These he knows as absolutely certain. He has ordained other things as contingent. These he knows as contingent.” To reconcile this

doctrine with Jehovah's omniscience, it is urged, "That as omnipotence implies the power to do all things, so omniscience implies the *ability* to know all things, but not the *obligation* to know all things. He knows himself, and what he has formed, and what he can do, but it is alleged, he is not necessitated to know, as certain, what himself has made contingent; and that, as God, though possessed of omnipotence, does not evidently exert it to its utmost extent—does not do all he might do—so, though he could know all things, yet that he chooses to be ignorant of some things because he does not see it proper to know everything which he might know." We believe that the Doctor here states the substance of all that can be urged in favour of this theory, but, with all due deference to his talents and learning, we regard his views as untenable.

(a) Our first objection to this theory is, that it gives an unamiable aspect to the Divine character. It does not, indeed, deny the *capability* of God to foreknow voluntary actions, but represents him as voluntarily refusing to know them—as designedly excluding them from his cognizance. Such a procedure involves, at least, a partial knowledge or expectation of their character, and supposes a motive for refusing to know them more perfectly. God can be influenced by no motives but such as are wise and good, but if it be wise and good to constitute beings free agents, can it be wise and good to refuse to know the issue of their freedom? Such a notion seems to involve the idea, that, had God known the result, he would not have given them such a constitution, nor have placed them in such circumstances. It represents the Deity as fearing to know the issue or moral results of his own work! How such reasoning harmonizes with the character and perfections of Deity, the wisdom, rectitude, and goodness of his administration, or the stability of his government, we are at a loss to know. In our view, it is incompatible with them all. If it be wise and good for God to constitute creatures voluntary agents, and accountable beings, it is equally wise and good to know the issue of their nature and condition; and if it be incom-

patible with wisdom and goodness to know the result, it was incompatible with wisdom and goodness to give them the nature they possess, and place them in the circumstances of a probationary state. Our opponents will, we think, admit the correctness of this statement, and, admitting this, their denial of the Divine prescience must be abandoned.

(b) Our second objection to the theory is, that it denies to Deity the attribute of omniscience. The parallel which Dr. Clarke draws between omnipotence and omniscience is inadmissible. He states that, as omnipotence does not involve the necessity of *doing* all things within the range of Almighty power, neither does omniscience involve the necessity of *knowing* all things possible to be known. But this is not a correct representation of the nature of the two attributes. Omnipotence is not an unlimited *act* of God, but the *faculty* to act with unlimited energy—not the *exertion* of power, but the *ability* to exert, or put forth power to an unlimited extent. But omniscience, on the contrary, is not the mere *faculty* of acquiring or obtaining a knowledge of all things, but it is the *actual knowledge* of all things. Dr. Clarke's view makes God merely *omniscible*, but denies his omniscience; it supposes the Divine Being to have a capacity for boundless knowledge, but denies that the capacity is filled. It supposes the Deity to be acquiring knowledge by experience, to know his creatures more fully by the development of their moral history, and to be growing wiser each day by observing the proceedings of moral agents. If our theorists shrink from these consequences, they must renounce the system which involves them.

(c) Our third objection to the theory is, that it denies the independence, the absolute perfection, and immutability, of the Divine Being. This result is seen in the preceding argument. For, if the Deity be destitute of knowledge in some respects, then is he partially ignorant, and a Being to whom this quality applies cannot be absolutely perfect. Besides, if his knowledge be, in part, gradually derived from the moral history of his creatures, then is he so far dependent upon things extraneous to himself: and thus his

independence is denied. If his knowledge accumulate by experience, then must his views change, his judgment alter : and thus immutability is denied. We cannot see how these consequences can be separated from the denial of the Divine prescience, and if they are felt to be repugnant to our reason, and our respect for the Divine character, the theory which involves them must be repudiated.

(*d*) Our fourth objection to the notion in question is, that it is incompatible with the regularity and order of the Divine government. In the economy of the material universe, design and object are everywhere conspicuous ; and system and means nicely adjusted to fulfil the design, to accomplish the object, are seen pervading every part of his works. Nothing is more obvious than that the intellect of Deity darted through every part of the complicated system ere it was created, and that the whole was adjusted and combined to fulfil the contemplated results. We should expect the same order and foresight to characterize his government in the world of mind—every rational creature being free, yet every event foreseen with intuitive certainty, and provision made for every exigency and state which would occur in the whole history of moral agents, so that, amid all the changes of fallible creatures, an ultimate purpose was contemplated, and that purpose fulfilled. But the denial of the Divine prescience involves the denial of such a system of order ; or if such a system of order were devised, it must be liable to interruption and disappointment. If God did not foresee the issue of moral agency, he could not plan for a given purpose, or if he did, he could only plan in the dark—his purposes must be based on conjecture, on probabilities, and possibilities—and, throughout the whole history of his government, must continue to be liable to defeat and disappointment. Arrangements made in uncertainty and partial ignorance must often be broken, and his government, if not in its principles, at least in its administration, be subject to incessant fluctuation. The vastness of his empire would only increase the embarrassment by continually yielding events never expected, causing emergencies never provided for, and thus compelling

the supreme Governor to be continually changing his plans, laying aside some as no longer suitable, adopting new ones to meet fresh exigencies, and these again in their time becoming useless, because of new events never expected. As President Edwards remarks, "In such a situation, God must have little else to do but to mend broken links as well as he can, and be rectifying his disjointed frame, and disordered movements, in the best manner the case will allow. The supreme Lord of all things must needs be under great and miserable disadvantages, in governing the world which he has made, and has the care of, through his being utterly unable to find out things of chief importance, which hereafter shall befall his system; which, if he did but know, he might make seasonable provision for. In many cases, there may be very great necessity that he should make provision in the manner of his ordering and disposing of things for some great events which are to happen, of vast and extensive influence, and endless consequence to the universe, which he may see afterwards when it is too late, and may wish in vain that he had known beforehand, that he might have ordered his affairs accordingly." Such a representation of the moral administration, we know, is repulsive; it shocks our sense of propriety to dwell long upon it; but these consequences logically result from denying God's prescience of moral actions, and because thus repulsive to our reason, and to our piety, the notion must be rejected.

On examination, then, it is found, that the two opposite theories—the denial of man's free agency, and the denial of God's foreknowledge of voluntary actions—are both unscriptural and irrational. Such denials must, therefore, be repudiated. We are bound to believe in both doctrines, because both the voice of scripture and the voice of reason command this belief.

3. There is yet another aspect of this theory which requires a moment's consideration—namely, the alleged incompatibility between prescience and contingent or voluntary actions. It is affirmed that the two are irreconcilable. In reply to this, we observe, it has already been shown that each

doctrine, viewed separately, is true—sustained both by reason and scripture. It is evident that our voluntary actions are free, and it is as evident that God foreknows them. If, therefore, reason do feel a difficulty in harmonizing the two propositions, that difficulty cannot neutralize either one truth or the other. It may involve a mystery, but not a contradiction. Each truth, separately considered, is abundantly sustained by evidence proper to itself, and that which is true in itself cannot be made untrue when compared with another truth. If any proposition be true in its separate and independent form, it must still be true when combined with other propositions equally true. Truth is immutable and eternal, and whatever difficulty or mystery there may be to our minds, when attempting to harmonize its multifarious combinations, the fact that it is true is a pledge that it does harmonize, though we may be incompetent to demonstrate the harmony. Thus it must be with respect to the Divine prescience, and the volitions and actions of moral agents: because each is true separately, they must harmonize when united, and if there be a difficulty, it must spring from the absence of a power to penetrate and comprehend truth in all its various combinations and relations.

4. But let us look at this subject a little more narrowly. Let us examine the pretended discrepancy between Divine prescience and the freedom of human thought and action. If it can be shown that this prescience involves no necessity, it must be admitted that human volitions and actions though foreseen are free; and this we think can be made manifest. Let the three terms in question—necessity, freedom, and prescience, be each separately explained and compared with one another.

What is involved in necessity? It is a resistless impulse exerted for a given end?

What is freedom? It involves a self-determining power to will and to act.

What is prescience? It is simply the knowledge of an event before it transpires.

Such being, we conceive, a correct representation of the terms we have to inquire, Where lies the alleged incompatibility of prescience with freedom? Between freedom and necessity there is an absolute and irreconcilable discrepancy and opposition; for the assertion of the one is a direct negation of the other. What is free cannot be necessitated, and what is necessitated cannot be free. But *prescience* involves no such opposition. For, simple knowledge is not coercion, it is not impulse, it is not influence of any kind; it is merely acquaintance with truth, or the mind's seeing a thing as it is. If I know the truth of a proposition in Euclid, it is not my knowledge that makes it true. It was a truth, and would have been a truth, whether I knew it or not, even if I had never existed. So of any fact in history; so of any occurrence around me: my mere knowledge of the fact did not make it fact, or exercise any influence in causing it to be fact. So, in reference to the Divine prescience; it is mere knowledge, and is as distinct from force, constraint, or influence, as any two things can be distinct one from another. It is force which constitutes necessity, and the total absence of force which constitutes liberty; and, as all force is absent from mere knowledge, it is evident that neither foreknowledge nor after-knowledge involves any necessity, or interferes in the least degree with human freedom. Man could not be more free than he is if God were totally ignorant of all his volitions and actions.

5. Still it is inquired, Can foreseen actions be otherwise than as they are foreseen? The word "*can*" is not, we conceive, a proper term to be employed in this question, as this word contains the idea of *potentiality* or *ability* in the creature. If, however, it mean, "Has the creature power to act otherwise than as God foresees?" we unhesitatingly reply, he has that power, and that power is unconstrained and free. But, if it be meant, "*Will* the event be otherwise than as God foresees it?" we reply, it will not, because God foresees it correctly. The question proposed is the same thing as to inquire, Does God foresee a thing correctly? or, Can truth be otherwise than true? If God foresees an

event correctly, it will occur as he sees it, because he sees it correctly. But its occurrence is not the result of his foresight; it is not his foresight which causes the event, for it has no influence over it at all. We know *past* events by memory, but our memory has no influence in causing the events which are past, nor has the Divine prescience any influence in causing events which are future. Prescience and memory are precisely the same both as to influence and as to certainty. If memory be correct, it corresponds with the events that are past, and, as God's prescience must be correct, it corresponds with future events, because it is in infallible conformity to truth. The past and the future make no difference in the consideration of this subject, for the question at issue is respecting the influence which mere knowledge has upon the events known, and we have seen that mere knowledge has no more influence upon events than mere ignorance; and the accordance of God's knowledge, with all events, past, present, and future, arises simply from its perfection—it accords with fact solely because it is infallibly correct.

6. Is the question urged, How can it be possible for the volitions and actions of free agents to be foreseen? we reply, It may, with equal propriety, be asked, How is it possible for God *not* to know all future events? Both the possibility of his knowing all things, and the impossibility of his not knowing all things, are involved in the truth, that *He is God!* He is God, and is, therefore, a Being of infinite and absolute perfection. He is God, and, therefore, free from all ignorance, error, and possibility of deception. He is God, and, therefore, knows himself, penetrates and comprehends the infinitude of his own essence and perfections. He is God, the Creator of all things, and what he creates he knows thoroughly—comprehending himself, he must comprehend the creature—the finite is as nothing to the infinite. All things actual, and all things possible, are equally under his eye. His glance pierces through all the complicated modes of being, of thought, and of action, which ever did or can take place. He sees what will be, and knows what will

not be, and no one can curtail his knowledge without limiting his perfections, and dishonouring his character.

7. Should any finally reply,—To affirm that God foreknew all things, is to affirm that God knew that man would sin, and with this knowledge the creation of man would have been derogatory to his character, we reply—God did know that man would sin, but we are not compelled to impugn his intellect in order to exculpate his character. If the *creation* of man, with a knowledge that man would sin, impugns God's character, so does the *continuance* of man's existence impugn his character. Our opponents will not deny that man sins, nor will they deny that God knows that man sins, nor will they deny that God continues man in existence while he is sinning, and continues to perpetuate a race of sinful beings from generation to generation. Yet, with these facts before them, they would shrink from impugning God's character. They have a logic, a philosophy, and a theology too, by which they harmonize these events with the Divine character ; and every one must admit, that the same reasoning applies to the *creation* of beings whom he knew *would* sin, as to the *preservation* of beings who *do* sin. The question, as to the existence of moral evil, however, has reference rather to the goodness and holiness of the Creator than to his knowledge, and will be considered in its proper place.

Reflections.—What solemnity there is in the truth, that, wherever we are there is God—that his awful presence surrounds us, and his piercing eye perceives every action we perform, every thought we exercise, every motive we cherish, every sentiment and affection that stirs in our bosom. We may forget God, but his presence is ever around and within us ; we may wish for secrecy, but, however retired and hidden from man, we are in his immediate presence, and under his immediate inspection. The Mahometans have a proverb, that “wherever there are two persons present God makes the third.” Yea, wherever there is one present God makes the second. We cannot escape from him, for he fills the universe ; we can no more escape from ourselves, than we can from God.

Nay, though we could secure, at pleasure, intervals of oblivion and unconsciousness, still God is there. Amid surrounding darkness, all is light with him ; and acts of secrecy, thoughts concealed, and purposes cloaked, are beheld with the same clearness and certainty as the most public transactions of a city, or the proclamations of an empire.

If to such a Being we are accountable, How awful his tribunal to which we must be summoned ! How unerring the register of our deeds ! How searching the scrutiny of our character ! How proportionate the final sentence to our deserts !

In the contemplation of this attribute of Jehovah, how essential must be the duty of sincerity ! Here, a heathen may speak to us a profitable sentiment. Seneca observes, “ We ought always so to conduct ourselves as if we lived in public ; we ought to think as if some one could see what is passing in our inmost breast ; and there is one who does thus behold us ! Of what avail is it, then, that any deed is concealed from men ? Nothing can be hidden from God. He is present with our very souls, and penetrates our inmost thoughts, and, indeed, is never absent from us.”* “ He, therefore, who believes in the existence of God, should never sin, neither secretly nor openly.”† How inexpressibly foolish the conduct of the hypocrite, when he knows his duplicity and guile, his arts of deception and deeds of darkness, are all under the inspection of God—though concealed from man, to whom he is not amenable, they are open to the view of that awful Being by whom he must be judged ! The thought, that we live in God’s presence, and act under his observation, should be a constant incentive to holiness, should prompt us to shun the slightest contact with evil in thought, word, and deed. We should “ stand in awe, and sin not.”

The doctrine of God’s omniscience is fraught with encouragement and comfort to the sincere and the upright. He, whose presence is everywhere, and whose eye observes every thought, is the friend of the good man, and it is always

* Seneca, Epist. 83.

† Democrat. sentiment.

delightful to have the presence of a friend. When misrepresented and maligned, it is a solace to the upright that God knows the sincerity and uprightness of our character. When, through infirmity or want of opportunity, we fail to accomplish some pious purpose, it is a comfort that God knows our intentions, motives, and desires. When overwhelmed with trials and sufferings, it is a source of consolation to lift up our weeping eye to heaven, like Hagar, and exclaim, "Thou, God, seest me." It is an encouragement to know, that our God is at hand to exercise his tender sympathy, and impart his timely succours. When we draw nigh to God in prayer, it inspires energy in our petitions, when we remember that Jehovah sees our necessities, reads the earnestness of our spirits, and observes our bosoms panting with eager desire. When the Saviour thrice uttered to Simon the appeal, "Simon, son of Jonas, lovest thou me," it was a consolation to that true penitent, to be able, with confidence, to refer the appeal back to his omniscient Saviour, saying, "Lord, thou knowest all things, thou knowest that I love thee."

But this doctrine speaks the language of terror and dismay to the wicked. He dislikes God; the thoughts of him are a burden intolerable to be borne; and yet that awful and dreadful Being is constantly with him; through every moment, and in every place, he is nearer to him than any other object, and inspects and marks every evil action and thought. Flee from God he cannot; for where can he flee to be beyond the pale of the Divine presence? Elude his notice he cannot, for God knows his acts before he has committed them, and his thoughts before they are conceived. How terrible the contemplation of this truth! When the impious Belshazzar saw but a hand writing on the wall of his palace, he "trembled, his countenance changed, his thoughts troubled him, the joints of his loins were loosed, and his knees smote one against another." But why this terror at the appearance of a mere hand, seeing he was previously hardened and unmoved, though surrounded by the presence of God? Why this consternation at a few mystic characters on the wall, seeing, a moment before, he cared not that the

all-seeing eye of God observed every thought of his licentious and malignant breast? It was not the mere hand-writing that filled him with dismay, but the sight of that strange and mystic object aroused his mind to the conviction of the fact he had forgotten—the fact that God was there—the fact that the eternal Jehovah, whose name he was profaning, whose authority he was despising, and whose laws he was trampling upon with contempt, was in the place where he sat, observing his conduct, and meditating the speedy punishment of his transgressions. God is not the less present though no mystic hand appear; nor his observance the less exact, though no visible writing record the sinner's doom. If the transgressor's eyes could but be opened to the reality of his position, what horror would seize him! a sight more dreadful than Sinai when in a blaze—more terrific than the hand-writing on the wall of Belshazzar's palace—a sight more awful than the drama of the world's conflagration would burst upon his vision—he would see the offended Deity on every side, he would behold himself enveloped with the presence and attributes of the eternal God, his Maker and his Judge.

WISDOM.

“God is wise in heart, as well as mighty in strength.”—Job ix., 4. Wisdom differs from mere knowledge, as it includes sagacity, judgement, and the right use of knowledge. Thus knowledge furnishes the materials with which wisdom builds. The exercise of Divine wisdom involves the possession of other attributes on which we have not yet enlarged. It supposes Almighty power, absolute rectitude, unbounded goodness, and every other moral excellence, and implies that all these attributes are exercised under the direction of infinite intelligence. Every production springing from their combined exercise must be good in its nature and design, and fitted to answer that design. Therefore, as in the Deity, infinite intelligence is associated with every other perfection, it follows that he must be “wise in heart,” and that all his works must bear the impress of wisdom. “Jehovah, by

wisdom, hath founded the earth: by understanding hath he established the heavens." Great and marvellous are his works; but in wisdom hath he made them all. Wisdom devised the plan of the universe, and, when created, it was, in all respects, in harmony with the Divine conception. Hence, God looked, with perfect satisfaction, upon all that he had made, and, behold, it was very good." All the manifestations of design and contrivance—all the exhibitions of adaptation, and the arrangement of means to their respective ends—all the evidences of order and harmony in the constitution of nature, are so many proofs of wisdom. Here is a vast and boundless field for meditation; as it expands before us, it presents alluring invitations to inquiry and research. O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! a depth never to be fathomed, riches never to be exhausted. Revelation declares, and reason responds to the declaration, that the intelligent universe will find delightful and ennobling employment throughout eternity in exploring the wisdom of God. Examples of this wisdom may be selected by thoughtful minds from every part of the Creator's works. We cannot enlarge, but, as a guide to the reader, we refer him to the general indications of wisdom suggested in Chapters vii. and viii., Part I.; to Ray on the Wisdom of God; to Paley's Natural Theology; to the Bridgewater Treatises; and to several unpretending, yet truly excellent volumes, recently issued by the Religious Tract Society, and published at a rate which places them within the means of the poorest artizan.

CHAPTER VI.

THE POWER OF GOD.

“ God hath spoken once ; twice have I heard this ; that power belongeth unto God.”—Psalm, lxii., 11.

IN the passage we have prefixed to this chapter, power, in an absolute and exclusive sense, is ascribed to the Deity. The meaning is, that Jehovah's power is underived and unlimited, and that he alone is the source and fountain of all power: so that whatever power is possessed and exerted by the creature, is derived from the Creator. This doctrine of holy scripture is unequivocally corroborated by the testimony of reason.

Perhaps the most simple definition of power is—the ability to do something, especially to produce some effect; and the idea of Almighty power, is the idea of ability to do all things. Thus, the proper conception of power always includes agency, and agency is an attribute of mind, and the mind that possesses this agency originally and without limit, must be God himself. The evidence therefore of power, like that of intelligence, carries us to the Deity as the only being who is its original source and fountain.

It was a sentiment taught by the ancient philosophers, that all motion originates with mind, and, though transmitted and continued through various means, it never commenced except in a volition, either of the Supreme Mind, or of created minds. The facts elicited by modern philosophy have removed this sentiment from the region of speculation to that of established certainty. It now takes its place in the category of established truths. We feel persuaded that this truth has been demonstrated in our third, fourth, and fifth propositions, and further, that another great truth—

the creation of matter, by the Supreme Mind—has been established by a continuation of the same argument. Thus, all existence as well as all motion, resulting from the volition of Deity, it follows, that in the most emphatic and exclusive sense—All power belongeth unto God.

Throughout the universe of matter and of mind we see evidences of power in boundless variety, but as the universe itself was created, whatever evidences of power it presents, they must be so many proofs of the power of God.

In the creature we see two distinct kinds of power exerted. The one, arbitrary and voluntary; the other, fixed and mechanical. The diversified motions of inanimate matter are fixed, determinate, and uniform. Chemical, electrical, and mechanical forces, operate according to fixed laws—the same physical causes producing the same effects invariably, except when interrupted by some miraculous interposition. But the source of the power, thus exerted, does not reside in matter itself. As matter is not eternal, nor motion self-originated, but both derived from God, it follows, that all the power involved in the multifarious motions of matter must be referred to the Creator. The Eternal mind which originated their existence, supplied the power which gives them impulse and activity.

In the various species of living creatures, we see an immense amount of power exerted spontaneously and voluntarily. With man, there is a power still more freely exerted, than that exerted by the inferior tribes. It is less under the influence of instinct, and more completely under the dominion of reason, and a self-determining faculty. Every human being knows, by consciousness, that he has a capability of voluntary activity, of producing a variety of effects. By a simple volition of my mind, I can produce an immediate action of the several parts of my body. I can produce muscular contraction and motion; I can lift my arm, change my position and locality. Here the effect is immediate and instantaneous. We perceive nothing intervene between the volition of the mind, and the obedient act of the body. Here there is the immediate contact of mind with matter;

here, an instantaneous effect is produced upon a material object by simple volition, and thus the supremacy of mind over matter is clearly manifested. "The mind, indeed, to a certain extent, and within its own sphere, possesses absolute power, and whatever motion it wills, instantly takes place."

There is, therefore, as clear a distinction, and as wide a difference, between the action of the chemical and mechanical forces in inanimate matter, and the voluntary motions of rational beings, as can be conceived, and yet the power exerted in both is solely the power of God. The evidence of this is as clear in the one case as the other, for as the voluntary agent derived his being from God, he derived all the attributes of his being from God. His power to act, as well as his power to digest and assimilate food, came equally from God. The power under the dominion of his will as well as that which operates mechanically and unconsciously in his material system, is derived from the almighty Creator. "Power belongeth unto God."

The power of Jehovah is displayed in the creation of the universe, in the wonderful operations which are incessantly transpiring, and in the preservation of all things.

THE POWER OF GOD IN CREATION.

1. *The Creation of Matter.* The act of creation involves omnipotence. Whatever energies man may possess, he cannot create a single particle of matter, nor can he annihilate one. He cannot add a new property to any elementary particle of matter, nor can he destroy one. He cannot change the laws which regulate the properties of matter, nor can he for a moment suspend them. He can dart his scrutinizing eye into the various modifications under which matter presents itself to his observation; he can subject it to the power of his alembic, his battery, and his searching menstruum; he can analyze and combine; he can resolve the solid into the gaseous, and can condense the gaseous into solid; but he has no power to create, to annihilate an atom of dust, nor any power to destroy a single property of matter. So far

is the smallest atom above the action of the most formidable powers which man can employ ; so distinct and impassable is the boundary which marks the operations of the Creator, from those of the creature. Creation is the work of God alone ; and the bringing of the smallest atom into existence involves, of itself, an act of omnipotence.

How exalted, then, must be our conceptions of the Divine power, when we contemplate the immensity of creation ! “ Lift up your eyes on high,” says the prophet, “ and see who hath created these things, that bringeth out their host by number ; He calleth them all by name : through the greatness of his strength, and the mightiness of his power, not one of them faileth to appear.” Thus summoned by the voice of inspiration to survey the manifestations of Jehovah’s power, let us, for a moment, gaze upon the magnificent spectacle. We have before descanted on the vastness of the visible universe, as revealed by the space-penetrating power of Lord Rosse’s telescope, and stated, that a line extending from two extreme Nebulæ, in opposite parts of the heavens, stretches over a space, through which a ray of light cannot travel in less than sixty millions of years. Through the immense sphere of which this is the diameter, it is estimated that millions upon millions, not only of orbs, but of congregations of orbs, are scattered with gorgeous profusion, and how far beyond this prodigious sphere no man knoweth ; but the probability is, that it bears the proportion of a grain of sand to a globe, compared to the outer boundaries of the universe of God, yet all equally replenished and crowded with galaxies, and diversified forms of existence. The world we inhabit, large as it is, with its mountains and valleys, its vast oceans and continents, is small compared with other globes belonging to our system. The planet Jupiter contains a mass of matter, equal to fourteen hundred of our earths, but the sun is three hundred and fifty-five thousand times larger than our world. Overpowering as this magnitude is, it is diminutive, compared with the size of some of the fixed stars. The star Sirius is, with good reason, supposed to be equal in size to many of our suns, but the

solid contents of the bright star Vega, or *a* Lyræ, are estimated to be 19,579,357,857,382,400,000,000, or, above nineteen thousand, five hundred and seventy-nine trillions of miles ; which is fifty-four thousand, eight hundred, and seventy-two times larger than the solid contents of the sun.* The magnitude of such a globe is altogether overpowering to the human imagination, and it baffles every effort to approximate to a distinct conception of an object of such amazing amplitude and splendour. Yet, have we reason to believe, there are millions upon millions of such orbs scattered through the spacious universe. The number of telescopic stars in the Milky Way, has been estimated at eighteen millions, but the Milky Way is only one collection of stars, and seems to form a type of thousands of similar clusters or galaxies, which are seen faintly looming in regions, too remote for distinct conception. Sir John Herschel himself has observed two thousand, five hundred nebulæ, or clusters of stars, and what multitudes more may be observed by the superior power of Lord Rosse's telescope, and what further numbers more may yet be discovered by similar instruments in other hemispheres we are unable to determine. In some of those already examined, the crowds of stars are found so dense, that "ten or twenty thousand stars appear compacted or wedged together, in a space not larger than a tenth of that covered by the moon, and presenting in its centre one blaze of light."

The powers of arithmetic seem baffled with such numbers, and the aggregate magnitude of such amazing bodies, confounds the imagination, and almost crushes the human spirit in its attempt to contemplate them, yet such are the creatures of God ; such are the evidences of his power. Every atom of the whole was brought into being by his word ; yet an atom proclaims his omnipotence. In the view of such a universe, what force and emphasis are given to the inspired declaration, "Power belongeth unto God." Nor can we suppose this work was a hard thing for the Almighty to accomplish. The inspired narrative represents

* Dick's Sidereal Heavens.

the universe as ushered into being by his word. He spake and it was done, he commanded and it stood fast. It was the effect of a simple volition of his Almighty mind. Just as a human action flows from a mental determination, so creation instantly followed the fiat of his will. The moment before his fiat was issued, there was not an atom in being; the instant after, the material of these myriads of stupendous worlds, declared that his will was obeyed.

2. *The Creation of Spirit.* The scriptures assert the existence of various orders of spiritual beings. This is not repugnant to reason. To an omnipotent Being all things are possible, and the creation of matter declares the existence of a power adequate to produce any other substance which the Divine wisdom might determine. If God has created matter, a substance so totally dissimilar to his own essence, it is quite rational to suppose, not only the possibility, but the probability of his creating beings of a nature in some respects resembling his own. The existence, therefore, of spiritual intelligences of various orders and capacities, may be admitted as a truth conformable to reason; and, as what reason admits, revelation asserts, their existence is another manifestation of creative energy.

THE POWER OF GOD DISPLAYED IN THE OPERATIONS OF NATURE.

The whole universe is in motion, and its motion is the effect of power, and of that power God is the only source and fountain.

1. It has pleased God, that a portion of matter should be animated, and this is full of activity. Respiration, digestion, secretion, circulation, assimilation, reproduction, growth, and decay, are modes of activity which pervade the whole animal economy; and, in the vegetable kingdom a similar process is going on, so that no portion of vitalized or organized matter can remain at rest. In inanimate matter, too, there are forces in constant operation. The air and the ocean are never in repose; meteoric changes are every moment transpiring. In the more compact and solid masses of the earth—rocks, mountains, minerals, and

substances apparently the most stable—electrical, magnetic, and chemical forces are ever active, producing a perpetual circle of decomposition, solution, analysis and combination. Not a particle of matter from the circumference to the centre of our globe, but is acted upon by a variety of agencies. Not an atom is completely isolated. It has properties which influence other atoms, and they have properties which influence it. Reciprocal properties and influences pervade the entire mass of the globe, from its surface to its deepest recesses. This action is the result of Almighty power. A similar process of motion and activity is, doubtless, the characteristic of the masses of matter composing the planets, the sun, and all those vast globes which are diffused through the spacious universe. In addition to the influences which thus operate upon the particles of matter in each separate globe, there are activities of a wider scope and mightier force, giving to those orbs prodigious velocity through the regions of space. Centripetal and centrifugal forces are incessantly acting upon worlds and systems of worlds, and carrying them round in orbits of amazing extent, and with a velocity compared with which, a cannon ball moves with a tardy action. Stationary as our own globe appears, it is moving in its sphere at the rate of more than a thousand miles in a minute of time; the planet Mercury moves at the rate of one thousand, seven hundred, and eighty-three miles in a minute. But the comet of 1680, is said to move at the awful rate of thirteen thousand, six hundred and sixty-six miles in a minute. While each planet and comet of the solar system is thus whirling round the sun with various degrees of speed, the system itself has no fixed abode in space, but is shifting its place among the stars; and further, the entire collections of stars, and nebulous clusters of stars, are, with good reason, supposed to be revolving around one common centre. The termed *fixed*, is now found to be no longer applicable to any star in the heavens, for, the apparent stability of their position arises from that prodigious distance which makes the whole diameter

of our system dwindle to a point, and the duration of a thousand years too short a period to perceive any great variation in their locality; and yet such variations have been perceived, as afford ground to estimate that the star Arcturus moves through space at the rate of above one thousand miles a minute, that μ Cassiopeiæ moves at the rate of two thousand one hundred and sixty miles a minute; but the double star, 61 Cygni, is estimated to be translated through space with the astounding velocity of twenty millions of millions of miles in the year. The varied velocities just named may be regarded as examples of the activities of the whole celestial machinery, and if they overpower our imagination, How shall we conceive of the energy which at first gave these huge bodies their motions, and which still directs and guides them, with unerring exactness, regularity, and ease, as they silently journey through the regions of immensity? The mighty impulse was an emanation of Jehovah's power. The centrifugal force which hurled the ponderous masses into space is His—the centripetal force which reins them in, and converts their rectilinear into an orbicular motion is His. The light which issues from them, and darts through the whole area of the vast profound, at the rate of twelve millions of miles in a minute of time, received its momentum from Him. He who gave them their being imparted these wonderful activities. Well may he be emphatically called “The mighty God.” Great is our Lord, and of great power; His understanding is infinite. He telleth the number of the stars, and calleth them all by their names. He bringeth forth Mazzaroth in his season, guideth Arcturus and his sons, and appointeth the ordinances of heaven.

2. The power displayed by the activity of all created minds proceeds from the Deity. Perhaps we have no standard by which to form an exact estimate of the power possessed by the human mind. We know it is capable of amazing activity, and that it can exercise a limited control over matter. Besides moving at pleasure the several parts of the corporeal system in which it resides, it can exert some degree of power

over surrounding objects. It can employ our bodily organs in arranging, disposing, and modifying various material substances, and transforming them into articles of utility and elegance. It can operate further; for it can avail itself of existing forces in nature, and thus intellect can produce effects where muscular energy fails. It can employ the lever, the pulley, the wheel, the screw, and the expansive power of steam, to execute its will. Archimedes said he could move the world if he had but a place on which to erect his machinery; and, although this assertion must be regarded as an extravagant hyperbole, yet it is evident that man can, by the aid of external forces, produce effects truly prodigious, both in magnitude and number, and his works look more like the operations of some superior being than of a creature so diminutive, and, apparently, so feeble as man. We are aware, indeed it may justly be urged, that the effects produced by the mechanism of *external* forces are rather the evidences of intellectual sagacity than of spiritual power; but it may be urged, on the other hand, that if the effects of mechanical instrumentality surpass the inherent energy of the mind, the effects of muscular instrumentality cannot be proved to limit its power. If the one be supposed to surpass it, the probability is, that the other is inadequate to the full degree of its capability. On the organs of its own body it acts by immediate contact, and its power is evidently restrained and held in by the feebleness of the instrumentality it employs, just as the expansive force of steam is limited only by the strength of the copper and iron in which it is confined; and, were the full power of the mind exerted, it would probably rend the vascular system, overcome the adhesive strength of the bones, tendons, and muscles, and break down the frail tenement in which it resides. In fact, we cannot estimate the power with which the Creator has endued the human mind over matter; but the probability is, that, if the human mind were furnished with corresponding apparatus, its power over matter would be found to surpass the strength of any inferior animal, as much as it transcends them in the dignity and excellence of its

nature. This view is corroborated by the statements furnished in the scriptures respecting the amazing powers of angelic beings. There may be intellectual beings of various orders, occupying every orb in the universe ; and, besides those who reside in the material universe, there may be, and indeed there are, countless multitudes of pure spiritual existences. No arithmetic can calculate, no mind can conceive, the number of intelligent beings with which the blessed God has peopled his wide domain in the material and spiritual worlds. All these are beings of intense activity, thought, purpose, will, affections, and acts of power are being incessantly put forth by these creatures. But all the energy thus employed, and all the capabilities yet to be exerted by them, are so many manifestations of the power of God. Nothing is self-existent but the glorious Creator ; and, as the existence of the creature is derived from God, so are the energies they individually and collectively exert. Though their volitions and actions are their own, the *power* involved in their exertion is from God.

THE POWER OF GOD DISPLAYED IN THE PRESERVATION OF
NATURE.

The sacred records teach the doctrine that God's power is constantly exercised in the preservation of his works, in the continuance of their being and order, until they have subserved the purposes of his will. The supposition of of God creating the universe and then leaving it to itself is heathenish, and as irrational as it is heathenish. True philosophy disowns it, and can no more recognise a universe independent in its preservation than independent in its existence. Existence derived is ever dependent upon him who gave it, and powers and properties derived are dependent upon him who bestowed them. Besides, the sacred records speak of many direct and special interpositions, in which the established order of things has been interrupted by the determination of the Creator. The waters of the sea have been divided, and stood erect like a wall of adamant ; the intensest flames have had no power to burn,—the sun and moon have been arrested in their course,—iron has had its gravity suspended,

—a handful of food has been augmented to a supply adequate for thousands,—diseases have been cured by a word,—the orb of day has concealed his light at noon, without any physical cause,—and the corrupting carcase has become reanimated. All these events, though above nature, are quite consistent with the philosophy which recognises the Deity as presiding over his own work, as everywhere present, and every moment exercising a directing and controlling agency. Second causes are but the instruments of his power, and natural laws are but the rules which he has prescribed for his own operations. These rules he can set aside, or diversify as he pleases, and the properties of matter operate only through his agency, and in accordance with his will. Vast as is the power thus continually put forth, he fainteth not neither is weary. The facility with which planets roll and stars shine, seems to indicate the ease with which Jehovah actuates and governs all things. Cicero represents the Deity pervading and moving the universe as the soul moves the members of the body, simply by a volition of his mind.* The simile, if devoid of a pantheistic meaning, is elegant and true to a certain extent, yet it falls short of fully representing the fact intended; for a human being in time becomes conscious of fatigue from exertion, however perfect his control over muscular instrumentality. But Jehovah is never weary with his incessant, multifarious, and Almighty labours. As he sees all things without distraction, so he operates through all without exhaustion or fatigue. In the same perfect manner is his power continually employed in the spiritual world. Our souls are in his hand, and by him all spirits continue to subsist. “This also cometh forth from the Lord of hosts, who is wonderful in counsel and excellent in working.”

It is puerile to allege, that as creation, however vast, is finite, therefore no manifestations of power therein can prove

* Vos enim ipsi dicere soletis, nihil esse, quod Deus non possit efficere, et quidem sine labore ullo. Ut enim hominum membra nulla contentione, mente ipsa ac voluntate moveantur: sic numine Deorum omnia fingi, moveri, mutarique posse.—Cicero De Nat. Deorum. Lib. iii. cap. 39, sec. 92.

God's power to be infinite. The manifestation is not to be estimated merely by its extent, vast as it is, but also by its nature and quality. That manifestation includes, as we have seen, the act of *creation*, as well as motion, and a creative power must be an infinite power. It is impossible either to fix any definite limit to such a power, or to conceive any limitation possible. Moreover, the absolute perfection of his nature involves the possession of every attribute in an unlimited degree. Nor is our estimate of God's power diminished by admitting that it cannot effect any thing contrary to wisdom and goodness, for, the impossibility here contemplated is no detraction from his natural energy, but a moral necessity arising from the superlative excellence of his nature. He cannot do evil, because he is infinitely and absolutely good ; his power cannot contradict his wisdom and holiness, because he is eternally and unchangeably perfect.

This doctrine opens a source of encouragement, confidence, and joy, to God's people. Their God is the Lord, "The Great God, the Mighty God, Jehovah of Hosts is his name ; great in council, and mighty in work, and his eyes are upon all their ways." This glorious Being is their Father, their covenant God. They know that he who created them and has received them into his favour, watches over them with unceasing care, that the very hairs of their head are numbered, and that all their concerns are in his hand. Assured that his providence will preserve, his power defend, and his grace cause all things to work together for their good ; they may trust and not be afraid. None can pluck them out of his hand, and no weapon formed against them shall prosper. They may, therefore, dismiss all corroding anxiety, and all distressing fears, knowing that he, in whom they have trusted, is able to keep that which they have committed unto him until the day of probation terminate ; and they may, without presumption, rejoice in the assurance, that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate them from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus.

CHAPTER VII.

THE BENEVOLENCE OF GOD.

“*God is Love.*”—1 John, iv., 8, 16.

HITHERTO we have considered what are commonly termed the *natural* attributes of Deity, we now proceed to contemplate the *moral* dispositions and affections of his nature. Properly speaking, however, all the attributes of Jehovah are natural; they are all equally essential to Deity.

Love is complacency in and affection for an object. But no definition of love can so clearly depict its nature as an appeal to our own consciousness. We all know what love is by experience, and an appeal to our own bosoms furnishes the best idea of its nature. We know what it is to love a partner, a child, a parent. This is *natural* love. The christian knows what it is to love his brother and to love his God. This is spiritual love: a love produced in the soul by God's renewing grace. Now, if God is love, an affection essentially the same in principle must dwell in his mind. In the scriptures the affection is described by the same word, whether applied to God or man, whether it be our love to one another or our love to God, or God's love to us, or whether it speak of God's love in the abstract, it is the same; and the affection itself must be the same in essence, however vast the difference in degree. Love is love, whoever may be its possessor or its object. To obtain, then, a correct idea of the love of God, we must consider the affection in our own bosom, purified from all unholy ingredients, and enlarged to a degree corresponding with his own infinite capacity. This is what is meant by the love of God—a pure, holy, benevolent affection, dwelling in his mind in an infinite measure or degree.

The passage of scripture standing at the head of this chapter is very peculiar. It employs not an adjective to express a quality, but it employs the noun itself, *love*; it affirms not merely that God is benevolent or loving in his nature, but, that he is *love itself*. This peculiar phraseology, too, occurs twice in the same discourse; we have it in the eighth verse, and again in the sixteenth of the same chapter,—“*God is love.*” We do not think, with some divines, that this form of expression is intended to denote that love is the *essence* of God, for, how can an affection be the essence of a substantive existence? At the same time it must be admitted by all who venerate and understand the scriptures, that phraseology of so peculiar a nature must be intended to convey an important and a peculiar meaning—a meaning in which this extraordinary assertion can be applied to no other being but God. To us it appears designed to express, not that love is the essence of God, but that love is essential to God. That love is not an adventitious affection, but one inseparable from his Being, and eternally existing in him; an affection not called into existence by the creation of objects, or by the contemplation of any objects intended to be created, but an affection which exists in the Divine mind essentially and eternally, irrespectively of the existence of any created being; so that, had no creature existed, love would have had the same place in the mind of Deity. The peculiar phrase was intended also to express the infinite intensity of God’s love—an intensity which could not be so clearly and fully indicated by any other form of speech as the one adopted—“*God is love.*” The scriptural representation of this truth is in accordance with the dictates of reason, as will be seen from the consideration of a variety of important and obvious truths.

I. CREATION IS A PROOF OF THE DIVINE LOVE.

1. The act of creation was either necessary or voluntary. That it was not the effect of an absolute necessity has already been demonstrated. God never works from the influence of any physical necessity, because no such necessity

operates within him or upon him. Existing alone from eternity, there was nothing *external* to compel or induce him to put forth his creative energy. Existing too as an intelligent and voluntary Being, there could be no *internal* necessity inducing the production of the universe. Creation, therefore, does not emanate from the Divine essence as water flows from a fountain, or as light beams from the sun. The great First Cause does not act as material and secondary causes operate. These act necessarily without intelligence or choice on their part, but Jehovah always acts intelligently and voluntarily, with particular purpose and design, knowing that he does good, and intending to do so freely and from choice. His works flow from his purposes, and his purposes are the dictates of his wisdom, and, therefore, all his operations are spontaneous and free.

2. If the creation of the universe was a voluntary act, and that act originated from a wise purpose, it follows, that the purpose itself must have originated from some *motive*; for to suppose God to act without a motive is to impugn his wisdom. What, then, was the motive which operated in the bosom of the Deity? Was it a selfish one? Was it a sense of his own need? This was impossible; for, as an absolutely perfect Being, he could need nothing. From all eternity he had been infinitely happy in the possession of his own all-sufficiency, and could need nothing. Was the motive a malignant one? This, also, was impossible; for there was nothing in his nature to generate such a passion, and nothing externally as yet existed to excite such a feeling, nor could anything do this if it had existed. Moreover, a malign feeling is the property of an imperfect nature, but the nature of Deity necessarily excludes the possibility of such a property; and the works of the Deity furnish, as we shall show hereafter, abundant evidence *à posteriori* that no such passion had any place in his bosom. If, then, the motive was neither a selfish nor a malignant one, it must have been a benevolent one. Thus, reason and revelation are one in their testimony. Creation must be the offspring of love. Created existence, then, in all its varied forms,

proclaims the goodness of God. The unnumbered worlds which his Almighty hand has scattered throughout immensity, and the countless myriads of sensitive and intelligent beings inhabiting them, are all the irradiations of his free, spontaneous, and boundless love. His benevolence inclined his will to communicate himself and to do good. His love both prompted his wisdom to devise, and his power to effect, the wondrous universe of being.

Although the preceding argument is perfectly valid and irresistible, as far as it extends, yet justice to the subject requires it to be followed up by a view of the works of God. We judge of the dispositions of a being by his doings, especially by his proceedings towards others ; and, though we cannot penetrate the heart, we can generally infer, with infallible certainty, as to the leading dispositions which actuate the conduct of men. We know the class of actions which flow from benevolence, and find no difficulty in distinguishing them from the effects of hatred and malignity. Let us then estimate the character of God by his works ; let us judge of his disposition by referring to his deeds.

II. GOD HAS MANIFESTED HIS BENEVOLENCE BY IMPLANTING LOVE IN THE NATURE OF SENTIENT BEINGS.

It is a fact worthy of observation, that in every animal capable of reciprocating any emotion, we find the affection of love. Some classes of animals appear to be too low in the scale of existence to be the subjects of any emotion, or, at least, of reciprocating any passion ; but in all where that capability exists, we believe it may be confidently stated, that the affection of love may be found to exist. Among the numerous irrational tribes it exists as an instinctive passion, uniting the bird to its mate, the parent animal to its young, and producing often a social and kindred attachment through the species. This affection, too, is frequently excited and reciprocated among animals of different species, and is sometimes cherished by brute creatures towards human beings with peculiar fondness and fidelity. In man, also, this affection exists as an instinctive passion, exercising

a similar influence, and is the foundation of our social attachments and relations. But when the heart of man embraces the Gospel (we speak of an experimental fact), it becomes possessed of a higher affection—a love more refined, more intense, and more ennobling, than an instinctive passion—a spiritual principle which causes the soul to delight in God as its chief good, and expands the bosom with a consciousness of pure and ardent benevolence to man. The scriptures reveal to us the existence of other orders of intelligent beings (which is perfectly consonant with reason to admit), and these are described as under the influence of the same benevolent affection. The existence of this amiable affection in the creature proves its existence in the Creator.

We are aware it may be replied, that most of the creatures described as under the influence of the affection of love are influenced also by other passions, and some of them of a malign character. This cannot be denied, but several important truths require to be well observed, which neutralise any objection from this source.

1. In estimating the character of God from his works, it is an axiom that the dispositions and properties of the Creator are to be inferred from the *excellencies* of the creature and not from its *defects*. Now, the malign passions, under any form, are marks of the creature's limited and imperfect nature. Any disposition or temper repugnant to love, whether it exist in the irrational tribes or in human beings, is an evidence of inferiority and imperfection; but love is an excellence which ennobles and dignifies the creature possessing it, and the dignity and excellence of the creature rise in proportion to the degree in which this benevolent affection is cherished and possessed. Now, as we cannot infer the character of God from the imperfections of the creature, we cannot ascribe to him any of the malign passions; but as we estimate his character from the superior and the excellent dispositions he has planted in our nature, we are carried to the conclusion that God is love—that he has bestowed a measure of this excellent disposition upon

the creature, because it dwells in infinite plenitude in himself.

2. The nature of intelligent beings is so constituted, that we approve of and admire benevolent affections, but disapprove and condemn those of the contrary nature. Pure, disinterested love, throws around the character of its possessor an amiability, an attractiveness, which forces our respect and admiration. Why should our nature be endowed with an instinctive approbation of the benevolent affection, but that it expresses the disposition of our Creator?—that, by our admiring what is amiable in his creature, we might learn and admire a corresponding excellency in himself.

3. The malign tempers are sources of unhappiness and misery. They render the possessor of them miserable, and inflict misery on others; but the benevolent affection is a source of happiness to its possessor, and is calculated to produce happiness in all towards whom it is exercised. Love is not an indolent or speculative sentiment, but an active principle. It prompts its possessor to effort for the good of others. It renders the work of doing good our element and delight; and thus its exercise yields happiness within and happiness without. It yields a rich harvest of *personal* enjoyment in the holy work [of imparting peace and enjoyment to all around. The universal diffusion of love would, indeed, dry up every fountain of misery, and fill the world with harmony, happiness, and joy. We ask, then, is it conceivable that the Author of this beneficent principle is a malignant Being? Certainly not. He could not give an excellence he did not possess, he could not fix the seal of his approval on what he abhorred; for, this is to suppose a contradiction between his disposition and his works. It is to suppose that his works, instead of being the exponents of his disposition are the exponents of dispositions diametrically opposite to his own; which is to suppose not only that he acts without motives, but that he acts contrary to his own motives. All such suppositions involve absurdities too flagrant to be entertained for one moment. God's works cannot contradict, but express, his nature and disposi-

tion, and, therefore, if he has invariably associated happiness with the possession and exercise of benevolence, it is a proof that he is benevolent himself—and an evidence that he approves of this amiable disposition in others. He thereby stimulates the creature to imitate himself. In the very constitution of our nature he says, “Be loving, for God is love.” There is no affection so refined in its nature, so happy in its influence, and so ennobling in its effects, as love; there is none so widely diffused through creation, and there is none so visibly impressed with tokens of Divine approval—the inference is irresistible, that God is love.

III. GOD'S CARE FOR HIS CREATURES DECLARES HIS BENEVOLENCE.

When a parent cheerfully provides for the necessities of his offspring, it is justly regarded as an evidence of his love for them; and, if this care be uniformly manifested, no rational mind will question its strength and sincerity. In estimating God's disposition towards his creatures, we look for similar evidence, and it constantly presents itself to our view. Indeed, every manifestation of wisdom is accompanied with some manifestation of goodness. It would be no service to truth to neglect or gloss over the fact that there is suffering in the world. This fact we shall look fully in the face at the proper time. But, in this argument we have to ascertain whether God evinces a paternal care for his creatures by providing for their welfare; for, if this disposition be manifest, his benevolent disposition is proved. Now, all inanimate nature is one vast and wonderful system, whose operations are *directed* to the welfare of living beings, thus affording a display not only of infinite intelligence and Almighty power, but of boundless benevolence. The good of sensitive and rational creatures is obviously the *design* of all the Creator's works. That this good is extensively and very generally enjoyed we do maintain; but that this good is invariably and in every instance fully realized by the creature is what we do not affirm. The good intended is, indeed, sometimes partially lost by the creature's own

conduct, and sometimes by circumstances over which the creature has no control; but whatever this may prove, it does not neutralize the clear and palpable evidences of a benevolent disposition and intention on the part of the Creator. From the endless multitude of examples, which press upon our view, only a few can be selected.

1. *The phenomena of circulation and respiration.*—Our mysterious nature is so constituted that the circulation of the blood, and the respiration of air, are essential to life. It is the blood which continues to supply the waste of our system, and to build it up with new material; and, for this important end, it penetrates every part of the body, and is made to circulate through it with great rapidity—the state of health depending upon the quality of the blood and the regularity of the circulation. But the important functions of the blood are constantly exhausting some of its vital properties, and it becomes necessary that its deteriorated qualities should be discharged, and a fresh supply of vitalizing properties should be as constantly imparted to it. This is effected by respiration. Now, in the animal economy we see an apparatus fitted for breathing, and in the surrounding atmosphere we see an element, or a mixture of elements, exactly suited to nature's requirements—being endowed with those properties which it is essential the blood should imbibe to qualify it to support existence. In order that these life-sustaining properties may be imbibed, all the blood in the system is made to pass through the lungs once during every few minutes of time. Hence, it is necessary that the air and the blood should have the greatest facility of contact, and to effect this the lungs are composed, according to Dr. Keill and other anatomists, of one thousand seven hundred and forty millions of membranous cells, communicating with one another, and which, if expanded, would extend, it is said, over a surface of one thousand five hundred square feet. Thus it is contrived, that a stratum of blood of fifteen hundred feet, should every moment be brought into contact with a corresponding stratum of air, that the necessary properties of the latter may be imbibed

in sufficient quantity to support life, and with such facility that a person in health is scarcely conscious of the act of respiration.

In reference to this wonderful process, which is alike distinguished by wisdom and goodness, Dr. Smith states, as the results of some experiments on the subject—"1. The volume of air ordinarily present in the lungs is twelve English pints. 2. The volume of air received by the lungs, at an ordinary inspiration is one pint. 3. The volume of air expelled from the lungs at an ordinary expiration is a little less than one pint. 4. Of the volume of air received by the lungs at one inspiration, only one fourth part is decomposed at one action of the heart, and this is so decomposed in the five-sixth parts of one second of time. 5. The blood circulates through the system, and returns to the heart, in one hundred and sixty seconds of time, which is exactly the time in which the whole volume of air in the lungs is decomposed. 6. The quantity of blood that flows to the lungs to be acted upon by the air at one action of the heart is two ounces, and this is acted upon in less than one second of time. 7. The quantity of blood in the whole body of the human adult is twenty-four pounds avoirdupois, or twenty pints. 8. In twenty-four hours, twenty-four hogsheds of blood are presented to the lungs to receive the influence of the vital air. 9. In the mutual action which takes place between the quantities of air and blood which come in contact in twenty-four hours, the air loses three hundred and twenty-eight ounces of oxygen, and the blood ten ounces of carbon."

It is thus made apparent, that, in order to relieve the blood of superfluous carbon, and supply it with a due proportion of oxygen, there must be a relative proportion between the action of the heart, and the action of the lungs—between the quantum of blood discharged by each pulsation of the heart, and the quantum of air inhaled by each inspiration of the lungs—between the return of the blood after being oxygenated, and the expiration of the deteriorated air after the absorption of its oxygen—between the time required for,

the absorbing power of the blood, and the decomposing susceptibility of the atmosphere; and, unless these proportions were exactly adjusted, the creature must die, or linger through a suffering existence. Now to provide for all these exigencies, to adjust all these multifarious proportions, to harmonize all these relations, required an elaborate and complicated organization, which only infinite wisdom could accomplish. But it is accomplished. The Creator has put forth his skill to secure the life, the health, and the comfort of his creatures. Is this the result of malignity or benevolence? Is it not wisdom and power fulfilling the suggestions of kindness and love?

2. *We see a similar benevolent adaptation in the properties of the atmosphere.* An atmosphere of some properties would destroy life instead of sustaining it. An atmosphere but a little varied would produce discomfort and suffering. Air was necessary with such properties as the blood required, which the system could bear, and which could be inhaled with safety and comfort. Such an atmosphere is that ocean of fluid which envelopes our globe. It consists of three gases—oxygen, nitrogen, and carbonic-acid, mixed together in the following proportions:—supposing any given quantity of air divided in 100 parts, there are 21 parts of oxygen, 78 parts of nitrogen, and 1 part of carbonic-acid gas, and these are thoroughly mixed together, and equably diffused through the space around us. The first of these gases supports combustion, and is essential to life; but the two latter destroy life and extinguish flame; and an animal placed in a vessel filled with either of these two gases instantly dies. Yet, the three gases, contrary as they are in their properties, are, when mixed in the above proportions, exactly suited to the animal system. If, however, these proportions were altered, comfort and life would be destroyed. If the proportions of oxygen were greatly increased, the flame of life would burn too intensely for our present physical constitution, and we should soon die; if the proportions of either of the other gases were augmented, we should expire in agony from poison or suffocation. Nitric acid, or aquafortis, is a deadly

poison, yet it is composed of seventy-five parts of oxygen, and twenty-five parts of nitrogen—merely a different combination of the two principle gases forming our atmosphere. Now, if the *same* proportion of these two gases constituted common air, to breathe would be to inhale poison and death. But our Creator has so ordered it that the atmosphere in all parts of the world, consists of the same specified proportions of three gases—oxygen, nitrogen, and carbonic-acid. Here, then, is an economy which protects innumerable creatures from poison, suffocation, and death, and secures for them the blessings of life, health, and comfort. Is the author of this economy a malignant or a benevolent Being? Does he hate the works of his hand, or is he even indifferent to their welfare? Is there not here the care of a parent, and is not that care the offspring of love?

But, to adapt the atmosphere to the life and health of the creature, a variety of other provisions were requisite. The air, on being decomposed by breathing, is unfit for a second respiration, until it has undergone a renovating process. When expelled from the lungs it consists chiefly of nitrogen, with a small portion of carbonic-acid gas, and to breathe this again, for any considerable period, would destroy life.

The fatal effects of breathing over again the foul air expelled from the lungs were seen in the case of the English prisoners of war, treacherously driven, on the 30th June, 1756, by the Indian Nabob, at the point of the musket and the sabre, into the dungeon called the black-hole, at Calcutta. One hundred and forty-six were thus forced into a space of only about eighteen feet square, and of that number one hundred and twenty-three expired the same night, and the twenty-three survivors were in a state of putrid fever. A similar result occurred but a short time since, from closing down the hatchway of an emigrant vessel. In such cases the cause of mortality was the close confinement, preventing both the escape of the putrid air expelled from the lungs and the access of pure air from the surrounding atmosphere. We see, then, what awful torment and death would await us if no provision was made by our Creator to shield us from

the effects of our own breath, and give us every moment a supply of fresh air. It is therefore ordained, that the noxious gas expelled from our lungs shall immediately escape from our vicinity, and be subject to a renovating process before we inhale it again. As a short interval of time elapses between each expansion of the lungs, the expelled nitrogen, being specifically lighter than common air, has time to ascend above our heads, from whence it passes into the higher regions, while the carbonic-acid gas, in the meantime, by its weight, descends, thus leaving a space between which a current of pure air rushes into the lungs on the next inspiration. The impure gases expelled soon become agitated and diffused through the surrounding air, which, by winds, tempests, evaporations, vast exhalations of oxygen gas from vegetation, and meteoric influences incessantly acting, is constantly undergoing such a purifying process as preserves to it, in all latitudes of the world, the same properties we have previously described, and, under all ordinary circumstances, fits it to sustain life and promote health. Was it a malignant disposition which made this provision for the creature's welfare? Did hatred or love dictate the origin of these remarkable properties of the air, and devise a scheme for the perpetual renovation of an element so essential to our life and comfort? The inquiry itself suggests the only answer which reason can give—God is love.

Another fact must close our remarks on the atmosphere, though a folio volume would not exhaust the adaptations suggested by the goodness of God in the constitution of this invisible element. The fact we refer to is the facility which these gases have of combining with one another, or of their entering into union one with another, so that they are completely mixed. Were not this the case, each gas would form a distinct stratum, according to its specific gravity. Carbonic-acid, being of the greatest density, would form the lowest stratum; oxygen, being the next in gravity, would form the next stratum, and dispose itself immediately above the carbonic-acid; and nitrogen, being the lightest, would form the uppermost stratum. The lowest stratum, consisting

of a gas destructive to life, would be of a depth or thickness probably of hundreds of yards, thus enveloping the whole world with a poisonous fluid, and immediately extinguishing all existence. The effect, now supposed, may be illustrated by a well known fact. In Italy, there is a cave called the Grotto del Cani, or the Dog's Grotto. In this cave there is a natural exhalation of carbonic-acid gas, and a man who attends on visitors usually enters with a dog, which he places on the floor of the cave; the dog soon dies, but the man is not at all affected, for the carbonic-acid, by its weight, lies at the bottom of the cave, forming a stratum of about eighteen inches in depth, and above this the air is pure. Now, had the three gases which form the genial atmosphere not had an affinity for each other, so as to become diffused through and mix with each other, the carbonic-acid gas now universally diffused through the air would all have settled down in one mass on the surface of the earth, like that in the grotto just named, forming a stratum so deep as to envelope the highest habitations. So, then, if the law of affinity, which unites these gases, had never existed, life could not have been given; and were this law to be suspended even for a day, life would become extinct. We know of no philosopher who can assign any cause for this law, but the will of God. It exists, but no one can philosophically explain why it exists. It is an ultimate fact, for which, like many others, no cause can be assigned but the will of God. We ask, then, What *disposition* originated that law? and what disposition continues that law incessantly in operation? Its existence subserves life and comfort; and What disposition can it be which provides for the creature's life and comfort? Is it a malignant or a benevolent one? If the provision of a father for the preservation and comfort of his child's life and health indicates not his hatred, but his instinctive love for it, so does the conduct of God in the instance before us—it emphatically proclaims that God is love.

3. *The phenomena of nutrition proves the Divine goodness.* In the same manner does the bountiful supply of food indicate the benevolence of God. While air is essential to

supply the blood with oxygen, &c., food is essential to supply the pabulum of which the blood is formed, and, as a portion of the blood is continually being expended by assimilation, &c., it becomes necessary that it should be regularly replenished with the material afforded by food. To meet this necessity, we see a combination of internal and external means admirably adjusted. In the human system, we see an elaborate organization for stimulating the appetite when food is required, and for mastication, deglutition, digestion, secretion, absorption, and assimilation, when food is supplied. In the economy of external nature, we see a corresponding system of adaptation. As neither man nor the inferior animals can live on minerals or mere earths, the process of vegetation converts the earths into nutritious aliments, and thus prepares them for the digestive organs of animal existence. This process involves another system of organization, in which other wonderful adaptations are seen. Again, if we step further back to contemplate a preceding economy, which anticipates and prepares materials for vegetable existence, we see all nature operating like an immense laboratory, ever actively employed in decomposing, resolving, and analyzing unorganized substances, and fitting them to form the pabulum of vegetable life. Electricity, solar heat, evaporation, rains, dews, winds, frost, snow, &c., are all so many active instrumentalities, preparing materials which are directed first to cover the earth with vegetation, wherewith next to nourish and sustain the existence of animal life. How bountiful the supply thus provided! and how abundant that which is most essential to the creature's immediate wants! If we cast our eyes abroad, how rich the vegetable verdure which covers the earth's surface! how thick the fields stand with corn! what an ample reward does nature give to industry! what profusion meets our eye, when, on a summer's eve, we quit the dusky haunts of the crowded city, and walk for an hour in nature's free domain! If now, in the midst of this bountiful supply, this luxuriant paradise, we ask, What is the disposition of the Almighty Donor? What impelled him to originate such a complicated system,

which runs through all nature, to provide for the countless myriads of creatures dependent upon him? If we look at their helplessness, and his independence—their daily necessities, and his unceasing bounty, what reply can reason utter? If we remember, that the suspension of his provisional operations, for a single year, would extinguish all existence, but that these operations never are suspended for a single hour, what answer can our judgement give? There is but one, and it is beautifully expressed by the grateful Psalmist, “The Lord is good to all, and his tender mercies are over all his works.” His wisdom ordains at the suggestion of goodness; his power works at the bidding of love.

4. Inviting as the subject is, our limited space puts a check upon our pen; yet we cannot refrain a few additional observations. As the mouth is formed for the admission of both food and air, which, as we have seen, perform separate functions, and enter into different parts of the system, there are two passages from the mouth, one called the *œsophagus*, leading to the stomach, and the other the *larynx* and windpipe, leading to the lungs. As the admission of food to the lungs would not only be excessively painful and distressing, but fatal, some organization was necessary to close the *larynx*, while food is swallowed. This has been provided for, by the construction of a little valve called the *epiglottis*, which opens of itself, while we breathe, for the admission of air, but which closes by muscles which act upon it in the act of swallowing, and thus effectually secures the windpipe from the intrusion of a single particle of food. This mechanism operates freely without any trouble on our part, and without any emotion which renders us conscious of its existence; perhaps, indeed, not one person in a thousand is at all aware of the organization, or thinks of the evils thus prevented, or the benefits thus conferred. Had not this organization been formed, the taking of food would have produced paroxysms of coughing, sensations of violent irritation, and ultimate death; and were this organization to be suspended, or its operation to be easily put out of order, these dreadful results must follow. The author had

a particular friend, who, from a disease in the throat, did experience the irritation and the suffering consequent on an imperfect action of the epiglottis, and, after lingering awhile, expired. Need we again ask, What was the disposition which induced Jehovah to construct the exquisitely beautiful, yet simple and efficacious, organization in question? The prevention of suffering, and the preservation of life, are the objects clearly contemplated. What then are the motives which induce a man to avert pain and suffering from a fellow-man, and plan and devise for his comfort? Malignity never employs genius to avert suffering; it is the office of benevolence and love. It is the motive which incited the labours of a Howard, and other philanthropists, whose lives have been spent in doing good. So the provision in question is the effect of Divine wisdom and power, stimulated by paternal and infinite love.

5. The mechanical structure of the animal system is an elaborate combination of contrivances to meet the necessities and promote the well-being of the creature, always suited to the element in which it lives, and the instincts which prompt its habits. In the human system we have the perfection of animal organization. The bony structure forms a collection of basements, pillars, curves, and arches, built up and adjusted, so as to give firmness to the fabric, and protection to the vital organs, and are placed, inserted, and articulated, so as to combine strength with convenience and facility of action. On the bony structure the fleshy fibre is laid, forming four hundred and seventy muscles, compacted and levelled with inlayings of fat, and adjusted and bound by ligaments and tendons, as so many pulleys, to give action to the osseous frame-work. Through the muscular fibre, are distributed the endless ramifications of the nervous tissue, with the arterial and venous conduits, and numerous vessels for various purposes in the animal economy; and over the whole an elastic cuticle, forming a smooth, transparent, and sensitive drapery, has been thrown by the Creator. We cannot conceive of symmetry more elegant, proportions more beautiful, and adaptations more complete, than are here

presented. All this exquisite contrivance is as much the product of goodness as of wisdom. Not a joint, a hinge, a pin, or a cord, of this complicated tabernacle, is redundant, or can be dispensed with as unnecessary to the comfort and welfare of the inhabitant. The material fabric is exactly suited to the wants and requirements of the mind, and has been fabricated for its use.

We can easily conceive painful and distressing results to have flowed from a different construction. Had the back bone, for example, been one solid, inflexible pillar, like the thigh bone, any bending or voluntary curvature of the body would have been impossible; but the beautiful structure of a series of vertebræ, nicely articulated, and combining firmness with flexibility, enables man to deflect his body at pleasure; yet, had such vertebræ formed the bones of our limbs, they would have been most inconvenient, and comparatively, if not altogether, useless. As the head is a mechanism where all the senses are concentrated, and by which the mind has the most frequent and important communication with the external world, it became requisite that it should be capable of turning freely every way, of moving vertically or horizontally, so as immediately to adjust the organs of sight, hearing, &c., to every surrounding object soliciting their attention. Without some contrivance for this diversified action the head could not have been moved at all, without, at the same time, moving the entire body: and it is easy to see, that, with such an organization, we should be subject to inconvenience, excessive trouble, and, not unfrequently, to danger. A contrivance is formed to meet the exigency, by a compound mechanism in the vertebræ of the neck, including a hinge joint, with a tenon and mortice. “First,—The head rests immediately upon the uppermost of the vertebræ of the neck, and is united to it by a hinge joint, enabling it to move forward and backward as far either way as is necessary, or as the ligaments allow; and, secondly,—in the joint below is a mechanism resembling a tenon and mortice. This uppermost bone but one has what anatomists call a process, namely, a projection

somewhat similar in size and shape to a tooth, which, entering a corresponding hole or socket in the bone above it, forms a pivot or axle, upon which that upper bone, together with the head which it supports, turns freely in a circle: and as far in the circle as the attached muscles permit the head to turn. When we nod the head, we use the hinge joint; when we turn the head round, we use the tenon and mortice." This beautiful mechanism resembles that of a telescope, by which that instrument may be turned upward or downward, laterally or horizontally, to command an aspect from different parts of the heavens, without removing the stand by which it is supported. Sometimes a severe cold, causing a stiff neck, gives us to feel, in part, and for a short time, the serious inconvenience which we should have suffered perpetually, but for the wise and benevolent adaptation now mentioned.

Had the legs been formed of one continuous bone, without a knee joint, Who can describe the inconvenience, suffering, and danger, attending every effort to rest the body by sitting or reclining, or of rising from that posture to an upright position? Had the arms consisted each of one continuous bone, without a joint at the elbow, the hands could never have conducted food to the mouth, and myriads of important offices, now performed with ease and celerity, could never have been performed at all. Had not muscles been constructed by which to move the eye-lids at our will, the advantages and pleasures arising from the organs of vision would have been greatly abated, and incalculable inconveniences, and sufferings, must have been our lot. The writer is especially impressed with this truth, from the fact of his having once been brought into contact with a poor boy, apparently about thirteen years of age, whose eye-lids had no muscular action. His eyes were apparently good, but he could not use them without the constant trouble of lifting up the lids with his fingers, and thus holding them open so long as he desired to see an object; they closed the moment his fingers let go their hold; and I observed, that, as the trouble and inconvenience of thus employing both hands were too

great to be constantly endured, one eye was generally not used, and often both were closed in darkness. So much does our well-being and comfort depend upon the diminutive organization which moves the eye-lid—an organization which we all use through every moment of our waking hours, perhaps without a thought of the contrivance, or the benefits resulting therefrom.

In each of the cases adduced we have elaborate organization, embracing a wonderful combination of means, and adaptations, and uses, requiring the most perfect and unerring wisdom for its design and execution—and, What is the object? Most obviously the good of the creature. To save the creature from inconvenience, from unnecessary toil and care, from suffering, and in many instances from premature death. Can such objects be contemplated by a malignant being, or by one devoid of regard for our welfare? We know they never were, and we are sure they never can be. The objects are those alone at which benevolence aims, and in which love delights. These contrivances, and all of a similar nature in the animal economy, are so many evidences that our Creator is a God of love.

6. Similar examples crowd upon our attention, but we must forbear, leaving to the reader the pleasing and grateful task of selecting and multiplying for himself instances of Divine benevolence. The air we breathe, the food we eat, the raiment which covers our bodies and grows upon the skin of the inferior tribes, the pleasing light and genial heat of the sun, the succession of day and night by a law “sublimely simple,” the former adapted to labour and activity, and the latter to refreshing repose; the regular return of the seasons by a law equally simple and sublime, dispensing in alternate periods the blessings of solar influence and vegetation to every part of the earth’s surface; the capacious ocean, whose depths teem with innumerable creatures, whose vapours, ascending, temper the atmosphere, and descending, fertilize the earth; the gentle breeze which fans us in the summer’s heat, and the howling tempest whose impetuous wings agitate the atmosphere and sweep away pestilence and

death; the salubrious frosts which purge away noxious effluvia from the air, and prepare the womb of nature for the fructifying seed; the earth's surface diversified by hill and dale, and irrigated by rivers and springs; her bowels fraught with materials for our use, and the fecundity of her soil enriching the face of creation with endless forms of beauty, and abundant stores of food; the animal and vegetable economy fraught with adaptations for the well-being of sentient life—all these, and ten thousand other wonders which a library could not record, proclaim the goodness and the benevolence of God, and summon the whole intelligent creation to gratitude and praise.

IV. GOD'S PROVISION TO AFFORD ENJOYMENT TO THE CREATURE
IS A PROOF OF HIS BENEVOLENCE.

The benignity of Jehovah's disposition is manifest not only by providing to shield his creatures from numerous evils and sufferings, but also by providing for their enjoyment. Whether we survey the rational or the irrational portion of animated being, we find each endowed with some capacities for enjoyment, and provided with ample sources whence that enjoyment may be derived.

1. Sensation. Every bodily sense is made an avenue of pleasure—a means of ministering gratification and delight. What a boundless field of enjoyment is opened to us by the sense of sight, by which the endless forms of beauty and magnificence in the productions of nature and of art are open to our view! What delight is ministered to us by the sense of hearing, by which the mellifluous harmonies of music, the soft tones of friendship, and the thrilling charms of eloquence, are made to vibrate through the soul! What delicious gratification is afforded by the sense of smelling, by which we are regaled with the aroma of flowers, and the richest odours of nature are made to yield us pleasure! Nor are the senses of touch and taste barren of the power to produce agreeable sensations. In an inferior degree, the lower animals share with us the pleasures of sensation, but the faculty of reason vastly augments the power of sense to

gratify, because the pleasure of sensation, when combined with reflection, is refined in its nature, and heightened in its intensity, by agreeable associations, and in some degree repeated by recollection. To secure these pleasing sensations, a variety of distinct organs are formed, of elaborate and exquisite mechanism. Now, when we see enjoyment superadded to comfort, pleasure joined with utility, and infinite skill employed in securing for us these results, we cannot mistake the intention of the Creator, and the intention unfolds the disposition. Thus, every organ of pleasing sensation, and every pleasing emotion, declares the benevolence of God. It proclaims his name and nature to be LOVE.

2. Allied to those just named, are the various pleasurable instincts of animated nature, some of which belong to man, and many others are widely distributed among the diversified tribes of the animal kingdom. Nor is there any instinct or appetite, but may be regarded as involving a capacity for enjoyment, and as furnishing a stimulus to seek for it, in some appropriate object or pursuit. Many of these instincts are infallibly directed to the continuance and preservation of the species, and all combine utility in some form with individual gratification. Whether we carefully study, or ~~curiously~~ glance, at the history and habits of the animal creation, we meet at every turn with proofs of the creature's happiness. We see it in their sportive diversions, and their cheerful mien; we hear it in the songs of melody they pour, and the varied sounds, harsh or harmonious, by which they spontaneously utter their delight. When, therefore, in the first place, we see the creature endowed with a capacity for enjoyment; in the second place, actuated by instincts prompting that enjoyment; in the third place, nature abounding with sources to afford that enjoyment; in the fourth place, that enjoyment itself made subservient to utility; and lastly, an organization adapted to the whole, Can we fail to see a benevolent intention? Is not the goodness of the Creator as conspicuous as his wisdom and power?

3. The higher the nature of the creature, the more diversified and refined its enjoyments, and the larger its

capacities for those enjoyments. Human beings, standing as they do on an eminent position, far above the inferior tribes, have faculties of a higher order superadded to animal instincts and propensities. They have reason, and, as the scriptures assure us, an immortal existence. They have the faculties of reflection, of voluntary recollection, association, combination, and hope. The pleasures of sense and instinct are heightened by the mental perceptions of beauty and taste, and multiplied a thousand-fold by imagination, by memory of the past, and hope of the future ; and all the enjoyments arising from the social principle, are heightened by the faculty of speech—of thus reciprocating affection, of uttering the softest tenderest sympathies, of expressing and exciting the most refined emotions, of blending thought with thought, spirit with spirit, of assimilating mind with mind, and producing and perpetuating the most sacred and endearing associations. We have a faculty for the perception of truth, and a relish for its attainment, prompting to the acquisition of knowledge, and enriching the mind with treasures more durable than the material universe. We have a faculty for communing with the invisible, for realizing the personal existence of the All-glorious Creator, for ascertaining our relation to him as our Father and Friend, for exchanging thoughts, sentiments, and affections, with this exalted Being, and for deriving enjoyments from him of a nature infinitely surpassing all created good. The soul has desires which nothing sensual can satisfy, and capacities which nothing earthly can fill. It roams among the infinite and the eternal, looks forward to perpetual existence, and feels that whatever is limited in space or duration is too narrow for the powers and the capabilities of its being. It longs and pants for the infinite, and cannot be satisfied with less. It is evidently formed to know, love, and enjoy, the Deity, and he alone is an adequate source of possession and enjoyment to the immortal mind. The Bible assures us that God is accessible to the human mind. This is in harmony with reason ; for, if the Deity has created beings with such powers and capacities, the existence of those powers is a pledge they shall be gratified

from their appropriate source : if he has provided for every exigency of instinct, reason tells us he has also provided for every exigency of mind. The goodness so profusely bestowed on the faculties of the lowest orders of creatures guarantees the bestowment of every good which the highest capacities of the highest nature are competent to receive. The *experience* of the good man verifies the statements of scripture, and answers to the deductions of reason. The Christian does enjoy God, finds he has access to the Father of spirits, is conscious of holy and transporting fellowship with him, exults in the endearments of his personal smile, and draws from him streams of enjoyment which satisfy and replenish the mind ; he rejoices in God with joy unspeakable and full of glory. We cannot deny the bestowment of higher capacities for happiness upon a higher nature, for the fact meets us at every turn, and the slightest consideration of our own nature attests it ; the opening of sources of happiness adequate to fill, and thus meet all the instincts and faculties of the highest nature with which we are familiar, is equally obvious to every candid inquirer. There is but one motive to which such an economy can be attributed—that is benevolence. Thus, in every department of the Creator's works, we see wisdom and power fulfilling the purposes of love.

V. THERE IS BENEVOLENCE DISPLAYED IN THE PRINCIPLES
OF JEHOVAH'S GOVERNMENT.

1. The benevolence so conspicuous in the work of creation, and the economy of providence, is manifest also in the principles of his moral government. The scriptures declare that we are subjects of Divine government, and reason cannot but admit the truth. If our Creator be an intelligent Being, and a portion of his creatures be intelligent, endued with moral sense, and capable of exercising moral affections, and performing moral actions, it is an evidence that they are subjects of moral government, under law and obligation, and amenable for their conduct. Men acknowledge a social and political accountability to one another as members of a

social or political community; and if this loose and adventitious relation to one another involves mutual obligation and accountability, the intimate and essential relationship of a creature to the Creator must involve far weightier obligations and more solemn accountability. It may, therefore, be inquired, Have the principles of the Divine government over his creatures a benevolent aspect? We aver that they have.

2. The principles of mere justice required that the laws imposed upon the creature should be such as he should be competent to fulfil, and that his obedience should be compatible with his well-being, but they required nothing more. If any arrangement be made to connect reward and happiness with obedience, it must spring not from mere justice, but from benevolence. Now, in the moral government of God we see equity at the foundation, and benevolence erecting a superstructure of happiness thereon. The laws enjoined upon the creature for the government of his moral conduct are not merely just, they are benevolent and kind. They are not only suitable to the creature's ability, and in harmony with his mental and moral constitution, but are calculated to excite delightful emotions, and constitute the happiness of the creature in the very act of obedience.

3. We have seen that the lower orders of animated being find happiness in obeying their instincts, or, in other words, in fulfilling the laws of their being; and the same principle pervades the moral economy. A rational being in doing good and not evil to his fellow-creatures, in exercising benevolent affections and actions towards them, is acting in conformity with the law of his being, and thereby rendering obedience to God. The exercise of this benign affection yields personal happiness, and diffuses it to all around. Thus duty and enjoyment are united. It is the same with regard to the more direct homage we render to God. The sum of all our duties to God may be compendiously expressed in the word *love*. Revelation itself has comprised our entire obedience to God in the exercise of love to him—"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul,

with all thy mind, and with all thy strength : " and this it is affirmed is the fulfilling of the law. Is there any thing unreasonable in loving our Creator and Benefactor ? If it be reasonable for one man to love another from whom, perhaps, he has received no benefit, is it not reasonable that man should love the Author of his existence and the Source of all his blessings ? Is not the duty delightful as well as reasonable ? There is no affection which yields enjoyment equal to love. When exercised towards an equal, or even an inferior, it affords a corresponding degree of happiness to our own minds ; but, when the affection embraces a nobler object—the very author and essence of all natural and moral excellence, must it not afford a higher degree of enjoyment ? If the sympathetic blending of our souls with an intelligent, benevolent, and excellent fellow creature, yields a refined and ennobling delight, how much more an affectionate union with the mind of Deity, the source of all perfection, excellence, and happiness ? The experience of the good man attests that this is the case. The christian finds that in the keeping of God's commandments there is a great reward.

4. We can conceive of an economy perfectly equitable, and yet widely different from the one we are now contemplating. Obedience to God is a duty we owe him. . It is just in him to require it, and it is only just in us to render it. To render him obedience, is not to acquire merit, but to pay a debt. Obedience has no desert—it is a debt which it would be unjust to withhold, and, therefore, the performance of a mere duty can no more give us an equitable claim to the Divine favour, or to happiness, than the discharge of a just debt gives a man a claim to the property of his neighbour. God could in equity have demanded our obedience, and have punished our disobedience, without either adding present pleasure to duty, or rewarding us with future happiness. All we could justly require from God would be simply ability to obey, power to do what he commands. The conjunction, therefore, of positive and immediate enjoyment with obedience, the rendering of duty a source of happiness, is what justice did not require ; it is a gratuity bestowed by pure benevolence.

It is an economy, designed to allure us to happiness through the medium of duty. It is making the claims of justice the basis on which to construct a kind and gracious economy. Such a procedure speaks forth abundantly the goodness of God. It proves that his proceedings in the administration of his moral government over his creatures, spring from the same principle as that which gave the creatures their existence, their faculties, and the place they hold in the scale of being; and that principle is love.

MERCY. We regard mercy not as an attribute distinct from love, but as another aspect of Divine benevolence. It differs not in its nature, but in its object. It is goodness exercised towards the *sinner*. Hence, in the scriptures the richest displays of Divine goodness to sinful man are ascribed both to mercy and love, as denoting one and the same principle. Thus we have both terms employed in the same passage, "But God who is rich in MERCY, for his great LOVE wherewith he loved us, even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together with Christ." The redemption and salvation of men, is described in the sacred writings as the greatest display of love which the Deity has exhibited towards mankind, and they employ a phraseology indicative of this. "God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life." "Herein is love." "Behold what manner of love the Father hath bestowed upon us." Unquestionably the love set forth in the gospel has no parallel in the displays of nature. Great as is the goodness manifested in creation, in providence, and in such proceedings of the Divine government, as are cognizable to man, there is in these no parallel to that peculiar form in which the love of God is exhibited in the economy of redemption. It is above all comparison, and transcends all conception and all prior expectation. The loftiest intelligence in creation, we believe, could never have conceived the thought, *à priori*, that such a manifestation of love would have found a place, at any period, in the history of God's moral government. Yet, since the event has become a matter of history, we can

see that there is nothing in it repugnant to the Divine nature, or contrary to any aspect of the Divine character presented before us in the other proceedings of the Creator. On the contrary, it is in good keeping and in perfect harmony therewith. Creation unfolds the fact that God, out of pure disinterested love, has brought into existence innumerable creatures, and providence shows us the Divine Being taking care for these creatures, supplying their wants, giving them capacities for enjoyment, endowing them with instincts which stimulate them to seek for that enjoyment, and laying all inanimate nature under contribution to afford them that enjoyment. It shows us, further, that, among intelligent beings, he has made love a duty which they all owe one towards another and towards himself, and that he has connected the performance of duty, as well as the gratification of instinct, with happiness. And, having left these impressions of his love on all the works of his hand, we cannot regard redemption as a departure from the principle here exhibited. It is rather a further development, a richer manifestation of the same principle. We grant it is astonishing, but not astonishing as involving inconsistency in the conduct of the Divine Being, or a departure from any previous development of his nature; but astonishing, simply, in the same manner as many of the displays of his wisdom, and power, and other perfections, are astonishing; that is, by their vastness and overpowering magnitude, in the contemplation of which our feeble minds seem to stagger with amazement, and our bewildered feelings seek relief in exclamations of wonder. Though the scriptural account, therefore, of human redemption involves a display of love vastly transcending all others in its imposing magnitude and grandeur, it is in perfect harmony with the more limited manifestations of the same benevolent principle. It is the last disclosure of the Divine goodness, which excels and transcends all others, as the brightness of noon exceeds the dim twilight of morn, and involves complicated germs of Divine truth and goodness to be unfolded for ever—affording to

intelligent minds an everlasting and a perpetually brightening comment on the declaration that God is love.

OBJECTIONS GROUNDED ON THE EXISTENCE OF EVIL.

Truth does not require us either to exaggerate the existence of good (if that were possible), nor blindly to disregard the existence of evil. We wish to contemplate facts just as they are, assured that God hath placed them before us for investigation, with a design to afford us a proper view of himself. The existence of evil is admitted, and, for the sake of order, it may be contemplated under the two aspects in which it is commonly described,—namely, moral evil and physical evil.

FIRST, MORAL EVIL. The existence of moral evil is alleged as an objection to the goodness of God. To which we reply, moral evil is sin, and sin is voluntary offence. Therefore, moral evil is not the act of God. He neither sins himself, nor forces any creature to sin. Holy and loving in his own nature, all his proceedings are in harmony with the moral laws he has prescribed for the government of intelligent beings. God, therefore, not being the author of sin, its existence is no impeachment of his goodness.

If it be alleged that, as sin is hurtful to the creature, a benevolent Creator ought to have prevented its existence, we reply—To have prevented the existence of sin by an absolute determination, would have prevented the freedom of all intelligent beings. As a consequence, this would have prevented the existence of moral excellence, and converted intelligent beings into mere machines. No voluntary action could have been performed, no deliberate acquiescence in the Divine will could have been felt, no intelligent elective preference of an obedient course could have been adopted; motives, emotions, mental determinations, moral sentiments, affections, principles, and all the conduct flowing therefrom, would have been irresistibly forced, and man have been as incapable of moral excellence as moral pravity, and as incapable of both as is the solar system. In such a state of things, God could have had no moral empire, no mental

obedience, no intellectual servants and subjects, nor could the creature have realized any moral development or excellency; the mind would have been as passive as matter, and God the only agent and operator in the universe of being. The exclusion of free agency would thus exclude from Jehovah's empire all moral government and the developments of all those moral excellencies which reflect so much real dignity, worth, and happiness on the creature. If, therefore, God must have a moral empire at all, if moral obedience must be rendered to him, and moral excellence with its attendant glories and enjoyments must be developed, intelligent beings must be free; and if free, they must be liable to sin. It is true they need not sin; their freedom excludes all necessity of departing from the right way; but the *possibility* of their doing so, is certainly involved in a capacity for obedience and moral excellence. Such a constitution, therefore, as renders the intelligent being free, with all its attendant possibilities, is undoubtedly wise and good, and is every way worthy of God.

Scholium.—It may here be remarked, that the existence of moral evil is an important fact, which, though it impugns not the benevolence of Deity, yet, ought to be kept constantly in view in investigating the evidences of Divine goodness. For, as the love of God is not a mere fond and blind affection, but an intelligent and discriminating regard—a love directed in its exercise by wisdom and justice—a righteous love, never setting aside the claims of truth and rectitude, but unchangeably harmonizing therewith—such a love is perfectly compatible with the punishment of sin; and, in a world where moral evil is acknowledged to abound, it is vain and irrational to expect the displays of benevolence unmixed with the manifestations of punitive justice. The introduction of moral evil will necessarily render man often the agent of his own misery, the instrument of frustrating the designs of Divine goodness; and moreover, will variously modify the economy of God's providence towards his rebellious creatures, as certainly as that his moral government exists, and as certainly as truth and justice are immutable

principles of its administration. If, therefore, sufferings be blended with enjoyments, it is a result to be expected as inseparable from the existence of moral evil ; and to afford a complete vindication of the Divine goodness, it is enough, if amid much that is painful, there be among sinful creatures under a system of gracious recovery, the continuance of positive indications of tender regard, of clemency and good will. If, however, in addition to these positive displays of goodness, we find natural evils converted into means of moral discipline, aiming at the improvement and ultimate good of the erring creature, our views of the Creator's love will be greatly enhanced. This we shall abundantly find in our subsequent inquiries.

SECONDLY, REMORSE AND MENTAL ANGUISH. Our susceptibility of remorse and mental anguish does not impugn the benevolence of the Divine Being. The very existence of remorse and mental anguish implies the existence of sin, and flows from it as its punishment. Unless, therefore, this impugns the Divine justice, it is in perfect harmony with his benevolence. That it is not unjust for the sinner to suffer these emotions will be admitted, and, if so, the capacity for such emotions involves no injustice. If intelligent beings were without such a capacity, they would have no moral sense, no conscience, and be incompetent for moral obedience.

So far from our moral sense, or, in other words, our susceptibility of remorse, impugning the Divine goodness, we are prepared to say, that such a constitution affords an additional proof of that goodness. In considering this subject, however, it must be carefully observed, that a constitutional *susceptibility* is widely different from a constitutional *propensity*. A propensity is a disposition actively operating, and stimulating the creature to a certain course. Such are all instinctive propensities and passions ; but a susceptibility implies a passive state—a mere liability to be subject to certain influences. Now it is remarkable that such is the constitution of our nature, that, while we are *stimulated* to enjoyments, we are merely *susceptible* of pains,

whether of body or mind. We have instincts and propensities *actively* prompting to what yields gratification and delight, but are merely *liable* to sufferings; we are never instinctively prompted to them. Thus, we are merely susceptible of remorse and mental anguish. These emotions do not, intrinsically or instinctively arise in our minds, like the salient and spontaneous springs of joyous emotions. They are never experienced but when excited by some course of moral action. In a well-ordered mind they are never excited by good actions; they are never excited by actions that are indifferent in their character. They are never excited by seeking happiness in any lawful object or within a lawful extent. They are never excited except by the exercise of bad affections and the practice of bad actions. Thus, remorse and mental anguish are only the associates of vicious conduct—the attendants and the scourge of moral evil. Such a constitution, therefore, instead of impugning the Divine goodness, affords an additional demonstration of it. For, Why are remorse and mental anguish merely susceptibilities, and not active instincts? Because God is good, and is averse to our suffering unnecessarily. Why are these painful emotions not excited by actions good in their nature, or indifferent in their quality? Because God is good, and delights in our nature and happiness. Why are these painful emotions connected only with evil dispositions and habits? Because God is good: he knows that sin is more hurtful and injurious to our nature than suffering is: he knows that sin is a moral poison, deteriorating and corrupting our principles, and that remorse and anguish are necessary to deter us from the commission of sin; and therefore, he inflicts the pain that he may rescue from the more deadly evil. In this economy which connects misery with nothing but sin, the aim of the Creator is seen—it is our welfare—our best interest—the elevation and perfection of our moral nature, that he seeks; and while the aim of the Deity is visible, his motive is equally conspicuous. It is love. A procedure so obviously directed to the creature's holiness and happiness, proclaims the Creator's goodness.

THIRDLY, HEREDITARY DEPRAVITY AND FUTURE PUNISHMENT. Nor can the doctrines of hereditary depravity and future punishment be made to impugn the benevolence of Deity. For human depravity is but the natural consequence of sin, and future punishment is but the continuation of the consequences of our own conduct. These awful truths do not indeed furnish any weapons to the mere rationalist. They are purely subjects of revelation, and if any opponent cross the threshold of revelation, in quest of objections, we may enter the same domain of sacred truth, for weapons wherewith to repel his assaults. The doctrines of human depravity and future retribution, as revealed in the sacred oracles, must be contemplated in sober and thoughtful connexion with the doctrine of human redemption by our Lord Jesus Christ, and, if so, we become acquainted with the most stupendous and overpowering manifestations of Divine mercy and love. Revelation declares, "That where sin abounded, grace did much more abound. That as sin hath reigned unto death, even so might grace reign through righteousness unto eternal life, by Jesus Christ our Lord." It is true, all men are involuntarily the subjects of inherent depravity; but it is equally true that all are involuntarily placed in a state of grace and salvation. The remedy is co-extensive with the disease. It is true, alas, that some perish eternally, but it is the result solely of their own obstinacy—their resistance of the purposes and the promises of mercy; and even their destiny, thus wilfully sought, shall be made subservient to the good of the universe. So that love is associated with justice even in the sinner's doom, and the spirits of the lost shall be forced to confess that God is righteous and good.

FOURTHLY, PHYSICAL EVIL. Pain and Death are commonly intended by the phrase, "physical evil."

PAIN. The distinction between a mere *susceptibility* and a *propensity*, which we have already noticed in respect to the mind, must be applied to the body. Pain, like remorse, is a sensation which does not spring from instinct, or from a natural propensity, as the social emotions do. It is a

sensation to which we are merely *liable*, and which rarely occurs except when some natural law has been transgressed, and even then it seems intended and directed to produce some ulterior good.

It is worthy of our notice, that, while bodily pain is not an instinctive emotion, neither is there any part of our physical organization formed with an intention to inflict pain and suffering. This has been lucidly stated by Dr. Paley, "Evil, no doubt, exists," he observes, "but it is never, that we can perceive, the object of the contrivance. Teeth are contrived to eat, not to ache; their aching now and then is incidental to the contrivance, perhaps inseparable from it, but it is not the object. This is a distinction which well deserves to be attended to. In describing implements of husbandry, one would hardly say of a sickle, that it was made to cut the reaper's fingers; though, from the construction of the instrument, and the manner of using it, this mischief often happens. But if he had occasion to describe instruments of torture or execution, this, he would say, is to extend the sinews; this to dislocate the joints, this to break the bones, this to scorch the soles of the feet. Here pain and misery are the very objects of the contrivance. Now, nothing of this sort is to be found in the works of nature. We never discover a train of contrivances to bring about an evil purpose. No anatomist ever discovered a system of organization calculated to produce pain and disease; or, in explaining the parts of the human body, ever said this is to irritate, this to inflame, this duct is to convey gravel to the kidneys, this gland to secrete the humour which forms the gout. If, by chance, he came to a part of which he knew not the use, the most that he can say is, that to him it appears to be useless: no one ever suspects that it is put there to incommode, to annoy, or to torment. If God had wished our misery, he might have made sure of his purpose, by forming our senses to be as many sores and pains to us as they are now instruments of gratification and enjoyment; or by placing us among objects so ill suited to our perceptions, as to have continually offended us, instead of ministering to our refreshment and delight."

The preceding arguments dispense with any objection grounded on the creature's instincts and organization, and prove that no purpose but that of benevolence dictated the creature's constitution. We have still, however, to admit the fact, that the creature is unquestionably *susceptible* of pain, and that pain is often realized by us. This fact has, then, to be accounted for.

It is impossible for us to determine, with precision, how much our susceptibility of suffering has been augmented as a punitive result of sin. That such a consequence would result, to some extent, from the introduction of moral evil, is as reasonable to suppose, as it is to suppose that Jehovah governs the world in righteousness, and that intelligent beings are accountable for their conduct. This truth which reason suggests, revelation plainly declares and confirms. But whatever extent of physical suffering may be attributable to punitive justice, the prevalence of clemency and love, in tempering those sufferings, and giving them a salutary tendency, is very conspicuous; for, pains and sufferings are seldom experienced, except when some physical or moral law is either transgressed or neglected, and even then the suffering is directed to a wise and beneficent end. A few examples will illustrate this truth.

1. Excess in eating, drinking, or any other indulgence, is a transgression of the law of temperance and self-government, and a variety of physical evils result therefrom. Gluttony produces plethora and gout; drunkenness generates dropsy, delirium tremens, and a host of miseries. Luxury produces effeminacy, and often brings on destitution and want.

2. Injustice, fraud, and oppression, are transgressions of the law of love to our neighbour; and all the cruelties, wars, and murders, which afflict mankind, spring from the indulgence of these depraved principles.

3. Filthiness is a neglect of the law of cleanliness—a law suggested by our own comfort and convenience, and exemplified by the habits of many brute animals. From filthiness spring putrid fevers, and diverse pestilences. It is a

remarkable fact, that the plague has never visited London since the streets were widened, and increased attention has been paid to cleanliness; and now, that destroyer finds his victims almost exclusively in those parts of the world where the inhabitants wallow in disgusting filthiness. Universal cleanliness would probably banish this destroyer from our world.

4. Lasciviousness is a violation of the law of continence and chastity. Debility, consumption, loathsome diseases, premature deaths, and hereditary infirmities and pollutions, stream forth from this degrading vice.

5. Indolence. The law of activity and industry is legibly inscribed upon man's nature, and enforced by his own interests, and by the instinctive habits of the animal creation. Idleness is a neglect of this law, and its consequences are squalid wretchedness and want; which, in their turn, produce other vices, and these vices again give birth to other miseries.

We need not multiply examples. They will suggest themselves to every reflecting mind. It is clearly an established principle, that man can violate or neglect no law, whether moral or physical, without entailing upon himself pain, suffering, or some evil consequence; and it is a truth almost equally conspicuous, that, if he were to live in uniform obedience to the laws of his moral and physical constitution, which are the laws of God, there would be such an abridgement of his miseries, as would leave but few behind. The faithful discharge of his duties to God, to himself, and his fellow creatures, uniformly and universally persevered in would immensely diminish the number and intensity of his woes, and augment, in the same proportion, the sum both of his temporal and spiritual enjoyments. The facts before us, then, so far from impugning, accumulate the proofs of the benevolence of God. For,

In the first place, the miseries in question are all self-sought and self-inflicted; man is his own tormentor. Whatever evidence, therefore, there is of man's folly and depravity, there is nothing here which reflects upon the character of his Maker.

To the sins now under our notice, surely men are scarcely prepared to add—that of attributing the consequences of their own evil conduct to the Most High.

Secondly.—After all the good which man ignorantly and wilfully throws away, a vast number of comforts and blessings are continued to him, vile as he is. This is the effect of clemency and goodness.

Thirdly.—After all the miseries which man voluntarily and impiously brings upon his own head, many others are warded off, and almost all are mitigated by mercy.

Fourthly.—In connexion with the diseases brought by man upon himself, there is a restoring process, in which nature, by her own efforts, seeks the recovery of man from the injuries inflicted upon him. Thus, when the drunkard fractures a limb, nature at once commences a process of reuniting it; and when the libertine debilitates and pollutes his constitution by excesses, nature at once labours to expel the poison infused, and to supply the energies which had been wantonly exhausted. Indeed, the suffering experienced in most diseases, arises from the struggle of nature to rectify human disorders, and restore the victims of intemperance, of lust, and vice, to a state of health and soundness. Surely no mind can be so blinded as not to perceive a benevolent intention in such an economy. It is a laborious and protracted effort to do the sinner good in spite of himself, and presents the clearest evidence of a presiding Mind, having infinitely more tender regard for him than he has for himself.

Fifthly.—The connexion of pains with the violation of moral and physical law, is as distinguished by clemency as by justice, as they are intended to subserve a benevolent purpose. If the abuse of a blessing were followed by its immediate withdrawal, the goodness which originated the gift at first could not be impugned, and if the connexion of pain with the violation of law were merely punitive and not restorative, the justice of God could not be impugned; but, when, throughout the whole economy of God, sufferings are intended to produce a reformation of habits and the

prevention of greater evils, we have evidence of astonishing clemency and goodness ; and such an intention pervades the whole process of Divine Providence towards man, during his probationary state. Thus the nausea, the head ache, and sickness which follow the first drunken surfeit, are gentle warnings to avoid that course in future ; and the debility, the delirium tremens, and dropsy, which attend a more advanced stage of intemperance, are still louder tones of admonition to escape from the disgusting vice. Thus, the squalid wretchedness, disease, and woe, resulting from idleness, filthiness, and prodigality, are rebukes to the miserable victims. The sufferings of the obscene libertine utter a loud and intelligible warning, calling upon him to abandon his depraved course. Indeed, all the physical evils springing from sin are so many merciful admonitions to repentance and reformation. They are so many appeals to man's self-love, even when he is lost to every higher principle—declaiming against his vicious habits, and summoning him to the path of virtue and obedience, lest iniquity be his utter ruin ; and, generally, this appeal of nature, though gentle at first, becomes louder and louder, as the danger becomes more imminent—the tones of admonition, uttered by suffering and woe, consequent on vice, assume a more startling and terrific cry, as the rebel steps nearer the precipice of irrecoverable ruin. We ask, What principle could dictate this economy ? The sinner's recovery to virtue and happiness is obviously the object, and that is the object of clemency and love. Punitive justice may indeed be manifested, but, evidently, in harmonious connexion with tender compassion—with unbounded goodness and love.

FIFTHLY, PHYSICAL EVILS NOT ARISING FROM VICIOUS HABITS.—It is alleged, however, that there are sufferings not immediately arising from sin, or moral evil, so far as their causes can be traced. We very much question, however, whether such pains and sufferings ought to be placed in the category of evils. Thus, if by accident, a man, or any other animal, receives a bruise, a burn, or a cut, pain is instantly felt. But, though, in such cases, pain is indeed experienced,

and is unavoidable with our present constitution, the pain we regard as no evil, but a benefit, and an indication of a benevolent purpose. It is obvious, the suffering, in such cases, is not punitive in its object, nor permitted for any object but a beneficial one, namely, the preservation of the creature. If no pain were felt from a bruise, we should have no warning to escape from danger; if no smart were felt from the fire, we might be burned to death before we were conscious of having received injury; if no pain were experienced from a wound, a limb might be amputated, or a vital part be pierced before we were aware of any harm being done. The connexion, therefore, of pain with any injury done to the body, is a benevolent provision made for our preservation. The goodness of God is further manifest in having given the greatest sensibility to the outer surface of the body, by having distributed an immense number of nerves, like net-work, immediately under the skin, which, as so many watchful sentinels, in a moment, give the alarm when danger is near, and our instinctive aversion to pain prompts us the next moment to escape. The same provision is made for the inferior animals as well for the human species. Though devoid of reason, they are commonly as susceptible of approaching evil as ourselves. Philosophy may answer many important purposes to rational beings, but sense and instinct are instrumentally the great preservatives of life, especially from immediate danger. Thus, on the one hand, our senses and instincts are the avenues of enjoyment; and, on the other, they are our guardians from evil and danger. Such an economy indicates the benevolent disposition of our Creator, and constrains us to rank pain itself as being a benefit and a blessing to creatures having a physical organization.

If it be asked, Why did not God secure our protection without the susceptibility of pain and suffering? we may reply to this question by proposing another, Why did God form any creatures with a physical organization? Why did he not create all beings of one nature, and absolutely perfect? If there must be a gradation and a variety of existence, and

that variety include a material organization, the conditions of that existence exclude the supposition involved in the inquiry; nor can the multiform manifestations of benevolence in the actual condition of the creature be set aside by any visionary scheme of optimism of which our imagination may dream. A state of real existence is before us, and it is fraught with proofs that God is love.

SIXTHLY, DEATH.—Whether we contemplate man's death theologically or philosophically, it is in perfect harmony with the Divine goodness. If viewed in the aspect of theology, we behold it certainly as a punitive result of sin, yet, connected with a merciful economy, which contemplates a resurrection to a physical existence of transcendent dignity and glory. Here superabounding goodness is apparent. If death be contemplated philosophically, it impugns neither Divine justice nor love; for, the cessation of life does not neutralize the goodness displayed in giving life, and in providing for the happiness of that life for a time. The non-continuance of life merely limits the *period* of the goodness of God, in respect to one generation; but this limitation of life to one generation affords scope for extending the same blessings to others, who, in their turn, share the same tokens of Divine clemency and regard. Without death, man must be either removed from this sphere while alive, or his species must cease to be multiplied. Sin has deprived him of the privilege of being removed by translation. He is taken away by death; this is punitive: but, seeing this punitive removal affords room for multiplying existence to countless myriads, and seeing Divine goodness immediately replenishes the vacancy by new generations of the same race, on whom God continues successively to heap the proofs of his regard, we see, in this economy, multiplying evidences that God is love. Similar remarks apply to the inferior species of existence. Without death, the Divine goodness must be limited to one generation, and all the social faculties and instinctive enjoyments, arising from the propagation of the species, must soon have been obliterated. But, by death, these enjoyments are continued, and generation succeeds generation, in which new existences

run the same round of enjoyment, and repeat the same manifestations of the goodness of God.

DEATH BY PREY—Though the death of man is punitive, the death of the inferior animals is not, for it is an essential part of the physical system. The organization of existing animals shows that death by prey was an event contemplated by the Divine mind, and the characteristics of geological strata show that it has obtained through every period in the history of our planet, from the first dawn of animal being until now. It was the characteristic of those geological periods anterior to the introduction of moral evil, as well as since: indeed, the existence of predatory animals is attested in many of the earliest strata of our world. We have already seen that the death of animals affords more ample scope for the exercise of benevolence than the immortality of the species; and death by prey, so far from diminishing, exalts our view of that benevolence. This statement may shock the feelings of some who have been accustomed to regard the system of prey as a formidable objection to the Divine goodness. But let us examine the subject. Animal existence must be sustained by food of some kind; and as mere earths and minerals are not adapted for this purpose, the food must consist of either animal or vegetable material. Animal life is accompanied with enjoyment; vegetable life is incapable of sensation or emotion. Whether then is it the more expressive of goodness, “that a certain portion of that food should be animated and filled with pleasure until it is wanted,”* or, that it should be inanimate and incapable of enjoyment? We can have no hesitation in replying—the former is an arrangement provided for securing the greatest amount of happiness, and, consequently, the most expressive of benevolence. “But, might it not have been provided that carnivorous animals should feed upon others after they had died a natural death?” We ask, in return, why should this arrangement be preferred? Is it in order to avoid the suffering of pain? Then the *present* arrangement is, doubtless, the most conducive to such a

* Dr. Harris.

result. When creatures die by accident, by disease, or by old age, there must, in general, be the endurance of much more pain than is felt in undergoing a sudden destruction by some predatory animal. Myriads of smaller creatures perish in an instant as prey for larger animals; and others who, from their size and strength, are capable of struggling for a time against their antagonist, yet, commonly, are soon dispatched; for nature has furnished their destroyers with weapons for effecting sudden destruction, and has directed them to attack those parts which produce almost instantaneous death. Add to this the consideration that animals have no idea of death, and, consequently, can have no fear of it. They enjoy life without being once interrupted by the thought of death. From the most obvious facts it appears, that, in a vast majority of cases, the death of animals preyed upon is instantaneous, in others it is effected with the least degree of pain possible, and, in all, without the animal having any conception of ceasing to live. Such being the case, the system of one animal preying upon another is an arrangement worthy of God, for it displays his benevolence, by providing for the greatest amount of animal enjoyment, and the least degree of animal suffering.

Summary.—In contemplating the attribute of benevolence, or love, we have seen it displayed in the creation of various orders of animated existence—in providing for the supply of the necessities of these creatures—in endowing them with instincts and capacities for diversified enjoyment—in rendering all nature subservient to that enjoyment—in implanting in the nature of sentient beings a principle of love one for another—in causing obedience to consist in the exercise of agreeable emotions and affections—and in connecting happiness with obedience. We have examined sundry objections derived from the existence of natural and moral evil, and shown that even here punitive justice is mixed and tempered with kindness and love, and that in the elements of our moral constitution, in our susceptibility of remorse, in our bodily sufferings, and in death itself there are evidences of goodness and love.

What an amiable and glorious Being is God, when contemplated as invested with the attribute of Love! Did we know him only as a self-existent and independent Being, of Almighty power, and infinite majesty, he would be an object of terror, and the contemplation of his existence and character would be only calculated to fill us with dismay. We should be overpowered with his greatness, instead of being attracted by his goodness. Our souls would not dare to approach him, nor could they feel any sympathy with him. We should deem him inaccessible and inexorable. The thought of him would be a burden, and the anxious mind would seek repose by excluding him from its meditations. But the perfection of love softens down the stern and awe-inspiring attributes of his character, and throws a mild and benignant splendour around him which the soul looks upon with complacency. We behold in him a Father as well as a Creator, and can think of him with delight as well as with wonder. Instead of being repelled, we are attracted by the beams of his glory; instead of trembling with dismay, we are inspired with filial confidence; instead of seeking a refuge from him, we draw near; and our language is, "My Father, thou art my Lord and my God."

Impressed with his benevolent character, we see the obligation of loving him in return; and, recognising him as our Creator, we perceive that our love towards him should be supreme—that he justly claims our undivided and our highest affection. From the same aspect of his character, we see, also, the duty of our loving one another; and feel assured that, in so far as we thus imitate his example, we fulfil his pleasure, realize his favour, answer the end of our being, and secure the happiness we are fitted to enjoy. "Beloved, let us love one another; for love is of God; and every one that loveth is born of God, and knoweth God. He that loveth not knoweth not God; for God is love." "He that dwelleth in love dwelleth in God, and God in him."

CHAPTER VIII.

THE HOLINESS OF GOD.

“Holy, Holy, Holy is Jehovah of Hosts.”—Isaiah, vi., 3.

HOLINESS is an assemblage of all moral excellencies, to the exclusion of all opposite properties. Holiness of nature implies the indwelling of all moral excellencies; and Holiness of character is the practical exemplification of these excellencies. Absolute Holiness implies the possession and exemplification of these moral excellencies in absolute perfection. Such is the Holiness of God. The passage we have placed at the head of this chapter contains a threefold ascription of holiness to God. It would be irrelevant, and lead us too far from the subject under our immediate consideration to show that this threefold ascription, viewed in its relation to the context, involves the doctrine of the Trinity; but, apart from this, it will be obvious to all minds that holiness is here ascribed to God in the most emphatic manner. This solemn averment of scripture receives the corroborative testimony of reason. This testimony, indeed, is so unequivocal and decisive, that it necessarily flows from a logical consideration of the Divine nature.

I. THE DIVINE NATURE NECESSARILY PRECLUDES THE EXISTENCE OF ANY QUALITIES CONTRARY TO HOLINESS.

If there were any qualities in the mind of the Deity repugnant to Holiness, those qualities must exist either essentially, adventitiously, or voluntarily.

1. They cannot be *essential* to God for various reasons. All the qualities repugnant to holiness are sources of uneasiness and misery; but God is perfectly happy, and, therefore, such malign qualities can have no place in his nature.

Those qualities involve, also, the absence or want of something. Thus, envy, malignity, injustice, and all other evil properties imply a sense of uneasiness on account of not possessing some supposed good. But God is totally independent and self-sufficient, and has been so from eternity; and, therefore, no quality indicative of want, weakness, or dependence, can have place in him. All malign qualities are the marks of imperfection; they exist only in an imperfect nature. But Jehovah is and always was absolutely perfect, and, therefore, no malign property or tendency can exist in him.

2. Neither can any disposition or habit contrary to holiness be induced *adventitiously*. The Deity has no adventitious attributes. They are all essential and eternal. Independent in his existence, he is infinitely above the influence of all created beings, and all external circumstances. Immutable in his attributes, he is liable to no change. Therefore, as he was free from all malign properties for an eternity prior to all creation, he must remain so for ever, for no extraneous events can change the nature or character of an independent and absolutely perfect Being.

3. Nor can any disposition or habit, repugnant to holiness, be *voluntarily* adopted. The adoption of any such quality would involve a loss of some attribute, and a degeneracy of nature, which, in the Divine Being, is impossible. The same perfections, which have precluded all degeneracy in ages past, preclude it now, and must do so through all ages to come. It is averred in Holy Scripture, that it is impossible for God to lie: and it is impossible, simply, because he is God. As wisdom, in the abstract, excludes folly, as veracity excludes falsehood, as love excludes every disposition to injustice, and as immutability excludes change, so the truth that God possesses absolute perfection, excludes the possibility of all decay in nature, and deterioration in principle or character. Nor can God be susceptible of any motive inducing him to change his moral character. His own wisdom is the rule of equity based on the fitness of things; and his will is the standard of holiness, based on

the goodness and perfection of his nature. What motive, then, can induce him to deny himself—to imbibe a sentiment, cherish a disposition, or perform an action, contrary to his own nature? No such cause can possibly be conceived. Not any in his nature, for that is the fountain, source, and standard of perfection. Not any in the creatures, for he is infinitely superior to the reach of their influence: he can be imposed upon by no deceit, swayed by no bias, and awed by no power. While thus incapable of being influenced by any motive to deteriorate, he is influenced by the most powerful motives to retain his perfections in their untarnished glory for ever. He supremely delights in what he is. He rejoices in the possession of all his attributes. He delights in his wisdom, in his benevolence, in his veracity, in his holiness, and in his all-sufficiency; and what he infinitely delights to possess, he must infinitely delight to retain; and, therefore, throughout eternity, he must be absolutely free from any quality opposed to holiness.

II. THE ATTRIBUTES OF THE DEITY NECESSARILY INVOLVE THE POSSESSION OF ABSOLUTE HOLINESS.

1. As the moral attributes of God are not mere capacities, but, for the most part, properties and dispositions essentially active, so holiness is not a negative quality: it is not mere purity, or the absence of evil and aversion to it, but an assemblage of excellent qualities and dispositions energetically operating in the Divine mind. The possession of infinite wisdom and love appears to us necessarily to involve the possession and exercise of perfect holiness. Without love, wisdom might be associated with malignity and injustice; and, without wisdom, love would be a blind, indiscriminating fondness, unworthy of the Deity, and incompatible with absolute rectitude and moral excellence. It is the possession of both, in infinite perfection, which renders Jehovah a Being of absolute rectitude in his views, his will, his dispositions, and affections.

2. Perfect holiness requires an infallible estimate of all beings, and all things, in their nature, their relation, and

character. Without this, objects abhorrent to holiness might be approved and loved, while others, amiable and holy, might be objects of aversion and punishment. Without absolute rectitude of judgement, there could be no righteous direction given to the dispositions and affections. An infallible estimate of all things, therefore, lies at the foundation of absolute holiness. Jehovah has this estimate, for he is infinite in wisdom. He cannot mistake truth for error, right for wrong, justice for injustice, good for evil. He sees all things as they are, with a view so comprehensive, a precision so minute, and an estimate so absolutely infallible, that his judgement is the standard of truth or falsehood, right or wrong, good or evil.

3. Absolute holiness requires the dispositions, the affections, and the will, to operate in perfect and undeviating harmony with the estimate in which all things are held by an unerring judgement—choosing, approving, and delighting in what is true and good, and eschewing and abhorring what is false and evil. Any discord or discrepancy between the judgement and the moral dispositions, would involve a tarnish upon the character. To know what was right, and approve and choose what was wrong, or to be conscious of any bias to evil, would be an evidence of a diseased and tainted nature. That no such a discrepancy can ever be in the attributes of the Divine being we have already shown. On the contrary, his will approves, and his affections embrace with delight whatever is good, and they are absolutely averse to all that is evil.

4. While the independence, the all-sufficiency, and absolute perfection of his nature preclude the existence of any motive or inducement to evil, his boundless love is an affection incessantly attracting him to all that is good. He cannot be indifferent to moral excellence; wherever it may exist, it is a quality which resembles himself, and he delights in it. In the possession of infinite love there is a consciousness of benevolent emotion, with all those dispositions to veracity, kindness, justice, and faithfulness which love inspires. These dispositions are inseparable from love;

and love not only excludes all the contrary dispositions, but gives activity to all these principles with an intensity corresponding with the intensity of love itself.

Veracity is an element of holiness, and it must exist in the Deity in absolute perfection; for, as, by his unerring wisdom, he knows what is true and right, and, as, by his love, he delights in the same, there must be undeviating veracity in all his statements and proceedings.

Faithfulness is an element of holiness, and it must exist in the Deity in absolute perfection; for, as he both knows and loves the truth, he must delight in conforming all his conduct thereto. Hence the disposition which prompts to unchanging fidelity, and secures the fulfilment of all his promises and covenant engagements.

Benignity is an element of holiness, and this, as we have shown at length, dwells, in infinite measure, in the bosom of Deity. The boundless love of God, the overflowing fountain of his goodness, is a full security that benignity will never be withheld wherever it can be righteously placed.

Justice is an element of holiness, and this perfection must essentially characterize Jehovah. As, from his wisdom, he cannot err, and, from his love, he cannot be unkind, so, from both, it is impossible he can be unjust. The disposition which prompts him to do more for the creature than justice requires, certainly cannot allow him to do less. Infinite wisdom and goodness conjoined, secure the observance of unchanging rectitude and equity in every part of his moral administration. Justice involves the punishment of sin, and this is only saying that his benevolence is not a blind and indiscriminate affection, but regulated by wisdom. He loves and delights in all whom it is wise to love and delight in. But he cannot delight in the perpetrators of evil, for that would be to act contrary to his wisdom, and to deny his own nature. Though his love has no respect to *persons*, it must have respect to *character*. To love the wicked, and be averse to the righteous, would be unjust in the highest sense: to love both alike would be to make folly, not wisdom, his rule. A Being, infinitely wise, just,

and good, must be averse to evil beings ; for their conduct is opposed to every decision of his judgment, and every affection of his nature. He can no more confound good with evil than he can mistake truth for falsehood. His heart can no more approve of a wicked being than his understanding can believe a lie. Between the dictates of his infallible understanding, and the dispositions of his perfect nature, there is an essential harmony ; and, because there is such an essential harmony, the righteous cannot but be approved and loved, and the wicked cannot but be abhorred and rejected.

The Being, in whom there is no taint of moral evil, and in whom veracity, faithfulness, love, and justice, exist in absolute perfection, must be perfectly holy in his nature, dispositions, and character. This Being is God.

III. THE CONCLUSIONS TO WHICH WE ARE THUS LED, BY AN
'A PRIORI ARGUMENT, ARE ABUNDANTLY CONFIRMED AND
ILLUSTRATED BY 'A POSTERIORI FACTS.

The various objective manifestations of the Deity, presented in his works, afford indications of his holiness.

1. CREATION.—The construction of the universe, the exquisite symmetry of all organized beings, the laws which obtain in both, the combination of means and ends, of adaptations, uses, and harmonies, which pervade all nature, evince that the love of truth and order is an essential property of the Divine mind, and is a guiding principle in his operations. Such a love of truth and order, in the natural world, involves a corresponding love of truth and order in the moral world ; and the mind which essentially possesses this property must be holy ; for, sin is but another name for confusion and disorder.

2. PROVIDENCE.—The general connexion of evil results with the transgression of physical and moral laws, and the connexion of good results with the observance of those laws, are evidences of Jehovah's love of truth and order, both in the natural and moral world, and of his disapproval of any infringement of that truth and order. Now, as moral

goodness consists in obedience to those laws, and moral evil consists in the transgression or neglect of them, we see, in the pain inflicted, God's aversion to evil; and, in the enjoyment bestowed, we see his approval of virtue and holiness. It is thus that Jehovah has left the impression of his nature on all the works of his hand.

But, it is alleged that there are exceptions to the principle we have laid down. We believe, however, that there are no absolute exceptions to the principle. There are, indeed, many instances in which the evils resulting from sin are not immediately and strikingly apparent, nor the blessings resulting from obedience at once very conspicuous, to human observation; but yet, evils in the one case, and blessings in the other, are certainly and universally consequent upon certain courses of conduct.

It is admitted, indeed, that, in the present life, the distribution of sufferings and enjoyments is not in exact proportion to the character of men—the righteous often passing through scenes of calamity and pain, and the wicked reveling in gratifications and pleasures; but two important truths must be remembered:—First, that no man, in this life, sustains a character either absolutely good or absolutely evil, but a mixture of both—no man being so absolutely vile, but that some remnant of good may be found in him in some part of his history; and no man so perfectly holy, but that sin has, at some period, stained his character. This being undeniable, it follows that the dispensations of providence may justly assign to every man a mixed portion of enjoyment and suffering, especially when it is a fact that no man's sufferings equal his deserts, while the enjoyment of all vastly surpass any claims arising from their own goodness. Secondly, it must be remembered, that the scriptures represent this life not as a scene of complete retribution, but one of probation. This doctrine accords with existing facts; and while, on this ground, it is entitled to our rational assent, it satisfactorily accounts for any apparent anomalies which the aspect of God's dispensations may present in this transient life. We admit, then, that the amount of

temporal enjoyment or suffering is not in exact proportion to the character of men, and account for it by the reasons stated; yet we maintain, at the same time, that there is such a constant and obvious connexion between vice and misery on the one hand, and between virtue and happiness on the other, as distinctly and loudly proclaims that the Creator and Governor of the universe has an aversion to sin and a love to holiness, and that, therefore, he is himself a Holy Being. Falsehood, treachery, pride, injustice, idleness, lust, intemperance, and all other sins, combined, are the sources of the complicated forms of misery which abound in our world; indeed, there is scarcely an instance of suffering, to which flesh is heir, but which may be traced to the violation of some physical or moral law. On the other hand, veracity, justice, faithfulness, benevolence, continence, temperance, industry, piety, and obedience to physical and moral law, are productive of good to both body and mind—of happiness to the individual and to society in general. This connexion of sin and woe, of piety and enjoyment, is not fortuitous and accidental, but fixed and irrevocable: no ingenuity can evade, no force can destroy, this connexion. It is an established ordinance of God; and, like all the laws of matter and of mind, it exists independent of human will, in defiance of human will, and is universal and unchangeable. This ordinance, like all other laws of nature, originated in the will of God, and originated in his will because it is in harmony with his nature. He has an aversion to evil, and expresses that aversion by connecting it with misery. He has a love for virtue and holiness, and expresses that love by connecting it with happiness. He is perfectly happy himself, because he is absolutely holy; and men participate in his happiness in proportion as they participate in his holiness,—just as they conform to his moral image.

3. OUR MORAL SENTIMENTS AND EMOTIONS ARE EXPRESSIVE OF THE CREATOR'S HOLINESS.—Though man is not endowed with innate ideas, yet such is his mental constitution, that he is formed to distinguish between the moral

qualities of actions—to distinguish right from wrong, as well as truth from error. However diversified the intellect, and varied the education of mankind, yet, wherever there is reason, there is a moral faculty, which has only to be enlightened to give it at least some degree of activity, and develop its sensibility. It may be said, that the development of this faculty, in every instance, is owing to the agency of the Holy Spirit. It is not our intention, at present, to inquire into the truth of this sentiment; we have to do with the mere fact, that all men have such a faculty. Take the most untutored savage, and pour the rays of truth upon his mind, and he becomes sensible of the distinction between right and wrong, and of corresponding moral emotions. An inherent principle is excited, which answers to the essential distinction in moral actions, approving the good and condemning the evil. All men whose mental faculties are at all exercised by reflection, know the difference between falsehood and truth, deceit and sincerity, treachery and generosity, fraud and equity, cruelty and kindness; and such is their mental constitution, that they condemn the one as evil, and approve the other as good. This determination of the mind, as to the moral quality of human actions, is not voluntary, but constitutional. It is a sort of moral instinct, which, to a certain extent, is irresistible. Let a man labour ever so hard to believe that an act of treachery is as good as an act of generosity, and he will find it impossible. The difference between good and evil is an essential and an eternal difference, and the human mind is constitutionally fitted to perceive this distinction; and all the efforts of men to make the quality of these actions change places, or to suppose them to be equally indifferent, must be totally abortive. Men may become so perverse and desperately wicked in their habits, that they uniformly practise evil; yet still they are compelled to pronounce and confess that their course is an evil one.

The essential difference in the quality of moral actions is *felt*, as well as seen, by the human mind. We can no more contemplate good and evil with the same emotions, than we

can think them to possess the same quality. We approve the good, we condemn the evil. There is commonly a sense of uneasiness in the contemplation of a wicked action. When that action is committed by another, we feel displeasure, sometimes abhorrence and horror—the kind and intensity of the emotion depending upon the complexion and character of the action; but, when the action is our own, the feeling is one of remorse, and sometimes of shame and anguish. This sensation is not voluntary, but forced upon us by nature. If it were voluntary, wicked men would speedily banish it from their minds. But, however unwelcome the sensation may be, it clings to the wicked in spite of himself. It comes unsought, and fastens upon his heart as with the talons of a vulture upon his prey, and inflicts a torture which often renders existence miserable. A wicked action may be secret, but secrecy cannot turn aside the shafts of conscience. The perpetrator of crime may be so high in station and power, that no human law can reach him, yet he cannot escape the self-inflicted condemnation and punishment which chafe his guilty spirit. There is a poniard in his breast which no power can withdraw. It strikes the victim with unerring aim and relentless justice. However sycophants may flatter him in his vices, or the trumpet of fame sound his hollow applause, and no human voice dare to charge him with wrong; still his own conscience sternly frowns upon him, and compels him both to abhor himself and despise his flatterers. O! what would the wicked man give to deceive himself as easily as he could deceive others—that he could evade the tribunal of his own heart as easily as he could evade the power of human law? O! that he could but forget some dark deeds in his history, and sink them into everlasting oblivion! But he cannot. They are registered in his memory, and, like so many grim spectres, they haunt him by night and by day, and pierce his bosom with insufferable anguish. Under the influence of remorse, some have slowly pined away even unto death; some have confessed and voluntarily surrendered themselves to public justice; and others, unable to bear the self-reproach

and anguish of their own conscience, have madly sought to escape by putting an end to their existence.

Good actions, on the other hand, are contemplated with complacency. When beheld in the conduct of others, we cannot withhold our approval; and, when conscious of them ourselves, we are the subjects of agreeable emotions: conscience pronounces her approval, and we feel satisfaction and delight. We cannot cherish a good disposition but it yields us pleasure; we cannot perform a good action but it affords complacency; and we cannot reflect upon such without approval and satisfaction. When memory recalls them they are welcome; like kind and friendly visitors their presence is hailed, and they yield us refined and hallowed delight. Whether we recognize them by observation, by consciousness, by reflection, or by memory, they afford satisfaction and peace—they foster the principles of virtue, and they discountenance vice.

So essential is the difference between good and evil, and so inherent is our approval of the one and our condemnation of the other, that the malign passions themselves corroborate the truth under our consideration. It is a remarkable fact, that a wicked man cannot justify the exercise of his own malice, hatred, or any malign passion towards a fellow-creature, without supposing his victim to be evil.

“Not the most furious or irascible of men can indulge his passion until after he has attributed an ill intention to the object of his wrath. To be angry with that which is seen and confessed to be innoxious or devoid of hostile feeling, is a reach of malignity that lies beyond the range of human passions, even when most corrupted or most inflamed.

“And so, when hatred has become the settled temper of the mind, there attends it a bad ingenuity, which puts the worst possible construction upon the words, actions, looks, of the abhorred object. Yet, Why is this, but because the laws of the moral system forbid that any thing should be hated but what actually deserves, or is at the moment thought to deserve, abhorrence?

“The most pernicious and virulent heart has no power of ejecting its venom upon a fair surface; it must slur whatever it means to poison. To hate that which is seen and confessed to be not wicked, is as impossible as to be angry with that which is not assumed to be hostile. And the most depraved souls, whose only element is revenge, feel the stress of this necessity not a whit less than the most benign and virtuous. Whether the universe anywhere contains spirits so malignant as to be capable of hating without assignment of demerit, or attributing of ill purpose to their adversary, we know not; but certainly man never reaches any such frightful enormity.”*

It is now time to inquire, Why is the human mind thus constituted? How is it that man is formed with a faculty for determining the quality of moral actions? How is it that he approves and justifies the good, and condemns the wicked? How is it that his mental determinations on all moral subjects are associated with moral sensibilities? How is it that complacency and satisfaction are uniformly united with a consciousness of good dispositions and actions, and remorse and anguish are associated with evil dispositions and actions? How is it, finally, that even the malign passions themselves cannot be justified, when exercised towards a being confessed to be good, and that we are compelled at least to imagine a being to be evil ere we can justify our hatred towards him? Why are the malign passions themselves thus compelled to do homage to virtue and goodness? It is not sufficient to reply, such is the constitution of the human mind. It is possible to suppose man might have had a different constitution, and, therefore, there must be a reason for giving him this constitution. It is not sufficient to say, that God thus made man because it was his will; for the question returns, Why was it God's will? The only reply is, Because it expresses his nature; and, if such be his nature, then he is a righteous and holy Being. Throughout the wide universe of mind, the Creator has left the brand of his aversion upon all evil dispositions

* Isaac Taylor on Fanaticism, p. 45.

and actions, by rendering them so many sources of uneasiness and misery; and impressed the seal of his approval upon every good disposition and action, by rendering such productive of satisfaction and happiness. And thus has he published to all intelligent beings the great truth, that their Creator is a Being of absolute rectitude, of essential and unchanging holiness.

IV. GOD'S MORAL GOVERNMENT IS DECLARATORY OF HIS HOLINESS.

In the objective or external manifestations of holiness, which have already been considered, the principles of God's moral government are developed, and, to some extent, illustrated; but there are some aspects of that government which demand special attention.

Absolute holiness admits of no compromise of principle or character. The principles of holiness are as immutable as the Divine nature itself, and they must regulate the Divine conduct towards the creature under all circumstances, in all states of being, and through all periods of duration. Those principles cannot change, because the Divine nature is absolutely unchangeable. From which it follows that the conduct of God, towards moral agents, will always have respect to their character.

If the conduct of the creature exhibit uniform obedience and holiness, the tokens of Divine benignity and favour will be uniform and uninterrupted, unaccompanied with any mark of displeasure or punishment.

If the conduct of the creature be one of unmixed evil and absolute disobedience, the benignity and approval of God must be totally withdrawn, and punitive justice must inflict suffering and pain, as the penalty of sin.

If the character of the creature be one presenting a mixture of good and evil, of obedience and disobedience, it will follow that the treatment of God will present a mixed character of clemency and punitive justice.

If pardon should ever be bestowed upon an offender, the bestowment must be on conditions which harmonize with

the strictest justice, and afford an equal manifestation of the holiness and rectitude of the Divine character.

If these principles were reversed or neglected, in the administration of the Divine government, the proceedings of God would be no exposition of his character. But we are sure that such a supposition can be entertained by no rational mind. The operations of our Creator and Governor must harmonize with his character, and publish that character to all intelligent beings.

Now, the moral government of God, so far as we are able to scan it, either by reason or revelation, exactly coincides with the principles we have stated. Whatever may be the nature of intelligent beings, their history and condition, so far as made known to us, furnish a practical exemplification of the principles now laid down.

1. While Adam retained his innocence, his experience constantly realized unmingled manifestations of Divine benignity and favour. While a stranger to sin, he was a stranger to remorse, to suffering, to death. Being the subject of no moral evil, he experienced no physical or natural evil. His state was happy, while his life was holy. The favour of the Deity shone resplendent upon him, while the Divine image remained unclouded on his soul. So the holy angels in heaven, who have never sinned, and glorified human spirits, who are made free from sin, are described as being in uninterrupted enjoyment—in happiness unalloyed by evil, in fruition which fills their capacities, and extends through the whole eternity of their being. The bestowment of such unmingled happiness upon holy beings illustrates our first principle, and proclaims aloud the holiness of God.

2. Apostate angels are described as lost to all goodness—as filled with the principles of evil operating within them with unceasing activity—hating God and his works, and employed incessantly in acts of rebellion and malignity. From such the Divine benignity is absolutely withdrawn, and they are everlastingly consigned to punitive justice. Divine goodness cannot ally itself with sin, for that were to sanction what is repugnant to the Divine nature, which is

impossible ; and, where only sin exists, its consequent punishment must be inflicted without mixture. So with regard to human spirits in the eternal world. Their probation being ended, and the merciful influences of grace being withdrawn, they, like devils, are become absolutely evil, and, like them, are described as excluded for ever from the Divine clemency, and given over to retributive justice. The eternity of their punishment is the just and the necessary consequence of the eternity of their evil nature, and the holiness of God, which invariably connects misery with sin. Thus, eternal punishment is nothing more than the continued application of a principle which connects a just proportion of suffering with sin.

3. Human beings, in the present life, present a mixed character—neither absolutely evil nor absolutely good. In a probationary state, and under a restorative economy, we see in them the elements of both good and evil—virtue and vice, benevolence and malignity, obedience and disobedience, being strangely mixed together in the same individual person, as well as in the world at large. Consequently, the Divine government presents a mixture of clemency and retributive punishment. This mixture is everywhere apparent in our world, as we have already proved. Amid profuse displays of benevolence, we continually meet with indications of a punitive character ; and, amid numerous physical evils, we find continual manifestations of clemency and goodness. Thus, the history of man is an instructive and ample comment on the principle that the government of a holy being must have respect to the character of moral agents. Distinguished from holy angels by a mixture of sin, we are distinguished from them by our sufferings and punishment. Distinguished from devils by a mixture of goodness, we are distinguished from them by our numerous enjoyments, and the tempered manifestations of Divine benignity. This distinction necessarily springs from the holiness of our Creator and our Judge.

4. If ever pardon be granted to sinful creatures, it must be on conditions which perfectly harmonize with the claims

of justice, and afford an equal manifestation of the rectitude and holiness of the Divine character. In such a mode is pardon offered and bestowed to guilty man:—

First condition.—An ample atonement is made by the propitiatory sacrifice of our Lord Jesus Christ. In this atonement we see the broken law honoured, its Divine authority upheld, its righteous claims asserted and enforced—we see justice revered and inflexibly maintained—we see the holiness of the Divine character beaming forth with ineffable radiance, and in harmony with the richest exhibitions of love. Mercy attains its object, yet no principle is compromised. Every legal barrier to our salvation is thrown down, yet the majesty of truth, the guards of moral order, and the motives to obedience, are unimpaired. Justice and benignity equally secure their object, and Jehovah is glorified in the redemption of a fallen world. In the cross of Christ, the righteousness of God is declared—he is just, and yet the justifier of the ungodly.

Second condition.—Repentance is required. Thus, the rectitude of the law, and the justice of the penalty, are acknowledged—man justifies his Maker, charges home upon himself his transgressions, renounces his evil ways, and implores forgiveness. Here, again, the holiness of God is manifested and confessed.

Third condition.—Faith is required. This act completes the soul's submission to God. It involves an entire surrender of the understanding, the reason, the judgement, the will, the affections, and the person, to God. So long as faith is withheld, rebellion is cherished in some form, and for God to pardon a soul in this state would be to connive at sin. But faith renders the submission of an intelligent being complete. It involves the principle of an unreserved obedience, and a thankful acquiescence in God's revealed method of forgiveness and salvation. Here, again, the holiness of God is acknowledged.

Fourth condition.—As a condition of our continuance in the Divine favour, and final salvation, it is imperatively required that our faith should be productive of practical

obedience, and personal holiness ; without this, our faith is vain, and all our blessings forfeited. Thus, though the penalties of the law are removed from the faithful believer, its precepts are unrelaxed, and its high claims to obedience are enforced.

Now, Why are these the conditions of our pardon ? Why did not God pardon by the exercise of his mere prerogative ? Why this atonement, repentance, faith, and return to obedience ? Why this respect to justice, law, and moral obligation ? Why this inflexible determination to connive at no sin, to dispense with no duty, but to maintain and perpetuate all the principles of the Divine government unimpaired ? The answer is, Because those principles are founded in the Divine nature, and that nature is absolutely unchangeably and eternally holy. The scheme of salvation aims as much at the personal holiness of mankind, as it does at their deliverance from personal misery. It seeks the restoration of the creature to purity, to rectitude, and the moral image of God, and thus proclaims as much the essential holiness, as it does the goodness and mercy, of God.

In whatever aspect, then, we contemplate the objective manifestations of the Deity, whether in the order and harmony of nature, in our mental and moral constitution, in the dispensations of providence, or in the characteristics of his moral government, we see the inscription standing out in bold and prominent relief—holy, holy, holy is Jehovah of hosts ; and, from every part of the Divine proceedings, we hear the voice of the Eternal addressing us, in solemn and impressive majesty, Be ye holy, for I am holy. The highest dignity which our intellectual and moral nature can attain is to be like God—to rise complete in his image, which is righteousness and true holiness.

CHAPTER IX.

GOD'S DISPOSITION FOR COMMUNION.

“*And God said, let us make man in our image, after our likeness.*”—
Genesis i., 26.

By Communion we mean not mere meditation or soliloquy, but the affectionate and reciprocal intercourse of one mind with another. That a disposition for such intercourse essentially exists in the mind of the Deity is a doctrine taught in the sacred scriptures. The existence of such a disposition might, indeed, be argued *à priori*, from the infinite benevolence or love of the Divine being, but it is expressly taught in a variety of forms in the sacred volume, and, therefore, it may be affirmed to be an attribute of Jehovah with as much propriety as wisdom, power, love, or any other perfection of his nature. In this chapter we shall adduce some of the forms under which this doctrine is presented before us, and show that these are in accordance with sober reason.

I. THE EXISTENCE OF THIS DISPOSITION WAS MANIFESTED IN THE SACRED CONFERENCE RECORDED IN GENESIS I., 25,—AND GOD SAID, LET US MAKE MAN, &c.

In this instance Jehovah is represented in actual intercourse and communion. The passage cannot be intended to set forth merely an act of meditation or soliloquy, for the language will not admit of this meaning. Meditation, or soliloquy, is the act of a mind holding intercourse with itself, whereas, the passage speaks of more than one. “And God said, let us make man in our image, after our likeness.” It is remarkable that the pronoun, used *three* times in this short passage, is *plural* in each case, plainly showing that

the communion and intercourse of one mind with another is both intended and expressed. A person may, in soliloquy, say, "I will do so and so," but he cannot say, "We will effect this or that," unless he is conversing with another. There was here a union of thought and purpose which preceded a union of act, and the union of the thought and purpose which preceded was as real as the united act which followed in the creation of man.

Some have endeavoured to account for the phraseology by supposing that the plural pronoun is used in conformity with the custom of monarchs and potentates in issuing their decrees and proclamations. This, however, is a mere supposition, gratuitously made—a supposition not only unsupported by proof, but contradicted by the clearest evidence. For, in the first place, no such custom existed at that period from which the phraseology could be borrowed. The language in question was used before kingdoms were formed, indeed, before man existed. The idea of Jehovah borrowing a figure from human customs, prior to human existence, is a piece of folly which borders on insanity. In the second place, had the pompous custom of using the plural for the singular existed, it is inconceivable that the holy, true, and faithful Jehovah would have adopted it. It is, indeed, in accordance with the vanity and arrogance of earthly potentates to assume the style of God, but incompatible with all correct views of God, to suppose him borrowing his titles from the arrogant assumptions of man. Thirdly, the language in question is not a mandate or a proclamation, but it is the language of converse and communion. This conclusion is so obvious that it has been admitted even by those who oppose the doctrine which it involves, and hence another evasive interpretation has been adopted.

It has been said that the language is certainly expressive of intercourse, but it is the intercourse of God with the holy angels. This flimsy sophism is, however, easily refuted; for, in the First place, the sacred records never intimate that God makes the angels his counsellors, but they plainly teach the contrary;—the scriptures demand, "With whom

took He counsel, and who instructed Him ?"—a challenge which has the force of the strongest negation. "Behold, he putteth no trust in his servants, and his angels he chargeth with folly." Secondly, the angels are never described as the creators of anything, even of the meanest reptile, or of an atom of dust. How then can it be supposed that they participate with God in the creation of man, the noblest work of God ? Thirdly, we are commanded to render supreme worship and homage to our Creator, and if we had been created by angels, it would have been lawful to worship them ; but we are expressly forbidden to worship angels ; they are, therefore, not our creators in any sense which can be conceived. From which evidence it is manifest that the communion in question could not have transpired between the Deity and the angels.

But if the Deity did not in this instance commune with angels, With whom then did he hold communion ? This inquiry has to be answered hereafter. We have at present only to do with the simple fact that the scriptures represent the Deity as holding communion with some mind or minds, at a period antecedent to the creation of man, and this fact involves a pre-existent disposition for such communion. We would desire the reader to waive, for the present, all difficulties which may naturally suggest themselves to his mind, in the consideration of this subject, and solely confine his attention to the fact, that the scriptures represent God as holding communion at the interesting period referred to—a fact which clearly involves a disposition for such intercourse as an attribute of his nature. We proceed to consider in the next place—

II. THE SCRIPTURAL FACT THAT MAN IS MADE IN GOD'S IMAGE, INVOLVES IN THE CREATOR A DISPOSITION FOR COMMUNION.

We have previously called attention to the scriptural declaration, that God made man in his own image and likeness. There is much implied in such a representation of our spiritual nature. It refers us to every excellency in our own spirit, as a manifestation or type of some corresponding perfection

in "the Father of spirits." And, indeed, this appellation, "*The Father of spirits*," involves the same interesting truth. It is a phraseology never applied to express the relation between God and the inferior animals. God is *their* Creator, but he is "OUR FATHER." He gave the brute species, as well as us, an *existence*, but he has given to our souls his *likeness* and *image*—and is, therefore, emphatically—"The Father of spirits." Such language denotes *resemblance*. Such a resemblance, in some respects, as exists between beings having a similar nature. God is a spirit; so is the human soul, and, as that soul was made in the image and likeness of its Author, it must possess many properties and attributes which correspond with the nature of Deity. Hence a certain author asks, "Whence come the conceptions under which we include that august name, (God)? Whence do we derive our knowledge of the attributes and perfections which constitute supreme Being? I answer, we derive them from our own souls. The Divine attributes are first developed in ourselves, and thence transferred to our Creator. The idea of God, sublime and awful as it is, is the idea of our own spiritual nature purified and enlarged to infinity. In ourselves are the elements of the Divinity. God, then, does not sustain a figurative resemblance to man. It is the resemblance of a parent to a child, the likeness of a kindred nature.

"We call God a Mind. He has revealed himself as a Spirit. But what do we know of mind but through the unfolding of this principle in our own breasts? That unbounded spiritual energy, which we call God, is conceived by us only through consciousness, through the knowledge of ourselves. We ascribe thought or intelligence to the Deity as one of his most glorious attributes. And what means this language? These terms we have framed to express operations or faculties of our own souls. The infinite light would be for ever hidden from us, did not kindred rays dawn and brighten within us. God is another name for human intelligence, raised above all error and imperfection, and extended to all possible truth.

"The same is true of God's goodness. How do we under-

stand this, but by the principle of love implanted in the human breast? Whence is it, that this Divine attribute is so faintly comprehended, but from the feeble development of it in the multitude of men? Who can understand the strength, purity, fulness, and extent of divine philanthropy, but he in whom selfishness has been swallowed up in love?

“The same is true of all the moral perfections of the Deity. These are comprehended by us, only through our own moral nature.....Do we understand, through sympathy, God's perception of the right, the good, the holy, the just? Then with what propriety is it said, that in his own image he made man?”*

John Howe remarks, “He hath made him (man) in his own image; and he, being the Father of Spirits, hath placed a spirit in man, so agreeable to his own spiritual nature; and by his own inspiration given him that understanding, that the mind begotten corresponds, by its most natural frame and constitution, to the mind that begot, the *νοῦς πατρικός* (as it was anciently called), *his own eternal mind*.”†

Dr. Wardlaw observes, respecting the constitution of rational beings, that, formed “in the possession of reason and holiness, they were made after God's own image. In them the principles of moral rectitude, being a transfusion from the fulness of the Deity, were the same in kind as in the fulness from which they were imparted—the same in the created nature as in the uncreated—the same in the stream as in the fountain.....His nature was then a fair and faithful indication of the nature of God; the excellence of the Maker being made apparent in the excellence of his work.”‡

These remarks are just and appropriate. The original truth of God's existence was, indeed, derived from revelation; but there is no created object which affords so full and clear a manifestation of the perfections and character of God, as the excellencies which God has implanted in the human soul.

If, therefore, a disposition for communion dwell in the mind

* Channing, on Likeness to God. + Howe's Living Temple.

‡ Wardlaw's Christian Ethics, 217.

of the infinite Spirit, we should expect to find a corresponding disposition inherent in the human spirit. Indeed, the truths we are now considering involve correlative propositions. They reflect evidence upon each other; they mutually sustain each other. So that, assume which we may in the premises, it involves the other in conclusion. If, on the one hand, we assume, as the scriptures teach, that there is, in the Father of Spirits, a disposition for communion, it follows that the same disposition should be found in the human spirit, because it was formed in the Creator's image and likeness. Or if, on the other hand, we assume, as a fact, that there is in man a disposition for communion, it follows that a similar disposition must dwell in the Deity, for the reason already assigned. Were it otherwise, there would not be likeness, but great dissimilarity. If in God there were this disposition, springing from the fulness of his benevolent nature, but in man there were no such disposition; or, on the other hand, if in man there were this disposition, springing from an inherent affection, but in God there were the total absence of any such disposition,—the two natures would be exceedingly unlike, and the assertion that man was created in God's likeness must be either given up, or so qualified as to leave but little significance. We can hardly conceive of two minds more unlike each other than the diverse complexions which the possession or non-possession of this disposition would involve. The one complacently delighting to communicate its thoughts and affections; the other averse to all such intercourse. The one relishing the society of a kindred spirit, and loving it with ardent affection; the other averse either to receiving or reciprocating any such affectionate intercourse. It is quite evident that two such minds must be most unlike each other in natural qualities, and that the most opposite moral qualities must spring from these contrary dispositions. The one disposition conforms to the nature of the misanthropist, and the other to the philanthropist. The one is fitted for the highest development of the malign tempers; the other must delight in the exercise and development of the most benevolent

affections. Such a disparity of nature is totally incompatible with intimate resemblance ; and, therefore, he who admits man to have been formed in God's image and likeness must admit that, if a disposition for communion dwell in the spirit of the creature, it must dwell in infinite plentitude and perfection in the Creator.

We ask, then, Does there dwell in the mind of man a disposition for communion ? All will admit that there does. What, indeed, is society, but the living evidence and development of this disposition ? What is speech, but the vehicle through which this disposition puts itself forth in audible words ? What is writing, but a more diffusive vehicle by which man pours his thoughts, desires, emotions, and affections, into the souls of his fellow-men, with a copiousness, and to an extent, which give a kind of ubiquity to his presence ? It is, in fact, the expression of the vehement desire of the mind for fellowship with mind—the disposition for communion breaking through the bounds of limited location, and seeking to gratify itself by intercourse with kindred spirits in every hemisphere and in every age. Were this disposition to become extinct, the whole framework of society would immediately dissolve ; and every man, fleeing from, and repelled by, his fellow-man, would seek seclusion, and live for no one, care for no one, but himself. It is the existence of this disposition which erects the social structure, which forms every family, and builds up every community. The evidence of man's disposition for communion is too palpable and diversified to require amplification. It connects itself with every instinct, unites itself with every ennobling affection, gives a complexion to every habit, and is an element in every cup of felicity. The Divine Being, who said it is not good for man to be alone, uttered a truth, of which man's intellectual, moral, and social nature furnishes the most ample illustration.

Seeing, then, that this disposition is essentially inherent in the human mind, and seeing that revelation affirms that the human mind is formed in the image and likeness of God, the same disposition must dwell in the mind of the

Creator. There is no excellence dwells in man, but it is the reflection of a corresponding excellence in God himself. To suppose the contrary would be to suppose that the Creator has endowed the creature with perfections which he himself does not possess, which is a palpable absurdity and contradiction. The Creator may be supposed to withhold from the nature of the creature various perfections which he himself possesses, but it cannot be supposed he could give to the creature any measure of an excellence of which himself is destitute. Indeed, the absolute perfection of his nature excludes the possibility of the absence of any excellence. It comprehends every perfection in kind, as well as in unlimited degree. The existence, therefore, of any excellence in the created spirit is an *à posteriori* proof that it dwells in infinite perfection in the Father of spirits. Thus reason and revelation concur in ascribing this attribute to Jehovah.

The only sophism which can be urged against this conclusion is, that the disposition for communion is not a perfection, but the mark of an imperfect and inferior nature. This sophism, we think, may be very easily refuted; and, ere we close this chapter, that refutation shall be given. In the meantime, let it be taken for granted, that the disposition in question is an excellency, a perfection, an evidence of a superior nature. To this proposition, the cordial believer in the Christian scriptures will find no difficulty in yielding his assent, seeing he finds this disposition ascribed to Deity in the passage already adduced at the head of this chapter.

III. SPIRITUAL RELIGION CONSISTS CHIEFLY IN THE EXERCISE OF THIS DISPOSITION.

Experimental religion is the affectionate communion of saints, one with another, and with God, their heavenly Father. It is the sanctified exercise and development of the principle in question. It is so vitally essential to religion, that there could be no experimental piety without

it. In its absence, men must for ever have remained in a state of alienation from one another and from God.

Church fellowship evinces this disposition for communion. God has ordained church fellowship both as a duty and a privilege. But what is church fellowship, except the religious communion of mind with mind? And why are believers congregated together, but for the exercise of this communion? Church fellowship is founded upon the disposition in question. Had not this disposition been inherent in our nature, church fellowship would never have been ordained; and, were it to become extinct, both the duty and the privilege would cease, because the thing would be impracticable. Even the external organization of a church could not exist in the absence of this disposition. It was because the mind of the psalmist delighted to have fellowship with kindred souls that he joyfully exclaimed, "I was glad when they said unto me, Let us go into the house of the Lord. Our feet shall stand within thy gates, O Jerusalem!" "O, magnify the Lord with me, and let us exalt his name together!" "Come and hear, all ye that fear God, and I will tell you what he hath done for my soul!" Thus the psalmist delighted in sacred fellowship. The desire for communion was indeed natural to him as a human being—an inherent element of his mental constitution; but his delight in the fellowship of *saints* was the effect of religious influence: it was religion recognizing and appropriating to its sacred use a disposition of our social nature.

All spiritual religion is grafted on this principle. The essence of religion is love—love to our fellow-creatures and love to God. Love to a fellow-creature is such affection for him as delights to hold communion with him. Love to God is the same affection, exciting the same disposition in a still higher degree. Under its influence, the affections go out towards him, the thoughts dwell upon him, the soul delights in him; and all the religious exercises of the soul are so many acts of communion with him. What is prayer, but the utterance of the soul's desires after God, its yearn-

ings for more of his presence, his grace, and blessing? What is praise, but the effusion of the soul's gratitude and affection? What is adoration, but the soul's utterance of solemn reverence and devotedness? What is confession, but the soul's contrite acknowledgment of sin before him? What is faith, but the exercise of the soul's confidence in God's veracity and goodness? What is hope, but the outgoings of its desires and expectations? What is joy, but the soul's exultant delight in God? In all these, and every other religious exercise, there is the communion of man's spirit with the Spirit of his Maker: it is the fellowship of the created mind with the eternal and uncreated mind. This is religion, and it is the religion which God requires and commands. "My son, give me thine heart." In the absence of this fellowship there is no religion; and, without it, the profession of religion is but formality and hypocrisy, which God despises and condemns. No external rites, no well-ordered ceremonials, no imposing pageantry, can be a substitute for this. Even morality and good works, apart from this fellowship with God, are of no avail. So essential is communion with God to the very existence of true religion, and so expressive is God's approval of that spiritual exercise in which the soul realizes fellowship with himself.

Yet, in all the intercourse with God which genuine religion affords, there is no creation of any new faculty in the soul of man. The faculty, and the disposition too, of the human mind to hold communion with other minds existed prior to the renewing power of grace; but then it required a right—a heavenly direction. Before conversion, the mind of man seeks to ally itself only with other human minds, like itself in disposition and character; but, under the influence of religion, it allies itself with the pure, the holy, the infinite mind of Deity, and here it finds supreme satisfaction and delight. Before conversion, like the unsupported vine, it was prone, and grasped the creature; but, afterwards, it shoots upward, and lays hold of the infinite and the eternal. The tendrils of the vine evince its inherent tendency to embrace an object; and the fellowship of

man with man shows that the disposition is inherent and natural, but it requires the renovating power of grace to give this inherent tendency a heavenly direction. Now, the existence of this property in man is an evidence that a corresponding disposition dwells in him who created man. He could not have given man a disposition diametrically opposite to his own. He gave it man because he had it, and delighted in it himself.

This intercourse, or fellowship, as the term implies, is reciprocal. This, indeed, is implied in the very terms. God communes with man, as well as man with God. "Truly our fellowship is with the Father, and with his Son, Jesus Christ." Every one, who understands experimental religion, knows what is meant by fellowship or communion with God; and he knows that, in this holy enjoyment, there is as direct and sensible a communication from the mind of God to the mind of man, as there is between any two human minds when in fellowship one with another. What is the love of God shed abroad in the heart, but such a manifestation of the love and favour of God communicated to our spirits, as fills us with love and joy? It is the Spirit of God speaking to our consciousness that we are accepted and beloved, and imparting the assurance of this estate, by dismissing every fear from our minds, and inspiring them with joy unspeakable and full of glory. A variety of other phrases indicate the same truth. The presence of God—his dwelling in our hearts—his teaching us his holy will—his enlightening our minds—his shining into our souls—his talking with us—his imparting peace and comfort—his hearing our prayers—his accepting of our praises—his leading, guiding, strengthening, directing, and sanctifying of our souls, with similar phrases, perpetually occurring in the scriptures, are all indicative of the communion of God's Spirit with the spirit of man. The sacred writings are full of this doctrine—are replete with promises and declarations of God's disposition to commune with man, and fraught with examples which illustrate their truth. When man was in Paradise, communion with God

was a privilege daily conferred. When the tabernacle was set up under the Mosaic dispensation, the promise was, "And there will I meet with thee, and there will I COMMUNE with thee, from above the mercy-seat from between the cherubim." Under the New Testament economy, it is declared to be our privilege to "have our fellowship with the Father, and with his son, Jesus Christ." So that no one, who receives the scriptures as the oracles of God, can doubt for a moment the truth, that experimental religion pre-eminently consists in the exercise of fellowship with God—in the realizing of direct communion with the Father of spirits.

Nor should it be forgotten that the more eminent our piety the more intimate our fellowship with God. The more nearly we resemble him in holiness—the more completely we are restored to his moral image, the more intense is our desire for this fellowship; and the more rich and abundant are the communications of light, comfort, love, and joy, from God, our heavenly Father. Since, then, this communion is reciprocated by God himself—since the Father of spirits has made experimental religion to consist in our intercourse with him, and since he communes with his people in every act of spiritual worship, What is more evident than the existence of this disposition in the Deity himself. If *our* intercourse with mind evinces the existence of the disposition in *our* nature, does not *his* intercourse with us evince the existence of the same disposition in *his* blessed nature? Could he make religion to consist in that act of mind to which his own nature is averse? Would he commune with us, if his Spirit did not take pleasure in it? Would he make his intercourse with us a cause of purest, serenest, holiest enjoyments, if he had not a blessed propension to this exercise in his own infinite and eternal nature? Only one answer can be furnished to these inquiries, and that answer must be—God does delight in the communion of his Spirit with the spirit of the creature, and the disposition to this is an essential property of his own nature.

The reciprocation of this holy fellowship is not confined to the present state of existence. As an essential element of our being, the disposition survives the dissolution of our animal nature, and is perpetuated through all eternity ; and the privilege of its gratification is destined to be continued throughout the whole length of our existence. Indeed, the chief distinction of heaven from earth is our freedom from all those restraints and impediments which, in the present life, interrupt and limit our communion with God. There, our nature being more perfect, and our condition more exalted, our intercourse with God will be more direct, and the manifestations of himself to the soul more immediate and transporting. The chief bliss of heaven will consist in our being constantly with God, dwelling in his immediate presence, favoured with uninterrupted intercourse with him, with perpetual consciousness of his favour and communications of his love. In all the symbolical representations of heaven are those which indicate the most intimate and delightful intercourse between the ransomed soul and the eternal God. As our spirits become more like his Spirit, the nearer their union, the closer their fellowship with him. Thus, the spirit of the sanctified creature, and the Spirit of the all-glorious Creator, are destined to be in contact and communion for ever. It is not an occasional but a perpetual flow of thought, feeling, and intercourse ; not a transient, but an eternal communion. There is not to be a moment, throughout the immeasurable ages of eternity, but in which the mind of Deity is to be in communion with the minds he has created. We ask, then, Would the Deity have imposed upon himself an exercise to which his disposition is repugnant ? Would he have established a principle which perpetuates that exercise throughout eternity, had his nature been averse to it ? The answer may be confidently anticipated. The economy which imposes upon his own mind an obligation to have eternal intercourse with other minds is a moral demonstration that the disposition to such intercourse is an essential property or attribute in

God. He has thus ordained it because he delights in it, and he delights in it because such is his nature.

The argument which conducts us to this conclusion becomes vastly enlarged in its breadth and fulness, when we contemplate another fact which philosophy and religion combine to support; namely, that the human spirit is only one order of mind amongst the universe of intelligent and rational minds, in which the same disposition for communion is inherent. As our world is but a small, dependant planet in the solar system, vastly surpassed in magnitude by other planets in the same system; and as that system is but one small family group, amid myriads of others which are congregated in our stupendous galaxy; and as our galaxy, vast as it is, forms but one of similar congregations which, in thousands, are scattered through immensity,—who will affirm that the intelligent beings on our diminutive planet are the only beings who possess an intelligent and moral nature? Who will venture upon the puerile supposition, that, among the millions of bright orbs which spangle in the blue firmament, this dark corner of the universe is the only spot where intelligent natures reside? The supposition is not defensible for a moment. Philosophy affords the highest probability that, as matter is subordinated to the welfare of mind, and seems to exist only for the welfare and development of mind, therefore, the universe is peopled with mind; and that the number of human spirits bears no greater proportion to the countless multitudes of other intelligent beings, than our world bears to the infinite number of orbs which bespangle the heavens. This rational deduction of philosophy derives support from revelation, which expressly asserts the existence of countless myriads of other spirits of various orders and rank in creation. And, in looking at the instructions furnished respecting the nature, the employments, and economy, of all holy intelligences, our attention is arrested by the existence of the same disposition for communion as that which dwells in our own minds; and the same fact, that,

while their minds delight in fellowship with God, God himself delights in fellowship and communion with them. Indeed, so far as the economy of other spiritual natures is unfolded to us in the scriptures, the disposition for communion among holy intelligences seems as universal in the world of mind as gravitation does in the world of matter. Wherever intellect and goodness characterize mind, so does the disposition for communion. The higher the intellectual nature, the holier the moral attributes, of spiritual beings, and the more intense is their disposition for fellowship with God, and the more abundantly does God reciprocate this intercourse with them. The disposition for communion invariably increases with the capacity of the creature, and the capacity of the creature is the only limit to the communications imparted by the Creator. What, indeed, are those radiant circles of happy beings around the Divine majesty, beheld in vision by the favoured apostle, but gradations of holy intelligences? What is their worship but the reciprocation of holy thoughts and affections with the great fountain of purity, knowledge, and happiness? And what the relative position they occupy, as it is nearer, or remoter from, the throne, but a description of the relative perfection of their nature, and their proportionate enjoyments in fellowship with the uncreated and eternal Mind. When our philosophy is thus sanctioned and hallowed by revelation, we may cast our thoughts abroad through the universe, and contemplate mind as co-extensive with matter, existing in boundless variety and in countless multitudes. In this case, there seems no danger of our calculations outstripping facts; indeed, no possibility of our conceptions stretching so far as to comprehend the vastness of the universe of created mind. Yet, reasoning from analogy, all intelligent minds are originally endued with the same disposition for communion and intercourse with one another and with God. This may be regarded as a part of the mental constitution of all intelligent beings.

If any beings lose their disposition for communion with God, it must be the consequence of some awful deteriora-

tion in moral principle. If ever they lose this disposition for fellowship one with another, it is because they allow malignant principles to acquire the absolute ascendancy over them. But it may, indeed, be doubted, whether the innate disposition of mind for communion with mind *can* be totally eradicated, even by the deepest, the most virulent and consummate, depravity. When human or angelic spirits become alienated from God, and, therefore, lose all disposition for communion with him, they still seek the fellowship of their kind. The worst of men, and even infernal spirits, band themselves together for the accomplishment of their purposes, and form a kind of society; thus proving, that, amid the complete wreck of every moral excellence, this original element of the mental constitution still survives,—the disposition of mind to hold fellowship with mind clings to the wretched spirit when virtue and holiness have expired.

But, wherever goodness dwells with intelligence, the mind seeks for fellowship with God. This we see in angels, in cherubim, in seraphim, in the Living Ones next the throne, and in all orders of the heavenly hierarchy; and this we see in man, when restored by grace to his original resemblance to the Divine image. Doubtless, the same disposition exists, in full force and activity, in every part of the intelligent universe, where beings are not tarnished by sin or corrupted by depravity. We have before us, then, the sublime fact of all intelligent creatures originally formed with a capacity, and endued with a disposition, to hold communion with their Maker for ever; a proof that their Maker himself has a disposition to hold communion with them—a proof that the eternal and uncreated Spirit intends to have intercourse with them throughout the whole period of their being. This disposition existed in his mind ere the creature was formed, and is, of course, an essential attribute of his mind, as it is an element of the creature's mental constitution. It must have supplied the motive for giving the creature the disposition in question. He imparted it to intelligent minds because it existed in his own.

Because he had it, and delighted in it as an element of his own perfect nature, he gave it to all intelligent beings, that they might resemble himself, and that they might thereby be fitted to participate of his eternal beatitude and felicity.

We may now notice the objection to which allusion has already been made. The objection anticipated is, that a disposition for communion implies an imperfect and a dependent nature, and cannot, therefore, be reasonably ascribed to Jehovah, who is all-sufficient and independent. This objection cannot, of course, be urged by one who cordially assents to the testimony of scripture, because the scriptures, we have seen, directly represent the Deity as holding intercourse with mind at a period prior to the creation of man; and this intercourse he could not have held had he not possessed an inherent disposition for it. The intercourse described is perfectly voluntary; it was uninfluenced and unconstrained by anything *ad extra*. "And God said, Let us make man in our image and likeness." Thus, the converse, or communion, sprang freely from the Divine volition, and, if from the Divine volition, it must have been from an inherent disposition; and such an inherent disposition was not a casual or adventitious impulse, but an essential property of the Divine nature. This must, we think, be irresistible to every mind which reveres the testimony of the sacred volume. Moreover, that a Being, possessing such an inherent disposition, should give a similar disposition to all intelligent beings, is an act in perfect accordance with his own blessed nature. That he should himself commune with the minds to which he has imparted this disposition, is a part of his providential and moral economy, equally in harmony with his nature; and, further, that he should make fellowship with his own mind a duty incumbent on all intelligent beings, and an essential element of all religion, of all-spiritual devotion, is an arrangement which might be anticipated, *à priori*, from the nature of the Creator. Thus, facts harmonize with principles, and the testimony of the scripture we have referred to is corroborated by reason.

Thus the objection in question not only derives no support from scripture, but it is contradicted by the sacred records. We think it will be no difficult task to refute the objection on philosophic grounds.

1. If a disposition for communion be evidence of an imperfect nature, then it follows that the absence of this disposition is a mark of excellence, and is, indeed, essential to the perfection of an intelligent being. Does not this, at first sight, seem an absurdity? Would the absence of this disposition be a mark of human excellence? Would a man, averse to fellowship with his fellow-man, and averse to fellowship with God, be a more amiable and excellent being on that account? With all his thoughts and affections concentrated only on himself, dwelling in solitude, hating society, and averse to his Creator, would he possess a superior nature, and exhibit more excellence of character, than he would with the contrary disposition urging him to delight in the society of mankind, and to exercise his thoughts, sympathies, and affections, towards them and towards God? Would an angel devoid of this disposition evince a higher nature, and manifest superior moral excellence? If so, the Creator must have greatly erred in forming their intellectual and moral constitution. In giving them a disposition for communion, he must, on this principle, have placed an effectual barrier to their superiority and excellence! We may further ask, Can we suppose the Deity himself to be more excellent in his nature if this disposition were absent from him? The absurdity of the notion is so transparent that we blush to pursue the inquiry. Had Jehovah been averse to this communion with intelligent beings, he would never have created them; or, if he had created them, he never would have given them a disposition to which his own nature is repugnant; and to suppose that he would have made their communion with himself a religious duty, and have reciprocated that communion with them for ever, is to suppose that he acted not only without motive, but against motive. It is, indeed, to suppose a tissue of palpable absurdities and contradictions.

2. So far from the absence of this disposition being a perfection, its absence is undoubtedly, in every instance, an evidence of imperfection and inferiority. This truth is confirmed by facts issuing from every part of the universe. The absence of the disposition for communion can only be supposed possible from three causes, namely, the absence of intelligence, the absence of love, or the absence of both. If it arise from the want of intelligence, it argues a mental imperfection, for intelligence is essential to any degree of mental excellence. If it arise from a want of love, it implies a moral imperfection, for a benevolent affection is essential to moral excellence. The Deity is benevolent, and it is only in proportion as the creatures imitate him in this property that they can exhibit a superior moral nature. If it arise from the absence of both intelligence and love, it argues both mental and moral imperfection. If we look at the creatures below the human species we find this disposition disappearing just in proportion to the imperfect nature by which the species are distinguished. Some creatures have it not because of the absence of a capacity for it, and others have it in an inferior degree because of the predominance of malign tempers—as in creatures of prey which mostly live in comparative solitude. If we look at the human race, we find men excelling in intellect and moral dignity just in proportion as this disposition for communion is exercised; and in the christian, who daily holds communion with the Father of spirits, we see the highest developments of moral excellence and dignity adorning human nature. If we contemplate the properties of intelligent beings above us in nature and capacity, we find those exhibiting the highest excellence holding the most intimate fellowship with Deity; and those exhibiting the most consummate depravity, the most virulent malignity, living in a state of alienation from God—averse to the Deity, and as much averse to each other as their nature will admit. It is a remarkable fact that, just in proportion as any nature is excellent, this disposition is predominant. In proportion as any nature is inferior this disposition is wanting. In proportion as this

disposition is cherished the nature becomes improved and exalted. This disposition is always the associate of excellence, and the more excellent the nature the more intense and active is its operation. From these facts it follows that the disposition itself is an excellence, and in ascribing it to the Divine nature we are ascribing to Deity a glorious attribute and an essential perfection. Without it the Deity himself would not be perfect. Perhaps the inquiry may be suggested, Does not this disposition involve a state of dependance, and does not dependance argue an imperfect nature? We reply, A disposition for communion does not necessarily imply a state of dependance, any more than love implies a state of dependance. Love to an object implies no dependance upon it. It can be exercised by a higher nature towards a lower, as well as by a lower nature towards a higher. Pure benevolence operates unaccompanied by the least expectation or hope of being benefited thereby. Thus it often operates among men, and thus it always operates in the mind of Deity. Now, the disposition for communion is excited chiefly by love. We do not say that among creatures of imperfect natures no other affection excites this disposition. It is true, indeed, that other affections, such as sorrow, grief, anxiety, and such-like passions, often excite the disposition in question, but it is equally true that love is the most powerful and active affection which excites in one mind the disposition for fellowship with another mind.

As John Howe observes, "When looking into ourselves we find there is in us a disposition, often upon no necessity, but sometimes from some sort of benignity of temper, unto conversation with others." Indeed, this disposition is often excited from a pure, benign feeling, to communicate something to others, to administer to their welfare and happiness. It is the effect of goodness overflowing its own bounds and extending to others. Such a benign disposition is compatible with the highest dignity and excellence. It is, in fact, not merely compatible therewith, but is an essential element of that excellence. If it be an element

of excellence in the creature, where that excellence is limited, it must be an element of the infinite excellence of the Creator. If it flow necessarily from benignity in the creature, though that benignity is finite, it must flow from that infinite ocean of benignity which dwells in the Creator. If the creature with but a spark of love has this disposition, the Creator, who is the origin and boundless source of love, must have it in an immeasurable degree. So far from being a mark of imperfection and dependence, it is an essential element of perfection.

Thus, an examination of this objection elicits new evidence in support of the doctrine it was intended to overthrow; for, if the absence of this disposition for communion be an evidence of an inferior nature, the presence of this disposition is essential to God's perfection. To deny that it dwells in the Deity is to deny the perfection and excellency of his nature. If God be a Spirit of infinite excellence and goodness, he must possess the disposition in a measure proportionate to his infinite excellence and perfection.

Summary.—In reviewing the argument, we find,

1. That the scriptures ascribe this disposition to the Deity.
2. That it exists as an excellence in the spiritual nature of man, who is said to be created in God's image.
3. That the essence of all spiritual religion consists in the fellowship of saints, and communion with God.
4. That this communion is reciprocated by God himself.
5. That this reciprocal intercourse is greater in proportion to our holiness of heart; the more intimately we resemble him, the more intimate our fellowship with him.
6. That this communion is maintained in both worlds—earth and heaven—in time and in eternity.
7. That the same disposition exists in all other holy and intelligent beings—and the higher and holier the nature of any intelligent being, the more intimate and delightful its fellowship with God. Thus all intelligent beings have communion with God, and God with them, for ever and ever.

8. We examined objections, and new evidence was elicited in proof of the general proposition.

It thus becomes evident, both from scripture and reason, that this disposition for communion must exist in the mind of Deity. The scriptures teach us directly that it does, and reason deduces the same conclusion from obvious facts. God gives to a created mind no excellence but what dwells in his own nature; he could not himself delight to hold fellowship with all created minds, and that for ever, unless the disposition belonged to his own blessed nature.

As this disposition belongs to God, it is an eternal and essential property of his nature. Being absolutely perfect, he acquires no new excellence; and being immutable, he loses no quality he ever had. As this disposition exists within him now, it cannot be adventitious but essential, it always existed in the same intensity and degree, and throughout eternity it will continue the same. Had no intelligent creature existed, it would have dwelt within him; and if the whole intelligent universe were to be destroyed, it would remain with him through all eternity.

In closing our observations on the Divine attributes, it must not be supposed that we have enumerated all Jehovah's perfections, or that any stretch of human thought can conceive adequately of his nature. But it is a pleasing and elevating thought that our minds are formed to receive eternally brightening and enlarging perceptions of his character. As Robert Hall has observed, "The idea of the supreme Being has this peculiar property; that as it admits of no substitute, so from the first moment it is formed, it is capable of continual growth and enlargement. God himself is immutable; but our conception of his character is continually receiving fresh accessions, is continually growing more extended and refulgent, by having transferred to it new elements of beauty and goodness; by attracting to itself, as a centre, whatever bears the impress of dignity, order, or happiness. It borrows splendour from all that is fair, subordinates to itself all that is great, and sits enthroned

on the riches of the universe."* Whatever excellencies there may be in existence they must essentially dwell in God's nature. Absolute perfection includes all possible perfection—in all variety and in unlimited degree. Such a Being must be infinitely, independently, and eternally happy. All the elements of greatness, goodness, and happiness, essentially belong to him—to whom be all honour, and glory, and blessing, evermore. Amen.

* R. Hall's Modern Infidelity.

PART III.

THE HOLY TRINITY.

CHAPTER I.

THE SCRIPTURAL DOCTRINE OF THE HOLY TRINITY STATED.

“Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.”—Matt., xxviii., 19.

THE same method we pursued in discoursing on the existence and attributes of God, we shall pursue in our observations on the Trinity—that is, our first appeal must be to the scriptures of truth. This is the source of our knowledge. That holy oracle first proclaims the Divine existence and perfections of God, and then reason gives her humble but emphatic response. We are solely indebted to revelation for our knowledge as to the mode of God’s existence. That mode the Bible tells us is a unity of essence, with a trinal distinction of persons. The Lord our God is one Jehovah, but this Jehovah comprehends the existence of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. To the Bible, therefore, we make our first appeal, and then we humbly ask, Does reason harmonize with the instructions given? Does its verdict corroborate the testimony of the heavenly oracle? We maintain that it does. It would be incompatible with our design to adduce in this place the whole volume of evidence furnished by the scriptures. We simply refer to one passage out of a multitude, in which a trinal distinction of persons is clearly and unequivocally taught.

No one will deny that the passage of scripture standing at the head of this chapter clearly recognizes a distinction in the names therein mentioned. This distinction is not merely nominal, but real. Each name designates a distinct person. The Father is not the Son, the Son is not the Father, but each is distinguished from the other, and the Holy Ghost is distinguished from both. These names, therefore, represent three distinct personalities, and the ordinance of Baptism here enjoined, recognizes the three persons as constituting the Godhead. Baptism is a religious ordinance, appointed by Divine authority, and of universal obligation. The obligation to administer this ordinance is correlative with the duty to propagate christianity. The obligation of doing both is enforced by the same authority, is enjoined in the same command, and expressed by the same breath. The duties of teaching and baptizing all nations are thus inseparably united, and they co-operate to the same result. It will be admitted that christianity is a system of religion which instructs men in the knowledge of God, and comprehends the clearest revelation which God has made of himself to mankind. The command, therefore, to teach christianity, is an injunction to teach men the knowledge of the true God. Now, the ordinance of baptism was established as an initiatory rite of the christian system—a rite performed on introducing men to the knowledge of the true God. It was, therefore, intended to be a visible symbol of christian truth, and its practical utility consists mainly in assisting men to form right conceptions of God, and their relation to him. It was to be combined with oral instruction, in order that a visible symbol might unite with oral discourse, in communicating to the mind right views of God and of christianity.

As this ordinance was performed by the authority of God, it was performed in his NAME. This is expressly stated. "Baptizing them in the Name"—of whom? certainly in the name of that God set forth in the christian system; and that name is three-fold—The Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. Baptism, as a christian ordinance, is a solemn

recognition of God as our Creator, our Sovereign Lord, who alone has an absolute right to our services and our hearts. Who, then, is this glorious Being, and what is his name? The formula declares him—The Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. Baptism is a solemn act of worship, directed exclusively to the true God. Who is this Being who is the only proper object of worship? The ordinance asserts him to be the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost. Baptism is a solemn act of personal dedication to God. The above passage declares this Being, to whom we are thus consecrated by baptism, to be the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. Finally, baptism is a sign and seal of a covenant between us and God. A covenant in which we receive the word of God for our oracle, his will for our law, his example for our pattern, and his glory as the sole end of our existence; and in which God gives himself to us, and imparts all the blessings and privileges of salvation. Who, then, is the glorious Being, with whom we enter into this most sacred and important relationship? He is here set forth as the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost

This formula, therefore, explicitly teaches a trinal distinction in the Godhead, the personality of each distinction, and the proper Deity of each person. The *distinction* is expressed in the words employed. The Father holds a specific relation, so does the Son, and the Holy Ghost. We cannot confound one with the other, without confounding the use of terms, torturing the most explicit language of scripture, and abusing our own minds. As the words Father, Son, and Spirit, are distinct in their meaning, so they express things really distinct from one another. If a distinction be thus obvious in the passage, so is it equally evident that this distinction is *personal*, for each sustains the same personal relation to us. If baptism express, as we have stated, a recognition of the true God, an act of worship directed to the true God, a dedication of ourselves to the service and glory of the true God, and an entering into a covenant relationship with the true God, then must each, whom we thus solemnly recognize in baptism, be a

proper person ; that is, a conscious, intelligent existence. It is obvious we can sustain the relations of creature, worshipper, servant, covenanter, to no one but a personal existence ; nor can any other than a personal existence sustain the corresponding relations to us. Indeed, it cannot be objected by any one, that the true God whom we worship, and with whom we covenant, is a person—a conscious, intelligent existence ; and it will not be denied that, in the formula of baptism, the name of the *Father* expresses a personal existence. But, if the Father be a person, so must the *Son*, and so must the *Holy Spirit* ; for they each stand in the same relation to us in this formula. Baptism is performed not in the name of the Father only, but in the name of the three ; and, therefore, all that baptism expresses in reference to the Father, it expresses in reference to the Son and Holy Spirit. There is here no difference at all. If it be essential that the Father should be a person—a conscious, intelligent existence—in order to receive our worship, our homage, our dedication, and to enter into a covenant relation with us, it is equally essential to the Son and the Holy Spirit. The evidence, therefore, of distinct personality is irresistible. We may as well deny the Divine authority of the passage altogether, as attempt to deny the distinct personality of any one of the three. In the same emphatic manner, and by the same reasoning, the proper Deity of each is taught in this formula. The evidence, which proves the personality of each, conducts us infallibly to the Deity of each. Each stands precisely in the same relation to us as our Lord, our Creator, our Sovereign, our Lawgiver, and our covenant God. As certainly, therefore, as the Father is our God, the Son and the Holy Spirit are our God. In being baptized in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, we are baptized in the name of the triune God.

This plurality of persons must, however, be so understood as to be consistent with unity of essence. For the same divine authority, which avers the trinal distinction of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, teaches emphatically a oneness of essence. “ Hear, O Israel ; Jehovah, thy God, is one Jeho-

vah." Now, in this passage, the word אֱלֹהִים, Elohim, which expresses personalities, is plural, but the word, יְהוָה, Jehovah, which expresses essence, is *singular*; and the same truth is taught in a multitude of passages. If it be demanded, What do you intend by a plurality of persons, and oneness of essence? we reply, We intend—distinct consciousness, combined with the united possession of the same nature and attributes. We do not, indeed, profess, that this is a full or adequate enunciation of the doctrine, but it doubtless expresses what is sufficient for our present purpose, namely,—The existence of unity compatible with plurality, and plurality consistent with unity. Moreover, it expresses the views in which all orthodox christians are agreed, and we believe it accords with the truth as it is taught in the scriptures, and as it actually exists in the Godhead.

Such is the doctrine of the holy scriptures, and, therefore, the sabellian notion which denies the distinction of Persons, and the Unitarian heresy which denies the Deity of the Son and Holy Spirit, are both diametrically opposed to the teachings of inspiration. We have now to inquire, Does this doctrine of holy scripture harmonize with reason? The Unitarian affirms that it does not. He denies the doctrine because it is, as he alleges, "irrational." *We* believe the doctrine because it is scriptural, and we are assured it is rational because it is scriptural. As before stated, it may be affirmed, *à priori*, that in unbelief there is folly as well as sin; that it involves a violation of the laws of mind as well as the laws of God; and this we hope to demonstrate in the following chapters.

CHAPTER II.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE HOLY TRINITY IS SUSTAINED BY THE VERDICT OF REASON.

IN order to establish our position it will be requisite for us to show, first, that the doctrine is not in any sense repugnant to reason; and, secondly, to prove that it is sustained by reason.

FIRST. The doctrine is not repugnant to reason, for it is not opposed to any abstract truth. It is an abstract and self-evident truth, that one is not three, and that three are not one. It is an abstract and self-evident truth, that no being can be one and three at the same time and in the same sense; and, therefore, to affirm this, would be to contradict a self-evident proposition, and to maintain a palpable absurdity. But this is not the doctrine of the scriptures, nor does it bear any semblance to it. The doctrine that, in the Godhead, there are distinctions in personal consciousness, combined with identity of nature and attributes, is nothing more than to affirm that—a being may be singular in one sense and plural in another; and this involves no contradiction. It is perfectly consistent with abstract truth, and is illustrated by actual truth: we have numerous illustrations of it in the phenomena of nature. In the constitution of a human being, we have a conjunction of unity and plurality. A human being is one, but his nature is two-fold. There is a spiritual principle, called the soul, and a material organization, called the body; yet these two natures, so diverse in their properties, make but one being or person, realized by one consciousness. We have here an illustration of the truth in question—that a being may be single in one sense and plural in another; and it is a demonstration of, at least, the possibility of the truth being exemplified

in the Divine nature. If the nature of the creature involve an exemplification of the principle, On what ground can it be excluded from the Creator? If fact demonstrate that the truth in question is illustrated in the economy of human nature, to deny its applicability to the Divine nature, is to reason against analogy and fact. It is, indeed, to assume, that the nature of the Creator is more limited than that of the creature. It is to say that God can illustrate a truth in his works, of which he cannot possibly have any counterpart or correspondence in himself. To us this appears the quintessence of presumption and absurdity.

Should it be alleged that there is no analogy in the example adduced, because in a human being the personality is one though the nature be two, but in the Trinity the personality is said to be plural while the essence is singular, We reply, the objection thus adduced can have no force ; for, if in the constitution of a being plurality and unity are seen harmoniously and consistently conjoined, the *principle* for which we contend is established. It matters not whether the personal consciousness be single and the nature plural, as in the constitution of a human being ; or whether the personal consciousness be plural and the nature single, as in the Deity ; the principle of plurality being compatible with unity, is as clearly and obviously exemplified in the one case as in the other. There may be a mystery in each, but, abstractedly considered, it is difficult to say which we should deem the greater mystery, were they both equally new to us, and both proposed together, at the same time, to the mind for its decision. Had we never heard of either until now, and some superior being were to demand from us, “Which do you think is the greater mystery, whether for a being purely spiritual to be *three* in person and *one* in nature, or for a being to be *one* in person and *two* in nature ?” we are inclined to think that, supposing the absence of all bias from our past experience, we should regard it as more mysterious for such a heterogeneous compound as mind and matter to form one person, than for a three-fold consciousness to reside in one purely spiritual and homogeneous nature. Such is

our conviction ; but, irrespective of this, the fact itself, of our nature presenting a constitution in which plurality consists with unity, shows that the scriptural doctrine of the Trinity is perfectly compatible both with abstract and actual truth.

Nor can a single *à posteriori* argument against the Trinity be drawn from any part of the economy of nature. It is true the universal prevalence of law and harmony, the uniform subservience and adaptation of means to ends, the regularity, order, and certainty, everywhere prevalent, argue a unity of purpose and design in the mind of the great Creator, but these manifestations furnish no evidence against a plurality of persons in the Godhead. As Paley justly observes, in reference to the argument drawn from nature as to the unity of God—"Certain, however, it is, that the whole argument for the divine unity, goes no farther than to a unity of counsel." If, indeed, the doctrine of the Trinity taught that there existed three supreme intelligences, co-equal, but separate in nature, and different in disposition and attributes, then the doctrine would both involve a physical impossibility, and be contradicted by the harmony, regularity, and order, of nature. But the doctrine asserts the opposite of this—it proclaims unity of essence and attributes, and, by necessary consequence, the same union of disposition, counsel, purpose, and operation, in the Divine Persons, as we see demonstrated in the harmonious economy of nature. If the phenomena of nature utter any testimony at all on this subject, it is not against, but in support, of the scriptural doctrine respecting the Godhead. If the attributes of Deity involve a plurality of persons as a necessary truth, and if the phenomena of the universe demonstrate the existence of those attributes, then the voice of nature is not absolutely silent on this great and important doctrine, but speaks unequivocally in its favour.

When sophisms are exploded, and no further objection against a doctrine can be established, we often hear the murmur of dissent uttered on account of its mysteriousness. Thus it is with respect to the Holy Trinity. When the dissident is disarmed of his arguments one by one, he still

urges that he is not able to conceive *how* such a plurality and unity can exist in the Deity. We reply, sober reason does not require us to explain the "*how*" a thing exists, but to furnish evidence that it "*does*" so exist, and to show that it is irrational to deny its existence. The *mode* of a thing's existence is quite distinct from the evidence which determines the *certainty* of its existence, and a logical reasoner will constantly keep this distinction in mind in all his inquiries after truth. He will never reject the evidence which proves a fact merely because he cannot explain every mode connected with that fact. He will accept clear and satisfactory evidence of a fact, and rest in the certainty of the same, and wait for further light as to its mode. The same principle should guide us in seeking for Divine truth; it is subject to the common laws of evidence, and both logic and candour require its evidence to be treated like that on all ordinary subjects. The duty of any inquirer is therefore not to demand such an explanation of the Godhead as shall unfold to him every mystery respecting the Trinity, but to seek for satisfactory evidence respecting its truth, and allow his judgment to be determined by the character and strength of that evidence. Until that is done, his unbelief is an offence against reason as well as against God. There are multitudes of facts in the economy of nature which are irresistibly evident, and yet they involve inquiries which no one can answer—mysteries which no philosopher can explain. We know the human mind can act directly upon matter, but who can explain its mode? We are familiar with the facts of nutrition, growth, assimilation, animal and vegetable life, chemical affinity, gravitation, heat, combustion, &c., but inquiries into each phenomenon soon show how short is our sounding line. We almost immediately get into depths we cannot fathom, and meet with ultimate facts which our reason can no more explain than it can the mode of God's existence and the mystery of the Trinity. But though we cannot explain the mode of natural phenomena we never question their reality, for that would be to deny the evidence of reason and often of sense. So with regard to the Trinity.

It belongs to the category of ultimate facts, and any thing inexplicable as to its mode must be regarded quite distinct from the evidence of its truth. We have already proved that there is nothing in the doctrine incongruous with either abstract or actual truth, and now we are prepared to adduce positive evidence in its support. If we are not prepared to explain “*how*” it is, we are prepared to show “*why*” it is, and “*why*” it cannot but be. If we cannot unfold the mystery of the *mode*, we can adduce the evidence which proves the reality and certainty of the doctrine; and this is as much as any philosopher can do with regard to any phenomenon in nature which involves an ultimate fact.

In conducting our argument on the direct evidence for a plurality of persons in the Godhead, it will conduce to order, and facilitate reference, if we arrange the successive steps of the argument into several general propositions.

PROPOSITION I.

Our first proposition must be merely a compendious summary of truths previously established. The existence of the Deity is a necessary truth, and, if so, all the attributes of Deity must exist necessarily and eternally, even, as his essence; they cannot be separated from it even in conception.

To suppose any of his attributes were derived, would be to suppose that he was dependent upon something, which is incompatible with his necessary existence. To suppose that they had a beginning, would be to suppose that there was a prior eternity in which he existed without possessing them, which is the same thing as to undeify him. To suppose that any of his attributes can ever cease to exist is absurd, because it is to suppose him to cease to be what he essentially is—the self-existent, independent, and immutable Jehovah. If his existence be essential and eternal so must all his attributes be essential and eternal. Whatever may be predicated of the nature of God now, may be predicated as belonging to that nature through all eternity past and to come. Therefore absolute perfection, all-sufficiency, immutability, omnipresence, omniscience, wisdom, omnipotence,

infinite goodness and love, perfect holiness, and a disposition for communion, being attributes of the Eternal God now, *always* were his attributes, and for ever will be, without deterioration or change in any respect. The truths embodied in this proposition have been fully established in the second part of this work, and are so generally acknowledged by Divines of all persuasions that it is unnecessary to do more than to give this brief statement of them under one general proposition, as the foundation of our argument.

PROPOSITION II.

Some of the attributes and perfections of the Deity are active powers or faculties, such as the attributes of intelligence or wisdom, of power, love, holiness, a disposition for communion, &c. These are active now. The scriptures declare it, and reason corroborates it; and, having existed eternally and immutably in God, they must have existed not as latent qualities, or mere capacities, but as essentially and eternally active. Their activity is as essential as their existence, and, therefore, eternal.

Several of the ancient philosophers held the eternal activity of the Divine attributes as a truth so self-evident, and so fully established, that they erroneously grounded upon this the eternity of matter. Plato reasons that the world is an eternal effect, proceeding from an eternal Cause; for, he says, “the will of God, and his power of acting, being necessarily as eternal as his essence, the effects of that will and power must be supposed coeval to the will and power themselves; in the same manner as light would eternally proceed from the sun, or a shadow from an interposed body, or an impression from an imposed seal, if the respective causes of these effects are supposed eternal.”* On this ground he maintained the eternity of the world. Aristotle, after him, held the same doctrine. He contends, that “God, who is an immoveable (immutable) nature, whose essence is energy, cannot be supposed to have rested, or slept, from

* Zachariæ Scholast. Disput. Quoted by Dr. S. Clarke, in prop. iii. on the Being and Attributes of God.

eternity, doing nothing at all, and then, after infinite ages, to have begun to move the matter, or make the world.”† The reasoning of these men is exceedingly like that of powerful minds, without the advantage of the light of the christian revelation. It is partly true, and partly erroneous—the premises are true, but the conclusions are false. The proposition they laid down, as an established and incontrovertible principle—namely, the eternal activity of the Divine attributes—is true; this was too clear to be doubted: but the eternity of matter does not follow from thence. If there were no other mode in which the Divine attributes could have been exercised than in the creation of matter, or in reference to some extraneous objects, then their reasoning would have some force; but this assumption is not true. There are other modes in which the active powers of the Divine Being can be employed, without the creation of either matter or spirit—without the existence of any extraneous objects whatever, as we shall prove hereafter. Were it not so, indeed, there would be no adequate mode in which the Divine attributes could find their full and appropriate operation, for the attributes are infinite, and creation, however vast, is but finite and limited. Besides, the eternity of matter, and the eternity, too, of any created mind has before been disproved. Both reason and scripture have conducted us to this conclusion, in the first part of this work. Yet the testimony of the above distinguished philosophers is valuable, as to the fundamental principle contained in our present proposition. It was with them a settled principle, an axiom which lay at the foundation of their reasoning, that the active powers, or attributes, of Deity must have been eternally exercised. This is the doctrine in the proposition now before the reader, and it is sustained by the following argument:—

1. Great absurdities and contradictions would be involved in maintaining the contrary. The nature of the argument requires us to notice these absurdities, but let every allusion to

† Met. Lib. xiv., c. 6. Quoted by Cudworth, in his *Intellectual System*, chap. iv., p. 417.

the Divine nature be made with modesty, reverence, and awe. Be it observed, then, that to deny the eternal exercise of the Divine attributes is to suppose that God was eternally in a state of inactivity; for, if the exercise of his attributes be not eternal, there must have been a period when they began their action; and, if there was a period when their action began, there must have been a prior eternity in which they did not operate; and this involves the most absurd consequences. Thus, if this absurd supposition be applied to his intelligence, it affirms there was an eternity in which the Divine Being knew nothing. If applied to his power, it affirms that there was an eternity in which he did nothing. If applied to his love, it affirms that there was an eternity in which he loved nothing. If applied to his disposition for communion, it affirms that there was an eternity in which he communed with nothing. If applied to his holiness, it affirms that there was an eternity in which this attribute was never exercised. Indeed, the notion involves such absurdities, that the mind recoils from them, as insulting to that glorious Being who is the object of our contemplations.

It avails nothing to plead that infinite faculties were eternally in the Divine nature, and, though not eternally exercised, they were inherent in his nature, and ready to be brought into exercise at any period when the Divine Being should determine. The attributes of Jehovah are not mere faculties, or negative qualities, or latent properties, but are essentially active powers. Omniscience, or infinite wisdom, for instance, implies not a mere capacity, or faculty, to know all things hereafter, but the actual and immediate knowledge of all things—of all things actually comprehended in his own nature, of all things designed to be accomplished by his own operations, and of all things both certain and possible in the creature: Thus, the existence of the faculty necessarily implies its exercise. So love is not a mere capacity to love, but the actual possession of that benign affection, the operation of which is essential to its existence; for a being not to love is to be without love. So of holiness. It is not the mere absence of evil, or any mere negative

quality, or a mere faculty for certain moral excellencies, to be hereafter developed ; but an assemblage of moral dispositions and excellencies, actually existing in the Divine mind, and their operation is essential to their existence. To deny the eternal activity of these attributes is to deny their eternal existence. To admit their eternal existence, and deny their eternal exercise, is a palpable contradiction. Their exercise is involved in their existence, and, whatever be the duration of their existence, must be also the duration of their exercise. If, then, there never was a period when these glorious attributes did not exist, there never was a period when they were not exercised.

2. The eternal exercise of the Divine attributes, is essential to the infinite and eternal happiness of God. Perfect happiness must be essential to Deity, for it is an element of absolute perfection ; so that if he be absolutely perfect, he must be infinitely happy. But does not the infinite happiness of God essentially flow from the exercise of his attributes. Can we conceive him to have been eternally happy in a state of absolute inactivity ? For example, It is declared in scripture that God is love, and reason proves the declaration to be true. We know that happiness and love are essentially connected in the creature. Can we suppose them separated in the Creator ? Can we suppose the Deity to have been eternally happy without love ? We may answer the inquiry by demanding, Could we suppose the Deity to continue his happiness now, if he were henceforth to cease to love ? Every rational mind will reply, No. If, then, God could not continue to be happy, were he now to cease to exercise his love, neither could he have been happy through a past eternity, without the exercise of the attribute of love. If then, God was always happy, he always exercised his love. The happiness of the Deity and the exercise of his attributes are co-essential and co-eternal.

3. The same conclusion flows from the absolute perfection of the Divine nature. Activity is an element of perfection ; hence inactivity is the property of an inferior nature, and activity an essential property of a superior nature.

Inanimate matter is the lowest form of existence, and it has no inherent activity. As Bishop Wilkins observes, "It cannot move unless it be moved; and cannot but move when impelled by another." It is essentially passive; but spirit is superior to matter, and it has voluntary activity. This is one element of its transcendent superiority. It moves itself, and it moves material substances. Angelic beings are described as being endued with powers of amazing activity, and so are human spirits in the future world. It seems to be a law pervading the Creator's works, that the activity of both mental and moral powers is correlative with the dignity and excellence of the creature. Can we recognize this as a perfection in the created spirit, and deny its existence in the Deity—the uncreated spirit from whom it proceeded? This is to contradict analogy, and to reason against that evidence which shines as with a flood of light from every source. Besides, it is to deny Jehovah's absolute perfection. For, what is absolute perfection but the possession of all possible perfections, natural and moral, and the possession of all perfections in infinite measure and degree, so as to exclude the possibility of any perfection being added numerically, or augmented in its measure? But to affirm, that, for an eternity, the faculties of intelligence, power, love, holiness, &c., were not exercised, is to exclude them from the category of proper attributes, and reduce them to mere latent powers, waiting for future development. This is to affirm a contradiction, and an impossibility, as we have already shown; and, indeed, were this conceivable as an abstract possibility, it would rob the Divine Being not only of absolute perfection, but even of such limited perfection as exists in the creature. The excellency and perfection of a created spirit consist not in its possessing latent powers, to be developed in future, but in its present active exercise of those powers. All moral excellence especially appears in the creature's exercise of its moral powers. Its veracity, love and holiness, consist in the true, benevolent, and holy exercise of its powers. Had it been always inactive, these excellencies would never have belonged to it, and were it to become

henceforth inactive, they would cease to be. If we abstract activity from the creature, we abstract all these excellencies at once; it henceforth becomes impossible for them to exist. Their essence consists in the activity of the creature. Now in no other way can we conceive the Deity to possess any moral excellence or perfection than by supposing his attributes to be active. Deny the activity of these attributes and we deny the natural perfection and moral excellence of the Divine Being. The exercise of the Divine attributes is the characteristic of the Divine Being now. Scripture, reason, and fact, abundantly prove this truth; it is as evident as God's existence. We may, then, simply ask, that, seeing Jehovah is absolutely perfect now in the exercise of his attributes or active powers, Could we conceive him to remain absolutely perfect, if he were to cease their exercise, and cease their exercise for ever? We feel assured that such an eternal cessation would be incompatible with his absolute perfection in future; and, if incompatible with it for the future eternity, it is equally incompatible with it during the past eternity. The exercise of the Divine attributes now—of his wisdom, power, love, holiness, &c.—is an essential element of his absolute perfection now. This is admitted. But, if the exercise of these attributes be essential now, it will be essential to that perfection for all eternity to come, and, if essential for all eternity to come, it must have been essential for all eternity past. Therefore, for so long a period as we suppose the Deity to have been inactive, we suppose him to have been imperfect; and, for so long a period as we suppose him to have been absolutely perfect, we must suppose him to have been active. If, then, we suppose him to have been absolutely perfect from all eternity, he must have been eternally and essentially active in the exercise of his glorious attributes.

4. The same conclusion flows from the attribute of immutability. If we contemplate the Divine Being as exhibited to us in the volume of inspiration and of nature, we behold him as constantly active—exercising all the attributes of his blessed nature—exercising wisdom, power, love, and perfect

holiness, and communing with all the holy intelligences his hands have made. But to suppose these attributes to have been eternally inactive, or existing as mere latent qualities, is to contemplate the Divine Being as essentially different from what he is now. To suppose him eternally (we would speak with reverence) as knowing nothing, doing nothing, communing with nothing, and loving nothing, is to contemplate him in a state perfectly contrasting with those present characteristics of the Divine Being, which are furnished to us both in the volume of revelation and of nature. We cannot conceive a greater disparity or unlikeness than what is here presented. Of course such a notion is perfectly incompatible with the unchangeable nature of the blessed God. Only a very brief process of reasoning seems requisite to decide the argument before us. We have only to inquire—As the attributes of the Deity are actively exercised now, would the entire suspension of their exercise henceforth and for ever be compatible either with his absolute perfection or his immutability? If the exercise of the wisdom, power, love, and holiness of God were at once to cease, would that accord with his unchangeable nature and character? Every one will admit it would not; even a momentary suspension of them, or any of them, is inconceivable. How then can we conceive a suspension of them for an eternity past, to be compatible with their present activity and the immutability of the Divine nature? The only answer is, the conception is impossible—it is an absolute contradiction. If Jehovah exercise his attributes now, and his nature be immutable, then he must have exercised them from all eternity. Thus the same conclusion flows from his immutability as from his absolute perfection—*both* necessarily involve the truth, that the eternally blessed and eternally glorious Deity is essentially and eternally active.

Scholium. Although the eternal activity of the Divine being is a necessary truth, it does not follow that his acts must be absolutely and eternally *uniform*, to the exclusion of variety in his operations. Such a notion is contradicted by his intelligence and freedom. He does not act from neces-

sity or constraint, but intelligently and voluntarily. It is true that his absolute perfection, happiness, and immutability, involve the eternal exercise of his attributes, but the mode of exercising them is spontaneous and free. This truth the nature of the Deity implies; this truth the preceding arguments admit; and this truth is illustrated by facts. Creation and Providence present *some particular modes* in which the Divine attributes have been exercised in time, but it does not follow that creation and Providence are essential to the exercise of the Divine attributes, or, that they are the principal modes in which they are exercised now. Prior to either creation or Providence they were appropriately exercised, and that as freely and voluntarily as they are now. Our argument leads us to such an eternal exercise of the Divine attributes as his immutability and absolute perfection require, but this leaves the *modes* of Jehovah's operations freely under the direction of his intelligence and goodness, and, therefore, open to boundless variety. The several modes in which the Divine perfections have been exercised through past eternity, in which they are exercised at the present period, and will continue to be exercised through all eternity to come, will hereafter be considered. We have at present to fix our attention solely upon the truth that the active powers involved in Jehovah's attributes must have been eternally exercised in some mode.

PROPOSITION III.

The exercise of the Divine attributes necessarily implies both Agent and Object.

If intelligence be exercised, there must be an object known, as well as the agent who knows. If power be exercised, there must be both agent and object in its exercise. If love be exercised, there must be an object beloved as well as the agent who loves. If the disposition for communion be exercised, there must be both agent and object, and such reciprocity in the exercise as involves their being mutually agent and object to each other. If holiness be exercised, those excellent dispositions and moral affections which

constitute holiness, necessarily imply both agent and object. We cannot conceive the possibility of an attribute being exercised without, at the same time, conceiving of both agent by whom, and the object in reference to whom, the attribute is exercised. This is too plain to require further argument. It requires only to be stated in order to its being admitted as a self-evident proposition.

PROPOSITION IV.

The Agent and Object cannot be numerically, identically, and, in every respect, the same. They involve such different relations to each other as cannot be sustained by one absolutely solitary existence.

We may, perhaps, admit one exception to this general proposition. In reference to knowledge, the agent and the object may be numerically and personally the same. An intellectual being may know himself, may be the object on which his own intellect is exercised, and thus be agent and object at the same time and in the same act. But, in reference to the exercise of other attributes, the distinction between agent and object is at once apparent. Thus, in reference to goodness or benovolence, the being who exercises this affection is distinct from him towards whom it is exercised. In reference to holiness, the being who exercises the principles of truth, justice, kindness, &c., and all the dispositions and principles involved in holiness, must be distinct from him towards whom these dispositions and principles are exercised. So of communion, the reciprocity of minds conscious of mutual sentiments and affections, involves a distinction of agent and object mutually sustained. These examples indicate that in reference to some attributes, agent and object cannot be identically and numerically the same,—such a distinction in relation is involved, as cannot be sustained by one absolutely solitary existence. To many minds this important truth will appear to be self-evident, but the following considerations will, we think, render it obvious to every candid mind.

1. Let us suppose a created spirit possessing the ordinary

attributes of mind, so isolated from the universe, as to exist in absolute solitude, and be unconscious of the existence of any being but itself—without any idea of either creature or Creator. Such a supposed state would be to the spirit thus isolated, equivalent to *actual* and absolute solitude. Let us now ask, How could this being exercise the attributes of power, of love, of holiness, and of a disposition for communion? We will not say that the faculty of knowledge might not be exercised to a very limited extent. This spirit would certainly be conscious of its own existence, but beyond this we conceive, there could be but little intelligence even of its own nature. But leaving the attribute of intelligence, we ask, how could the other active powers, with the affections, and dispositions of its nature, be exercised, without one single object in existence towards whom they could have any relation. For example, How could this spirit exercise the amiable affection of love or benevolence without the knowledge of any being towards whom it could be benevolent? To say that this isolated being might love himself, is to evade the question; for self-love is not benevolence. When it is said in Scripture that God is love, it is not meant that God loves himself. It is a love which he has exhibited towards others, and a love which we are required to imitate. Love is, therefore, an amiable, benevolent affection which inclines one mind towards another, and causes it to delight therein with a benevolent complacency and regard. If there were but one being in existence beside itself, it might love that being, but without the existence of that one being, the amiable affection of love could not be exercised by it at all. As the exercise of love necessarily implies an object as well as an agent, so it is self-evident the agent and object cannot be numerically and personally the same, but, must in some respects be distinct.

2. We ask again, how could this spirit, thus isolated from all existence but itself, exercise the sentiments and dispositions, comprehended under the term holiness? We can conceive of it as absolutely free from sin, but mere freedom from sin is a negative quality. Holiness includes not only free-

dom from sin, but much more than that. It is not made up of negative qualities or latent properties, waiting for an occasion to be developed, but it consists of the actual possession and exercise of holy sentiments, dispositions, affections, and principles, such as truth, goodness, justice, faithfulness, &c. This is the holiness ascribed to God in the bible, and this is the holiness of man, and of all other intelligent beings who are holy. The principles of holiness, indeed, are essentially the same in all beings. Now the exercise of these holy sentiments, dispositions, and principles, involves certain moral relations to others, and those relations involve the actual existence of others as well as ourselves, together with our knowledge of their existence, and our consciousness of the relations subsisting between us and them. It is evident, therefore, that a spirit supposed to exist in absolute solitude could not exercise these moral sentiments, dispositions, and principles, because, not knowing of any being in existence but himself, he could not be conscious of any moral relations. If not conscious of any moral relations, he could not be the subject of any moral sentiments or emotions. A being in absolute solitude, and unconscious of any existence but his own, could neither be just nor unjust, good or evil, true nor false, holy nor unholy. Whatever latent powers and faculties there might be inherent in his nature, they could never be exercised nor developed without being directed towards an object or objects in some sense distinct from himself. As, therefore, it is evident that the exercise of holy sentiments, affections, and principles, implies an object as well as an agent, and as the object and agent cannot be numerically and personally the same, the exercise of the attribute of holiness involves the existence of others distinct from self or individual consciousness. The argument thus applicable to man, or to any intelligent spirit in a state of absolute solitude, is applicable to the eternal Spirit, so far as we have any rational conception of his nature and attributes.

3. The disposition to communion, which both Scripture and reason ascribe to Jehovah, involves a distinction between agent and object, or rather necessarily implies the reciprocal

intercourse of minds in which each is mutually agent and object. This disposition therefore could not be exercised by a Spirit existing in that absolute solitude before described, and conscious of the existence of nothing but himself. To say that he might hold communion with himself is to assert what is irrelevant, for self-communion is mere meditation or soliloquy. Communion properly implies the affectionate intercourse of mind with mind, in which there is a reciprocation of thought, sentiment, will, purpose, and a loving disposition. Such is the intercourse of one human mind with another, and the human soul with God ; and such must be the communion of any holy intelligent being with another. Such was the communion of the Divine Being when he said “ Let us make man in our own image and after our likeness.” It was not soliloquy but intercourse,—the reciprocation of thought, sentiment, will, purpose, with a view to a *united* act in the production of a most important event—the creation of an intelligent and moral being. There was here as really a union of thought, will and purpose, as there was a union of act. Now to suppose a Spirit existing in such absolute solitude as renders it unconscious of the existence of any being but itself, is to suppose it placed in a condition in which the disposition for communion can never be experienced. As therefore the exercise of this disposition involves the act of minds which are reciprocally object as well as agent to each other, and as it is evident that the object and agent cannot be numerically and identically the same, it follows that the exercise of this disposition involves the existence of others distinct from self and individual consciousness. The argument thus applicable to man, or to any intelligent being, is applicable to the eternal Spirit, so far as we have any rational conception of his nature and attributes.

PROPOSITION V.

In the exercise of some of the Divine attributes, it is essential that the object as well as the agent should be a conscious and intelligent existence.

This truth is demonstrative, especially as it applies to the

moral attributes, such as truth, justice, holiness, love, and the disposition for communion. The establishment of the preceding proposition will render this so evident as to require but a brief consideration. Power may, indeed, be exerted upon a material and inanimate object, and goodness may be exercised towards sentient beings who are without reason, but the moral attributes suppose a moral relation, and can only have their appropriate exercise when their object, or objects, possess an intelligent and moral nature. If we exercise veracity, justice, or holiness, towards any being, that being must be capable of understanding and appreciating veracity, justice, or holiness; and, as such, must be intelligent, must possess intellect, moral sentiments and affections, and, therefore, have a real personal existence. So the love of an intelligent being can only have for its appropriate object an intelligent existence. There may, indeed, be admiration, approval, and a certain kind of fondness, exercised by us towards objects which are irrational, but what we understand by love—proper, and in its highest sense, whether as a natural or moral affection—requires, we think, an intelligent nature for its object. Thus, natural affection is the love of one person towards another—a person is its agent, and a person its object. We may admire a rose, a landscape, a painting, or a poem, but this is not to be confounded with love, which, as a natural affection, and in its highest sense, can only have a person for its proper object. We may be fondly attached to a brute animal, but this is not to be confounded with natural affection, or love in its highest sense. It does not appear to us that such an affection can be appropriately exercised except toward objects capable of reciprocating the affection. But, be this as it may, religious love, as a moral affection, is always the love of a person. Not the mere approbation of certain principles, and the admiration of certain facts, but the affections ardently cleaving to a conscious, intelligent, moral being. Such is the christian's love to God, and to his brother. Such, too, is the love of God. As a Being of infinite intelligence and excellence, his affection of love could not be satisfied without

having a conscious, intelligent, moral being for its object—capable of appreciating and reciprocating the affection.

The disposition for communion could be reciprocated with no other than an intelligent existence. As before stated, it is the intercourse of mind with mind—the interchange of thought, purpose, benign and affectionate complacency. Such reciprocation proves, beyond dispute, that the object, as as well as the agent, must be a conscious, intelligent existence.

Summary of the five propositions.—We have seen, then, by the first proposition, that the attributes of God are as essential as his existence—By the second proposition, that the exercise of his active powers has been eternal—By the third proposition, that the exercise of an attribute requires an object as well as an agent—By the fourth proposition, that the object and agent are not identically, and in all respects, the same, but have a real distinction one from another—And by the fifth proposition we have seen, that, in reference to the exercise of the moral attributes, the object must be an intelligent, conscious, personal existence. We have now to ascertain who or what the object, or objects, must be, in reference to which the attributes are exercised. God, himself, we know, is the agent, but, Who or what is the object, or the objects, in question? To answer this inquiry, we must pass on to other propositions.

PROPOSITION VI.

Created existence presents a vast collection of objects in reference to which the Divine attributes have been, and still are, exercised; but vast as is the aggregate of these objects, the whole are not sufficient either in duration or extent, for the full, eternal, and infinite exercise of the Divine perfections.

Every active attribute of Deity with which either scripture or reason makes us acquainted, finds a *limited* sphere of operation in the vast universe. We have, already, seen numerous evidences of this truth in the chapters composing the second part of this work. We have seen power exerted in the creation of matter and mind, and in the mighty operations of nature and providence. We have seen intel-

ligence and wisdom in the manifestations of contrivance and design, in the constitution of law, order, adaptation, and harmony in the economy of the universe. We have seen goodness and love in the ample provision made to supply the wants, and provide for the happiness of sentient existence, and especially of intelligent and moral creatures. We have seen holiness displayed in the constitution of our moral nature, and in the law which connects happiness with goodness, and suffering with sin. We have seen God's disposition for communion abundantly manifested by his imparting this disposition to all intelligent beings, by making fellowship with himself a religious duty, and his own reciprocation of that fellowship or communion with upright intelligences, their common privilege both in a state of probation and of reward. And when we look at the vastness of the universe, and the countless myriads of beings of various kinds and orders, which fill the great temple of nature, we are lost and overpowered with the view we thus obtain of the energy there must be in the Divine being, in order to the creation and preservation of the whole universe of matter and of mind. Yet, after all, when we contemplate God, the Almighty Agent,—the duration of his being, and the infinitude of his perfections, we are forced to the exclamation of Job,—“Lo, these are parts of his ways.” They are but “*parts*” of his ways, only a limited portion of the boundless operations of the active attributes of his infinite nature. The universe is not, cannot be, the adequate sphere for the full exercise of the Divine perfections. This is the truth embodied in the proposition before us, and may be demonstrated as follows:—

1. The universe is only of finite duration. There was a period when it did not exist: when, neither in its present form, nor in its primordial elements, it had any being—when, indeed, there was neither matter nor mind in existence. But as Jehovah's existence is eternal, so are his attributes eternal; and as his active powers are exercised now, so have they always been from all eternity. This was proved under our second proposition. Seeing, then, that

the universe is only of finite, and Jehovah of infinite duration, and the exercise of his attributes has been coeval with his being, it is impossible that the universe can be the adequate sphere for the exercise of his active attributes. It does not obviate this conclusion, to give to created existence a vast antiquity. We may extend its duration into the past, as remotely as we please ; we may multiply its ages by millions of millions, and then again by trillions ; we may suppose its antiquity expressed by a line of figures so extensive, as to reach from hence to the remotest nebula ; but, after all, this period is only finite, and bears no proportion to the infinite. There was still a prior eternity ere creation was brought forth, and during that period the active attributes of Jehovah were exercised. His wisdom, his power, his goodness, his love, his holiness, his disposition for communion, were adequately exercised during those awful ages, the vastness of which almost makes our spirits faint, when we ponder them. Compared with the duration of Jehovah's being, creation is but of yesterday, and, therefore, cannot be the adequate or only sphere for the exercise of Jehovah's attributes.

2. The existence of the universe was a contingent event, but the exercise of the Divine attributes is essential. A contingent event is one which may be or may not be ; the non-existence of which may be conceived as possible. Thus the universe not being self-existent but dependent upon the will of the Creator, it is conceivable that it might not have existed. As there was an eternity in which it had no being, it might have had no being at this period ; it might have had no being for myriads of ages to come ; indeed, it might not have had to exist through all future ages. Its existence was a contingent event. To suppose the exercise of the Divine attributes, therefore, to be confined to the creation, preservation, and government, of the universe is to make their exercise to depend upon a contingent event. It is to make the exercise of Jehovah's attributes not only to be limited to the short duration of the universe, but to be dependent upon the contingent conditions of its existence.

It is, in fact, to affirm positively, that, for the eternity prior to creation, they were not exercised at all; that possibly they might not have begun to be exercised even yet; that possibly they might not have had to be exercised for millions of ages to come; and, further, that possibly they might never have had to be exercised through all eternity to come; which is to say, that the wisdom, the power, the goodness, the love, and the holiness, of the Deity might possibly never have had any exercise at all; and, therefore, that his moral perfections might possibly never have had any actual existence. For, to make their exercise depend upon a contingency, is to make them subject to all the conditions involved in that contingency. The contingency of the universe being such as we have stated, such must have been the contingency of the exercise of the Divine attributes in the case supposed. Such a supposition, however, is too absurd to find a place for a moment in our convictions. It must be immediately rejected, and the contrary proposition be the decision of our judgment. The exercise of the Divine attributes, therefore, being essential and eternal, and Nature being a contingent event, it cannot be the adequate or only sphere for the exercise of the Divine attributes.

3. Nature cannot be the adequate and only sphere for the exercise of the Divine attributes, because God is independent of the creature. As God's existence is independent, so are his attributes; and, as the existence of his attributes is independent, so is their exercise. To maintain that the universe is the only sphere for the exercise of his attributes is to deny God's independence, and make him dependent upon the creature. His happiness, his holiness, and absolute perfection, are essentially connected with the exercise of his attributes. This has been proved under the second proposition; therefore, to confine the exercise of the Divine attributes to the creatures is to deny this important truth, and to make God dependent upon them for his happiness, holiness, and perfection, which is absurd. What God is, he is of himself, and by himself, and cannot be dependent upon any thing created—upon anything extraneous to his own essence.

Cicero represents Velleius as proposing to his opponents the strange inquiry—"What was it that induced God to adorn the heavens with stars and bright luminaries? Whether he was previously like one who lived in a dark and comfortless habitation and desired a better residence? If so, why was he so long a period without the gratification of his desire?"* An irreverent and impious inquiry: but the notion which confines the exercise of the Divine attributes to the universe lies open to this profane and sarcastic inquiry of the Epicurean, and is incapable of answering it. If, as we have before proved, the exercise of God's attributes was essential to his happiness, holiness, and absolute perfection, and, if that exercise had no object or sphere but the universe, then the Divine being could not have been perfect or happy until the universe was formed; but both scripture and reason abundantly prove that he is the blessed God; absolutely blessed; and blessed for ever. Blessed in himself; infinitely and independently blessed from all eternity, and to all eternity, Absolutely perfect, and infinitely all-sufficient, needing nothing that he has made. From all eternity he was as happy and perfect as he is now. Had the universe been yet unborn he would have been equally perfect and happy; had the first act of creation been postponed millions of years beyond the present date, he would have been absolutely happy in the exercise of all his perfections, and if it had been determined that creation should never take place through all eternity to come, still would the Divine nature have been essentially active and infinitely happy for ever. To deny this is to deny the independence of the everlasting God, and contradict one of the essential characteristics of the Deity. To admit the absolute independence and all-sufficiency of God, is to admit that the activity

* Quid autem erat, quod concupisceret Deus, mundum signis et luminibus, tanquam Aedilis, ornare? Si; ut Deus ipse melius habitaret? antea videlicet tempore infinito in tenebris, tanquam in gurgustio, habitaverat. Post autem varietatene eum delectari putamus, qua caelum et terras exornatas videmus? Quae ista potest esse oblectatio Deo? Quae si esset, non ea tamdiu carere potuisset.—*De Natura Deorum, Lib. i., c. 9.*

of his eternal energy, and the source of his infinite happiness, were prior to, and independant of, all created existence.

4. The universe is finite, and, therefore, cannot be the adequate and only sphere for the exercise of the Divine attributes. The extent of the universe, like its duration, however vast it may be, is limited; but the attributes of Jehovah are infinite and unlimited. It is evident, therefore, that the universe, vast as it is, is not adequate to fill the capacities of the Deity, nor to afford scope for the full and boundless exercise of his attributes. If the active faculties of Jehovah are at any period exerted to an extent corresponding with their natural infinity, the objects on which they are exerted, or in reference to which they are exercised, must be characterized by a corresponding infinitude. Thus respecting his faculty for infinite intelligence, the object or objects answering to that capacity must have no limits; but the universe of matter and of mind has limits, and, therefore, the universe, in all its magnitude, cannot be that object. It is too diminutive. So with respect to love. This attribute is infinite, and, if it be exercised in a degree proportioned to its infinitude, the object it embraces must be infinite. But every created mind is finite, and the entire aggregate of created mind in the universe is finite, and, consequently, inadequate to the reception of infinite love. So with regard to the disposition for communion, so clearly ascribed to Deity both by scripture and reason. This disposition, to be exercised in a mode proportioned to the capacity of the agent, requires an infinite capacity in the object. But, seeing all the created minds in the universe are but finite, what created intelligence is fully adequate to reciprocate the sublime intercourse of Deity. If communion involve reciprocity of intercourse, to render it perfect there should be corresponding faculties and capacities, as well as corresponding dispositions. If the minds engaged in communion are mutually agent and object to each other, there should be proportionate powers and capabilities in each. If the one be infinite, so should the other, or the intercourse can be but partial and limited. To comprehend the thoughts, pur-

poses, will, affections, and moral dispositions of an infinite mind, and perfectly to reciprocate them, requires infinite mental and moral faculties and capacities. If, then, the disposition of the Deity for communion be exercised perfectly, or to its fullest extent, it is obvious there is no created mind adequate for this exercise. So with regard to the infinite holiness of God. It is impossible that the profound sentiments, the affections, and dispositions, involved in perfect and absolute holiness, can have an adequate object in the creature.

5. An argument, leading to the same conclusion, may be deduced from the analogy of the human mind. The soul of a human being, though finite, can be satisfied with nothing less than the infinite. Vast as creation is, it is not adequate to the capacities of the human mind. The whole universe is not sufficient for it. Nothing that has limitation or bounds seems adequate to its aspirations, to its ever growing powers, and its interminable existence. If a human spirit were informed that it was permitted for ever to have access to all created objects, but that *created* beings alone were to be the objects of its thoughts, its contemplations, its affections, its fellowship, and its sources of happiness, for ever, and that it could not be allowed to have the infinite Being for its object, it would feel itself restrained and confined, and long to emerge into the infinite. Though finite itself, it would feel that its powers of reflection, its faculties formed for endless development, and its immortal duration, fitted it for something greater than the whole universe. God alone is the proper object of a being having a rational, moral, and immortal nature. In the Deity there is an abyss of knowledge, of love, of perfection, of blessedness, which a created mind cannot fathom; and, because it cannot fathom that abyss, it enjoys the consciousness of sufficiency, of satisfaction, of perpetuity, of sources inexhaustible and eternal. A spirit, whose existence is endless, and whose mental and moral faculties are formed for boundless expansion, feels that it cannot rest, unless in the possession of God; for, no other object is suited to its nature. Now, it is in harmony with our mental constitution and requirements,

that God has graciously rendered himself accessible to all intelligent beings. But, if finite objects are not adequate to the faculties of a finite mind, How can they be adequate to the faculties or attributes of an infinite mind? If the mind of *man* feels the whole universe too little for its capacities, How can it be sufficient for the infinite capacities of the mind of Deity? If man, or angel, can rest in nothing but in the infinite, How can the mind of Jehovah rest in less? Thus, analogy carries us to the same conclusion—The universe, being finite, cannot be the adequate sphere for the full exercise of the Divine attributes and perfections.

The sum of the whole argument, sustaining our present proposition, is this:—Jehovah's attributes have been exercised eternally, but the universe has existed for only a limited duration, therefore God must have exercised his attributes before any creature existed. The exercise of the Divine attributes is essential, but the existence of the universe was contingent, and that which, in itself, is essential cannot be based upon a contingency. The exercise of the Divine attributes must be independent, because essential and eternal, and, therefore, cannot depend upon the existence of a creature. The attributes of Deity are infinite, but the whole assemblage of creation is only finite, and, therefore, cannot be the adequate and only object for the full exercise of the Divine perfections. If we select any one of these reasons, it will, of itself, sustain our conclusion; but, when the whole are put together, and combined, they furnish a four-fold exemplification of the absurdity of denying the proposition which stands at the head of this argument. Created existence cannot be the adequate and only object for the exercise of Jehovah's infinite perfections. We must, therefore, look for something infinitely anterior and superior to all creation.

PROPOSITION VII.

The mental archetypes of created existence could not be the adequate objects for the exercise of the Divine attributes.

By mental archetypes we mean the ideas of the various objects of which the universe consists, as they existed in the mind

of God before he gave them *actual* being. Though the actual universe be of only limited existence, yet, we must admit these archetypes to have been eternally in the mind of Deity; for, to deny this would be to deny the infinite knowledge of God, and to suppose him to have gradually received accessions to his intelligence, which is absurd. These archetypes, however, cannot be an adequate sphere for the full exercise of Jehovah's infinite attributes. Some of the reasons stated in support of the preceding proposition apply with equal, nay, with augmented force, in sustaining our present proposition. Though these archetypes were eternal, they were finite, and, therefore, insufficient. If the objects, when actually existing, are inadequate, the mere ideas of those objects must be equally insufficient, and, therefore, eternally insufficient. Besides, having proved that God is independent of the objects when they actually exist, he must have been equally independent of the ideas, or archetypes, prior to creation, and, therefore, eternally independent. The notion of God being eternally dependent upon mere ideas for the exercise of his attributes is too absurd to be held for a moment. God is not dependent upon anything, but absolutely and eternally independent. Moreover, mere ideas, or archetypes, having no substantive or personal existence, are not objects on which all the Divine attributes can be exercised. The mind of Deity might indeed contemplate them, and thus they would be objects of his intelligence; and his certain prospect of creatures who were to be brought into being might give exercise to some of his moral attributes: but these archetypes could not be objects of his actual power, his actual personal love and communion. When power is actually exerted, it must have a substantive existence for its object. When a moral affection is exercised, it must have a personal existence for its object. When the disposition for communion is exercised, it must have a mind for its object, capable of reciprocating thought, sentiment, purpose, and benign affection. It must, in fact, not be a mere idea, but a conscious, intelligent, moral being, or mind. Whether, therefore, we look at the absolute independence and infinitude of the Divine nature, or the unsubstantial and impersonal

existence of the mental archetypes of the created universe, we are irresistibly carried to the conclusion, that those archetypes could not be the adequate and only sphere for the exercise of the Divine attributes.

If, then, neither created existence itself, nor the archetypes of that creation, though eternally in the mind of Deity, afford an adequate sphere for the exercise of his attributes, we have still to determine what that sphere is. It is evident we must look to the Divine nature itself. This carries us to our next proposition.

PROPOSITION VIII.

The Divine nature itself is the only sphere in which God's attributes can have adequate scope for their fullest exercise.

It accords well with the independence and infinite excellence of the Divine Being, to say that all his resources are in himself. This is one fundamental distinction between the Creator and the creature, the perfect and the imperfect nature, the independent and the dependent being. The creature looks for happiness to something out of himself, because he has nothing but what is derived—even his very being. We have seen, too, that his only sufficiency is in God. This accords well with the fact, that he received his being, and his all from God. But God himself receives nothing from the creature, but his own. He gives all, but receives nothing. It is rational, therefore, to suppose that the fountain of all being, and of all blessing, should find his felicity, and the only adequate sphere for the infinite exercise of his own attributes, in his own nature. To this great truth, we are necessarily conducted by the preceding arguments. The Creator and the creature, comprehend all existence. If then the attributes of Deity have been eternally exercised, and neither the creature nor the archetypes of the creature be the adequate sphere of the Divine attributes, then the Divine nature itself must be that adequate sphere. There is nothing infinite but God himself, and that he is infinite and absolutely perfect, scripture and reason abundantly attest. His absolute perfection and infinity, are as

essential as his existence, and, therefore, his own nature must be adequate to the fullest scope of the exercise of his attributes; and as the eternal exercise of his attributes, is as essential as the existence of his attributes, it follows, that not only must his nature afford an ample sphere for the fullest exercise of his attributes, but such must be the peculiar mode of his Being, as to admit the possibility of the Divine attributes being exercised within, and upon itself. This peculiar mode, too, must be an essential element of the absolute perfection of the Divine nature; for, if in that nature there was no mode admitting of this exercise, then, this exercise of the Divine perfections could not take place, and, consequently, the Divine nature must be essentially imperfect. Absolute perfection, and infinite all-sufficiency, imply that the nature of God is such, that it is equal in its vastness to afford scope for the fullest exercise of its own powers, and that it has within itself, such a peculiar mode, as renders that exercise possible and practicable. To this conclusion, we are necessarily shut up, by the preceding train of argumentation.

PROPOSITION IX.

If the Divine nature be the only adequate sphere of the activity and exercise of the Divine attributes, then the peculiar mode of the Divine nature must admit of both agent and object within itself.

Under proposition II. it was proved that the exercise of the Divine attributes necessarily requires an object as well as an agent, and, in propositions VI. and VII., it was shown that neither the universe, nor the archetypes of the universe, could be the adequate object, and therefore both object and agent must exist in the Divine nature. As we cannot deny that both object and agent are necessarily implied in the exercise of the Divine perfections, and as we can find no adequate object in finite beings, we have no alternative but to conclude, that such must be the peculiar mode of the Divine nature, that it admits both object and agent within itself.

PROPOSITION X.

If the Divine nature admit of both agent and object within itself, there must be some plurality in the Godhead.

Under proposition IV. it was proved that agent and object cannot be numerically, identically, and in every respect the same, for they involve such different relations to each other, as cannot be sustained by one absolutely solitary existence. There must, therefore, be such a distinction between agent and object, as involves plurality of some sort: see pages 356-9.

PROPOSITION XI.

If the Divine nature admit of some plurality, it must be a plurality of Persons.

It would be irrational to suppose a plurality of essences, for this the argument does not require; it is contradicted by the testimony of scripture, and rendered improbable by the harmony, concord, and regularity of nature; yet the plurality is real, and not nominal, as proved in proposition IV. It cannot be a plurality of offices, for mere offices, however diverse, cannot be agent and object to one another. Nor can the plurality consist of the Deity and his attributes, for neither can these be reciprocally agent and object one to another. The plurality must consist of persons—of persons possessing distinct consciousness. This has been proved under the fourth proposition, and the following remarks may be added:—

In reference to some of the attributes, especially the moral perfections, the agent and the object stand in such relations as can be sustained only by Persons—mutually possessing intelligence, consciousness, and moral agency. Thus the love or moral benignity of God cannot in its highest character, be exercised towards any but a conscious and intelligent object. The attribute of holiness, including veracity, justice, and faithfulness, cannot be, in its highest character, exercised toward any being but one capable of appreciating truth, justice, faithfulness, and moral excellence. Such an object must be a person.

The act of communion, as before stated, implies the reciprocal intercourse of thought, disposition, will, purpose, and benign affection. Therefore, if the agent be a person, so must the object be a person, for they are reciprocally agent and object to each other. At present we speak not of the dignity involved in the object as well as the agent, sustaining these relations, and reciprocating this intercourse in its infinite extent. This must be noticed hereafter. At present we call attention merely to the fact, that the object as well as the agent must be a person, and, if so, the plurality in the Divine nature, must be a plurality of Persons. Thus reason conducts us step by step to a conclusion in perfect harmony with the doctrine of revelation—that there is a plurality of persons in the Godhead ; and thus the thesis at first propounded, becomes established as a rational deduction, and reason and scripture are seen to harmonize. Nor are we aware that in this argument we have assumed any principle without proof, or taken any proposition for granted. Each proposition in the series rationally springs from its predecessor. The whole is built upon established and unquestionable data, and the final conclusion is as logically necessary as the first principle.

The preceding argument does not indeed determine whether there be two or three persons in the Godhead, but it determines that there is a plurality or a distinction of persons in the Deity. The Holy Scriptures, however, determine that the Persons are three—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. It will hereafter be shown that this is consonant to reason.

PROPOSITION XII.

Each person existing in the Godhead must exist necessarily and eternally.

Whatever exists in the Deity must be necessary and eternal. There can be nothing in the Divine nature that is contingent or adventitious. Even every Divine attribute is essential and eternal : see proposition the first. Now, what applies to attributes must apply with greater force to persons. Thus, if

unity be essential to Deity, so is plurality. The plurality is absolutely essential to the Divine nature, and constitutes the Deity : therefore the persons unitedly possess the Divine nature and essence, and each is necessarily and eternally existent.

PROPOSITION XIII.

The persons in the Godhead must possess infinite attributes .

Each person existing essentially and eternally must possess the attributes connected with essential being ; each person existing in the Divine essence must possess the perfections of that essence. Therefore the infinite wisdom, power, goodness, holiness, and the absolute, natural, and moral perfections of the Father, must be those of the Son and Holy Spirit. The same truth flows from the exercise of the Divine attributes. For, if an infinite agent requires and implies an infinite object, then, the persons in the Godhead being mutually agent and object to one another, each must be infinite. See proposition VI. and VII.

PROPOSITION XIV.

The Persons in the Godhead must be coequal.

Infinity does not admit of gradations. There is nothing between the finite and the infinite. If one Person in the Godhead were at all inferior to another in dignity and glory, in natural or moral excellence, he must be infinitely inferior. But each person, as shown in the former proposition, is infinite. Each, possessing the Divine essence, must possess the Divine attributes : each, therefore, must be infinite in all his perfections ; and, if infinite in his perfections, there can be no inferiority or superiority. Therefore, the Divine Persons must be coequal in power, glory, and dignity. Nor is this equality incompatible with the relations in which the Persons stand to each other, as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.

PROPOSITION XV.

As each person essentially possesses the Divine attributes so each must have eternally exercised them. For, it has been demonstrated, that activity is involved in the very

existence of the Divine nature, and it follows, that this activity belongs to each person. If it be essential to one Divine person, it must, for the same reasons, be essential to the others; it cannot be predicated of one, and excluded from another. As an essential perfection, it must be the eternal characteristic of each blessed person in the Godhead.

PROPOSITION XVI.

As each person in the Godhead has eternally exercised the Divine attributes, it follows, that they must have been reciprocally agent and object one to another from all eternity, and must continue such to all eternity. This shows us how the Divine nature is to itself a sphere of infinite activity, and a source of infinite blessedness, independent of the existence of any created being.

Dr. Wardlaw reverently asks, "What were the occupations of the Divine mind during that eternity which preceded creation?" and he then remarks, "We feel as if we were chargeable with presumption, in having even so much as ventured to put the question into words;—so infinitely is the subject beyond the range of our short-sighted speculations—wrapt in a secrecy so profound and awful—the secrecy of him 'whom no man hath seen, nor can see'—of the depths of whose nature there is no line of created intelligence that can take the soundings."* We admire, and would imitate, the reverential spirit of the good doctor, but we think it does not require us to sound the depths of the Godhead, in order to say that those occupations must have been the reciprocal exercise of the Divine perfections by the persons of the Godhead. This exercise, we have before seen, was essential, and here we see infinite scope for that exercise, and infinite blessedness as the result. Baxter says, "the love of benevolence is a natural perfection in God, but the exercise of it is not necessary, because the being and felicity of the creature is not necessary."† This assertion involves an inconsistency. If the attribute was necessary, its exercise

* Wardlaw's *Christian Ethics*, p. 215.

† Baxter's *Practical Works*, vol. xx., p. 482.

was also necessary. Baxter's inconsistency arose from supposing that only created beings could be objects of benevolence. Benevolence is benignity or good will, and it was eternally exercised and reciprocated by the persons in the Godhead, before any creature was brought into being. The Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, living eternally in essential union, sustained the most intimate relations, and from these relations and the mutual possession of the Divine attributes, there must have subsisted the most intimate and endearing affection. Each must be full of benevolence and love to the other. Each loves, and each is loved in return. From all eternity the Father infinitely loved the Son, the Son infinitely loved the Father, and each infinitely loved the Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit infinitely loved both. Infinite delight and blessedness must be associated with the consciousness of this infinite love one for another. The Father complacently sees his own image in the Son, and both see their image in the Holy Spirit, not dimly and imperfectly reflected as in the creature, but clearly, perfectly, and infinitely—full-orbed in all the transcendent excellency and glories of absolute Divinity. Between minds, thus united to each other, and complacently delighting in each other, there must be the most perfect fellowship and communion. With equal intelligence, the infinite thoughts and conceptions of the one would be comprehended by the others. The holy will of one would harmonize with the will of the others. The vast purposes and designs of one would be approved and delighted in by the others. All the mental operations, all the benevolent affections, and all the moral emotions, of the Deity, would thus be mutually reciprocated and approved with ineffable complacency. Though we are unequal in our thoughts and conceptions, diverse in our sentiments, imperfect in our nature, and often inconstant in our affections, yet, the sanctified fellowship of human minds, one with another, is a prolific source of refined and exalted enjoyment. Still more refined and exalted is our enjoyment flowing from fellowship with God. What, then, must be the bliss springing from the communion of the Divine Persons, infinite in their

attributes, absolutely perfect in all their qualities, essentially intimate, indissoluble, and eternal, in their relations; and identical in all their thoughts, purposes, dispositions, and affections? Here must be harmony corresponding with absolute perfection of nature. Here must be enjoyment corresponding with infinite capacity. Thus, the attribute of holiness would be exercised and manifested between the Persons of the Godhead. Though existing in ineffable union, yet possessing distinct consciousness, they must sustain moral relations to each other, and hence their intercourse must evince and elicit their moral dispositions—must develop their moral qualities. And, each mind being infinite in its capacity, the absolute rectitude of the Divine nature, all the moral excellencies, and the infinite depths of the Divine perfections, would be unfolded to, and reciprocated by, each Person—the Father towards the Son, the Son towards the Father, and both towards the Holy Ghost. Further specification may not be necessary; nor is it possible for us to conceive all the infinite modes in which the Divine attributes would be eternally exercised by the Persons of the Godhead towards one another. But we may rest assured, that, seeing there are distinct personalities, with infinite attributes and capacities in each, and seeing these Divine Persons exist in eternal relations and essential union, there must be adequate scope for the fullest activity within the boundless sphere of the Divine nature itself, and resources therein of infinite and eternal felicity.

PROPOSITION XVII.

The works of God ad extra, are the works of each person in the Godhead.

In the operations of Deity we have to contemplate the Divine attributes exercised not only eternally and reciprocally and within the sphere of the Divine nature, but in the production of dependent creatures. After existing from eternity without any external manifestation, it pleased God, at the predetermined period, to issue the Almighty fiat in the creation of the material and spiritual universe. Now, if

each person possess and exercise the same attributes, it follows, that these external operations of God must be the works of each person. The distinction existing between the personal consciousness and relations in the Godhead may, indeed, admit of such a distinction in their operations, *ad extra*, as that one mode of acting may, by the Divine counsel, be more especially assumed by one person than by another; yet in all operations there must be such a harmonious concurrence of will, purpose, and design, and such a co-operation in the exercise of the Divine attributes, that the works of creation and providence must be the works of each. Thus the material universe, and the universe of mind, the creation and preservation of rational and irrational creatures, is one great effect of the conjoint operation of the three persons in the Godhead.

PROPOSITION XVIII.

All creatures stand in the same relation to each Person in the Godhead.

As the universe of matter and of mind is the work of each Person, and of all unitedly, it follows, that we stand related to each Divine Person as our Creator and God; and as we stand in the same relation to each, we owe to each the same duties arising from that relation. Thus, if homage, worship, love, and obedience, be due to one, we owe the same duties to each Person in the Godhead. Therefore, to deny the Deity of one Divine Person, is to insult the majesty of the other Persons; and to present homage to one, while refusing it to another, is to present a sacrifice which cannot be accepted. Though distinct in personality, yet united in essence and attributes, one Divine person cannot be denied or insulted without an affront being received by the Three.

PROPOSITION XIX.

The scriptural doctrine which determines the Divine persons to be a triad, is consonant to reason.

It has already been proved, that there must be a plurality of persons; revelation explicitly declares that plurality to be

three, and this doctrine is conformable to the testimony of reason. A plurality is essential, but no reason can be conceived why that plurality should be more or less than Three. While the sacred volume asserts that there are three persons, we think there are grounds for supposing this truth also is involved in the essential activity of the Divine persons. The preceding argument which proved that there must be a plurality of persons, was based upon the truth—that as the attributes of the Divine being are essential and eternal, so those which involve activity must have been exercised eternally, their activity being coeval with their existence. It has since been proved in proposition xv., that this activity belongs equally to each person—that as each person possesses the Divine nature and attributes, and as activity essentially belongs to one person, it must belong to each. Now if activity be essentially the characteristic of each person contemplated distinctly, it is reasonable to suppose it is their characteristic *conjointly*. Viewing the intimate union and essential relation of the Father and the Son, it is reasonable to suppose, that they would exercise the Divine attributes conjointly. Now, any conjoint infinite act must have an infinite object, which shall stand in the same relation to both; and if an infinite object, it must be something not *ad extra*, but, within the Divine nature, as proved in propositions VI., VII., VIII. This object, too, must be a person—a conscious intelligent object, as proved in proposition V. If, then, this object be a person, an infinite person, and if this person exist in the Divine nature, then must the Divine nature be of such a peculiar mode as admits, within itself, the existence of a Third person, which must have the same relation to the other Two persons, being the object of both. This is the doctrine of holy scripture, and thus, revelation and reason are seen to harmonize, in this important truth as well as in others.

Should it be asked, Does not this reasoning afford ground for rationally supposing that there may be more persons than three? our reply is, we think not. In the above argument it is shown, that the conjoint activity of two persons has

an infinite object in the third. Thus Father and Son being conjoint agents, say in the exercise of infinite love, have the Holy Spirit for an object; the Son and Spirit being conjoint agents, have the adorable Father for an object of their infinite love; and the Father and Spirit being conjoint agents, have the Son as the blessed object of their infinite love. This completes the relations and reciprocity of the persons, and reason can demand no more. Besides, we do not assume to be capable of affording a rigid *à priori* demonstration in this argument. Our aim is simply to show that the doctrine of Revelation which expressly determines the persons to be a triad, is consonant to reason. In this, we trust we have succeeded. We clearly see how a conjoint action of two persons requires an infinite object, and as this completes the reciprocity and the relations between the persons, reason requires no more, and the Holy Scriptures teach no more. This harmony between the teachings of revelation and the deductions of reason, must be satisfactory to every mind who reveres the sacred truths of the Bible, and restrains the dictates of human reason, within their proper province.

PROPOSITION XX.

The preceding arguments, for a plurality of persons, combine to sustain the scriptural doctrine of the unity of the Divine essence.

All truths must agree with one another. Sometimes, indeed, through the feebleness of our faculties—the faint degree of light we have upon a subject,—there are paradoxical appearances, and seeming inconsistencies, which somewhat embarrass our judgement. Yet, when two propositions are found to be true, if contemplated in their isolated condition, we are intuitively certain they must be equally true when combined. It is, however, always satisfactory when we find the arguments in support of one truth uniting their strength to support and establish another truth, embodied in a distinct and separate proposition. Thus it happens with regard to the two distinct propositions respect-

ing the Godhead, namely, the plurality of persons, and the unity of essence; both doctrines are taught in the scriptures, and, therefore, both must be essentially and eternally true. The plurality of persons we have shown is in accordance with reason, and, indeed, necessarily involved in the eternal exercise of the Divine attributes; and the same general argument leads to the conclusion that the Deity, though three in person, must be one in essence.

If the Divine Persons are reciprocally and adequately agent and object to one another, it follows, that they must possess absolute equality in intelligence, in love, in holiness, in all dispositions, affections, and powers. It has been shown, that, without this equality in the object, the exercise of the Divine perfections by the agent would be restrained and inadequate. It would not be commensurate with the capacities of the agent; and, from unequal powers and attributes, it must follow, that there could be no full or adequate reciprocity. Seeing, however, that the all-sufficiency and absolute perfection of the Divine nature necessarily involve the adequate exercise of the Divine perfections, it follows, that the persons who are mutually agent and object to each other must be co-infinite, and therefore co-equal, and this argues unity of essence.

Most theologians, however diverse in their sentiments on other points of doctrine, have contended that there can be but one infinite essence in existence. This almost universal agreement of sentiment is a fact which strongly argues how accordant the doctrine of God's essential unity is with the unsophisticated judgement. In addition to the evidence derivable from the reasoning of these authors, we adduce peculiar reasons springing from the foregoing argument.

1. *Intelligence*.—That the Persons may be reciprocally agent and object to one another, we have shown that each must have infinite intelligence. Now, as truth is essentially and immutably the same, it follows that different degrees of intelligence can only arise from partial ignorance, and difference of judgement from liability to error, and indeed actual error. If such diversity were the characteristics of any one of the

persons it would be a proof of a different nature ; it would involve an essential difference, and be incompatible with identity of essence. But, as the intelligence of each is infinite, there can be no diversity in kind or degree of knowledge, no difference in judgement. Each person has absolutely the same wisdom ; and, therefore, the Divine three must have the same views and the most perfect unanimity on all subjects. This eternal, unvarying, and immutable, unanimity of views and sentiment, on all subjects, is a powerful argument for oneness of essence or nature.

2. *Love*.—We have seen that each Divine Person exercises the same love—the same in its purity, its intensity, and immutability. Now, it is the characteristic of minds, essentially separate and different, to possess a corresponding difference of affection—the difference being one either in the nature, the intensity, or the objects, of their affection. Such a variety is incompatible with identity of essence. But an affection of exactly the same nature, always exercised toward the same objects, and with the same degree of intensity and constancy, throughout eternity, argues an identity of essence. Such, then, is the identity of their love. In it there is not the least diversity ; there never was, nor can there be for ever, and hence we argue their identity of essence.

3. *The disposition for communion*. We have seen that the disposition for communion is exercised by each person, and hence their reciprocal and eternal intercourse one with another. This disposition exists in the same intensity in each person ; and with the same disposition there is the same capacity for its exercise. If either the disposition or the capacity of one exceeded that of the other, the intercourse could not be in the fullest sense reciprocal, and, consequently, could not be perfect. It must be restrained and imperfect, nor could the essence of the persons be identical. But we have previously seen the communion is perfect. The thoughts, the will, the purposes, the principles, and the benign affections, of the one are identical with, and reciprocated by, the other. There is no defect, no diversity whatever. The harmony is complete ; the concord uninterrupted and

eternal. Such absolute harmony in the three Persons strongly argues an identity of essence.

4. *Holiness*.— We have seen that the dispositions and principles comprehended under the generic term holiness are reciprocally exercised by each Person in the Godhead. Now the exercise of the attribute of absolute holiness by the several persons throughout eternity, implies the same clear, comprehensive, and immutable views of truth, of all relations, duties, and obligations, without the least obscurity, defect, or diversity in each Person ; it implies also the same unchangeable principles of rectitude in each Person ; the same benign and holy dispositions, and moral affections ; the same moral faculties and capacities in each, without the least diversity, defect, or change. Indeed the least difference in moral sentiment, dispositions, or faculties, would necessarily imply a different nature. But, seeing there is no diversity at all, either in moral sentiments, moral qualities, or capacities, but eternally and immutably the same both in their nature and the extent of their exercise, such perfect identity in holiness argues an identity of nature.

Thus the arguments adduced to demonstrate a plurality of Persons in the Godhead, so far from being incompatible with the unity of the Divine essence, clearly imply that unity. All truths must accord with one another, and because the propositions in our arguments are true, they agree with both doctrines relating to the Godhead—namely, the plurality of persons, and the unity of essence.—The decisions of sound reason accord with the teachings of revelation which exhibit to man his glorious Creator as three in person and one in essence.—Jehovah, our Elohim, who, in the clearness and plenitude of the christian economy, is placed before us under the appropriate designation of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.

Summary of the general argument.—A brief recapitulation of the principles established may assist the reader, by presenting under his eye, at one view, the great truths which sustain the doctrine originally laid down. It was first shown that the doctrine was not repugnant to reason, and then,

in the positive argument, the following propositions were established:—

1. That all the attributes of the Divine nature are essential and eternal, equally so with the Divine essence.
2. That the active powers involved in the Divine attributes have been eternally exercised.
3. That the exercise of the Divine attributes implies the existence of object as well as agent.
4. That the object and agent involve an essential and real distinction, as they cannot be numerically and identically the same.
5. That the object, as well as the agent, must (at least with reference to the exercise of the moral attributes) be a conscious, intelligent, and moral Being, because they are reciprocally agent and object to each other.
6. That no adequate object can be found in created existence, because all created existence is limited, both in its duration and its nature.
7. That no adequate object can be found in the archetypes of creation, for although they existed in the mind of Deity prior to creation, they are impersonal and finite.
8. That only in the Divine nature itself can an infinite and adequate object be found.
9. That, therefore, the Divine nature must exist in such a peculiar mode as comprehends within itself both agent and object.
10. That, seeing agent and object are comprehended in the Divine nature, there must be some plurality.
11. That the plurality thus existing in the Godhead must be a plurality of Persons.
12. That each Person must exist in the Godhead necessarily and eternally.
13. That each Person in the Godhead must possess infinite attributes, because nothing finite can exist essentially in the Divine nature.
14. That the Divine Persons, being infinite, must be co-equal in dignity and glory.

15. That each Divine Person must have eternally exercised the Divine attributes.
16. That, as each Divine Person has eternally exercised the Divine attributes, the Persons must have been reciprocally and eternally agent and object to one another.
17. Each Person having mutually and eternally exercised the Divine attributes, it follows that all the operations, *ad extra*, must be the works of each Person, and of all conjointly.
18. That all finite beings stand in the same relation to each Person as creature and Creator, and owe to each the same homage, obedience, love, and devotion.
19. That the Persons are three, and three only, is a doctrine in conformity to reason, as well as Holy Scripture.
20. That the arguments which thus sustain a personal plurality are in harmony with the unity of the Divine essence, and rationally support this doctrine.

It is thus made manifest, that neither Sabellianism, which denies the distinction of the Persons; nor Unitarianism, which denies the Divinity of two of the Persons; nor Tritheism, which denies the unity of the Divine essence, has any more foundation in reason than it has in scripture. Sabellianism cannot be rational, for reason unites with scripture in proving a plurality of persons; Unitarianism cannot be rational, for reason unites with scripture in proving the divinity of each person: and Tritheism cannot be rational, for reason unites with scripture in establishing the unity of the Divine essence. It thus appears that the orthodox creed of three persons in one God, so far from being an enormous tax upon human credulity, is in harmony with the soundest philosophy. If to believe *without* evidence be credulity, then that credulity is justly chargeable upon the opponents of this doctrine. If to believe *against* evidence (against the evidence of scripture sustained by the deductions of reason) be a species of fanaticism, then that fanaticism belongs to

our opponents. But if to believe according to evidence be rational, then the faith of the orthodox christian is rational.

THE DILEMMA OF AN OBJECTOR.

We know of no objections, of any moment, but what have already been answered, either directly or by implication, in the process of argumentation we have pursued. But if, indeed, there were some tangible difficulties which might be alleged, and which it might be impossible, with our present amount of knowledge, to remove, still no mere difficulty could overturn or set aside any demonstrated principle. Such a principle takes its legitimate place in the category of truths, and remains a truth notwithstanding the difficulty connected with it. The truth arises from our knowledge, the difficulty arises from our ignorance; and what we know as a truth cannot be set aside by what we do not know. It is the part of a logical mind to retain every established truth, and wait for accessions to our knowledge, by which to remove any existing difficulty. The conclusion of our argument appears to us to flow necessarily from the premises involved in the preceding propositions. An opponent, who calls in question the correctness of our reasoning, is bound to prove either that our conclusion is false, or that our premises are unsound. If he can do neither, his objections are irrational. The propositions from first to last are, we conceive, inseparably connected, and the conclusion is as necessarily true as the first proposition. Any attempt to invalidate them must, we think, involve an objector in contradictions and absurdities, as a brief investigation will make apparent. Let us notice the consequences of an objector denying any of the propositions included in this chain of argument.

1. If he deny the first proposition—that the attributes of Jehovah are essential and eternal, his denial implies that for an eternity God was without them. He thus makes the existence of God's attributes contingent, and involves the possibility that he might never have had them at all. Is this rational? Can we indeed conceive a greater absurdity? The notion is incompatible with the immutability

and absolute perfection of the Deity, and, indeed, incompatible with his essence. It undeifies Jehovah, and denies the eternity and self-existence of his essence; for if his attributes are adventitious and contingent, so is his essence, as they cannot be separated from it even in conception. The notion, therefore, must be rejected on account of its absurdity.

2. If the objector admit the eternal existence of all the Divine attributes, but deny the eternal exercise of God's active powers and energies, we ask him for proof, but he can give us none. He is denying without any authority, either from scripture or reason. Moreover his denial implies that there was an eternity in which God did not exercise his active powers. Is this a rational supposition? His denial involves also a denial of the *existence* of some attributes, because their activity is essential to their very existence. Thus the attribute of omniscience involves the actual knowledge of all things. Thus, the attribute of infinite love implies the exercise of love; for, if a being do not love, he is without love. Thus holiness involves the exercise of moral dispositions, and for a being not to exercise them is to be without holiness. To deny the exercise of these and other attributes is then to deny their existence, and involves the absurdity before mentioned. The immutability and absolute perfection of the Deity at once annihilate all such futile objections.

3. If he admit the eternal exercise of some of Jehovah's active attributes, but deny the activity of others, again we ask him for proof.* But he has no proof to give from revelation or from reason. We ask, then, can it be rational to believe without proof? His denial is, indeed, contradictory to reason, for it implies that God is essentially different now from what he was during a prior eternity. This amounts to a denial of his immutability and absolute perfection.

* But if our argument only proved the eternal exercise of *one* Divine attribute which required an intelligent object, it would be sufficient to establish a plurality of persons. Thus before an objector can resist our argument he must be prepared to prove that God from all eternity never exercised one attribute which required an object.

For instance, to admit the eternal exercise of wisdom, but to deny the eternal exercise of love, or holiness, or power, or a disposition for communion, is to change the character of God, and, in effect, to undeify him. We cannot conceive of Deity to be immutable and absolutely perfect, and, yet, to have existed from all eternity without the exercise of love, or holiness, or power, and the objection which involves the supposition must be rejected as an absurdity.

4. If he admit that the attributes of Deity must have been exercised eternally, but deny that their exercise involves the existence of any object, we reply, his denial implies an impossibility. For, if a being know something, that something known is the object—if he love something, that something loved is the object, and so of the other attributes. The exercise of each involves the existence of object as well as agent.

5. If he admit that the exercise of an attribute requires an object as well as an agent, but deny that the object is a personal existence, we reply, none but a personal existence, or a conscious intelligent mind, can be the object with respect to the exercise of some of the Divine attributes. For instance, love or benignity cannot be exercised towards mere unorganized matter, nor, in its highest sense, towards any object, except it be a rational mind. Holiness implies moral relations, such as can exist only between moral agents ; it implies dispositions and affections which can only be exercised towards moral agents. So the disposition to communion can be exercised only between conscious and intelligent minds, and such minds must have a real personal existence. The objection therefore cannot stand ; it involves a contradiction to reason.

6. If he admit that the object, as well as the agent, must possess a conscious, intelligent, and personal existence, but contend that the objects exist in the created universe, we reply, This cannot be ; for, the objects constituting the created universe are not eternal. Besides, if they were eternal, they would be inadequate, because finite and limited. This objection, therefore, falls to the ground.

7. If he admit that no created being can be the object, but contend that the archetypes, or ideas, in the Divine mind were the objects, we reply, These ideas have no personal and substantive existence, which the exercise of the Divine attributes necessarily requires in the objects, as well as in the agent ; and, moreover, if they had, they are inadequate, because finite. This objection, like the former, has no rational foundation.

8. If he admit that the object as well as agent cannot be either in external nature or in the archetypes of nature, then he must admit the existence of a plurality of persons who, from eternity, have been mutually agent and object to one another in the reciprocal exercise of the Divine perfections.

9. If he contend that this conclusion involves the existence of three separate beings, as distinct from each other in essence as in personal consciousness, we reply, The argument does not sustain this conclusion. It necessarily proves the existence of a plurality in consciousness ; and, in connexion with this truth, it affords powerful evidence that there must be a unity of essence. The reciprocal possession and exercise of the same attributes, the same perfections, the same dispositions, and the same affections, involve the possession of an identical nature and essence ; for, where there is no difference, or variety, in any property, it is irrational to suppose a different nature, or essence ; and if the essence be one, the persons cannot be *separate* beings. They are distinct in personality, yet united in essence.

10. If the objector admit a oneness of essence, but argue for a gradation of dignity in the Persons, he reasons inconsistently ; for, identity of nature and attributes necessarily implies equality in the Persons. Any inferiority would imply an infinite disparity ; but this is impossible, seeing each Person possesses the same attributes in infinite measure.

11. If he finally admit this, as we conceive he must, he admits, with us, the Divine nature to consist of a plurality of Persons, with unity of essence.

12. If he admit this, he will find no difficulty in admitting the truth of the scriptural doctrine which restricts the

plurality to three Persons—Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, especially as this truth also is sustained by the verdict of reason, as we have shown in proposition XIX.

13. In admitting this, he recognizes, with us, each Person in the Godhead as sustaining the same relations to mankind, and to the whole intelligent universe, as our Creator and our God, claiming the same homage, adoration, obedience, affection, and devotedness. This is the Deity in whose name we are baptized, to whom we are consecrated in that holy ordinance, and with whom we enter into covenant relation as our God for ever and ever, whose we are and whom we serve—the glorious Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.

14. In the reception of this doctrine, he finds reason and revelation harmonize, and he is able to see how the Divine attributes have been infinitely exercised from eternity, irrespective and independent of all created being. He has no need either to deny the existence and exercise of the Divine attributes ; or, like Plato, Aristotle, and other ancient philosophers, to suppose the eternity of the universe, in order to find an object for the exercise of the Divine perfections, for, even if the universe were eternal, it would be inadequate. He sees that the only adequate sphere for the exercise of the Divine attributes is the Divine nature, and the absolute perfection and all-sufficiency of the Divine nature necessarily involve a mode of existence which admits their exercise reciprocally by the Persons in the Godhead.

He sees the faculty of infinite intelligence or wisdom exercised by each, in penetrating the infinite depths and capabilities of the Divine nature, in reciprocally comprehending the thoughts, purposes, will, and operations of an infinite mind. He sees infinite energy in that essential vitality which characterizes each. He sees infinite love, reciprocally exerted by the Divine persons, existing as they do in essential union, and the most intimate and endearing relations. The Father infinitely delighting in the Son and Spirit, and the Son and Spirit infinitely delighting in the Father, and in each other. He sees the disposition to

communion exercised without bounds. The intimate union, the endearing relation and infinite love of each, giving infinite intensity to the disposition, and the capacity of each affording infinite scope for its gratification ; every thought however vast ; every purpose however profound ; every volition ; every affection, however intense, being fully understood, appreciated, and reciprocated by each person, in eternal harmony and delectation. He sees how infinite holiness can be exercised and manifested. In the eternal relations of the Divine persons, in their infinite capacities and powers, he sees how truth, faithfulness, justice, benignity, and all moral qualities and affections have an infinite scope, and can be exercised without any limit either in their duration or extent. He sees no other mode than that of the personal distinctions and eternal relations, and no other scope than that of unbounded capacity, in which the attributes of God can be exercised in all their infinitude ; but, he sees both the mode and the capacity existing in the scriptural doctrine of the Trinity. He sees that infinite blessedness must be the associate of such a union of the persons, from such a mode of their existence, and from such a reciprocal exercise of the Divine perfections. If finite happiness flows from the exercise of finite benign affections, from finite and imperfect intercourse, from finite and imperfect holiness, he sees that infinite and eternal happiness must flow from such attributes when exercised without limit, without imperfection, and without interruption. Such, then, must be the essential, eternal, and independent blessedness of the Triune God. Through the infinite ages which preceded the first fiat of creation he was thus blessed ; had creation not yet existed he would have been thus blessed ; had creation been postponed for myriads of ages yet to come, he would have been thus blessed ; and had it been determined that creation should never take place at all he would have remained thus infinitely blessed. The Divine nature itself, comprehending a plurality of persons, with a unity of essence, constitutes an independent sphere of eternal activity, and an independent source of infinite blessedness.

While, in this argument, he sees that the Divine nature itself, from its eternity, its infinity, and its trinal distinction of persons, is the independent and eternal sphere of its own activity, and the source of its own infinite blessedness, he can perceive no discrepancy with this doctrine in the creation of the universe. The one presents before us the eternal and infinite mode of the exercise of the Divine perfections, but the other presents us with a particular and finite mode of their exercise. Thus, creation existed not because it was essential to Deity, but because he willed it; not because the exercise of his perfections could not take place without it, but because his wisdom determined it. He determined its mode, its particular limitation, its laws, its arrangements, its operations, its varieties of being, the date of its origin, the duration of its continuance in any particular state, and every other characteristic and property belonging to it. He resolved that there should be other intelligent beings besides himself, not because he needed them, as the only mode of exercising his moral attributes, or was constrained by any internal necessity to create them, but because it was his pleasure to give them existence, and cause them to participate of his love and happiness. At a determined period he gave them their being, he made them capable of knowing, loving, obeying, and enjoying, him. He gave them a moral nature, impressed upon them his own likeness, and imparted to them immortality. Creation was intended to be an external manifestation of himself; and rational and moral beings were fitted to perceive that manifestation, so that, looking into the great mirror of nature, they might see the reflection of the wisdom, power, goodness, and glory, of the Creator; and, rightly exercising their own faculties, and living in obedience to his will, they might enjoy his favour, realize perpetual communion with him, and participate of the joys springing from his benignity, through time and eternity. Though such a particular manifestation of the Deity could, neither in its duration, nor its extent, be an adequate sphere to the exercise of his infinite attributes, nor a source of happiness adequate to his infinite capacities—

for the finite cannot fill the infinite—yet, creation was in perfect accordance with his independence, his absolute perfection, and all-sufficiency. It was, indeed, because his nature and mode of being were eternally such as we have proved them to be, that there could be any external manifestation of the Deity. Had not the Divine attributes been exercised eternally, they never could have commenced their operations in time; had they not been exercised within the Divine nature, they never could have been put forth and displayed in the actual existence of the universe. The wisdom, the power, the benignity, the holiness, and all the active perfections of God we behold in nature and providence, are so many evidences and manifestations, that these active properties existed in the Deity prior to creation and providence, and that they existed in him eternally, essentially, and unchangeably.

The plurality of persons, conjoined with the unity of essence, presents a mode of existence which harmonizes with universal truth, so far as we can investigate that truth, whether in the nature of the Deity, or in the objective manifestations of his existence and perfections. The *à priori* argument from the Divine nature proves it, and the *à posteriori* argument from created nature accords with it. We see nothing discordant with the doctrine of the Trinity but what is discordant with truth. We see no way of resisting it but that of perverting our reason, and resisting evidence which has the force of a moral demonstration. The rejection, therefore, of this doctrine is an exhibition of folly, as well as of sin; it is irrational, as well as wicked; it is a violation of the laws of mind, as well as the law of God. Were there no attainable evidence of this doctrine in the present life, it would be our bounden duty to yield it our implicit and unwavering credence on the testimony of God; for, our allegiance to him involves the submission of our understanding to his teaching, as well as our will to his absolute control; but when revealed truth is sanctioned and corroborated by reason, the sin of rejecting it becomes enormously aggravated, and we are worthy of the greater condemnation and punishment.

CHAPTER III.

THE MODE OF THE ARGUMENT IS SUSTAINED BY THE COLLATERAL TESTIMONY OF HOLY SCRIPTURE.

WHATEVER doctrine or proposition is revealed from heaven is true, but it is not the fact of its being thus revealed that makes it true. It was absolutely true before it was revealed, and would have been eternally and unchangeably true had it never been revealed to man. Though it should remain for ever unknown to man, it would be known to God, and recognized by his omniscient and infallible mind as absolutely true. All that revelation does then, in respect to any truth, is to make it known to man, and thus invest it with Divine authority ; and the duty of man is to receive it cordially and thankfully as truth. With respect to some doctrines thus revealed from heaven, it may be that we are not able to produce any demonstration of their truth, but it is certain we can produce no demonstration to the contrary. It therefore is our duty to admit them as truths because of their divine authority. The fact that they are revealed from heaven is a guarantee to us that they are true, for they are declared by that God who cannot be deceived himself, and who cannot deceive his creatures. His infinite wisdom precludes the possibility of his being deceived himself, and his unchangeable goodness precludes the possibility of his deceiving others. Therefore whatever doctrine or proposition he declares in his blessed word must be unchangeably, eternally, and absolutely true. This is a fundamental principle which every rational mind must admit. If, then, it be received as a fundamental principle that every doctrine which God reveals is true, it follows that whenever a process of reasoning contradicts the scriptures, it must be false. There must be error somewhere in the argument, either in the premises or in the conclusion. But on the other hand, whenever we reason correctly, both

our process of argument, and our conclusion, must be in conformity with revelation. If, then, the doctrine of the Trinity be revealed from heaven, no rational argument can disprove it. This is impossible. Every argument which affects to disprove it, must be false somewhere—either the premises are untenable, or the conclusion is illogical.

The *conclusion* of our argument on the Trinity is unquestionably in harmony with the scripture doctrine, and must be true; and, if the process of argument which leads to this conclusion, be correct, it will follow, that the premises themselves are also in harmony with scripture. Since the argument was conceived and written out, we have been struck with a variety of instances, in which its leading and fundamental propositions, are sustained by incidental declarations of Holy Scripture. The fundamental principles in the argument are these—that as the Divine attributes are exercised *now*, so if God be unchangeable, they must have been exercised not merely within the limited period of creation, but eternally; and, as their exercise requires an object, that object must be eternal also; and, as their exercise, to be adequate, must be infinite, so their object must be both infinite and eternal; and, as the object must be a conscious personal existence, so the Divine nature which alone is infinite and eternal, must be characterized by such a peculiar mode as includes a plurality of persons.

After this argument was elaborated by rational induction, the inquiry naturally suggested itself to the mind of the author—seeing the *conclusion* of the argument is in perfect accordance with the Holy Scripture, Do the several *premises* in the process of the argument, derive any sanction from the same Divine authority? Do the scriptures speak at all on the fundamental principles here laid down by reason, and if they do, what is their testimony? Contemplated purely as a rational argument, it was not incongruous to make this inquiry, and it certainly could not be without some interest and importance. The inquiry thus suggested soon brought before the mind a variety of texts, which uttered no equivocal testimony in support of the leading

principles of our argument. It will at once be seen that any passages available for this object must refer to the condition of the Divine existence as it was prior to all created being, and totally independent and irrespective of all created being; and several such passages are supplied in the word of God. While there is not a single text in the bible which represents the attributes or active perfections of the Deity as being dormant or latent prior to creation, there are several which describe them as in active operation prior to the first fiat of creative power. While there is no passage which represents God, in the exercise of his attributes, as being both agent and object in the same act, abstractedly and absolutely considered, there are several passages which represent his attributes as being so exercised as to involve agent and object distinct from one another. While there is no passage which represents God as existing in that absolute oneness which excludes all plurality from his nature, there are several which describe him prior to all creation, existing in such a plurality as admitted of the reciprocal exercise of love, communion, holiness, &c. It is our duty to adduce a few of these remarkable portions of scripture.

I. *The eternal exercise of love.*—In our argument we laid down the proposition that love requires an object as well as an agent, and the object must be co-eternal and co-infinite with the agent. Our blessed Lord expressly declares that the Father loved him before the era of recorded time, or, before the foundation of the world—"Father, I will that they also whom thou hast given me be with me where I am; that they may behold my glory which thou hast given me: for thou lovedst me before the foundation of the world."—John xvii., 24. This passage carries our minds back to eternity—to the ages which preceded any *created* existence. The foundation of the world means the beginning of time: *since* the foundation, or *from* the foundation, of the world means since time began to be: but *before* the foundation of the world means *eternity*—the infinite ages prior to any created existence. Take a few examples. Christ is said to have been "slain from the foundation of the world—"*

* Rev. xiii., 8.

that is, set forth by type, promise, and prophecy, as a sacrificial victim through all the ages of time. But in another place he is said to have been ordained to be a Saviour prior to this period—even from eternity : as the apostle Peter states, He was “foreordained BEFORE the foundation of the world.”* So saints were chosen in Christ to gospel privileges from eternity; as Paul says, “According as he hath chosen us in him BEFORE the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and without blame before him in love.”† Thus it is clear as the light of day, that the phrase, “before the foundation of the world,” means that dateless eternity which preceded all created existence. The Psalmist in like manner refers to the infinite ages prior to creation, and speaks of that period as the eternity of God’s existence—“Before the mountains were brought forth or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting thou art God.”‡

The Redeemer’s words, therefore, carry us back to that awful eternity which preceded creation, when there was not a creature yet formed, and show us the condition of the Divine existence at that period. What, then, was the condition of the Divine existence during that preceding eternity? Was it one of inactivity? On the contrary, it was one of love; it was one in which the benevolent affection was in full exercise. What then did God love? Was it mere self-love, or was it a benevolent love directed to an object? It was a love directed to an object, as truly, as really, as it is this moment. Who, then, was the object of this love prior to all creation, prior to the existence of any created being, and during the awful eternity of his existence? Our Lord’s words give the answer most emphatically. “Thou lovedst me before the foundation of the world,”—when there was no being as yet in existence, when the universe was unborn, when there was as yet no external manifestation of his perfections. The eternal Father loved, and the eternal Son was the object of his love. This corroborates the leading principle of our argument—that love requires an object as

* 1 Peter, i., 20.

+ Ephesians i., 4.

‡ Psalm xc., 2.

well as an agent, and the object as well as the agent must be a person, and must be eternal.

II. *The Father and the Son existed in mutual glory, during that eternity which preceded creation.* “And now O Father, glorify thou me with thine own self, with the glory which I had with thee before the world was.” John xvii., 5. This passage carries us back to the same dateless period of eternity, to the ages prior to the existence of any created object, and represents both Father and Son enjoying together a state of glory. The passage is very remarkable, and worthy of a thorough investigation. To elicit the meaning and application of the passage, it is requisite to inquire, First, What is meant by the glory of God, and, Secondly, What is intended by Christ having this glory with the Father *himself*.

1. The glory of God means his estate of dignity, perfection, and blessedness. Our Lord’s words clearly indicate, that whatever glory God has now he had before a creature was formed; for, he speaks of his glory “before the world was.” If it be essential to his glory *now* to be holy, just, benevolent, wise, powerful—to possess and exercise all his attributes, it was equally an element of his glory before the world was. We cannot detach any of these properties, qualities, or perfections, from God, without detracting from his glory. We cannot suppose him to have been deficient in any one of them prior to creation, without supposing his glory to have been less at that period than what it is now. But, as our Lord’s words imply, he had the same glory before the world was, they necessarily imply that he had the same elements of perfection, dignity, and happiness, from all eternity, and, therefore, the Scriptures being our guide, his attributes were exercised eternally.

2. Our Lord teaches that he had this glory with the Father before the world was; he therefore participated with him in the dignity, perfection, and blessedness of his nature from all eternity. As our Lord’s language necessarily carries us to a period anterior to all creation, it necessarily refers to the condition of the Divine existence, independent of, and abstracted from, all created being. What then was that

condition of the Divine existence? It was one of glory mutually enjoyed by a plurality—the glory arising exclusively from the Divine nature. “Glorify thou me with thine own self (*παρὰ σεαυτῷ*)”—not with any external dignities or honours, but with thine own abstract self, thy very nature, thy very being, thine own essential perfections, even “with the glory which I had with thee (*παρὰ σοι*) before the world was.” Thus it is evident that from all eternity the Son enjoyed a glory in or with the Father’s own self. This glory, then, was not adventitious but essential, not created but uncreated, not external but internal, or within the Divine nature: it was a glory within the very *self* or essential being of the Deity. The passage before examined represents the Father as loving the Son before any created being existed, and this passage represents Him and the Son together enjoying a glory which had no source but his own self, his own essential being, and that before the world was. The two periods referred to in each passage are, therefore, the same—they both carry us to that eternity before a creature was yet in existence; and they both describe the same state of being; for, if the Son was eternally loved by the Father, he must have enjoyed his eternal and essential glory; and if he enjoyed his essential glory, he must have been an object of his eternal love.

There is a beautiful and expressive harmony in the phrases employed in these passages. As the reference is to a state of being prior to all creation, it is evident that whatever love and glory were reciprocated must have been with the Deity *alone*; and hence the appropriate phrase “*with thine own self*.” There was as yet no created being who could give him glory, who could love or glorify either Father or Son. If glory was enjoyed, or if love was reciprocated, in unison with any being at all in that anterior eternity, it must be with the Deity alone, as our Lord states, “*with thine own self*.” He is speaking of a period when, as yet, the foundations of the world were not laid, when the matter of the universe was not called into being, when no seraph had gazed upon his majesty, when no radiant worshipper had veiled his face and fallen prostrate before him, when the vast solitudes of

space were untenanted, and the silence of eternity unbroken by the voice of any created being, and when the Godhead existed alone. It was then that the Son was loved by the Father; it was then that he had a glory with the Father's "*own self*," and with no other—in unison with his infinite and eternal being.

3. This language is expressive also of agent and object existing in the Deity. If the Son had a glory with the Father's "*own self*," and the Father with the Son, there was distinct consciousness, and mutual recognition, reciprocal love, holiness, communion, and blessedness, in which they were mutually agent and object one to another. This scriptural representation then is in harmony with our argument, and sustains its fundamental premises.

III. In our argument we have stated, that if in the Godhead there be a plurality, who are mutually object and agent to each other, they must thoroughly know each other. The thoughts, purposes, and will, of each, must be reciprocally understood and comprehended. This, too, is expressly asserted in the sacred scriptures, and asserted in reference to each person—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. Thus the Father and the Son are declared mutually to know each other. Our Lord says, "As the Father knoweth me, even so know I the Father."* No one will dispute the perfect knowledge of the Father, but here, the same perfection is ascribed to the Son. In the same perfect manner the Holy Ghost is declared to have a knowledge which pierces into the very depths of the Godhead, and comprehends every thought, purpose, disposition and affection. "For the Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God. For what man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of a man which is in him? Even so knoweth no man the things of God, but the Spirit of God."† Just as a human soul is conscious of all its own thoughts, desires, emotions, and determinations; so the Holy Spirit is conscious of all that passes in the mind of Deity. In the same express manner God the Father is said to know the mind of the

* John, x., 15. † 1 Cor., ii., 10, 11.

Spirit. “He that searcheth the heart, knoweth what is the mind of the Spirit.”*

These scriptures, therefore, teaching such absolute knowledge by, and of, each person—by the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, plainly declare that they are reciprocally agent and object to each other; and if so now, they must have been so from all eternity. For the knowledge of the Father comprehends all the events of eternity—all that exists in his own nature; and all that has, does, or will exist in external nature. If, then, the Son comprehends this, he must be eternal; and if the Spirit comprehends this, he must be eternal also. Each person must also be infinite. No finite mind can comprehend infinity; for, says the Saviour, “No being (not no *man*, for that word is not in the original, but)—no being knoweth the Son but the Father.”† Thus the teachings of holy scripture give direct support to the several premises in our argument.

IV. The mutual knowledge, love, and glory, here eternally ascribed to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, imply the most intimate communion, the most delightful fellowship, one with another. From what we know of the laws of mind, a delightful fellowship must subsist between human beings when they have mutual views, harmonious sentiments and affections; and it is irrational, and, indeed, impossible, to suppose a different result in the Three Divine Persons. If the Father is conscious of all the thoughts, intentions, purposes, and dispositions of the Son, and the Son of the Father, and the Holy Ghost of both, and both of the Holy Ghost; and if this mutual knowledge be combined with reciprocal love, there must be the most intimate and delightful communion. This itself in fact is actual communion of the most intimate and exalted kind which can be conceived: a communion yielding felicity as infinite as their capacities, and as durable as their existence. If, then, the sacred scriptures teach that this was the condition of the Divine nature prior to all creation—during those dateless ages of

* Rom., viii., 26.

† Καὶ οὐδεὶς ἐπιγινώσκει τὸν υἱὸν εἰ μὴ ὁ πατήρ.—Mat. xi., 27.

eternity when there was nothing in existence but the Deity, it is obvious that our argument from reason is corroborated by the testimony of revelation—the *premises* of our argument, as well as the conclusion, have the direct sanction of Divine authority. Though it was not the consideration of these special texts of scripture which suggested the argument at first, it is satisfactory to find the harmony and consistency of reason and scripture thus demonstrated.

V. Our argument for the essential union of the persons is also sanctioned by the testimony of Scripture. The apostle John declares, that, “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God.”* The period intended by the phrase—in *the beginning*, is the eternity which preceded creation. This is too obvious to be rationally doubted. The whole context irresistibly proves it. The evangelist speaks of two distinct periods. He speaks first of the condition of the Divine existence *prior* to creation; and then proceeds to speak of creation itself. Having spoken, in the two first verses, of what was the condition of the Divine existence *before* creation, he observes in the next verse “All things were made by him (the Divine word), and without him was not anything made that was made.” This shows plainly that he speaks of two periods—eternity and time; and it so clearly fixes and defines the first period of which he was speaking that we cannot mistake it. That period was evidently the eternity prior to the existence of any created thing—not only prior to the existence of our world, but prior to all things, for, he emphatically declares “without him was not any thing made that was made.”

What, then, does he affirm was the condition or mode of the Divine existence during those awful and dateless ages of eternity? Did the Deity then exist in absolute oneness? Was there no plurality at all? The apostle expressly affirms that the Divine Logos was then in existence—that he was co-existent with God, for “he was with God, and he was

* John i. 1. *Sic mos Hebræis Eternitatem populariter describere.* Grotius. Such was the Hebrew manner of setting forth eternity.

God." Carry back, then, the period of the existence of the Father as remotely as we may, we have the same duration ascribed to the Son. During whatever period the Father existed, the Logos was with him. If the Father was eternal, so was the Son, for he was with him. There is no difference—the same eternity is applicable to one Divine person as the other. Here, then, was plurality, an eternal plurality.

But this plurality is compatible with the most intimate and essential union of nature, for it is declared "*the Word was with God.*" The apostle intended this union to be as vividly impressed upon our minds as the Divine plurality, for he asserts the one in immediate connexion with the other, and he asserts it twice. Not content with once uttering the assertion—"The Word was with God," he immediately reiterates the truth, "the same was in the beginning with God." There is a peculiar emphasis intended by this repetition. It is, indeed, the apostle's usual manner of marking the importance of a subject, of expressing its peculiarity, and drawing special attention to it. The phrase rendered *with God* (*πρὸς τὸν Θεόν*) is expressive of the most intimate union compatible with distinction. It is, indeed, synonymous with the passage before quoted from John xvii. 5, where our Lord speaks of the glory which he had *WITH* the Father before the world was. The same truth is repeated in John's first epistle i., 2.—"That which was from the beginning which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled of the Word of Life. For the Life was manifested, and we have seen it, and bear witness, and shew unto you that Eternal Life, which was with the Father, (*πρὸς τὸν πατέρα*) and was manifested unto us. He who is here called the Word and the Life, is declared to have been manifested in the flesh, and so manifested that the apostle had seen him, and heard him, and handled him; but, prior to this manifestation, he was *with the Father*—that is, as we have shown, existed from eternity in the most intimate union with him. In another place the same essential union is asserted by his being "in the bosom of the Father," and

by his being one with the Father—"I and my Father are one." So intimately *one* in nature, attributes, and propriety, that the Redeemer could say, "All things that the Father hath are mine." So intimately one in nature, attributes, and operation, that he was the express image of his person, and could say to the inquiring disciple, "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father, how, then, sayest thou show us the Father. Believest thou not that I am in the Father, and the Father in me? The words that I speak unto you I speak not of myself, but the Father that dwelleth in me he doeth the works. Believe me that I am in the Father, and the Father in me." These, and all such passages, serve to unfold more clearly and fully the meaning of the apostle's language, when, referring to the eternal existence of the Divine word, he declares that he was in the beginning with God; and the meaning of our Lord's own words, when he speaks of being loved by the Father before the foundation of the world, and of enjoying a glory with the Father—with the Father's own self, before the world was.

Such, then, are some of the representations which the scriptures afford, when they make any reference to the condition of the Divine existence prior to creation. They never set forth the Deity as dwelling in that absolute oneness which excludes all plurality and distinction of persons, nor in that absolute solitude which excludes the possibility of his attributes being exercised upon some object. But they represent Jehovah as a plurality of persons from all eternity, loving and being loved, as mutually enjoying glory together, as communing with, and realizing felicity one with another—the sphere of the eternal activity, and the source of the Divine happiness, being solely comprehended in the boundless ocean of the Divine nature. This, then, is the doctrine

* The phrase *πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν* expresses the sense of the dative—*παρὰ σεαυτῷ*, *with thyself*; and *παρὰ σοὶ*, *with thee*—John xvii., 5. Thus it is rendered by Ignatius, *παρὰ πατρὶ*. Compare also *πρὸς ἡμᾶς*, Mark vi., 3., with Prov. viii., 30., where, in the Septuagint, wisdom is said to have been *παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ*; and Sapiientia ix., 9., where the same sense is given to *μετα σοῦ ἡ σοφία*.

of the sacred records respecting God, whenever they carry our thoughts to the mode of God's existence, during those immeasurable ages of eternity which preceded the first fiat of creative energy; and, here we find the premises of our argument sanctioned by Divine authority—we see the dictates of reason corroborated by the teachings of revelation.

VI. We may notice another passage which directly confirms our reasoning on the absolute independence and all-sufficiency of God, and on the Divine nature itself being the only adequate sphere of his own activity, and the source of his happiness. The passage we refer is the following, “Who is like unto Jehovah, our Elohim who dwelleth on high, who humbleth himself to behold the things that are in heaven and in earth?” Now, the things that are in heaven and in earth are all things that exist besides himself; all created beings, whether material or immaterial; whether rational or irrational; whether human or angelic, the highest as well as the lowest. It is here said to be a condescension on the part of God to behold them, to notice them; and if a condescension to behold them, he is absolutely independent of them—independent of their very existence—absolutely independent of them for his happiness, his perfection, his glory, and the exercise of his attributes. If he is thus independent of them now, he always was, for he is unchangeable. And, if absolutely and eternally independent of them, there was no need for his creating them; such must be his nature and the mode of his existence, that it has, within itself alone, a source of blessedness, and a sphere of activity, adequate to its infinite faculties, energies, and capacities. Such a nature, we have shown, implies a plurality—object as well as agent within itself, and both agent and object must be persons—infinite, eternal, coequal persons. Thus, the rational interpretation of this passage involves both the premises and the conclusion of our argument.—Reason and scripture lead to the same result.

Yet, though absolutely independent and eternally blessed as the Deity is in himself, essentially united and completely happy as the Divine persons are in themselves, they do not

exclude the creatures from their regard. Though a regard to created existence is a condescension, they *do* condescend to behold the things that are in heaven and in earth. It was their blessed will to create them, it is their blessed will to regard them, to supply their need, to promote their welfare and happiness. The essential glory and infinite blessedness of the Divine persons are with themselves, as much so since creation, as in those immeasurable ages which preceded creation; but they love the work of their own hand, and delight to do them good, though they need them not. Thus their regard to the creature springs from pure, disinterested benevolence. Their all-sufficiency resides in their own infinite nature. The adequate sphere for the operation of their own essentially active energies, and the source of their absolute blessedness, reside in themselves; thus it was prior to all created being—thus it has been during the existence of created being—thus it is now, and ever shall be through the infinite ages of eternity to come.

DIRECT TESTIMONY OF THE SACRED SCRIPTURE, AS TO THE
DOCTRINE OF THE HOLY TRINITY.

As this volume may fall into the hands of some readers who are not in possession of the Author's first volume of Theology, wherein the scripture doctrine of the Trinity is copiously unfolded, it may be proper to close this chapter with a brief and concentrated view of the direct evidence which the sacred scriptures so richly furnish, in reference to that important doctrine, which has been established by a process of rational argumentation.

First.—*The names of God are directly applied to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.* This is never questioned respecting the Father. The Son is designated God—the true God—the blessed God—the great God—the mighty God—God over all—the Lord God—Jehovah—Jehovah of Hosts. See John, i., 1. 1 John, v., 19, 20. Rom., ix., 5. Titus, ii., 13. Isaiah, ix., 6. Luke, i., 16—17. Eph., iv., 8, 9, 10, compared with Psalm lxviii., 18. Isaiah, vi., 1—3. The Holy Ghost is designated God—Lord—Jehovah—Jehovah

God—the God of Israel—Jehovah God of Hosts. Acts, v., 3—9. 2 Cor., iii., 18. Acts, i., 16—20, compare with Psalms xlix. and cix. Luke, i., 67. Judges, xv., 14. Isaiah, vi., compared with Acts, xxviii., 25, 26, 27. From a view of these and a multitude of other passages, it is evident, that the peculiar and proper names of Deity are applied to the Divine three—the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.

Secondly.—*The attributes and perfections of God are those of a Trinity of Persons.*

1. *Each glorious person is declared to be eternal.* Of the Father it is said, “From everlasting to everlasting thou art God.” Of the Divine Word it is said, “He is the Alpha and the Omega, the beginning and the end, the first and the last;” that “he was in the beginning with God;” and that “his goings forth have been from the days of eternity.” And of the Holy Ghost it is said, that “Christ, through the *Eternal Spirit*, offered himself without spot a sacrifice to God.”—Psalm xc., 2; Rev. i., 8; Heb. ix., 14, &c.

2. *The power of God is the power of the blessed Trinity.* Speaking of the Father’s agency, the Apostle says that he was “appointed a minister of the Gospel by the grace of God given unto him by the effectual working of *God’s power*.” Speaking of the Son, he saith, “Most gladly will I glory in mine infirmities, that *the power of Christ* may rest upon me.” And, speaking of the Holy Ghost, he saith that “signs and wonders were wrought by *the power of the Spirit of God*.” Eph. iii., 7; 2 Cor. xii., 9; Rom. xv., 19.

3. *The omnipresence of God is the omnipresence of the glorious Three in One.* “Do not I fill heaven and earth, saith Jehovah.” Of the Son it is said, that “he filleth all in all.” To Moses God said, “In all places where I record my name I will come unto thee, and I will bless thee.” Christ said, asserting the same Divine attribute, “For where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them.” Of the Holy Ghost the Psalmist said, “Whither shall I go from *thy Spirit*? or, whither shall I flee from thy presence?” And, again, the Holy Spirit, to denote his omnipresence, is said to

dwell in the hearts of God's people. Thus it is evident the omnipresence of the Deity is the omnipresence of the Trinity in Unity. Jer. xxiii., 24; Eph. i., 23.; Exod. xx., 24; Matt. xviii., 20; Psal. cxxxix., 7.

4. *The holiness of God is the holiness of the glorious Trinity.* "Who would not fear thee, O Jehovah, and glorify thy name, for thou only art holy?" Of Christ it is said, that he is "the Holy One." "But ye denied the Holy One, and desired a murderer to be released unto you." The Spirit is emphatically called "the Holy Ghost." "Ye have an unction from the Holy One." And of the whole Trinity the cherubim and seraphim exclaim, "Holy, holy, holy, is Jehovah of Hosts." Rev. xv., 4; Acts iii., 14; 1 John, ii., 20.; Isaiah vi., 3.

5. Truth, as an attribute or perfection of God, is the attribute of the *blessed Three in One*. Of the Father it is said, by Christ, "He that sent me is True." Of the Divine Word it is declared, "These things saith he that is Holy, he that is True, he that hath the key of David." "This is the True God and Eternal Life." Of the Holy Ghost it is said, "It is the Spirit that beareth witness, because the Spirit is Truth." Thus, the Truth of God is the truth of the Trinity in Unity. John vii., 28; Rev. iii., 7; 1 John, v., 20; 1 John, v., 6.

6. The Omniscience of God is the Omniscience of the *Triune Jehovah*. Of the Father it is said, that "he searcheth the heart." Christ also declares, "All the churches shall know that I am he which searcheth the reins and the hearts." Of the Holy Ghost it is said, that "the Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God. For, What man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man, which is in him? even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God." Jer. xvii., 10; Rev. ii., 23; 1 Cor. ii., 10, 11. Here is an appeal to our own consciousness. As a man knows his own thoughts, affections, and emotions, and as no one else can know them but himself; so the Holy Ghost, penetrating the profound depths of the Godhead, understands and comprehends all the thoughts and purposes, and is conversant with all the dispositions

and affections, in the mind of the Deity throughout the ages of eternity.

7. The benevolence of God is the benevolence of the ever blessed *Three in One*. The prophet Nahum says "The Lord is good," "He is a stronghold in the day of trouble." And it is said, "God so loved the world," &c. Of the Son, also, it is said, that "Christ *loved* the church, and gave himself for it, that he might sanctify and cleanse it with the washing of water by the word," and so on. And of the Holy Ghost it is said, by the Psalmist, "Thy Spirit *is Good* (benevolent): lead me in the land of uprightness." And Nehemiah, enumerating God's great benefits to the ancient Israelites, says, "Thou gavest them thy Good SPIRIT, or, thy benevolent Spirit." Now, here we have it proved that the goodness of God is the goodness of the Trinity in Unity. Nahum i., 7; Psalm cxliii., 10; Eph. v., 25; Neh. ix., 20.

8. The disposition for communion is ascribed to the Ever Blessed Three. It is exercised towards the saints by the Father, and the Son; "For truly our *fellowship* is with the Father, and with his Son Jesus Christ." Also with the Holy Ghost; "The *communion* of the Holy Ghost be with you all, Amen." It was also reciprocally exercised by the Divine persons before man was created; and "God said, let us make man in our image—after our likeness. 1 John, i., 3; 2 Cor., xiii., 14; Gen. i., 26.

Thus, then, the attributes of eternity, of omnipotence, of omniscience, of omnipresence, with the moral perfections of truth, of love, of holiness, and the disposition for communion in their infinite perfection are the attributes of a Trinity in Unity. All the perfections which belong to the Father belong also to the Son and to the Holy Spirit; which proves as clearly as language and facts can prove, that in the Godhead there are Three Persons; and that, in essence and perfections, these Three are One.

Thirdly.—We observe that the works of God are also the operations of the Trinity in Unity.

1. *Creation*. The creation of the world is ascribed to

the eternal and almighty *Three in One*. Of God it is said, "that the heavens and the earth are the work of his hand." Of Christ it is said, that "by him all things were made, visible or invisible." And of the Holy Ghost it is said, "The Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters"—arranging and distributing the conflicting elements, impregnating them with their first principles, and disposing them into that order and harmony which resulted in the beauty and glory of the universe. And, again, it is said in Job, "by his Spirit he hath garnished the heavens." John i., 3; Gen. i., 2; Job xxvi., 13. Thus, creation is ascribed to each; and yet these Three are One; for in the first verse of the Bible it is said, "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth." And the noun, though plural, is constructed with a singular verb and pronoun.

2. *The creation of man*, the most noble and important work of God on earth, is ascribed to the *Divine Three*. Of the Father it is said, that "Jehovah God formed man out of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life." Of Christ it is said, that "by him all things were made, whether visible or invisible;" which of course comprehends *man*. And of the Holy Ghost it is said, by Job, "The Spirit of God hath made me, and the breath of the Almighty hath given me life." Gen. ii., 7; John i., 3; Job xxxiii., 4.

Viewing man thus, as the work of the Trinity—of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, we clearly see the reason and force of the language, "And God said, let US make man in OUR image, and in OUR likeness," &c. Gen. i., 26. And in this view we see why man is called upon to remember his *Creators*. Eccles. xii., 1,—“Remember now thy בוראִיך, thy Creators, in the days of thy youth.” In the language of Scripture there is always a propriety and force which is seen by diligent and careful examination. See the force, the beauty, and the propriety, of Scripture language in these instances.

3. *The preservation of all things is the work of the Triune God*. Providence is everywhere ascribed to the Father.

So it is to the Son; for “he upholdeth all things by the word of his own power,” and “by him all things consist.” So the same work is ascribed to the Holy Spirit; for, says the Psalmist, “Thou sendest forth thy Spirit, and they are created, and thou *renewest the face of the earth.*” Heb. i., 2; Col. i., 16; Ps. civ., 30.

4. The *Trinity in Unity* raised the body of Christ from the dead. Of the Father it is said, “God hath both raised up the Lord, and will raise up us by his own power.” The same is asserted by Christ. “Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up.” “I have power to lay down my life, and I have power to take it up again.” And the same great work is ascribed to the Spirit. “Christ was put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the Spirit.” 1 Cor., vi., 14; John ii., 19; x., 18; 1 Peter iii., 18.

5. The raising of all mankind is the work of the Ever Blessed Three. Of the Father it is said, “that he raiseth up the dead, and quickeneth whom he will.” Christ declareth, “Even so the Son quickeneth whom he will; and “all that are in their graves shall hear his voice, and come forth.” The same work is ascribed to the Holy Ghost. “For it is the Spirit that quickeneth.” “For if the Spirit of him that raised up Christ from the dead dwell in you, He that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit that dwelleth in you.” John v., 21, 28. Rom. viii., 11.

6. The inspiration of prophets and apostles is ascribed to the glorious *Three in One*. “All Scripture is given by inspiration of God.” To Christ the same act is ascribed. For “the prophets searched what or what manner of time the Spirit of Christ, which was in them, did signify, when it testified beforehand the sufferings of Christ, and the glory that should follow.” The same inspiration is directly ascribed to the Holy Ghost. “For the prophecy came not in old time by the will of man; but holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost.” 2 Tim., iii., 16; 1 Pet., i., 10, 11; 2 Pet., i., 21.

7. In like manner to give commission and authority to

ministers of the gospel is ascribed to the Triune Deity. In reference to the Father, says Paul, "Our sufficiency is of God; who hath made us able ministers of the New Testament." The same act is ascribed to the Son; for, says Paul, of Jesus Christ, "he counted me faithful, putting me into the ministry." To the Spirit the same commission and authority are ascribed. "Take heed, therefore, to the flock of God over which the Holy Ghost hath made you overseers." 2 Cor., iii., 5, 6; 1 Tim., i., 12; Acts xx., 28.

8. To dwell in the hearts of God's people is ascribed to the *omnipresent Trinity*. "I will walk in you, and dwell in you, and be a Father unto you, saith the Lord God." The same is affirmed of the Son. "For, know ye not that Christ is in you, except ye be reprobates?" And "*Christ in you* the hope of glory" is the common privilege of God's people. The same is affirmed of the Spirit. "For know ye not that your bodies are the temple of the *Holy Ghost* which is in you?" Thus the Triune God dwells in the heirs of glory; sealing their adoption, witnessing their acceptance, and preparing them for heaven. 2 Cor., vi., 16; xiii., 5; Col. i., 27; 1 Cor., vi., 19.

9. The work of sanctification is ascribed to the *holy Trinity*. "Jude, the servant of Jesus Christ, to them that are sanctified by God the Father." Of Christ it is said, "He that sanctifieth and they that are sanctified are all of one; for which cause he is not ashamed to call them brethren." Again, "Ye are washed and sanctified in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the *Spirit* of our God." Jude i.; Heb. ii., 11.; Cor. vi., 11.

Such are the united acts of the three persons in the Godhead—the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost—to create the universe; to form mankind; to preserve all things; to raise the dead body of Christ, and all mankind at the last day: a work equal to creation itself—to inspire prophets to foretell things to come; to commission and authorise apostles and ministers; to dwell in the hearts of God's people; to hold fellowship with the saints; and to sanctify us throughout body, soul, and spirit;—such, and a hundred other acts,

had we space to go through them—all actions peculiar to God—actions which none but God could perform, are ascribed to each person in the ever-BLESSED AND GLORIOUS TRINITY—FATHER, SON, AND HOLY GHOST.

In the Fourth Place, the Divine worship ascribed to God is ascribed to the Trinity in Unity.

We might adduce a multitude of passages to prove that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are to be worshipped, but this has been amply done in our first volume, therefore we shall now adduce merely those passages of scripture in which the three persons are *conjointly* worshipped.

This worship of the Triune God is rendered by the Hosts of heaven. We refer, in the first place, to the 6th of Isaiah. Here the seraphim, veiling their faces with their wings, worship and adore Jehovah of Hosts; and the Jehovah of Hosts includes, as the context proves, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. The word Jehovah, which occurs several times in that chapter, though singular in form, refers to a plurality of persons; and, by comparing scripture with scripture, we shall soon find that, in this plurality, there is a clear and distinct reference to the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. That there was here a representation of the Father needs no proof, as it is no matter of dispute; all Unitarians acknowledging that “Jehovah of hosts” is his appropriate designation. That there was here also the presence of the Son and the Holy Ghost we can soon render evident from Divine authority.

That there was here the presence of the Son we learn from the Apostle John, who, speaking of Christ in chap. xii., 41st verse, says, “These things said Esaias, when he saw HIS GLORY, and spake of him.” He saw Christ’s glory, and spake of him. So there was here the presence of the Son. That there was here the presence also of the Holy Ghost, is manifest from Acts xxviii., 25, 27, where the prophecy uttered in this vision is said to be spoken by the Holy Ghost. Now, attend unto the words of Paul, “Well spake,”—who?—“Well spake the HOLY GHOST by Esaias the prophet unto our fathers, saying, Go unto this

people and say, Hearing ye shall hear, and shall not understand; and seeing ye shall see, and ye shall not perceive." Thus, then. the *Triune God*—the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, constitute the Jehovah of hosts exhibited in this sublime vision of the prophet. Here we see the reason for using the plural US in the eighth verse. There was a plurality of persons intended, the scripture informs us, and hence the language, "Who will go for US."

The presence of the *Trinity* being thus established, it will follow that the sublime adoration, presented by the seraphim, must be ascribed to each Person with equal reverence and awe: and hence the three-fold repetition in the language they employ, "Holy, holy, holy, is the Jehovah of Hosts;"—that is, holy is the Father, holy is the Son, and holy is the Divine Spirit; equally Holy, eternally blessed, and alike to be adored, and praised, and exalted, by all the creatures he has made!

It is in harmony with this, that, in a similar vision which St. John had of the heavenly world, he had a similar display of the Divine glory, and beheld the same description of exalted spirits before the eternal throne, and heard exactly the same language of three-fold adoration employed, "Holy, holy, holy, Lord God Almighty."—Rev. iv., 8. The Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, had been previously mentioned in this very passage; and, therefore, there can be no doubt but that this triple ascription of praise, like that in Isaiah's vision, was rendered to the *Triune God*. There is no possibility of evading this argument, but by proving that there was not the presence of the Son, and the Spirit, as well as the Father. Such is the worship of heaven.

Worship is likewise equally rendered by the church to the *Triune God*. We have an indication of this under the Old Testament dispensation. Although the Jewish economy was a dark and obscure one compared with the brightness of the Christian dispensation, and we are not to expect the same clear and complete discoveries of God in the Old Testament as in the New, yet the doctrine of the Trinity was intimated, as we have before shown, by the plural

name given to God—Elohim, constructed with verbs and pronouns in the singular: and the spiritually-minded Jews recognized the doctrine thus implied. In the three-fold form of the benediction which the High Priest was authorized to pronounce, this doctrine clearly appears to be recognized. Numbers vi., 24, 25,—

“JEHOVAH bless thee, and keep thee ;

JEHOVAH make his face shine upon thee, and be gracious unto thee ;

JEHOVAH lift up his countenance upon thee, and give thee peace.”

Here the term Jehovah is thrice repeated ; and, though we have not the names of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, mentioned, we have a blessing recognized as proceeding from each, corresponding beautifully and harmoniously with the solemn form of benediction employed by the apostle, namely,

“The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ,	} be with you all.
And the love of God,	
And the communion of the Holy Spirit,	

Amen.”

Here, then, we have a three-fold form of benediction in the old economy, and a three-fold form in the new economy. In the original form, we have not the appellation Father, Son, and Spirit, mentioned ; but, in the new economy, we have the whole Three mentioned, and spiritual blessings are sought from each by prayer. Now, here is the reason why we find that a plural noun is not employed in the New Testament—the plural noun is done away by the brighter manifestation and distinct appellations of *Father, Son, and Holy Spirit*.

In the form of baptism, also, we have the worship of the Triune God. “Go ye and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name—

OF THE FATHER,

AND OF THE SON,

AND OF THE HOLY GHOST.”

Baptism is a solemn initiatory rite, in which the soul is brought into immediate recognition of the True God, who

alone is the proper object of our worship. This has already been shown; baptism, indeed, is itself a solemn form of worship, in which we dedicate ourselves to God. This God whom we worship, and with whom we covenant to love, serve, and obey, to whom we consecrate ourselves, and who mercifully and graciously gives himself to us, is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.

Since, then, the word of God declares that there is but One God; and since the same word as expressly teaches us that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are invested with the names and attributes of Deity, to whom, equally, all the works of God are ascribed, to whom all homage is ascribed, *we have a perfect demonstration that the sacred scriptures teach the important doctrine of the Holy Trinity—Three in One, and One in Three.*

Glory be to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost; as it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be, world without end. Amen.

NOTES ILLUSTRATIVE AND CONFIRMATORY OF THE
SEVERAL ARGUMENTS DERIVED FROM THE
SCIENCE OF GEOLOGY, &c.

THE argument derived from Geology, in support of several propositions in the first part of this work, is based chiefly upon the facts recorded by Lyell, Buckland, and Mantell; but, since that argument was sent to press, the author has met with the work of Professor Anstead, which brings geological discovery down to the period of 1844. It is satisfactory to find that the more recent discoveries, recorded in Mr. Anstead's work, furnish additional evidence in support of our argument for a Divine Creator.

RESPECTING THE RECENT ORIGIN OF MAN, Professor Anstead observes:—

“The remains of man have never yet been discovered in a fossil state, except in a limestone very rapidly forming in the island of Guadaloupe, and under circumstances which leave no doubt of the recent origin of the deposit.—*Anstead's Geology*, vol i., 81.

ATHEISTIC THEORY OF THE EVOLUTION OF A HIGHER FROM A
LOWER SPECIES DISPROVED.

With regard to this, Professor Anstead makes the following emphatic observations: “It is not true—it is, on the contrary, distinctly disproved by every day's research in palæontology, that there was, in the history of the development of organized life, any successive or graduated scale adhered to, or any thing like a successive development of species in the same natural family, the newer being more highly organized than the older. The cephalopoda, the most highly organized of all the invertebrata, were the inhabitants of the most ancient seas with whose existence we are acquainted. Sauroid fish, those which most nearly approach the higher or reptilean type, were among the first created of the finny tribes. Of the reptilean, lacertine, and crocodilian animals, it was by no means those of least complicated organization that accompanied the batrachians during the close of the palæozoic and the commencement of the secondary period; and numberless other instances might be quoted, having the same tendency.

“There is no such thing apparent in the works of the great Author of nature, as profiting by the experience of past imperfections and errors. There is infinite variety in working out a plan which, even to our limited capacity, is shown to be of perfect beauty; and in this variety there is a constant harmony strikingly analogous to the operation of the laws which govern the material universe. The palæontologist must now reject, almost with ridicule, the wild theories on this subject which have sometimes been indulged in during an earlier condition of his science.” *Anstead's Geology*, vol. i., 496.

Thus it always has been and always must be—The progress of science augments and brightens the evidences of natural theology. God's works must demonstrate his existence, and illustrate his nature, to mankind.

ON THE IMPRESSIONS OF THE FOOTSTEPS OF BIRDS AND AMPHIBIOUS REPTILES, &C., ON THE NEW RED STONE.

In page 75, we remark, that, in the earlier formations of the New Red Sandstone, there are impressions of the feet of several animals, some, apparently, of the tortoise kind, and one of an extraordinary animal called the *Chirotherium*. To determine precisely the genus of the animals, whose footsteps are thus traced, engaged for some time the attention of geologists, apparently with little hope of success, but more recently there have been discovered in Red Sandstone, of the same date, some bones of animals which are supposed to be of the same genus as the *chirotherium*,*—the large animal whose foot prints are left upon the New Red Sandstone. Respecting the foot prints of this extraordinary animal, and the means by which geologists judge of its characteristics, Professor Anstead has the following observations:—

“ It may appear at first sight, that nothing can be more fleeting, or less likely to be handed down to future ages, among the fossils of a bed of sandstone, than the casts of the impressions of the footsteps of an animal, who may by chance have walked over that bed when it existed in the condition of loose sand, forming a sea shore. A little consideration, however, will show that this is, in fact, a very possible occurrence: as, if the wet sand should be immediately covered up with a thin coating of marl, and another layer of sand be superimposed, such an impression will be permanently preserved. In after ages, also, when the soft sands have become sandstones, and are elevated above their former level, the stone splits asunder wherever a layer of different material occurs; and thus it happens that the casts of the footsteps may be preserved and exhibited, although all other traces of the former existence of the animal are lost.

“ At any rate, such markings have long been known to exist in various parts of the New Red Stone, quarried near Liverpool, in others at Hildburghausen, in Saxony, and again in other beds of sandstone, supposed to be of the same date, in Connecticut, in the United States of America. Those found in Europe consist partly of the footsteps of small animals, supposed to be tortoises and turtles, but contain also among them, others, belonging to a much larger animal, and differing entirely in shape and proportions from such as would be left by any known quadruped or reptile. The American specimens have been referred by Dr. Hitchcock to large birds.

“ The larger foot marks found impressed on the marly sandstone in Europe, bear a singular resemblance to the impressions that would be made by the palm and expanded fingers and thumb of

* The Hand Beast.

the human hand, and, for that reason, the name *Chirotherium* (χείρ, a hand, θηρίον, a beast,) was proposed to designate the unknown animal by which they had been produced. The dimensions are various; but in all cases the prints of what appear to have been the hind feet are considerably larger than those of the fore feet; so much so, indeed, that in one well preserved slab containing several impressions, the former measure eight inches by five, and the latter not more than four inches by three. In this specimen, the print of the fore foot is not more than an inch and a half in advance of that of the hinder one, although the distance between two successive positions of the same foot, or the length of a pace of the animal, is fourteen inches. It, therefore, appears, that the animal must have had its posterior extremities, both much larger and much longer than the anterior; but the peculiarity is possessed in common with many existing species, such as the frog, the kangaroo, &c.; and beyond this and certain appearances in the sandstone, as if a tail had been dragged behind the animal, in some sets of foot prints, but not in others, there is nothing to suggest to the comparative anatomist any idea of even the class of vertebrata to which the animal should be referred.

“Within the last few years, however, certain fragments have been found in some of the quarries of New Red Sandstone, of the same age as those in which the foot prints occur, and several teeth, the careful examination of which, by Professor Owen, has given great interest to these singular fossils, and may almost be said to have explained the nature of the animal of which such indications have been preserved.

“Before Professor Owen had the opportunity of examining these remains, several teeth found in the Keuper of Wurtemberg, had been referred to new genera of saurians, under the names *Mastodonsaurus* and *Phytosaurus*; but on placing thin slices of similar teeth under a powerful microscope, they were found to possess a remarkably complicated structure, approximating the animal rather to the fishes, than the saurian reptiles. Shortly after this, several fragments of bones from the same locality were found, and came under the observation of Professor Owen, who was thus enabled to arrive at more satisfactory conclusions, and to describe the structure of several species (amounting in the whole to five), all of which he referred to the same genus, including in it also the supposed saurians of Wurtemberg. This genus he named *Labyrinthodon*, in consequence of the labyrinthine appearance observable in the minute structure of the teeth. I will endeavour to give, in a few words, the results of the investigations upon which the genus was founded, and the different species determined.

“In the first place it appears, that the animal must have belonged to the batrachian order of reptiles, and that the different species varied considerably in size, the smallest, hitherto determined, much exceeding the dimensions of the largest living species of the same order, but the larger ones actually measuring several feet in length.

“The cranium of the *Labyrinthodon* was broad, depressed, and

flattened, like that of the alligator, the outer surface being also strongly sculptured; the condition of the nasal cavity indicates a resemblance to the saurians in the mode of respiration, and, although the modifications of the jaws prove this extinct genus to have been essentially batrachian, it must, in many points, especially in the proportions of the head, have approximated to the higher saurians; while in others, such as the biconcave structure of the vertebrae, and the mode in which the teeth were reproduced, and subsequently became fixed to the bone, it presents affinities scarcely less remarkable to fishes. The arrangement of the teeth is illustrative of the batrachian character, one row of small teeth extending transversely across the anterior extremity of the vomerine bones, and another longitudinal row being continued backwards along the exterior margin of the palatal bone.

"The extremities offer analogies partly with the Batrachians, and partly with the crocodilean tribe, the principal resemblance to the latter being seen in some bones of the pelvis.

"With regard to the proportions and dimensions of this singular genus, there has been found one fragment of a lower jaw, between nine and ten inches in length, and corresponding to the same part in a crocodile six or seven feet long; but fragments of bones of hinder extremities, found in the same quarry, and referrible to the same species, are as large as those of a crocodile four times that length. Now, if, as is probable, these belonged to the same individual, the hinder extremities must have been of a magnitude utterly disproportionate, when compared with those of existing saurians; but of very fair proportions, when considered with reference to some of the living tail-less batrachians.*

"It appears, then, that there are found in the New Red Sandstone certain foot prints indicating an animal remarkable for the disproportionate magnitude of its posterior extremities, and also for the singular shape of the foot. In the beds of the same formation are found also the teeth and bones of a batrachian reptile, of dimensions and proportions sufficient to produce the foot prints, and of which the structure of the teeth, and of the bones of the extremities, is remarkable and anomalous. Perhaps it is hardly too much to assume, that the animal is discovered whose footsteps have excited so much curiosity, and that the *Chirotherium* is the same as the *Libyrinthodon*." From the above representation it appears obvious that this creature was an aquatic or amphibious, and not a properly terrene, animal."

In reference to the foot prints of birds, some of which are of gigantic size, discovered in New Red Sandstone of the same era, Professor Anstead observes that no bones of birds belonging to this era have yet been discovered, but he states that Mr. Lyell has examined the locality in which the impressions are found, and he concurs entirely in the views of Professor Hitchcock, as before expressed, respecting the fact that the impressions were undoubtedly made by birds of that early period. He remarks, that "The sandstones, being separated by several thin laminæ of green shale are very favourably

Professor Owen's Report, ante cit., p. 188.

circumstanced for the perfect preservation of the impressions; and the foot prints here, as in other cases, are accompanied by many other appearances, such as the ripple marks commonly seen on a sandy shore, at low water; casts of rocks in the sandy clay; and not unfrequently, peculiar rounded marks, which have been supposed by Dr. Buckland, to have been produced by the dropping of heavy rain, on the soft marls by the sea side.

"It may be worth while to mention, with reference to the large proportion of the foot marks of birds found in America, that the remains of Struthious birds (birds allied to the ostrich) have been found in a semi-fossil state in New Zealand, the feet of which are sufficiently large to have produced such marks. The animal to which these remains belonged is calculated by Professor Owen to have attained the height of at least ten feet."—*Anstead's Geology*, vol. i., 306—312.

Thus, recent discoveries furnish increasing evidence of the fact laid down in our argument in page 75. The existence of birds in the earlier formations of the New Red Sandstone, at a period as early as the first appearance of amphibious reptiles, is a direct contradiction to the hypothesis of a gradual development or evolution of the species.

ON SPONTANEOUS GENERATION.

Animalcula. In pages 80—86, we have considered the development hypothesis as to the production of animalcules, and furnished, as we think, satisfactory evidence, that these diminutive beings are propagated by living predecessors as necessarily as the animals of largest species and the most complicated organization. That they are not spontaneously produced by animal and vegetable matter, the following interesting experiment may be regarded as furnishing an additional proof. A careful observer of nature states,

"I filled a glass flask half full of distilled water, in which I mixed various animal and vegetable substance; I then closed it with a good cork, through which I passed two glass tubes, but at right angles, the whole being air tight. It was next placed in a sand bath, and heated until the water boiled violently, and thus all parts had reached a temperature of 212° Fahrenheit. While the watery vapour was escaping by the glass tubes, I fastened at each end an apparatus which chemists employ for collecting carbonic acid; that to the left was filled with concentrated sulphuric acid, and the other with a solution of potash. By means of the boiling heat, every thing living and all genus in the flask, or in the tubes were destroyed, and all access was cut off by the sulphuric acid on the one side, and by the potash on the other. I placed this easily moved apparatus before my window, where it was exposed to the action of light, and also, as I performed my experiments in the summer, to that of heat. At the same time, I placed near it an open vessel, with the same substances that had been introduced into the flask, and, also after having subjected them to a boiling temperature. In order now to renew constantly the air within the flask, I sucked with my mouth, several times a day, the open end

of the apparatus filled with the solution of potash, by which process the air entered my mouth from the flask through the caustic liquid, and the atmospheric air, from without, entered the flask through the sulphuric acid. The air was, of course, not altered in its composition by passing through the sulphuric acid into the flask, but if sufficient time was allowed for the passage, all the portions of living matter, or of matter capable of becoming animated, were taken up by the sulphuric acid and destroyed. From the 28th of May until the early part of August, I continued uninterruptedly the renewal of the air into the flask without being able, by the aid of the microscope, to perceive any living animal or vegetable substance, although during the whole of the time I made my observations, almost daily, on the edge of the liquid; and, when, at last, I separated the different parts of the apparatus, I could not find in the whole liquid the slightest trace of *infusoria*, of *confervæ*, or of mould; but all the three presented themselves in great abundance a few days after I had left the flask standing open. The vessel which I placed near the apparatus contained, on the following day, vibriones and monads, to which were soon added larger polygastric *infusoria*, and afterwards *rotatoria*." Curiosities of animal life, 137.

From the above experiment it would appear, that the ova or genus of these diminutive creatures float unpercieved in the atmosphere, and become developed when situated in a matrix which favours their development.

ON CELLULAR DEVELOPMENT.

The organic structure of both plants and animals is composed of cells as the elementary basis, and, because the most complicated structures, when traced to their ultimate points of organism, are found to consist of simple cells, the author of the *Vestiges of Creation* has the sagacity to conclude, that man is only the latest and most perfect development of the monad—the simplest form of cellular organization. He says, "The idea which I form of the progress of organic life upon our earth—and the hypothesis is applicable to all similar theatres of vital being—is, that the simplest and most primitive type, under a law to which that of like productions is subordinate, gave birth to the type next above it; that this organ produced the next higher, and so on to the very highest, the stages of advance being in all cases very small, namely, from one species only to another; so that the phenomenon has always been of a simple and modest character."

This pretended advancement by a very slow progress, we have shown, is contradicted by the most obvious facts in Geology, which prove that species of the highest organization were sometimes contemporaneous with, and sometimes anterior to, other species of the same class: and as to the theory of cellular development itself, Dr. Mantell furnishes the following decisive and triumphant reply: "Although it is now a received physiological axiom, that cells are the elementary basis, the ultimate limit, of all animal and vegetable structures, and that the varied functions, in which

organic life essentially consists, are performed by the agency of cells, which are not distinguishable from each other by any well-marked characters; there is not any ground for assuming any identity between the primary cells, even of the simplest species of animals or vegetables, much less between those of more complicated organisation. The single cell which embodies vitality in the monad, or the yeast fungus, is governed by the same immutable organic laws which preside over the complicated machinery of man and the other vertebrata; and the single cell which is the embryotic condition of the *mammal*, has no more relation to the single cell, which is the permanent condition of the monad, than has the perfect animal, into which the mammalian cell becomes ultimately developed. The cell that forms the germ of each species of organism is endowed with special properties, which can result in nothing but the fabrication of that particular species. The serious error, which pervades the theory advanced in the work entitled "The Vestiges of Creation," has arisen from its author having, in many instances, assumed *analogy* to be a proof of *identity*. There is an analogy between the human embryo and the monad of the volvox, in that each consists of simple cells; but there is no more *identity* between thy human and the polygastric cells than between the perfect man and the mature animalcule."

THE VIEWS OF SEVERAL AUTHORS ON THE TRINITY.

THE general reader will be aware that, in several eminent writers, some incidental thoughts and observations may be found which substantially correspond with some of the principles laid down in our general argument. Howe, in his *Calm Discourse on the Trinity*, observes:—

"We do know of the actual union of two things of very different natures, so as to be one thing; and have no reason to think the union of two or more things, of the same sort of nature, with sufficient remaining distinction, less possible or less intelligible.

"Upon the whole, let such a union be conceived in the being of God with such distinction, and one would think the absolute perfection of the Deity, and especially the perfect felicity thereof, should be much the more apprehensible with us. When we consider the most delicious society which would hence ensue among the so entirely consentient Father, Son, and Spirit, with whom there is so perfect rectitude, everlasting harmony, mutual complacency, unto highest delectation; according to our way of conceiving things, who are taught by our own nature (which, also, hath in it the Divine image) to reckon no enjoyment pleasant, without the consociation of some other with us therein, we, for our parts, cannot but hereby have in our minds a more gustful idea of a blessed state, than we can conceive in mere eternal solitude.

“God speaks to us, as men, and will not blame us for conceiving things so infinitely above us according to the capacity of our natures, provided we do not assume to ourselves to be a measure for our conceptions of him, further than as he is himself pleased to warrant and direct us herein.....When looking into ourselves, we find there is in us a disposition, often upon no necessity, but sometimes from a sort of benignity of temper, unto conversation with others; we have no reason when other things concur, and do fairly induce and lead our thoughts this way, to apprehend any incongruity in supposing God may have some distinct object of the same sort of propension in his own most perfect being too, and therewith such a propension itself also.

“We are not, I say, strictly to measure God by ourselves in this, further than as he himself prompts and leads us; but if we so form our conception of Divine bliss, as not to exclude from it somewhat whereof that delight in society which we find in ourselves may be an imperfect faint resemblance, it seems not altogether disagreeable to what the scriptures also teach us to conceive concerning him, when they bring in the eternal wisdom, saying, as one distinct from the prime author, and parent of all things, ‘Then was I by him, as one brought up with him, and daily his delight.’”—Prov. viii., 30. *Howe’s Works*, vol. iv., 320.

Dr. Watts expresses the same view, apparently having formed it from Howe.

“Our admiration may be raised yet higher if we make one excursion beyond all created nature, and lift our thoughts upwards to the blessedness of the Glorious Trinity. All their infinite and unknown pleasures are derived from their ineffable union and communion with one Godhead, their inconceivable nearness to each other in the very centre and spring of all felicity. They are inseparably and intimately one God; they are eternally one God, and therefore eternally blessed; 1 John, v., 7., which text I believe to be authentic and Divine, and that upon just reasons, notwithstanding the cavils and criticisms that have endeavoured to blot it out of the Bible. Nor is their blessedness nor their nearness a dull inactive state: knowledge and mutual love make up their heaven so far as mortals dare conceive of it, and so far as we have leave to speak of God after the manner of men.

“Knowledge—an eternal blissful contemplation of all the infinite beauties, powers, and properties of the Godhead, and of all the operation of these powers in an inconceivable variety among creatures—this is the glorious employment of God. His own knowledge of infinite truths, whether wrapt up in his own nature, or unfolded and displayed in his works, is a pleasure becoming the Deity, and each sacred person possesses this unknown pleasure.

“And, besides the general glories of the Divine nature, we may suppose that a full and comprehensive knowledge of the sameness, the difference, the special properties, and the mutual relations, of the three Divine persons, which are utterly incomprehensible to mortals, and perhaps far above the reach of all created minds, in the incommunicable entertainment of the Holy Trinity, and makes

a part of their blessedness." In reference to this mystery, God may be said to dwell in thick darkness,—1 Kings, viii., 12., or, which is all one, in light inaccessible. 1 Tim., vi., 16. We are lost in this glorious, this Divine abyss, and overcome with dazzling confusion. But the ever-blessed Three behold these unities and distinctions in the clearest light. *As the Father knoweth me so know I the Father*, saith Jesus, the eternal Son. John, x., 15. And, *as the spirit of a man knoweth the things of a man, so, the things of God are known to his Spirit*, for he searcheth the depths of God. 1 Cor., ii., 10, 11: as it is expressed in the original, τὰ βάθη τοῦ Θεοῦ.

"May we not suppose the blessedness of the sacred Three to consist also in mutual love? May I call it a perpetual delightful tendency, and active propensity, toward each other. An eternal approach to each other with infinite complacency—with arms of inimitable love, and with sensations of unmeasured joy? Thus saith the Son of God under the character of Divine wisdom. Prov., viii., 23, 30. I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was. Then was I by him as one brought up with him, and I was his daily delight, rejoicing always before him. As the Father loveth the Son, so the Son loveth the Father.

"As the Father delights infinitely in his perfect image, so may we not venture to say the Son takes infinite delight in the glorious archetype, and thus imitates the Father? Will not the expressions of the apostle Paul, Heb. i., 3, and the words of Christ himself, John v., 19, 20, encourage and support this manner of speaking? He is the brightness of the Father's glory, and the express image of his person. The Father loveth the Son, and showeth him all things that himself doeth, and what things soever he seeth the Father to do, these also doeth the Son likewise. And this seems to be the foundation of those glorious offices of raising the dead and judging the world, which, in the following verses, are committed to the Son, that all men may honour the Son as they honour the Father.

"As the blessed Three have an unknown communication in the Godhead, or Divine nature, so they must have an unspeakable nearness to each other's person, an inconceivable in-being and in-dwelling in each other. John xiv., 10. Each is near to the two other Divine subsistences, and this mutual nearness must be attended with delight and felicity unknown to all but the blessed Three who enjoy it. O, glorious and divine communication! The father for ever near his own image, the Son, and herein blessed! The Son never divided from the embraces of the Father, and, therefore, happy! The Spirit everlastingly near them both, and, therefore, he is the ever blessed Spirit. And all these united in one Godhead, and, therefore, infinitely and for ever blessed!

"The Father is so intimately near the Son and Spirit, that no finite or creative natures, or unions, can give a just resemblance of it.

"In vain we may run through all the parts and powers of nature

and art to seek a full resemblance of the mutual propensity and love of the blessed Three towards each other. Mathematicians talk, indeed, of the perpetual tendencies and infinite approximations of two or more lines in the same surface, which never can entirely concur in one line. And if we should say that the three persons of the Trinity, by mutual in-dwelling and love, approach each other infinitely in one Divine nature, and yet lose not their distinct personality, it would be but an obscure account of this sublime mystery. But this we are sure of, that for three Divine persons to be so inconceivably near one another in the original and eternal spring of love, goodness, and pleasure, must produce infinite delight. In order to illustrate the happiness of the sacred Three, may we not suppose something of society necessary to the perfection of happiness in all intellectual nature? To know and be known, to love and to be beloved, are, perhaps, such essential ingredients to complete felicity, that it cannot subsist without them. And it may be doubted whether such mutual knowledge and love, as seems requisite to this end, can be found in a nature absolutely simple in all respects. We, for our parts, cannot but hereby have in our mind, a more gustful idea of a blessed state than we can conceive in mere eternal solitude.

“And, if this be true, then the three differences, which we call personal distinctions in the nature of God, are as absolutely necessary as his blessedness, as his being, or any part of his perfections.

“These are glories too Divine and dazzling for the weak eye of our understanding, too bright for the eye of angels those morning stars, and they and we must fall down together, alike overwhelmed and confounded. It is one infinite transport, that runs through the Father, Son, and Spirit, without beginning and without end, with boundless variety, yet ever-perfect and ever-present, without change, and without degree, and all this because they are so near to one another, and so much one with God.—*Watts's Works*, vol. i., p. 178, 181.

Professor Kidd, in the year 1815, published “An Essay on the Doctrine of the Trinity,” in which he argues, from the essentially vital energy of the Divine nature, the necessary emanation of a second person; and, from their necessary conjoint united act, the procession of the third person in the Godhead. We had not seen this work before our own argument was elaborated and written out. Several of the principles and propositions maintained by Professor Kidd are in harmony with our own, though the mode of the argument is different. Indeed, from what is stated above, it will be seen, that Mr. Kidd applies his argument further than we have felt justified in carrying it as a *rational demonstration*—He endeavours to prove not only that a plurality of persons in the Godhead is sustained by the verdict of reason, but that the peculiar relations of the persons must necessarily result from the essentially vital energy of the Deity. We honour the author's motives, but, before we can either admit or reject his reasoning, *in toto*, we must give his volume a more careful and searching investigation than we have yet had the opportunity of doing.

Our present view is this—that the existence of a plurality of persons in the Godhead is demonstrable; but, that the peculiar relations of the Son, as a filial emanation from the Father, and of the Holy Ghost, as a procession from both, though not incongruous to reason, yet, is not capable of demonstration by rational argument.

The objections which have been alleged against this doctrine, on the ground of its being incompatible with the eternity of the Son and Spirit, are puerile objections. They are totally without foundation, and the dogmatical and positive manner in which they have been put forth by some is to be deeply deplored. Such objectors often confute their own principles. The eternity of the Divine attributes is maintained by them, although these attributes have the Divine essence as their source. The eternity of the exercise of at least some of the Divine attributes is held by them, although that exercise is *voluntary*. Even the eternity of the Divine purposes is admitted by them, although those purposes are *voluntary*. Now, the filial relation of the Son, and the procession of the Holy Ghost, are never represented as the result of any *voluntary* act, but absolutely *necessary*, as the *essential* mode of the Divine nature. There is, therefore, great feebleness, gross inconsistency, and palpable contradiction, in this reasoning. To admit a voluntary act to be eternal, and to deny that a necessary condition of the Divine nature can be eternal, is absurd. The relation of the Son and Spirit to the Father is perfectly compatible with their eternity and absolute perfection. If essential, they must necessarily be eternal.

Storr and Flatt have published a rational argument for the Trinity, but this work we have not seen.

Dr. Harris, in his profound work on the Pre-Adamite Earth, sufficiently intimates his views on this interesting subject in the following passage :—

“If the operation of infinite activity, either of love, or power, or of any other excellence, be essential to infinite perfection, and if such activity could not be agent and object at the same time and in the same act, and yet no object, *ad extra*, existed from eternity, then it must have existed in the Divine nature itself; in other words, the Divine nature must include it as one of its necessary conditions, or essential perfections; that, if no exercise of the Divine efficiency, *ad extra*, can ever be adequate to its infinite perfection, then must it be one of the excellencies of the Divine nature, not only that it should include a plurality of distinctions, but that the adequate sphere of its infinite activity should be its own infinite perfections—that, if a God in unity, without internal distinctions, or diversity of modes, be incapable of moral affection because having had nothing, *ad extra*, from eternity to love, then such internal distinctions, must ever have existed as elements of reciprocal, social, self-sufficient perfection; and if such plurality be an excellence, and if unity be an excellence also, and if there be any respect in which this plurality of one kind can consist as an excellence with this unity of another, then it will certainly be included in absolute perfection. And, further, this perfection implies

not only that all the excellence which it includes is simple, uncompounded, one, but that God and it are identical, that it is not an adjunct of his being, but his being itself."—*Pre-Adamite Earth*, p. 4.

GLOSSARY.

Animalculum, a very small microscopic animal. Animalcula is the plural.

Articulate, a jointed animal.

Axiom, a proposition evident at first sight.

Batrachian, having the nature and properties of the frog.

Chemical affinity, the tendency of certain elementary particles to combine with each other in fixed and definite properties.

Corollary, the conclusion of an argument.

Fauna, and Flora, the various kinds of animals peculiar to a country constitute its Fauna, as the various kinds of vegetables constitutes its Flora.

Fungus, soft spongy vegetables, such as the mushroom. Fungi is the plural.

Genera, the plural of genus, a term which comprehends species.

Hornblende, mineral of a dark green or black colour.

Hybrid, a mongrel animal, whose sire is of one kind and dam of another.

Igneous, fiery.

Mammalia, a class of animals which suckle their young.

Mica, a simple mineral, the shining silvery surface seen in granite and Gneiss.

Mollusk, a soft-bodied animal, such as shell-fish, &c.

Pterodactyle, a winged reptile.

Rotifer Vulgaris, a microscopic animal, which has a wheel-like organization.

Saurian, an animal of the lizard kind.

Schist, same as slate.

Scholium, an explanatory observation.

Silurian rocks, a name given to the oldest rocks in which organised fossils are found; these rocks abound in Wales, and take their appellation from the classic name, Silures, anciently applied to the inhabitants of that locality.

Strata, the plural of stratum.

Stratum, a bed, or layer, commonly applied to geological formations.

Vomerine, relating to the lower part of the nose.

Zoophyte, a creature partaking of the properties of both animal and plant, such as coral, sponges, &c.

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
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